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

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THE

WORKS

53971

OF

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

EDMUND BURKE.

A NEW EDITION.

VOL. VIII.



London:

PRINTED FOR F. C. AND J. RIVINGTON,
St. Paul's Church-Yard;

SOLD ALSO BY J. HATCHARD, PICCADILLY.

1808.

081
BUY/WOY
53971

Printed by Luke Hanfard & Sons,
near Lincoln's-Inn Fields.

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A

LETTER

FROM THE

RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE,

TO

A NOBLE LORD,

ON THE

ATTACKS MADE UPON HIM AND HIS PENSION,
IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS,

BY

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

AND THE

EARL OF LAUDERDALE,

Early in the preſent Seſſions of Parliament.

1796.

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A

LETTER,

&c.

MY LORD,

I COULD hardly flatter myſelf with the hope, that ſo very early in the ſeaſon I ſhould have to acknowledge obligations to the duke of Bedford and to the earl of Lauderdale. Theſe noble perſons have loſt no time in conferring upon me, that ſort of honour, which it is alone within their competence, and which it is certainly moſt congenial to their nature and their manners to beſtow.

To be ill ſpoken of, in whatever language they ſpeak, by the zealots of the new ſect in philoſophy and politicks, of which theſe noble perſons think ſo charitably, and of which others think ſo juſtly, to me, is no matter of uneaſineſs or ſurpriſe. To have incurred the diſpleaſure of the duke of Orleans or the duke of Bedford, to fall under the cenſure of citizen Briſſot or of his friend the earl of Lauderdale, I ought to conſider as proofs, not the leaſt ſatisfactory, that I have produced ſome part of the effect I propoſed by my endeavours. I have laboured hard to earn, what

the noble Lords are generous enough to pay. Perſonal offence I have given them none. The part they take againſt me is from zeal to the cauſe. It is well! It is perfectly well! I have to do homage to their juſtice. I have to thank the Bedfords and the Lauderdales for having ſo faithfully and ſo fully acquitted towards me whatever arrear of debt was left undiſcharged by the Prieſtleys and the Paines.

Some, perhaps, may think them executors in their own wrong: I at leaſt have nothing to complain of. They have gone beyond the demands of juſtice. They have been (a little perhaps beyond their intention) favourable to me. They have been the means of bringing out, by their invectives, the handſome things which lord Grenville has had the goodneſs and condeſcenſion to ſay in my behalf. Retired as I am from the world, and from all its affairs and all its pleaſures, I confeſs it does kindle, in my nearly extinguiſhed feelings, a very vivid ſatisfaction to be ſo attacked and ſo commended. It is ſoothing to my wounded mind, to be commended by an able, vigorous, and well informed ſtateſman, and at the very moment when he ſtands forth with a manlineſs and reſolution, worthy of himſelf and of his cauſe, for the preſervation of the perſon and government of our ſovereign, and therein for the ſecurity of the laws, the liberties, the morals, and the lives of his

people. To be in any fair way connected with ſuch things, is indeed a diſtinction. No philoſophy can make me above it: no melancholy can depreſs me ſo low, as to make me wholly inſenſible to ſuch an honour.

Why will they not let me remain in obſcurity and inaction? Are they apprehenſive, that if an atom of me remains, the ſect has ſomething to fear? Muſt I be annihilated, leſt, like old *John Ziſca*'s, my ſkin might be made into a drum, to animate Europe to eternal battle, againſt a tyranny that threatens to overwhelm all Europe, and all the human race?

My lord, it is a ſubject of awful meditation. Before this of France, the annals of all time have not furniſhed an inſtance of a *complete* revolution. That revolution ſeems to have extended even to the conſtitution of the mind of man. It has this of wonderful in it, that it reſembles what lord Verulam ſays of the operations of nature: It was perfect, not only in its elements and principles, but in all its members and its organs from the very beginning. The moral ſcheme of France furniſhes the only pattern ever known, which they who admire will *inſtantly* reſemble. It is indeed an inexhauſtible repertory of one kind of examples. In my wretched condition, though hardly to be claſſed with the living, I am not ſafe from them. They have tygers to fall upon animated ſtrength. They

have hyenas to prey upon carcaſſes. The national menagerie is collected by the firſt phyſiologiſts of the time; and it is defective in no deſcription of ſavage nature. They purſue, even ſuch as me, into the obſcureſt retreats, and haul them before their revolutionary tribunals. Neither ſex, nor age—nor the ſanctuary of the tomb, is ſacred to them. They have ſo determined a hatred to all privileged orders, that they deny even to the departed, the ſad immunities of the grave. They are not wholly without an object. Their turpitude purveys to their malice; and they unplumb the dead for bullets to aſſaſſinate the living. If all revolutioniſts were not proof againſt all caution, I ſhould recommend it to their conſideration, that no perſons were ever known in hiſtory, either ſacred or profane, to vex the ſepulchre, and by their ſorceries, to call up the prophetick dead, with any other event, than the prediction of their own diſaſtrous fate.—"Leave me, oh leave me to repoſe!"

In one thing I can excuſe the duke of Bedford for his attack upon me and my mortuary penſion. He cannot readily comprehend the tranſaction he condemns. What I have obtained was the fruit of no bargain; the production of no intrigue; the reſult of no compromiſe; the effect of no ſolicitation. The firſt ſuggeſtion of it never came from me, mediately or immediately, to his majeſty or any

any of his miniſters. It was long known that the inſtant my engagements would permit it, and before the heavieſt of all calamities had for ever condemned me to obſcurity and ſorrow, I had reſolved on a total retreat. I had executed that deſign. I was entirely out of the way of ſerving or of hurting any ſtateſman, or any party, when the miniſters ſo generouſly and ſo nobly carried into effect the ſpontaneous bounty of the crown. Both deſcriptions have acted as became them. When I could no longer ſerve them, the miniſters have conſidered my ſituation. When I could no longer hurt them, the revolutioniſts have trampled on my infirmity. My gratitude, I truſt, is equal to the manner in which the benefit was conferred. It came to me indeed, at a time of life, and in a ſtate of mind and body, in which no circumſtance of fortune could afford me any real pleaſure. But this was no fault in the royal donor, or in his miniſters, who were pleaſed, in acknowledging the merits of an invalid ſervant of the publick, to aſſuage the ſorrows of a deſolate old man.

It would ill become me to boaſt of any thing. It would as ill become me, thus called upon, to depreciate the value of a long life, ſpent with unexampled toil in the ſervice of my country. Since the total body of my ſervices, on account of the induſtry which was ſhewn in them, and the fairneſs of my intentions, have obtained the acceptance

of my ſovereign, it would be abſurd in me to range myſelf on the ſide of the duke of Bedford and the correſponding ſociety, or, as far as in me lies, to permit a diſpute on the rate at which the authority appointed by *our* conſtitution to eſtimate ſuch things, has been pleaſed to ſet them.

Looſe libels ought to be paſſed by in ſilence and contempt. By me they have been ſo always. I knew that as long as I remained in publick, I ſhould live down the calumnies of malice, and the judgments of ignorance. If I happened to be now and then in the wrong, as who is not, like all other men, I muſt bear the conſequence of my faults and my miſtakes. The libels of the preſent day, are juſt of the ſame ſtuff as the libels of the paſt. But they derive an importance from the rank of the perſons they come from, and the gravity of the place where they where uttered. In ſome way or other I ought to take ſome notice of them. To aſſert myſelf thus traduced is not vanity or arrogance. It is a demand of juſtice; it is a demonſtration of gratitude. If I am unworthy, the miniſters are worſe than prodigal. On that hypotheſis, I perfectly agree with the duke of Bedford.

For whatever I have been (I am now no more) I put myſelf on my country. I ought to be allowed a reaſonable freedom, becauſe I ſtand upon my deliverance; and no culprit ought to plead in irons

Even

Even in the utmoſt latitude of defenſive liberty, I wiſh to preſerve all poſſible decorum. Whatever it may be in the eyes of theſe noble perſons themſelves, to me, their ſituation calls for the moſt profound reſpect. If I ſhould happen to treſpaſs a little, which I truſt I ſhall not, let it always be ſuppoſed, that a confuſion of characters may produce miſtakes; that in the maſquerades of the grand carnival of our age, whimſical adventures happen; odd things are ſaid and paſs off. If I ſhould fail a ſingle point in the high reſpect I owe to thoſe illuſtrious perſons, I cannot be ſuppoſed to mean the duke of Bedford and the earl of Lauderdale of the houſe of peers, but the duke of Bedford and the earl of Lauderdale of palace-yard; —The dukes and earls of Brentford. There they are on the pavement; there they ſeem to come nearer to my humble level; and, virtually at leaſt, to have waved their high privilege.

Making this proteſtation, I refuſe all revolutionary tribunals, where men have been put to death for no other reaſon, than that they had obtained favours from the crown. I claim, not the letter, but the ſpirit of the old Engliſh law, that is, to be tried by my peers. I decline his grace's juriſdiction as a judge. I challenge the duke of Bedford as a juror to paſs upon the value of my ſervices. Whatever his natural parts may be, I cannot recogniſe in his few and idle years, the competence

competence to judge of my long and laborious life. If I can help it, he ſhall not be on the inqueſt of my *quantum meruit* Poor rich man! He can hardly know any thing of publick induſtry in its exertions, or can eſtimate its compenſations when its work is done. I have no doubt of his grace's readineſs in all the calculations of vulgar arithmetick; but I ſhrewdly ſuſpect, that he is little ſtudied in the theory of moral proportions; and has never learned the rule of three in the arithmetick of policy and ſtate.

His grace thinks I have obtained too much. I anſwer, that my exertions, whatever they have been, were ſuch as no hopes of pecuniary reward could poſſibly excite; and no pecuniary compenſation can poſſibly reward them. Between money and ſuch ſervices, if done by abler men than I am, there is no common principle of compariſon: they are quantities incommenſurable. Money is made for the comfort and convenience of animal life. It cannot be a reward for what, mere animal life muſt indeed ſuſtain, but never can inſpire. With ſubmiſſion to his grace, I have not had more than ſufficient. As to any noble uſe, I truſt I know how to employ, as well as he, a much greater fortune than he poſſeſſes. In a more confined application, I certainly ſtand in need of every kind of relief and eaſement much more than he does. When I ſay I have not received more than I deſerve,

deſerve, is this the language I hold to majeſty? No! Far, very far, from it! Before that preſence, I claim no merit at all. Every thing towards me is favour, and bounty. One ſtyle to a gracious benefactor; another to a proud and inſulting foe.

His grace is pleaſed to aggravate my guilt, by charging my acceptance of his majeſty's grant as a departure from my ideas, and the ſpirit of my conduct with regard to œconomy. If it be, my ideas of œconomy were falſe and ill founded. But they are the duke of Bedford's ideas of œconomy I have contradicted, and not my own. If he means to allude to certain bills brought in by me on a meſſage from the throne in 1782, I tell him, that there is nothing in my conduct that can contradict either the letter or the ſpirit of thoſe acts. Does he mean the pay-office act? I take it for granted he does not. The act to which he alludes is, I ſuppoſe, the eſtabliſhment act. I greatly doubt whether his grace has ever read the one or the other. The firſt of theſe ſyſtems coſt me, with every aſſiſtance which my then ſituation gave me, pains incredible. I found an opinion common through all the offices, and general in the publick at large, that it would prove impoſſible to reform and methodize the office of paymaſter general. I undertook it, however; and I ſucceeded in my undertaking. Whether the military ſervice, or whether the general œconomy of our finances have profited

profited by that act, I leave to thoſe who are acquainted with the army, and with the treaſury, to judge

An opinion full as general prevailed alſo at the ſame time, that nothing could be done for the regulation of the civil-liſt eſtabliſhment. The very attempt to introduce method into it, and any limitations to its ſervices, was held abſurd. I had not ſeen the man, who ſo much as ſuggeſted one œconomical principle, or an œconomical expedient, upon that ſubject. Nothing but coarſe amputation, or coarſer taxation, were then talked of, both of them without deſign, combination, or the leaſt ſhadow of principle. Blind and headlong zeal, or factious fury, were the whole contribution brought by the moſt noiſy on that occaſion, towards the ſatisfaction of the publick, or the relief of the crown.

Let me tell my youthful cenſor, that the neceſſities of that time required ſomething very different from what others then ſuggeſted, or what his grace now conceives. Let me inform him, that it was one of the moſt critical periods in our annals.

Aſtronomers have ſuppoſed, that if a certain comet, whoſe path interſected the ecliptick, had met the earth in ſome (I forget what) ſign, it would have whirled us along with it, in its eccentrick courſe, into God knows what regions of heat and

and cold. Had the portentous comet of the rights of man, (which "from its horrid hair ſhakes "peſtilence, and war," and "with fear of change "perplexes monarchs") had that comet croſſed upon us in that internal ſtate of England, nothing human could have prevented our being irreſiſtibly hurried, out of the highway of heaven, into all the vices, crimes, horrours, and miſeries of the French revolution.

Happily, France was not then jacobiniſed. Her hoſtility was at a good diſtance. We had a limb cut off; but we preſerved the body: We loſt our colonies; but we kept our conſtitution. There was, indeed, much inteſtine heat; there was a dreadful fermentation. Wild and ſavage inſurrection quitted the woods, and prowled about our ſtreets in the name of reform. Such was the diſtemper of the publick mind, that there was no madman, in his maddeſt ideas, and maddeſt projects, who might not count upon numbers to ſupport his principles and execute his deſigns.

Many of the changes, by a great miſnomer called parliamentary reforms, went, not in the intention of all the profeſſors and ſupporters of them, undoubtedly, but went in their certain, and, in my opinion, not very remote effect, home to the utter deſtruction of the conſtitution of this kingdom. Had they taken place, not France, but England, would have had the honour of leading

up

up the death-dance of democratick revolution. Other projects, exactly coincident in time with thoſe, ſtruck at the very exiſtence of the kingdom under any conſtitution. There are who remember the blind fury of ſome, and the lamentable helpleſſneſs of others; here, a torpid confuſion, from a panick fear of the danger; there, the ſame inaction from a ſtupid inſenſibility to it; here well-wiſhers to the miſchief; there, indifferent lookers-on. At the ſame time, a ſort of national convention, dubious in its nature, and perilous in its example, noſed parliament in the very ſeat of its authority; ſat with a ſort of ſuperintendance over it; and little leſs than dictated to it, not only laws, but the very form and eſſence of legiſlature itſelf. In Ireland things ran in a ſtill more eccentrick courſe. Government was unnerved, confounded, and in a manner ſuſpended. Its equipoiſe was totally gone. I do not mean to ſpeak diſreſpectfully of lord North. He was a man of admirable parts; of general knowledge; of a verſatile underſtanding fitted for every ſort of buſineſs; of infinite wit and pleaſantry; of a delightful temper; and with a mind moſt perfectly diſintereſted. But it would be only to degrade myſelf by a weak adulation, and not to honour the memory of a great man, to deny that he wanted ſomething of the vigilance and ſpirit of command, that the time required. Indeed, a darkneſs, next

to

to the fog of this awful day, loured over the whole region. For a little time the helm appeared abandoned—

Ipſe diem noctemque negat diſcernere cælo
Nec meminiſſe viæ mediâ Palinurus in undâ.

At that time I was connected with men of high place in the community. They loved liberty as much as the duke of Bedford can do; and they underſtood it at leaſt as well. Perhaps their politicks, as uſual took a tincture from their character, and they cultivated what they loved. The liberty they purſued was a liberty inſeparable from order, from virtue, from morals, and from religion, and was neither hypocritically nor fanatically followed. They did not wiſh, that liberty, in it ſelf, one of the firſt of bleſſings, ſhould in its perverſion become the greateſt curſe which could fall upon mankind. To preſerve the conſtitution entire, and practically equal to all the great ends of its formation, not in one ſingle part, but in all its parts, was to them the firſt object Popularity and power they regarded alike. Theſe were with them only different means of obtaining that object; and had no preference over each other in their minds, but as one or the other might afford a ſurer or a leſs certain proſpect of arriving at that end. It is ſome conſolation to me in the cheerleſs gloom,

gloom, which darkens the evening of my life, that with them I commenced my political career, and never for a moment, in reality, nor in appearance, for any length of time, was ſeparated from their good wiſhes and good opinion.

By what accident it matters not, nor upon what deſert, but juſt then, and in the midſt of that hunt of obloquy, which ever has purſued me with a full cry through life, I had obtained a very conſiderable degree of publick confidence. I know well enough how equivocal a teſt this kind of popular opinion forms of the merit that obtained it. I am no ſtranger to the inſecurity of its tenure. I do not boaſt of it. It is mentioned, to ſhew, not how highly I prize the thing, but my right to value the uſe I made of it. I endeavoured to turn that ſhort-lived advantage to myſelf into a permanent benefit to my country. Far am I from detracting from the merit of ſome gentlemen, out of office or in it, on that occaſion. No!—It is not my way to refuſe a full and heaped meaſure of juſtice to the aids that I receive. I have, through life, been willing to give every thing to others; and to reſerve nothing for myſelf, but the inward conſcience, that I had omitted no pains, to diſcover, to animate, to diſcipline, to direct the abilities of the country for its ſervice, and to place them in the beſt light to improve their age, or to adorn it. This conſcience I have. I have never ſuppreſſed

any

any man; never checked him for a moment in his courſe, by any jealouſy, or by any policy. I was always ready, to the height of my means (and they were always infinitely below my deſires) to forward thoſe abilities which overpowered my own. He is an ill-furniſhed undertaker, who has no machinery but his own hands to work with. Poor in my own faculties, I ever thought myſelf rich in theirs. In that period of difficulty and danger, more eſpecially, I conſulted, and ſincerely co-operated with men of all parties, who ſeemed diſpoſed to the ſame ends, or to any main part of them. Nothing to prevent diſorder, was omitted: when it appeared, nothing to ſubdue it was left uncounſelled, nor unexecuted, as far as I could prevail. At the time I ſpeak of, and having a momentary lead, ſo aided and ſo encouraged, and as a feeble inſtrument in a mighty hand—I do not ſay, I ſaved my country; I am ſure I did my country important ſervice. There were few, indeed, that did not at that time acknowledge it, and that time was thirteen years ago. It was but one voice, that no man in the kingdom better deſerved an honourable proviſion ſhould be made for him.

So much for my general conduct through the whole of the portentous criſis from 1780 to 1782, and the general ſenſe then entertained of that conduct by my country. But my character, as a

reformer, in the particular inſtances which the duke of Bedford refers to, is ſo connected in principle with my opinions on the hideous changes, which have ſince barbarized France, and ſpreading thence, threaten the political and moral order of the whole world, that it ſeems to demand ſomething of a more detailed diſcuſſion.

My œconomical reforms were not, as his grace may think, the ſuppreſſion of a paltry penſion or employment, more or leſs. Œconomy in my plans was, as it ought to be, ſecondary ſubordinate, inſtrumental. I acted on ſtate principles. I found a great diſtemper in the commonwealth; and, according to the nature of the evil and of the object, I treated it. The malady was deep; it was complicated, in the cauſes and in the ſymptoms. Throughout it was full of contra-indicants. On one hand government, daily growing more invidious from an apparent increaſe of the means of ſtrength, was every day growing more contemptible by real weakneſs. Nor was this diſſolution confined to government commonly ſo called. It extended to parliament; which was loſing not a little in its dignity and eſtimation, by an opinion of its not acting on worthy motives. On the other hand, the deſires of the people, (partly natural and partly infuſed into them by art) appeared in ſo wild and inconſiderate a manner, with regard to the œconomical object (for

I ſet

I ſet aſide for a moment the dreadful tampering with the body of the conſtitution itſelf) that if their petitions had literally been complied with, the ſtate would have been convulſed; and a gate would have been opened, through which all property might be ſacked and ravaged. Nothing could have ſaved the publick from the miſchiefs of the falſe reform but its abſurdity; which would ſoon have brought itſelf, and with it all real reform, into diſcredit. This would have left a rankling wound in the hearts of the people, who would know they had failed in the accompliſhment of their wiſhes, but who, like the reſt of mankind in all ages, would impute the blame to any thing rather than to their own proceedings. But there were then perſons in the world, who nouriſhed complaint; and would have been thoroughly diſappointed if the people were ever ſatisfied. I was not of that humour. I wiſhed that they *ſhould* be ſatisfied. It was my aim to give to the people the ſubſtance of what I knew they deſired, and what I thought was right, whether they deſired it or not, before it had been modified for them into ſenſeleſs petitions. I knew that there is a manifeſt marked diſtinction, which ill men, with ill deſigns, or weak men incapable of any deſign, will conſtantly be confounding, that is, a marked diſtinction between change and reformation. The former alters the ſubſtance of the objects themſelves; and gets rid

of all their eſſential good, as well as of all the accidental evil annexed to them. Change is novelty; and whether it is to operate any one of the effects of reformation at all, or whether it may not contradict the very principle upon which reformation is deſired, cannot be certainly known before hand. Reform is, not a change in the ſubſtance, or in the primary modification of the object, but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of. So far as that is removed, all is ſure. It ſtops there; and if it fails, the ſubſtance which underwent the operation, at the very worſt, is but where it was.

All this, in effect, I think, but am not ſure, I have ſaid elſewhere. It cannot at this time be too often repeated; line upon line; precept upon precept; until it comes into the currency of a proverb, *to innovate is not to reform.* The French revolutioniſts complained of every thing; they refuſed to reform any thing; and they left nothing, no, nothing at all *unchanged.* The conſequences are *before* us,—not in remote hiſtory; not in future prognoſtication: they are about us; they are upon us. They ſhake the publick ſecurity; they menace private enjoyment. They dwarf the growth of the young; they break the quiet of the old. If we travel, they ſtop our way. They inſeſt us in town; they purſue us to the country. Our buſineſs is interrupted; our repoſe is troubled;

our

our pleaſures are ſaddened; our very ſtudies are poiſoned and perverted, and knowledge is rendered worſe than ignorance, by the enormous evils of this dreadful innovation. The revolution harpies of France, ſprung from night and hell, or from that chaotick anarchy, which generates equivocally "all monſtrous, all prodigious things," cuckoo-like, adulterouſly lay their eggs, and brood over, and hatch them in the neſt of every neighbouring ſtate. Theſe obſcene harpies, who deck themſelves, in I know not what divine attributes, but who in reality are foul and ravenous birds of prey (both mothers and daughters) flutter over our heads, and ſouſe down upon our tables, and leave nothing unrent, unrifled, unravaged, or unpolluted with the ſlime of their filthy offal.*

* Triſtius haud illis monſtrum, nec fævior ulla
Peſtis, & ira Deûm Stygiis ſeſe extulit undis.
Virginei volucrum vultus; fædiſſima ventris
Proluvies; uncæque manus; & pallida ſemper
Ora fame——

Here the Poet breaks the line, becauſe he (and that He is Virgil) had not verſe or language to deſcribe that monſter even as he had conceived her. Had he lived to our time, he would have been more overpowered with the reality than he was with the imagination. Virgil only knew the horrour of the times before him. Had he lived to ſee the revolutioniſts and conſtitutionaliſts of France, he would have had more horrid and diſguſting features of his harpies to deſcribe, and more frequent failures in the attempt to deſcribe them.

If his grace can contemplate the reſult of this complete innovation, or, as ſome friends of his will call it, *reform*, in the whole body of its ſolidity and compound maſs, at which, as Hamlet ſays, the face of heaven glows with horrour and indignation, and which, in truth, makes every reflecting mind, and every feeling heart, perfectly thought-ſick, without a thorough abhorrence of every thing they ſay, and every thing they do, I am amazed at the morbid ſtrength, or the natural infirmity of his mind.

It was then not my love, but my hatred to innovation, that produced my plan of reform. Without troubling myſelf with the exactneſs of the logical diagram, I conſidered them as things ſubſtantially oppoſite. It was to prevent that evil, that I propoſed the meaſures, which his grace is pleaſed, and I am not ſorry he is pleaſed, to recal to my recollection. I had (what I hope that noble duke will remember in all his operations) a ſtate to preſerve, as well as a ſtate to reform. I had a people to gratify, but not to inflame, or to miſlead. I do not claim half the credit for what I did, as for what I prevented from being done. In that ſituation of the publick mind, I did not undertake, as was then propoſed, to new model the houſe of commons or the houſe of lords; or to change the authority under which any officer of the crown, acted, who was ſuffered at all to exiſt. Crown, lords, commons, judicial ſyſtem, ſyſtem of admi-

niſtration, exiſted as they had exiſted before; and in the mode and manner in which they had always exiſted. My meaſures were, what I then truly ſtated them to the houſe to be, in their intent, healing and mediatorial. A complaint was made of too much influence in the houſe of commons; I reduced it in both houſes; and I gave my reaſons article by article for every reduction, and ſhewed why I thought it ſafe for the ſervice of the ſtate. I heaved the lead every inch of way I made. A diſpoſition to expence was complained of; to that I oppoſed, not mere retrenchment, but a ſyſtem of œconomy, which would make a random expence without plan or foreſight, in future not eaſily practicable. I proceeded upon principles of reſearch to put me in poſſeſſion of my matter; on principles of method to regulate it; and on principles in the human mind and in civil affairs to ſecure and perpetuate the operation. I conceived nothing arbitrarily; nor propoſed any thing to be done by the will and pleaſure of others, or my own; but by reaſon, and by reaſon only. I have ever abhorred, ſince the firſt dawn of my underſtanding to this its obſcure twilight, all the operations of opinion, fancy, inclination, and will, in the affairs of government, where only a ſovereign reaſon, paramount to all forms of legiſlation and adminiſtration, ſhould dictate. Government is made for the very purpoſe of oppoſing that reaſon to

will and to caprice, in the reformers or in the reformed, in the governors or in the governed, in kings, in ſenates, or in people.

On a careful review, therefore, and analyſis of all the component parts of the civil liſt, and on weighing them againſt each other, in order to make, as much as poſſible, all of them a ſubject of eſtimate (the foundation and corner-ſtone of all regular provident œconomy) it appeared to me evident, that this was impracticable, whilſt that part, called the penſion liſt, was totally diſcretionary in its amount. For this reaſon, and for this only, I propoſed to reduce it, both in its groſs quantity, and in its larger individual proportions, to a certainty: leſt, if it were left without a *general* limit, it might eat up the civil liſt ſervice; if ſuffered to be granted in portions too great for the fund, it might defeat its own end; and by unlimited allowances to ſome, it might diſable the crown in means of providing for others. The penſion liſt was to be kept as a ſacred fund; but it could not be kept as a conſtant open fund, ſufficient for growing demands, if ſome demands would wholly devour it. The tenour of the act will ſhew that it regarded the civil liſt *only*, the reduction of which to ſome ſort of eſtimate was my great object.

No other of the crown funds did I meddle with, becauſe they had not the ſame relations. This of the four and a half per cents. does his grace

imagine

imagine had eſcaped me, or had eſcaped all the men of buſineſs, who acted with me in thoſe regulations? I knew that ſuch a fund exiſted, and that penſions had been always granted on it, before his grace was born. This fund was full in my eye. It was full in the eyes of thoſe who worked with me. It was left on principle. On principle I did what was then done; and on principle what was left undone was omitted. I did not dare to rob the nation of all funds to reward merit. If I preſſed this point too cloſe, I acted contrary to the avowed principles on which I went. Gentlemen are very fond of quoting me; but if any one thinks it worth his while to know the rules that guided me in my plan of reform, he will read my printed ſpeech on that ſubject; at leaſt what is contained from page 230 to page 241 in the ſecond volume of the collection which a friend has given himſelf the trouble to make of my publications. Be this as it may, theſe two bills (though achieved with the greateſt labour, and management of every ſort, both within and without the houſe) were only a part, and but a ſmall part, of a very large ſyſtem, comprehending all the objects I ſtated in opening my propoſition, and indeed many more, which I juſt hinted at in my ſpeech to the electors of Briſtol, when I was put out of that repreſentation. All theſe, in ſome ſtate or other of forwardneſs, I have long had by me.

But

But do I juſtify his majeſty's grace on theſe grounds? I think them the leaſt of my ſervices! The time gave them an occaſional value: What I have done in the way of political œconomy was far from confined to this body of meaſures. I did not come into parliament to con my leſſon. I had earned my penſion before I ſet my foot in St. Stephen's chapel. I was prepared and diſciplined to this political warfare. The firſt ſeſſion I ſat in parliament, I found it neceſſary to analyze the whole commercial, financial, conſtitutional and foreign intereſts of Great Britain and its empire. A great deal was then done; and more, far more would have been done, if more had been permitted by events. Then in the vigour of my manhood, my conſtitution ſunk under my labour. Had I then died, (and I ſeemed to myſelf very near death) I had then earned for thoſe who belonged to me, more than the duke of Bedford's ideas of ſervice are of power to eſtimate. But in truth, theſe ſervices I am called to account for, are not thoſe on which I value myſelf the moſt. If I were to call for a reward (which I have never done) it ſhould be for thoſe in which for fourteen years, without intermiſſion, I ſhewed the moſt induſtry, and had the leaſt ſucceſs; I mean in the affairs of India. They are thoſe on which I value myſelf the moſt; moſt for the importance; moſt for the labour; moſt for the judgment; moſt for conſtancy and perſeverance

perſeverance in the purſuit. Others may value them moſt for the *intention.* In that, ſurely, they are not miſtaken.

Does his grace think, that they who adviſed the crown to make my retreat eaſy, conſidered me only as an œconomiſt? That, well underſtood, however, is a good deal. If I had not deemed it of ſome value, I ſhould not have made political œconomy an object of my humble ſtudies, from my very early youth to near the end of my ſervice in parliament, even before (at leaſt to any knowledge of mine) it had employed the thoughts of ſpeculative men in other parts of Europe. At that time it was ſtill in its infancy in England, where, in the laſt century, it had its origin. Great and learned men thought my ſtudies were not wholly thrown away, and deigned to communicate with me now and then on ſome particulars of their immortal works. Something of theſe ſtudies may appear incidentally in ſome of the earlieſt things I publiſhed. The houſe has been witneſs to their effect, and has profited of them more or leſs, for above eight and twenty years.

To their eſtimate I leave the matter. I was not, like his grace of Bedford, ſwaddled, and rocked, and dandled into a legiſlator: "*Nitor in adverſum*" is the motto for a man like me. I poſſeſſed not one of the qualities, nor cultivated one of the arts that recommend men to the favour and protection of

of the great. I was not made for a minion or a tool. As little did I follow the trade of winning the hearts, by impoſing on the underſtandings, of the people. At every ſtep of my progreſs in life (for in every ſtep was I traverſed and oppoſed), and at every turnpike I met, I was obliged to ſhew my paſſport, and again and again to prove my ſole title to the honour of being uſeful to my country, by a proof that I was not wholly unacquainted with its laws, and the whole ſyſtem of its intereſts both abroad and at home. Otherwiſe no rank, no toleration even, for me. I had no arts, but manly arts. On them I have ſtood, and, pleaſe God, in ſpite of the duke of Bedford and the earl of Lauderdale, to the laſt gaſp will I ſtand.

Had his grace condeſcended to inquire concerning the perſon, whom he has not thought it below him to reproach, he might have found, that in the whole courſe of my life, I have never, on any pretence of œconomy, or on any other pretence, ſo much as in a ſingle inſtance, ſtood between any man and his reward of ſervice, or his encouragement in uſeful talent and purſuit, from the higheſt of thoſe ſervices and purſuits to the loweſt. On the contrary I have, on an hundred occaſions, exerted myſelf with ſingular zeal to forward every man's even tolerable pretenſions. I have more than once had good-natured reprehenſions from my friends for carrying the matter to ſomething

bordering

bordering on abuſe. This line of conduct, whatever its merits might be, was partly owing to natural diſpoſition; but I think full as much to reaſon and principle. I looked on the conſideration of publick ſervice, or publick ornament, to be real and very juſtice: and I ever held a ſcanty and penurious juſtice to partake of the nature of a wrong. I held it to be, in its conſequences, the worſt œconomy in the world. In ſaving money, I ſoon can count up all the good I do; but when by a cold penury, I blaſt the abilities of a nation, and ſtunt the growth of its active energies, the ill I may do is beyond all calculation. Whether it be too much or too little, whatever I have done has been general and ſyſtematick. I have never entered into thoſe trifling vexations and oppreſſive details, that have been falſely, and moſt ridiculouſly laid to my charge.

Did I blame the penſions given to Mr. Barré and Mr. Dunning between the propoſition and execution of my plan? No! ſurely no! Thoſe penſions were within my principles. I aſſert it, thoſe gentlemen deſerved their penſions, their titles—all they had; and more had they had, I ſhould have been but pleaſed the more. They were men of talents; they were men of ſervice. I put the profeſſion of the law out of the queſtion in one of them. It is a ſervice that rewards itſelf. But their *publick ſervice*, though, from their abilities unqueſtionably of more value

value than mine, in its quantity and in its duration was not to be mentioned with it. But I never could drive a hard bargain in my life, concerning any matter whatever; and leaſt of all do I know how to haggle and huckſter with merit. Penſion for myſelf I obtained none; nor did I ſolicit any. Yet I was loaded with hatred for every thing that was witheld, and with obloquy for every thing that was given. I was thus left to ſupport the grants of a name ever dear to me, and ever venerable to the world, in favour of thoſe, who were no friends of mine or of his, againſt the rude attacks of thoſe who were at that time friends to the grantees, and their own zealous partiſans. I have never heard the earl of Lauderdale complain of theſe penſions. He finds nothing wrong till he comes to me. This is impartiality, in the true modern revolutionary ſtyle.

Whatever I did at that time, ſo far as it regarded order and œconomy, is ſtable and eternal; as all principles muſt be. A particular order of things may be altered; order itſelf cannot loſe its value. As to other particulars, they are variable by time and by circumſtances. Laws of regulation are not fundamental laws. The publick exigencies are the maſters of all ſuch laws. They rule the laws, and are not to be ruled by them. They who exerciſe the legiſlative power at the time muſt judge.

It may be new to his grace, but I beg leave to tell him,

him, that mere parſimony is not œconomy. It is ſeparable in theory from it; and in fact it may, or it may not, be a *part* of œconomy, according to circumſtances. Expence, and great expence, may be an eſſential part in true œconomy. If parſimony were to be conſidered as one of the kinds of that virtue, there is however another and an higher œconomy. Œconomy is a diſtributive virtue, and conſiſts not in ſaving, but in ſelection. Parſimony requires no providence, no ſagacity, no powers of combination, no compariſon, no judgment. Mere inſtinct, and that not an inſtinct of the nobleſt kind, may produce this falſe œconomy in perfection. The other œconomy has larger views. It demands a diſcriminating judgment, and a firm ſagacious mind. It ſhuts one door to impudent importunity, only to open another, and a wider, to unpreſuming merit. If none but meritorious ſervice or real talent were to be rewarded, this nation has not wanted, and this nation will not want, the means of rewarding all the ſervice it ever will receive, and encouraging all the merit it ever will produce. No ſtate, ſince the foundation of ſociety, has been impoveriſhed by that ſpecies of profuſion. Had the œconomy of ſelection and proportion been at all times obſerved, we ſhould not now have had an overgrown duke of Bedford, to oppreſs the induſtry of humble men, and to limit by the ſtandard of

of his own conceptions, the juſtice, the bounty, or, if he pleaſes, the charity of the crown.

His grace may think as meanly as he will of my deſerts in the far greater part of my conduct in life. It is free for him to do ſo. There will always be ſome difference of opinion in the value of political ſervices. But there is one merit of mine, which he, of all men living, ought to be the laſt to call in queſtion. I have ſupported with very great zeal, and I am told with ſome degree of ſucceſs, thoſe opinions, or if his grace likes another expreſſion better, thoſe old prejudices which buoy up the ponderous maſs of his nobility, wealth, and titles. I have omitted no exertion to prevent him and them from ſinking to that level, to which the meretricious French faction, his grace at leaſt coquets with, omit no exertion to reduce both. I have done all I could to diſcountenance their inquiries into the fortunes of thoſe, who hold large portions of wealth without any apparent merit of their own. I have ſtrained every nerve to keep the duke of Bedford in that ſituation, which alone makes him my ſuperiour. Your Lordſhip has been a witneſs of the uſe he makes of that pre-eminence.

But be it, that this is virtue! Be it, that there is virtue in this well ſelected rigour; yet all virtues are not equally becoming to all men and at all times.

times. There are crimes, undoubtedly there are crimes, which in all ſeaſons of our exiſtence, ought to put a generous antipathy in action; crimes that provoke an indignant juſtice, and call forth a warm and animated purſuit. But all things, that concern, what I may call, the preventive police of morality, all things merely rigid, harſh and cenſorial, the antiquated moraliſts, at whoſe feet I was brought up, would not have thought theſe the fitteſt matter to form the favourite virtues of young men of rank. What might have been well enough, and have been received with a veneration mixed with awe and terrour, from an old, ſevere, crabbed Cato, would have wanted ſomething of propriety in the young Scipios, the ornament of the Roman nobility, in the flower of their life. But the times, the morals, the maſters, the ſcholars have all undergone a thorough revolution. It is a vile illiberal ſchool, this new French academy of the *ſans culottes*. There is nothing in it that is fit for a gentleman to learn.

Whatever its vogue may be, I ſtill flatter myſelf, that the parents of the growing generation will be ſatisfied with what is to be taught to their children in Weſtminſter, in Eton, or in Winchester: I ſtill indulge the hope that no *grown* gentleman or nobleman of our time will think of finiſhing at Mr. Thelwall's lecture whatever may have been left incomplete at the old univerſities of

his country. I would give to lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt for a motto, what was ſaid of a Roman cenſor or prætor (or what was he), who in virtue of a Senatus conſultum ſhut up certain academies,

"*Cludere ludum impudentiæ juſſit.*"

Every honeſt father of a family in the kingdom will rejoice at the breaking up for the holidays, and will pray that there may be a very long vacation in all ſuch ſchools.

The awful ſtate of the time, and not myſelf or my own juſtification, is my true object in what I now write; or in what I ſhall ever write or ſay. It little ſignifies to the world what becomes of ſuch things as me, or even as the duke of Bedford. What I ſay about either of us is nothing more than a vehicle, as you, my lord, will eaſily perceive, to convey my ſentiments on matters far more worthy of your attention. It is when I ſtick to my apparent firſt ſubject that I ought to apologize, not when I depart from it. I therefore muſt beg your lordſhip's pardon for again reſuming it after this very ſhort digreſſion; aſſuring you that I ſhall never altogether loſe ſight of ſuch matter as perſons abler than I am may turn to ſome profit.

The duke of Bedford conceives, that he is obliged to call the attention of the houſe of peers to his majeſty's grant to me, which he conſiders as exceſſive and out of all bounds.

I know

I know not how it has happened, but it really ſeems, that, whilſt his grace was meditating his well-conſidered cenſure upon me, he fell into a ſort of ſleep. Homer nods; and the duke of Bedford may dream; and as dreams (even his golden dreams) are apt to be ill-pieced and incongruouſly put together, his grace preſerved his idea of reproach to *me*, but took the ſubject-matter from the crown-grants *to his own family*. This is "the ſtuff "of which his dreams are made." In that way of putting things together his grace is perfectly in the right. The grants to the houſe of Ruſſel were ſo enormous, as not only to outrage œconomy, but even to ſtagger credibility. The duke of Bedford is the leviathan among all the creatures of the crown. He tumbles about his unwieldy bulk; he plays and frolicks in the ocean of the royal bounty. Huge as he is, and whilſt "he lies float-"ing many a rood," he is ſtill a creature. His ribs, his fins, his whalebone, his blubber, the very ſpiracles through which he ſpouts a torrent of brine againſt his origin, and covers me all over with the ſpray,—every thing of him and about him is from the throne. Is it for *him* to queſtion the diſpenſation of the royal favour?

I really am at a loſs to draw any ſort of parallel between the publick merits of his grace, by which he juſtifies the grants he holds, and theſe ſervices of mine, on the favourable conſtruction of which

I have obtained what his grace ſo much diſapproves. In private life, I have not at all the honour of acquaintance with the noble duke. But I ought to preſume, and it coſts me nothing to do ſo, that he abundantly deſerves the eſteem and love of all who live with him. But as to publick ſervice, why truly it would not be more ridiculous for me to compare myſelf in rank, in fortune, in ſplendid deſcent, in youth, ſtrength, or figure, with the duke of Bedford, than to make a parallel between his ſervices, and my attempts to be uſeful to my country. It would not be groſs adulation, but uncivil irony, to ſay, that he has any publick merit of his own to keep alive the idea of the ſervices by which his vaſt landed penſions were obtained. My merits, whatever they are, are original and perſonal; his are derivative. It is his anceſtor, the original penſioner, that has laid up this inexhauſtible fund of merit, which makes his grace ſo very delicate and exceptious about the merit of all other grantees of the crown. Had he permitted me to remain in quiet, I ſhould have ſaid 'tis his eſtate; that's enough. It is his by law; what have I to do with it or its hiſtory? He would naturally have ſaid on his ſide, 'tis this man's fortune.—He is as good now, as my anceſtor was two hundred and fifty years ago. I am a young man with very old penſions; he is an old man with very young penſions,—that's all.

Why

Why will his grace, by attacking me, force me reluctantly to compare my little merit with that which obtained from the crown thoſe prodigies of profuſe donation by which he tramples on the mediocrity of humble and laborious individuals? I would willingly leave him to the herald's college, which the philoſophy of the ſans culottes, (prouder by far than all the Garters, and Norroys and Clarencieux, and Rouge Dragons that ever pranced in a proceſſion of what his friends call ariſtocrats and deſpots) will abolith with contumely and ſcorn. Theſe hiſtorians, recorders, and blazoners of virtues and arms, differ wholly from that other deſcription of hiſtorians, who never aſſign any act of politicians to a good motive. Theſe gentle hiſtorians, on the contrary, dip their pens in nothing but the milk of human kindneſs. They ſeek no further for merit than the preamble of a patent, or the inſcription on a tomb. With them every man created a peer is firſt an hero ready made. They judge of every man's capacity for office by the offices he has filled; and the more offices the more ability. Every general-officer with them is a Marlborough; every ſtateſman a Burleigh; every judge a Murray or a Yorke. They who alive, were laughed at or pitied by all their acquaintance, make as good a figure as the beſt of them in the pages of Guillim, Edmondſon, and Collins.

To theſe recorders, ſo full of good nature to the

great and profperous, I would willingly leave the firſt baron Ruſſel, and earl of Bedford, and the merits of his grants. But the aulnager, the weigher, the meter of grants, will not ſuffer us to acquieſce in the judgment of the prince reigning at the time when they were made. They are never good to thoſe who earn them. Well then; ſince the new grantees have war made on them by the old, and that the word of the ſovereign is not to be taken, let us turn our eyes to hiſtory, in which great men have always a pleaſure in contemplating the heroick origin of their houſe.

The firſt peer of the name, the firſt purchaſer of the grants, was a Mr Ruſſel, a perſon of an ancient gentleman's family raiſed by being a minion of Henry the Eighth. As there generally is ſome reſemblance of character to create theſe relations, the favourite was in all likelihood much ſuch another as his maſter. The firſt of thoſe immoderate grants was not taken from the ancient demeſne of the crown, but from the recent confiſcation of the ancient nobility of the land. The lion having ſucked the blood of his prey, threw the offal carcaſe to the jackall in waiting. Having taſted once the food of confiſcation, the favourites became fierce and ravenous. This worthy favourite's firſt grant was from the lay nobility. The ſecond, infinitely improving on the enormity of the firſt, was from the plunder of the church.

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In truth his grace is ſomewhat excuſable for his diſlike to a grant like mine, not only in its quantity, but in its kind ſo different from his own.

Mine was from a mild and benevolent ſovereign; his from Henry the Eighth.

Mine had not its fund in the murder of any innocent perſon of illuſtrious rank,* or in the pillage of any body of unoffending men. His grants were from the aggregate and conſolidated funds of judgments iniquitouſly legal, and from poſſeſſions voluntarily ſurrendered by the lawful proprietors with the gibbet at their door.

The merit of the grantee whom he derives from, was that of being a prompt and greedy inſtrument of a *levelling* tyrant, who oppreſſed all deſcriptions of his people, but who fell with particular fury on every thing that was *great and noble.* Mine has been, in endeavouring to ſcreen every man, in every claſs, from oppreſſion, and particularly in defending the high and eminent, who in the bad times of confiſcating princes, confiſcating chief governours, or confiſcating demagogues, are the moſt expoſed to jealouſy, avarice and envy.

The merit of the original grantee of his grace's penſions, was in giving his hand to the work, and partaking the ſpoil with a prince, who plundered a part of the national church of his time and country.

* See the hiſtory of the melancholy cataſtrophe of the Duke of Buckingham. Temp. Hen 8.

Mine was in defending the whole of the national church of my own time and my own country; and the whole of the national churches of all countries, from the principles and the examples which lead to eccleſiaſtical pillage, thence to a contempt of *all* preſcriptive titles, thence to the pillage of *all* property, and thence to univerſal deſolation.

The merit of the origin of his grace's fortune was in being a favourite and chief adviſer to a prince, who left no liberty to their native country. My endeavour was to obtain liberty for the municipal country in which I was born, and for all deſcriptions and denominations in it. Mine was to ſupport with unrelaxing vigilance every right, every privilege, every franchiſe, in this my adopted, my dearer and more comprehenſive country; and not only to preſerve thoſe rights in this chief ſeat of empire, but in every nation, in every land, in every climate, language and religion, in the vaſt domain that ſtill is under the protection, and the larger that was once under the protection of the Britiſh crown.

His founder's merits were, by arts in which he ſerved his maſter and made his fortune, to bring poverty, wretchedneſs and depopulation on his country. Mine were under a benevolent prince, in promoting the commerce, manufactures and agriculture of his kingdom; in which his majeſty

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ſhews an eminent example, who even in his amuſements is a patriot, and in hours of leiſure an improver of his native ſoil.

His founder's merit, was the merit of a gentleman raiſed by the arts of a court, and the protection of a Wolſey, to the eminence of a great and potent lord. His merit in that eminence was by inſtigating a tyrant to injuſtice, to provoke a people to rebellion.—My merit was, to awaken the ſober part of the country, that they might put themſelves on their guard againſt any one potent lord, or any greater number of potent lords, or any combination of great leading men of any ſort, if ever they ſhould attempt to proceed in the ſame courſes, but in the reverſe order, that is, by inſtigating a corrupted populace to rebellion, and, through that rebellion, introducing a tyranny yet worſe than the tyranny which his grace's anceſtor ſupported, and of which he profited in the manner we behold in the deſpotiſm of Henry the Eighth.

The political merit of the firſt penſioner of his grace's houſe, was that of being concerned as a counſellor of ſtate in adviſing, and in his perſon executing the conditions of a diſhonourable peace with France; the ſurrendering the fortreſs of Boulogne, then our out-guard on the continent. By that ſurrender, Calais, the key of France, and the bridle in the mouth of that power, was, not many

years

years afterwards, finally loſt. My merit has been in reſiſting the power and pride of France, under any form of its rule; but in oppoſing it with the greateſt zeal and earneſtneſs, when that rule appeared in the worſt form it could aſſume; the worſt indeed which the prime cauſe and principle of all evil could poſſibly give it. It was my endeavour by every means to excite a ſpirit in the houſe, where I had the honour of a ſeat, for carrying on with early vigour and deciſion, the moſt clearly juſt and neceſſary war, that this or any nation ever carried on; in order to ſave my country from the iron yoke of its power, and from the more dreadful contagion of its principles; to preſerve, while they can be preſerved, pure and untainted, the ancient, inbred integrity, piety, good nature, and good humour of the people of England, from the dreadful peſtilence which beginning in France, threatens to lay waſte the whole moral, and in a great degree the whole phyſical world, having done both in the focus of its moſt intenſe malignity.

The labours of his grace's founder merited the curſes, not loud but deep, of the commons of England, on whom *he* and his maſter had effected a *complete parliamentary reform*, by making them in their ſlavery and humiliation, the true and adequate repreſentatives of a debaſed, degraded, and undone people. My merits were, in having had

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an active, thought not always an oftentatious ſhare, in every one act, without exception, of undiſputed conſtitutional utility in my time, and in having ſupported on all occaſions, the authority, the efficiency, and the privileges of the commons of Great Britain. I ended my ſervices by a recorded and fully reaſoned aſſertion on their own journals of their conſtitutional rights, and a vindication of their conſtitutional conduct. I laboured in all things to merit their inward approbation, and (along with the aſſiſtance of the largeſt, the greateſt, and beſt of my endeavours) I received their free, unbiaſſed, publick, and ſolemn thanks.

Thus ſtands the account of the comparative merits of the crown grants which compoſe the duke of Bedford's fortune as balanced againſt mine. In the name of common ſenſe, why ſhould the duke of Bedford think, that none but of the houſe of Ruſſel are entitled to the favour of the crown? Why ſhould he imagine that no king of England has been capable of judging of merit but king Henry the Eighth? Indeed, he will pardon me; he is a little miſtaken; all virtue did not end in the firſt earl of Bedford. All diſcernment did not loſe its viſion when his creator cloſed his eyes. Let him remit his rigour on the diſproportion between merit and reward in others, and they will make no inquiry into the origin of his fortune. They will regard with much more ſatisfaction, as

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he will contemplate with infinitely more advantage, whatever in his pedigree has been dulcified by an expoſure to the influence of heaven in a long flow of generations, from the hard, acidulous, metallick tincture of the ſpring. It is little to be doubted, that ſeveral of his forefathers in that long ſeries, have degenerated into honour and virtue. Let the duke of Bedford (I am ſure he will) reject with ſcorn and horrour, the counſels of the lecturers, thoſe wicked panders to avarice and ambition, who would tempt him in the troubles of his country, to ſeek another enormous fortune from the forfeitures of another nobility, and the plunder of another church. Let him (and I truſt that yet he will) employ all the energy of his youth, and all the reſources of his wealth, to cruſh rebellious principles which have no foundation in morals, and rebellious movements that have no provocation in tyranny.

Then will be forgot the rebellions, which, by a doubtful priority in crime, his anceſtor had provoked and extinguiſhed. On ſuch a conduct in the noble duke, many of his countrymen might, and with ſome excuſe might, give way to the enthuſiaſm of their gratitude, and in the daſhing ſtyle of ſome of the old declaimers, cry out, that if the fates had found no other way in which they could give a* duke of Bedford and his opulence

* At ſi non aliam venturo fata Neroni, &c.

as

as props to a tottering world, then the butchery of the duke of Buckingham might be tolerated; it might be regarded even with complacency, whilſt in the heir of confiſcation they ſaw the ſympathizing comforts of the martyrs, who ſuffer under the cruel confiſcation of this day; whilſt they behold with admiration his zealous protection of the virtuous and loyal nobility of France, and his manly ſupport of his brethren, the yet ſtanding nobility and gentry of his native land. Then his grace's merit would be pure and new, and ſharp, as freſh from the mint of honour. As he pleaſed he might reflect honour on his predeceſſors, or throw it forward on thoſe who were to ſucceed him. He might be the propagator of the ſtock of honour, or the root of it, as he thought proper.

Had it pleaſed God to continue to me the hopes of ſucceſſion, I ſhould have been according to my mediocrity, and the mediocrity of the age I live in, a ſort of founder of a family; I ſhould have left a ſon, who, in all the points in which perſonal merit can be viewed, in ſcience, in erudition, in genius, in taſte, in honour, in generoſity, in humanity, in every liberal ſentiment, and every liberal accompliſhment, would not have ſhewn himſelf inferiour to the duke of Bedford, or to any of thoſe whom he traces in his line. His grace very ſoon would have wanted all plauſibility in his attack upon

upon that proviſion which belonged more to mine than to me. HE would ſoon have ſupplied every deficiency, and ſymmetrized every diſproportion. It would not have been for that ſucceſſor to reſort to any ſtagnant waſting reſervoir of merit in me, or in any anceſtry. He had in himſelf a ſalient, living ſpring, of generous and manly action. Every day he lived he would have re-purchaſed the bounty of the crown, and ten times more, if ten times more he had received. He was made a publick creature; and had no enjoyment whatever, but in the performance of ſome duty. At this exigent moment, the loſs of a finiſhed man is not eaſily ſupplied.

But a diſpoſer whoſe power we are little able to reſiſt, and whoſe wiſdom it behoves us not at all to diſpute; has ordained it in another manner, and (whatever my querulous weakneſs might ſuggeſt) a far better. The ſtorm has gone over me; and I lie like one of thoſe old oaks which the late hurricane has ſcattered about me. I am ſtripped of all my honours; I am torn up by the roots, and lie proſtrate on the earth! There, and proſtrate there, I moſt unfeignedly recogniſe the divine juſtice, and in ſome degree ſubmit to it. But whilſt I humble myſelf before God, I do not know that it is forbidden to repel the atacks of unjuſt and inconſiderate men. The patience of Job is proverbial. After ſome of the convulſive ſtruggles

of

of our irritable nature, he ſubmitted himſelf, and repented in duſt and aſhes. But even ſo, I do not find him blamed for reprehending, and with a conſiderable degree of verbal aſperity, thoſe ill-natured neighbours of his, who viſited his dunghill to read moral, political, and œconomical lectures on his miſery. I am alone. I have none to meet my enemies in the gate. Indeed, my lord, I greatly deceive myſelf, if in this hard ſeaſon I would give a peck of refuſe wheat for all that is called fame and honour in the world. This is the appetite but of a few. It is a luxury; it is a privilege: it is an indulgence for thoſe who are at their eaſe. But we are all of us made to ſhun diſgrace, as we are made to ſhrink from pain, and poverty, and diſeaſe. It is an inſtinct; and under the direction of reaſon, inſtinct is always in the right. I live in an inverted order. They who ought to have ſucceeded me are gone before me. They who ſhould have been to me as poſterity are in the place of anceſtors. I owe to the deareſt relation (which ever muſt ſubſiſt in memory) that act of piety, which he would have performed to me; I owe it to him to ſhew that he was not deſcended, as the duke of Bedford would have it, from an unworthy parent.

The crown has conſidered me after long ſervice: the crown has paid the duke of Bedford by advance. He has had a long credit for any ſervice which

which he may perform hereafter. He is ſecure, and long may he be ſecure, in his advance, whether he performs any ſervices or not. But let him take care how he endangers the ſafety of that conſtitution which ſecures his own utility or his own inſignificance; or how he diſcourages thoſe, who take up, even puny arms, to defend an order of things, which, like the ſun of heaven, ſhines alike on the uſeful and the worthleſs. His grants are engraſted on the publick law of Europe, covered with the awful hoar of innumerable ages. They are guarded by the ſacred rules of preſcription, found in that full treaſury of juriſprudence from which the jejuneneſs and penury of our municipal law has, by degrees, been enriched and ſtrengthened. This preſcription I had my ſhare (a very full ſhare) in bringing to its perfection*. The duke of Bedford will ſtand as long as preſcriptive law endures: as long as the great ſtable laws of property common to us with all civilized nations, are kept in their integrity, and without the ſmalleſt intermixture of laws, maxims, principles, or precedents of the grand revolution. They are ſecure againſt all changes but one. The whole revolutionary ſyſtem, inſtitutes, digeſt, code, novels, text, gloſs, comment, are, not only not the ſame, but they are the very reverſe, and the reverſe

* Sir George Savile's Act called The *Nullum Tempus* Act.

fundamentally

fundamentally, of all the laws, on which civil life has hitherto been upheld in all the governments of the world. The learned profeſſors of the rights of man regard preſcription, not as a title to bar all claim, ſet up againſt old poſſeſſion—but they look on preſcription as itſelf a bar againſt the poſſeſſor and proprietor. They hold an immemorial poſſeſſion to be no more than a long continued, and therefore an aggravated injuſtice.

Such are *their* ideas; ſuch *their* religion, and ſuch *their* law. But as to *our* country and *our* race, as long as the well compacted ſtructure of our church and ſtate, the ſanctuary, the holy of holies of that ancient law, defended by reverence, defended by power, a fortreſs at once and a temple*, ſhall ſtand inviolate on the brow of the Britiſh Sion—as long as the Britiſh monarchy, not more limited than fenced by the orders of the ſtate, ſhall, like the proud Keep of Windſor, riſing in the majeſty of proportion, and girt with the double belt of its kindred and coeval towers, as long as this awful ſtructure ſhall overſee and guard the ſubjected land—ſo long the mounds and dykes of the low, fat, Bedford level will have nothing to fear from all the pickaxes of all the levellers of France. As long as our ſovereign lord the king, and his faithful ſubjects, the lords and commons of this

* *Templum in modum arcis.* Tacitus of the temple of Jeruſalem.

realm,—the triple cord, which no man can break; the ſolemn, ſworn, conſtitutional frank-pledge of this nation; the firm guarantees of each others being, and each others rights; the joint and ſeveral ſecurities, each in its place and order, for every kind and every quality, of property and of dignity.—As long as theſe endure, ſo long the duke of Bedford is ſafe: and we are all ſafe together—the high from the blights of envy and the ſpoliations of rapacity; the low from the iron hand of oppreſſion and the inſolent ſpurn of contempt. Amen! and ſo be it: and ſo it will be,

Dum domus Æneæ Capitoli immobile ſaxum
Accolet; imperiumque pater Romanus habebit.—

But if the rude inroad of Gallick tumult, with its ſophiſtical rights of man, to falſify the account, and its ſword as a makeweight to throw into the ſcale, ſhall be introduced into our city by a miſguided populace, ſet on by proud great men, themſelves blinded and intoxicated by a frantick ambition, we ſhall, all of us, periſh and be overwelmed in a common ruin. If a great ſtorm blow on our coaſt, it will caſt the whales on the ſtrand as well as the periwinkles. His grace will not ſurvive the poor grantee he deſpiſes, no not for a twelvemonth. If the great look for ſafety in the ſervices they render to this Gallick cauſe, it is to be fooliſh,

even

even above the weight of privilege allowed to wealth. If his Grace be one of theſe whom they endeavour to proſelytize, he ought to be aware of the character of the ſect, whoſe doctrines he is invited to embrace. With them inſurrection is the moſt ſacred of revolutionary duties to the ſtate. Ingratitude to benefactors is the firſt of revolutionary virtues. Ingratitude is indeed their four cardinal virtues compacted and amalgamated into one; and he will find it in every thing that has happened ſince the commencement of the philoſophick revolution to this hour. If he pleads the merit of having performed the duty of inſurrection againſt the order he lives (God forbid he ever ſhould), the merit of others will be to perform the duty of inſurrection againſt him. If he pleads (again God forbid he ſhould, and I do not ſuſpect he will) his ingratitude to the crown for its creation of his family, others will plead their right and duty to pay him in kind. They will laugh, indeed they will laugh, at his parchment and his wax. His deeds will be drawn out with the reſt of the lumber of his evidence room, and burnt to the tune of *ça ira* in the courts of Bedford (then Equality) houſe.

Am I to blame, if I attempt to pay his Grace's hoſtile reproaches to me with a friendly admonition to himſelf? Can I be blamed, for pointing out to him in what manner he is like to be affected, if the ſect of the cannibal philoſophers of France ſhould

proſelytize any conſiderable part of this people, and, by their joint proſelytizing arms, ſhould conquer that government, to which is Grace does not ſeem to me to give all the ſupport his own ſecurity demands? Surely it is proper, that he, and that others like him, ſhould know the true genius of this ſect; what their opinions are, what they have done; and to whom; and what, (if a prognoſtick is to be formed from the diſpoſitions and actions of men) it is certain they will do hereafter. He ought to know, that they have ſworn aſſiſtance, the only engagements they ever will keep, to all in this country, who bear a reſemblance to themſelves, and who think as ſuch, that *The whole duty of man* conſiſts in deſtruction. They are a miſallied and diſparaged branch of the houſe of Nimrod. They are the duke of Bedford's natural hunters; and he is their natural game. Becauſe he is not very profoundly reflecting, he ſleeps in profound ſecurity: they, on the contrary, are always vigilant, active, enterpriſing, and, though far removed from any knowledge which makes men eſtimable or uſeful, in all the inſtruments and reſources of evil, their leaders are not meanly inſtructed, or inſufficiently furniſhed. In the French revolution every thing is new; and, from want of preparation to meet ſo unlooked-for an evil, every thing is dangerous. Never, before this time, was a ſet of literary men, converted into a gang of robbers and

aſſaſſins. Never before, did a den of bravoes and banditti, aſſume the garb and tone of an academy of philoſophers.

Let me tell his Grace, that an union of ſuch characters, monſtrous as it ſeems, is not made for producing deſpicable enemies. But if they are formidable as foes, as friends they are dreadful indeed. The men of property in France confiding in a force, which ſeemed to be irreſiſtible, becauſe it had never been tried, neglected to prepare for a conflict with their enemies at their own weapons. They were found in ſuch a ſituation as the Mexicans were, when they were attacked by the dogs, the cavalry, the iron, and the gunpowder of an handful of bearded men, whom they did not know to exiſt in nature. This is a compariſon that ſome, I think, have made; and it is juſt. In France they had their enemies within their houſes. They were even in the boſoms of many of them. But they had not ſagacity to diſcern their ſavage character. They ſeemed tame, and even careſſing. They had nothing but *douce humanité* in their mouth. They could not bear the puniſhment of the mildeſt laws on the greateſt criminals. The ſlighteſt ſeverity of juſtice made their fleſh creep The very idea that war exiſted in the world diſturbed their repoſe. Military glory was no more, with them, than a ſplendid infamy. Hardly would they hear of ſelf-

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defence, which they reduced within ſuch bounds, as to leave it no defence at all. All this while they meditated the confiſcations and maſſacres we have ſeen. Had any one told theſe unfortunate noblemen and gentlemen, how, and by whom, the grand fabrick of the French monarchy under which they flouriſhed would be ſubverted, they would not have pitied him as a viſionary, but would have turned from him as what they call a *mauvais plaiſant*. Yet we have ſeen what has happened. The perſons who have ſuffered from the cannibal philoſophy of France, are ſo like the duke of Bedford, that nothing but his Grace's probably not ſpeaking quite ſo good French, could enable us to find out any difference. A great many of them had as pompous titles as he, and were of full as illuſtrious a race: ſome few of them had fortunes as ample; ſeveral of them, without meaning the leaſt diſparagement to the duke of Bedford, were as wiſe, and as virtuous, and as valiant, and as well educated, and as complete in all the lineaments of men of honour as he is: And to all this they had added the powerful outguard of a military profeſſion, which, in its nature, renders men ſomewhat more cautious than thoſe, who have nothing to attend to but the lazy enjoyment of undiſturbed poſſeſſions. But ſecurity was their ruin. They are daſhed to pieces in the ſtorm, and our ſhores are covered

covered with the wrecks. If they had been aware that ſuch a thing might happen, ſuch a thing never could have happened.

I aſſure his Grace, that if I ſtate to him the deſigns of his enemies, in a manner which may appear to him ludicrous and impoſſible, I tell him nothing that has not exactly happened, point by point, but twenty-four miles from our own ſhore. I aſſure him that the Frenchified faction, more encouraged, than others are warned, by what has happened in France, look at him and his landed poſſeſſions, as an object at once of curioſity and rapacity. He is made for them in every part of their double character. As robbers, to them he is a noble booty: as ſpeculatiſts, he is a glorious ſubject for their experimental philoſophy. He affords matter for an extenſive analyſis, in all the branches of their ſcience, geometrical, phyſical, civil and political. Theſe philoſophers are fanaticks; independent of any intereſt, which if it operated alone would make them much more tractable, they are carried with ſuch an headlong rage towards every deſperate trial, that they would ſacrifice the whole human race to the ſlighteſt of their experiments. I am better able to enter into the character of this deſcription of men than the noble Duke can be. I have lived long and variouſly in the world. Without any conſiderable pretenſions to literature in myſelf, I have aſpired to the love of letters. I have

lived for a great many years in habitudes with thoſe who profeſſed them. I can form a tolerable eſtimate of what is likely to happen from a character, chiefly dependent for fame and fortune, on knowledge and talent, as well in its morbid and perverted ſtate, as in that which is ſound and natural. Naturally men ſo formed and finiſhed are the firſt gifts of Providence to the world. But when they have once thrown off the fear of God, which was in all ages too often the caſe, and the fear of man, which is now the caſe, and when in that ſtate they come to underſtand one another, and to act in corps, a more dreadful calamity cannot ariſe out of hell to ſcourge mankind. Nothing can be conceived more hard than the heart of a thoroughbred metaphyſician. It comes nearer to the cold malignity of a wicked ſpirit than to the frailty and paſſion of a man. It is like that of the principle of evil himſelf, incorporeal, pure, unmixed, dephlegmated, defecated evil. It is no eaſy operation to eradicate humanity from the human breaſt. What Shakeſpeare calls "the compunctious viſitings of nature," will ſometimes knock at their hearts, and proteſt againſt their murderous ſpeculations. But they have a means of compounding with their nature. Their humanity is not diſſolved. They only give it a long prorogation. They are ready to declare, that they do not think two thouſand years too long a period for the good that they purſue.

purſue. It is remarkable, that they never ſee any way to their projected good but by the road of ſome evil. Their imagination is not fatigued with the contemplation of human ſuffering through the wild waſte of centuries added to centuries of miſery and deſolation. Their humanity is at their horizon—and, like the horizon, it always flies before them. The geometricians, and the chymiſts bring, the one from the dry bones of their diagrams, and the other from the ſoot of their furnaces, diſpoſitions that make them worſe than indifferent about thoſe feelings and habitudes, which are the ſupports of the moral world. Ambition is come upon them ſuddenly; they are intoxicated with it, and it has rendered them fearleſs of the danger, which may from thence ariſe to others or to themſelves. Theſe philoſophers, conſider men in their experiments, no more than they do mice in an air pump, or in a recipient of mephitick gas. Whatever his Grace may think of himſelf, they look upon him, and every thing that belongs to him, with no more regard than they do upon the whiſkers of that little long-tailed animal, that has been long the game of the grave, demure, inſidious, ſpring-nailed, velvet-pawed, green-eyed philoſophers, whether going upon two legs, or upon four.

His Grace's landed poſſeſſions are irreſiſtibly inviting to an *agrarian* experiment. They are a downright inſult upon the rights of man. They are

are more extenſive than the territory of many of the Grecian republicks; and they are without compariſon more fertile than moſt of them. There are now republicks in Italy, in Germany, and in Swiſſerland, which do not poſſeſs any thing like ſo fair and ample a domain. There is ſcope for ſeven philoſophers to proceed in their analytical experiments, upon Harrington's ſeven different forms of republicks, in the acres of this one Duke. Hitherto they have been wholly unproductive to ſpeculation; fitted for nothing but to fatten bullocks, and to produce grain for beer, ſtill more to ſtupify the dull Engliſh underſtanding. Abbé Sieyes has whole neſts of pigeon-holes full of conſtitutions ready made, ticketed, ſorted, and numbered; ſuited to every ſeaſon and every fancy; ſome with the top of the pattern at the bottom, and ſome with the bottom at the top; ſome plain, ſome flowered; ſome diſtinguiſhed for their ſimplicity; others for their complexity; ſome of blood colour; ſome of *boue de Paris*; ſome with directories, others without a direction; ſome with councils of elders, and councils of youngſters; ſome without any council at all. Some where the electors chooſe the repreſentatives; others, where the repreſentatives chooſe the electors. Some in long coats, and ſome in ſhort cloaks; ſome with pantaloons; ſome without breeches. Some with five ſhilling qualifications; ſome totally unqualified. So that no conſtitution,

ſtitution-fancier may go unſuited from his ſhop, provided he loves a pattern of pillage, oppreſſion, arbitrary impriſonment, confiſcation, exile, revolutionary judgment, and legalized premeditated murder, in any ſhapes into which they can be put. What a pity it is, that the progreſs of experimental philoſophy ſhould be checked by his Grace's monopoly! Such are their ſentiments, I aſſure him; ſuch is their language when they dare to ſpeak; and ſuch are their proceedings, when they have the means to act.

Their geographers, and geometricians, have been ſome time out of practice. It is ſome time ſince they have divided their own country into ſquares. That figure has loſt the charms of its novelty. They want new lands for new trials. It is not only the geometricians of the republick that find him a good ſubject, the chymiſts have beſpoke him after the geometricians have done with him. As the firſt ſet have an eye on his Grace's lands, the chymiſts are not leſs taken with his buildings. They conſider mortar as a very anti-revolutionary invention in its preſent ſtate; but properly employed, an admirable material for overturning all eſtabliſhments. They have found that the gunpowder of *ruins* is far the fitteſt for making other *ruins*, and ſo *ad infinitum*. They have calculated what quantity of mater convertible into nitre is to be found in Bedford houſe, in Wooburn Abbey, and

and in what his Grace and his truſtees have ſtill ſuffered to ſtand of that fooliſh royaliſt Inigo Jones, in Covent Garden. Churches, play-houſes, coffee-houſes, all alike are deſtined to be mingled, and equaliſed, and blended into one common rubbiſh; and well ſifted, and lixiviated, to cryſtallize into true democratick explosive inſurrectionary nitre. Their academy del *Cimento* (per antiphraſin) with Morveau and Haſſenfrats at its head, have computed that the brave ſans-culottes may make war on all the ariſtocracy of Europe for a twelvemonth, out of the rubbiſh of the duke of Bedford's buildings.*

While

* There is nothing, on which the leaders of the republick, one and indiviſible, value themſelves, more than on the chymical operations, by which, through ſcience, they convert the pride of ariſtocracy to an inſtrument of its own deſtruction—on the operations by which they reduce the magnificent ancient country ſeats of the nobility, decorated with the *feudal* titles of Duke, Marquis, or Earl, into magazines of what they call *revolutionary* gunpowder. They tell us, that hitherto things "had not yet been "properly and in a *revolutionary* manner explored."—"The "ſtrong *chateaus*, thoſe *feudal* fortreſſes, that *were ordered to be* "*demoliſhed*, attracted next the attention of your committee. *Na*- "*ture* there had *ſecretly* regained her *rights*, and had produced "ſaltpetre, for the *purpoſe*, as it ſhould ſeem, *of facilitating the* "*execution of your decree by preparing the means of deſtruction.* From "theſe *ruins*, which *ſtill frown* on the liberties of the republick, "we have extracted the means of producing good; and thoſe "piles, which have hitherto glutted the *pride of deſpots*, and co- "vered the plots of La Vendée, will ſoon furniſh wherewithal to "tame

While the Morveaux and Prieſtleys are proceeding with theſe experiments upon the duke of Bedford's houſes, the Sieyes, and the reſt of the analytical legiſlators, and conſtitution venders, are quite as buſy in their trade of decompoſing organization, in forming his Grace's vaſſals into primary aſſemblies, national guards, firſt, ſecond and third requiſitioners, committees of reſearch, conductors of the travelling guillotine, judges of revolutionary tribunals, legiſlative hangmen, ſupervifors of domiciliary viſitation, exactors of forced loans, and aſſeſſors of the maximum.

The din of all this ſmithery may ſome time or other poſſibly wake this noble Duke, and puſh him to an endeavour to ſave ſome little matter from their experimental philoſophy. If he pleads his grants from the crown, he is ruined at the outſet. If he pleads he has received them from the pillage of ſuperſtitious corporations, this indeed will ſtagger them a little, becauſe they are enemies to all corporations, and to all religion. However, they will ſoon recover themſelves, and will tell his Grace or his learned council, that all ſuch property belongs

"tame the traitors, and to overwhelm the diſaffected."—— "The *rebellious cities* alſo, have afforded a large quantity of ſalt- "petre. *Commune Affranchie* (that is, the noble city of Lyons "reduced in many parts to an heap of ruins, and Toulon, will "pay a *ſecond* tribute to our artillery." Report 1ſt. February 1794.

belongs to the *nation*; and that it would be more wife for him, if he wifhes to live the natural term of a *citizen*, (that is, according to Condorcet's calculation, fix months on an average,) not to pafs for an ufurper upon the national property. This is what the *ferjeants* at law of the rights of man, will fay to the puny *apprentices* of the common law of England.

Is the genius of philofophy not yet known? You may as well think the garden of the Thuilleries was well protected with the cords of ribbon inſultingly ſtretched by the national aſſembly to keep the ſovereign canaille from intruding on the retirement of the poor king of the French, as that ſuch flimſy cobwebs will ſtand between the ſavages of the revolution and their natural prey. Deep philoſophers are no triflers; brave ſans-culottes are no formaliſts. They will no more regard a Marquis of Taviſtock than an Abbot of Taviſtock; the Lord of Wooburn will not be more reſpectable in their eyes than the Prior of Wooburn; they will make no difference between the ſuperiour of a Covent Garden of nuns and of a Covent Garden of another deſcription. They will not care a ruſh whether his coat is long or ſhort; whether the colour be purple or blue and buff. They will not trouble *their* heads, with what part of *his* head, his hair is cut from; and they will look with equal reſpect on a tonſure and a crop. Their only queſtion will be

be that of their *Legendre*, or ſome other of their legiſlative butchers, how he cuts up? how he tallows in the cawl or on the kidneys?

Is it not a ſingular phenomenon, that whilſt the ſans-culotte carcaſe butchers, and the philoſophers of the ſhambles, are pricking their dotted lines upon his hide, and like the print of the poor ox that we ſee in the ſhop-windows at Charing-croſs, alive, as he is, and thinking no harm in the world, he is divided into rumps, and ſirloins, and briſkets, and into all ſorts of pieces for roaſting, boiling, and ſtewing, that all the while they are meaſuring *him*, his Grace is meaſuring *me*; is invidiouſly comparing the bounty of the crown with the deſerts of the defender of his order, and in the ſame moment fawning on thoſe who have the knife half out of the ſheath—poor innocent!

Pleas'd to the laſt, he crops the flow'ry food,
And licks the hand juſt rais'd to ſhed his blood.

No man lives too long, who lives to do with ſpirit, and ſuffer with reſignation, what Providence pleaſes to command or inflict: but indeed they are ſharp incommodities which beſet old age. It was but the other day, that on putting in order ſome things which had been brought here on my taking leave of London for ever, I looked over a number of fine portraits, moſt of them of perſons now

now dead, but whoſe ſociety, in my better days, made this a proud and happy place. Amongſt theſe was the picture of Lord Keppel. It was painted by an artiſt worthy of the ſubject, the excellent friend of that excellent man from their earlieſt youth, and a common friend of us both, with whom we lived for many years without a moment of coldneſs, of peeviſhneſs, of jealouſy, or of jar, to the day of our final ſeparation.

I ever looked on Lord Keppel as one of the greateſt and beſt men of his age; and I loved, and cultivated him accordingly. He was much in my heart and I believe I was in his to the very laſt beat. It was after his trial at Portſmouth that he gave me this picture. With what zeal and anxious affection I attended him through that his agony of glory, what part my ſon in the early fluſh and enthuſiaſm of his virtue, and the pious paſſion with which he attached himſelf to all my connections, with what prodigality we both ſquandered ourſelves in courting almoſt every ſort of enmity for his ſake, I believe he felt, juſt as I ſhould have felt, ſuch friendſhip on ſuch an occaſion. I partook indeed of this honour, with ſeveral of the firſt, and beſt, and ableſt in the kingdom, but I was behind hand with none of them; and I am ſure, that if to the eternal diſgrace of this nation, and to the total annihilation of every trace of honour and virtue in it, things had taken a different turn from what

what they did, I ſhould have attended him to the quarter-deck with no leſs good will and more pride, though with far other feelings, than I partook of the general flow of national joy that attended the juſtice that was done to his virtue.

Pardon, my Lord, the feeble garrulity of age, which loves to diffuſe itſelf in diſcourſe of the departed great. At my years we live in retroſpect alone: and, wholly unfitted for the ſociety of vigorous life, we enjoy, the beſt balm to all wounds, the conſolation of friendſhip, in thoſe only whom we have loſt for ever. Feeling the loſs of Lord Keppel at all times, at no time did I feel it ſo much as on the firſt day when I was attacked in the houſe of lords.

Had he lived, that reverend form would have riſen in its place, and with a mild, parental reprehenſion to his nephew the duke of Bedford, he would have told him that the favour of that gracious Prince, who had honoured his virtues with the government of the navy of Great Britain, and with a ſeat in the hereditary great council of his kingdom, was not undeſervedly ſhewn to the friend of the beſt portion of his life, and his faithful companion and counſellor under his rudeſt trials. He would have told him, that to whomever elſe theſe reproaches might be becoming, they were not decorous in his near kindred. He would

have told him that when men in that rank loſe decorum, they loſe every thing.

On that day I had a loſs in Lord Keppel; but the public loſs of him in this awful criſis—! I ſpeak from much knowledge of the perſon, he never would have liſtened to any compromiſe with the rabble rout of this ſans culotterie of France. His goodneſs of heart, his reaſon, his taſte, his publick duty, his principles, his prejudices, would have repelled him for ever from all connection with that horrid medley of madneſs, vice, impiety, and crime.

Lord Keppel had two countries; one of deſcent, and one of birth. Their intereſt and their glory are the ſame; and his mind was capacious of both. His family was noble, and it was Dutch: that is, he was of the oldeſt and pureſt nobility that Europe can boaſt, among a people renowned above all others for love of their native land. Though it was never ſhewn in inſult to any human being, Lord Keppel was ſomething high. It was a wild ſtock of pride, on which the tendereſt of all hearts had grafted the milder virtues. He valued ancient nobility; and he was not diſinclined to augment it with new honours. He valued the old nobility and the new, not as an excuſe for inglorious ſloth, but as an incitement to virtuous activity. He conſidered it as a ſort of cure for ſelfiſhneſs and a nar-

row mind; conceiving that a man born in an elevated place, in himself was nothing, but every thing in what went before, and what was to come after him. Without much ſpeculation, but by the ſure inſtinct of ingenuous feelings, and by the dictates of plain unſophiſticated natural underſtanding, he felt, that no great commonwealth could by any poſſibility long ſubſiſt, without a body of ſome kind or other of nobility, decorated with honour, and fortified by privilege. This nobility forms the chain that connects the ages of a nation, which otherwiſe (with Mr. Paine) would ſoon be taught that no one generation can bind another. He felt that no political fabrick could be well made without ſome ſuch order of things as might, through a ſeries of time, afford a rational hope of ſecuring unity, coherence, conſiſtency, and ſtability to the ſtate. He felt that nothing elſe can protect it againſt the levity of courts, and the greater levity of the multitude. That to talk of hereditary monarchy without any thing elſe of hereditary reverence in the commonwealth was a low minded abſurdity; fit only for thoſe deteſtable "fools aſpiring to be knaves," who began to forge in 1789, the falſe money of the French conſtitution—That it is one fatal objection to all *new* fancied and *new fabricated* republicks, (among a people, who, once poſſeſſing ſuch an advantage, have wickedly and inſolently rejected it,) that the

prejudice of an old nobility is a thing that *cannot* be made. It may be improved, it may be corrected, it may be repleniſhed: men may be taken from it, or agregrated to it, but the *thing itſelf* is matter of *inveterate* opinion, and therefore *cannot* be matter of mere poſitive inſtitution. He felt, that this nobility, in fact does not exiſt in wrong of other orders of the ſtate, but by them, and for them.

I knew the man I ſpeak of; and, if we can divine the future, out of what we collect from the paſt, no perſon living would look with more ſcorn and horrour on the impious parricide committed on all their anceſtry, and on the deſperate attainder paſſed on all their poſterity, by the Orleans, and the Rochefoucaults, and the Fayettes, and the Viſcomtes de Noailles, and the falſe Perigords, and the long *et cætera* of the perfidious ſans culottes of the court, who like demoniacks, poſſeſſed with a ſpirit of fallen pride, and inverted ambition, abdicated their dignities, diſowned their families, betrayed the moſt ſacred of all truſts, and by breaking to pieces a great link of ſociety, and all the cramps and holdings of the ſtate, brought eternal confuſion and deſolation on their country. For the fate of the miſcreant parricides themſelves he would have had no pity. Compaſſion for the myriads of men, of whom the world was not worthy, who by their means have periſhed in priſons,

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or on ſcaffolds, or are pining in beggary and exile, would leave no room in his, or in any well-formed mind, for any ſuch ſenſation. We are not made at once to pity the oppreſſor and the oppreſſed.

Looking to his Batavian deſcent, how could he bear to behold his kindred, the deſcendants of the brave nobility of Holland, whoſe blood prodigally poured out, had, more than all the canals, meers, and inundations of their country, protected their independence, to behold them bowed in the baſeſt ſervitude, to the baſeſt and vileſt of the human race; in ſervitude to thoſe who in no reſpect were ſuperiour in dignity, or could aſpire to a better place than that of hangmen to the tyrants, to whoſe ſceptered pride they had oppoſed an elevation of ſoul, that ſurmounted, and overpowered the loftineſs of Caſtile, the haughtineſs of Auſtria, and the overbearing arrogance of France?

Could he with patience bear, that the children of that nobility, who would have deluged their country and given it to the ſea, rather then ſubmit to Louis XIV. who was then in his meridian glory, when his arms were conducted by the Turennes, by the Luxembourgs, by the Boufflers; when his councils were directed by the Colberts, and the Louvois; when his tribunals were filled by the Lamoignons and the Dagueſſaus—that theſe ſhould be given up to the cruel ſport of the Pichegru's,

the Jourdans, the Santerres, under the Rolands, and Briſſots, and Gorſas, and Robeſpierres, the Reubels, the Carnots, and Talliens, and Dantons, and the whole tribe of regicides, robbers, and revolutionary judges, that, from the rotten carcaſe of their own murdered country, have poured out innumerable ſwarms of the loweſt, and at once the moſt deſtructive of the claſſes of animated nature, which, like columns of locuſts, have laid waſte the faireſt part of the world?

Would Keppel have borne to ſee the ruin of the virtuous patricians, that happy union of the noble and the burgher, who with ſignal prudence and integrity, had long governed the cities of the confederate republick, the cheriſhing fathers of their country, who, denying commerce to themſelves, made it flouriſh in a manner unexampled under their protection? Could Keppel have borne that a vile faction ſhould totally deſtroy this harmonious conſtruction, in favour of a robbing democracy, founded on the ſpurious rights of man?

He was no great clerk, but he was perfectly well verſed in the intereſts of Europe, and he could not have heard with patience, that the country of Grotius, the cradle of the law of nations, and one of the richeſt repoſitories of all law, ſhould be taught a new code by the ignorant flippancy of Thomas Paine, the preſumptuous foppery of La Fayette, with his ſtolen rights of man in his hand,

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the wild profligate intrigue and turbulency of Marat, and the impious ſophiſtry of Condorcet, in his inſolent addreſſes to the Batavian republick?

Could Keppel, who idolized the houſe of Naſſau, who was himſelf given to England, along with the bleſſings of the Britiſh and Dutch revolutions; with revolutions of ſtability; with revolutions which conſolidated and married the liberties and the intereſts of the two nations for ever, could he ſee the fountain of Britiſh liberty itſelf in ſervitude to France? Could he ſee with patience a prince of Orange expelled as a ſort of diminutive deſpot, with every kind of contumely, from the country, which that family of deliverers had ſo often reſcued from ſlavery, and obliged to live in exile in another country, which owes its liberty to his houſe?

Would Keppel have heard with patience, that the conduct to be held on ſuch occaſions was to become ſhort by the knees to the faction of the homicides, to intreat them quietly to retire? or if the fortune of war ſhould drive them from their firſt wicked and unprovoked invaſion, that no ſecurity ſhould be taken, no arrangement made, no barrier formed, no alliance entered into for the ſecurity of that, which under a foreign name is the moſt precious part of England? What would he have ſaid, if it was even propoſed that the

Auſtrian Nertherlands (which ought to be a barrier to Holland, and the tie of an alliance, to protect her againſt any ſpecies of rule that might be erected, or even be reſtored in France) ſhould be formed into a republick under her influence, and dependent upon her power?

But above all, what would he have ſaid, if he had heard it made a matter of accuſation againſt me, by his nephew the duke of Bedford, that I was the author of the war? Had I a mind to keep that high diſtinction to myſelf, as from pride I might, but from juſtice I dare not, he would have ſnatched his ſhare of it from my hand, and held it with the graſp of a dying convulſion to his end.

It would be a moſt arrogant preſumption in me to aſſume to myſelf the glory of what belongs to his majeſty, and to his miniſters, and to his parliament, and to the far greater majority of his faithful people: But had I ſtood alone to counſel, and that all were determined to be guided by my advice, and to follow it implicitly—then I ſhould have been the ſole author of a war. But it ſhould have been a war on my ideas and my principles. However, let his Grace think as he may of my demerits with regard to the war with regicide, he will find my guilt confined to that alone. He never ſhall, with the ſmalleſt colour of reaſon, accuſe me of being the author of a peace with

regicide. But that is high matter; and ought not to be mixed with any thing of so little moment, as what may belong to me, or even to the duke of Bedford.

I have the honour to be, &c.

EDMUND BURKE.

MR. BURKE'S

THREE LETTERS

ADDRESSED TO

A MEMBER OF THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT;

ON THE

PROPOSALS FOR PEACE

WITH THE

REGICIDE DIRECTORY OF FRANCE.

1796.

LETTER I.

ON THE

OVERTURES OF PEACE.

MY DEAR SIR,

OUR laſt converſation, though not in the tone of abſolute deſpondency, was far from chearful. We could not eaſily account for ſome unpleaſant appearances. They were repreſented to us as indicating the ſtate of the popular mind; and they were not at all what we ſhould have expected from our old ideas even of the faults and vices of the Engliſh character. The diſaſtrous events, which have followed one upon another in a long unbroken funereal train, moving in a proceſſion, that ſeemed to have no end, theſe were not the principal cauſes of our dejection. We feared more from what threatened to fail within, than what menaced to oppreſs us from abroad. To a people who have once been proud and great, and great becauſe they were proud, a change in the national ſpirit is the moſt terrible of all revolutions.

I ſhall not live to behold the unravelling of the intricate plot, which ſaddens and perplexes the awful

awful drama of Providence, now acting on the moral theatre of the world. Whether for thought or for action, I am at the end of my career. You are in the middle of yours. In what part of its orbit the nation, with which we are carried along, moves at this inſtant, it is not eaſy to conjecture. It may, perhaps, be far advanced in its aphelion.—But when to return?

Not to loſe ourſelves in the infinite void of the conjectural world, our buſineſs is with what is likely to be affected for the better or the worſe, by the wiſdom or weakneſs of our plans. In all ſpeculations upon men and human affairs, it is of no ſmall moment to diſtinguiſh things of accident from permanent cauſes, and from effects that cannot be altered. It is not every irregularity in our movement that is a total deviation from our courſe. I am not quite of the mind of thoſe ſpeculators, who ſeem aſſured, that neceſſarily, and by the conſtitution of things, all ſtates have the ſame periods of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude, that are found in the individuals who compoſe them. Parallels of this ſort rather furniſh ſimilitudes to illuſtrate or to adorn, than ſupply analogies from whence to reaſon. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an analogy are not found in the ſame claſſes of exiſtence. Individuals are phyſical beings ſubject to laws univerſal and invariable. The immediate cauſe acting in theſe laws may be obſcure:

obſcure: the general reſults are ſubjects of certain calculation. But commonwealths are not phyſical but moral eſſences. They are artificial combinations; and in their proximate efficient cauſe, the arbitrary productions of the human mind. We are not yet acquainted with the laws which neceſſarily influence the ſtability of that kind of work made by that kind of agent. There is not in the phyſical order (with which they do not appear to hold any aſſignable connexion) a diſtinct cauſe by which any of thoſe fabricks muſt neceſſarily grow, flouriſh, or decay; nor, in my opinion, does the moral world produce any thing more determinate on that ſubject, than what may ſerve as an amuſement (liberal indeed, and ingenious, but ſtill only an amuſement) for ſpeculative men. I doubt whether the hiſtory of mankind is yet complete enough, if ever it can be ſo, to furniſh grounds for a ſure theory on the internal cauſes which neceſſarily affect the fortune of a State. I am far from denying the operation of ſuch cauſes: but they are infinitely uncertain, and much more obſcure, and much more difficult to trace, than the foreign cauſes that tend to raiſe, to depreſs, and ſometimes to overwhelm a community.

It is often impoſſible, in theſe political inquiries, to find any proportion between the apparent force of any moral cauſes we may aſſign and their known operation. We are therefore obliged to deliver up that

that operation to mere chance, or more piouſly (perhaps more rationally) to the occaſional interpoſition and irreſiſtible hand of the Great Diſpoſer. We have ſeen ſtates of conſiderable duration, which for ages have remained nearly as they have begun, and could hardly be ſaid to ebb or flow. Some appear to have ſpent their vigour at their commencement. Some have blazed out in their glory a little before their extinction. The meridian of ſome has been the moſt ſplendid. Others, and they the greateſt number, have fluctuated, and experienced at different periods of their exiſtence a great variety of fortune. At the very moment when ſome of them ſeemed plunged in unfathomable abyſſes of diſgrace and diſaſter, they have ſuddenly emerged. They have begun a new courſe and opened a new reckoning; and even in the depths of their calamity, and on the very ruins of their country, have laid the foundations of a towering and durable greatneſs. All this has happened without any apparent previous change in the general circumſtances which had brought on their diſtreſs. The death of a man at a critical juncture, his diſguſt, his retreat, his diſgrace, have brought innumerable calamities on a whole nation. A common ſoldier, a child, a girl at the door of an inn, have changed the face of fortune, and almoſt of nature.

Such, and often influenced by ſuch cauſes, has commonly

commonly been the fate of monarchies of long duration. They have their ebbs and their flows. This has been eminently the fate of the monarchy of France. There have been times in which no power has ever been brought ſo low. Few have ever flouriſhed in greater glory. By turns elevated and depreſſed, that power had been, on the whole, rather on the increaſe; and it continued not only powerful but formidable to the hour of the total ruin of the monarchy. This fall of the monarchy was far from being preceded by any exterior ſymptoms of decline. The interiour were not viſible to every eye; and a thouſand accidents might have prevented the operation of what the moſt clear-ſighted were not able to diſcern, nor the moſt provident to divine. A very little time before its dreadful cataſtrophe, there was a kind of exterior ſplendour in the ſituation of the crown, which uſually adds to government ſtrength and authority at home. The crown ſeemed then to have obtained ſome of the moſt ſplendid objects of ſtate ambition. None of the continental powers of Europe were the enemies of France. They were all, either tacitly diſpoſed to her, or publickly connected with her; and in thoſe who kept the moſt aloof, there was little appearance of jealouſy; of animoſity there was no appearance at all. The Britiſh nation, her great preponderating rival, ſhe had humbled; to all appearance ſhe had weakened; certainly had

endangered, by cutting off a very large, and by far the moſt growing part of her empire. In that its acmé of human proſperity and greatneſs, in the high and palmy ſtate of the monarchy of France, it fell to the ground without a ſtruggle. It fell without any of thoſe vices in the monarch, which have ſometimes been the cauſes of the fall of kingdoms, but which exiſted, without any viſible effect on the ſtate, in the higheſt degree in many other princes; and, far from deſtroying their power, had only left ſome ſlight ſtains on their character. The financial difficulties were only pretexts and inſtruments of thoſe who accompliſh the ruin of that monarchy. They were not the cauſes of it.

Deprived of the old government, deprived in a manner of all government, France fallen as a monarchy, to common ſpeculators might have appeared more likely to be an object of pity or inſult, according to the diſpoſition of the circumjacent powers, than to be the ſcourge and terrour of them all: but out of the tomb of the murdered monarchy in France, has ariſen a vaſt, tremendous, unformed ſpectre, in a far more terrifick guiſe than any which ever yet have overpowered the imagination, and ſubdued the fortitude of man. Going ſtraight forward to its end, unappalled by peril, unchecked by remorſe, deſpiſing all common maxims and all common means, that hideous phantom overpowered thoſe who could not believe it was poſſible

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ſhe could at all exiſt, except on the principles, which habit rather than nature had perſuaded them were neceſſary to their own particular welfare and to their own ordinary modes of action. But the conſtitution of any political being, as well as that of any phyſical being, ought to be known, before one can venture to ſay what is fit for its conſervation, or what is the proper means of its power. The poiſon of other ſtates is the food of the new republick. That bankruptcy, the very apprehenſion of which is one of the cauſes aſſigned for the fall of the monarchy, was the capital on which ſhe opened her traffick with the world.

The republick of regicide with an annihilated revenue, with defaced manufactures, with a ruined commerce, with an uncultivated and half-depopulated country, with a diſcontented, diſtreſſed, enſlaved, and famiſhed people, paſſing with a rapid eccentrick, incalculable courſe, from the wildeſt anarchy to the ſterneſt deſpotiſm, has actually conquered the fineſt parts of Europe, has diſtreſſed, diſunited, deranged, and broke to pieces all the reſt; and ſo ſubdued the minds of the rulers in every nation, that hardly any reſource preſents itſelf to them, except that of entitling themſelves to a contemptuous mercy by a diſplay of their imbecility and meanneſs. Even in their greateſt military efforts and the greateſt diſplay of their fortitude, they ſeem not to hope, they do not even appear to

wiſh, the extinction of what ſubſiſts to their certain ruin. Their ambition is only to be admitted to a more favoured claſs in the order of ſervitude under that domineering power.

This ſeems the temper of the day. At firſt the French force was too much deſpiſed. Now it is too much dreaded. As inconſiderate courage has given way to irrational fear, ſo it may be hoped, that through the medium of deliberate ſober apprehenſion, we may arrive at ſteady fortitude. Who knows whether indignation may not ſucceed to terrour, and the revival of high ſentiment, ſpurning away the deluſion of a ſafety purchaſed at the expence of glory, may not yet drive us to that generous deſpair, which has often ſubdued diſtempers in the ſtate for which no remedy could be found in the wiſeſt councils.

Other great ſtates, having been without any regular certain courſe of elevation, or decline, we may hope that the Britiſh fortune may fluctuate alſo; becauſe the publick mind, which greatly influences that fortune, may have its changes. We are therefore never authorized to abandon our country to its fate, or to act or adviſe as if it had no reſource. There is no reaſon to apprehend, becauſe ordinary means threaten to fail, that no others can ſpring up. Whilſt our heart is whole, it will find means, or make them. The heart of the citizen is a perennial ſpring of energy to the ſtate.

ſtate. Becauſe the pulſe ſeems to intermit, we muſt not preſume that it will ceaſe inſtantly to beat. The publick muſt never be regarded as incurable. I remember in the beginning of what has lately been called the ſeven years war, that an eloquent writer and ingenious ſpeculator, Dr. Browne, upon ſome reverſes which happened in the beginning of that war, publiſhed an elaborate philoſophical diſcourſe to prove that the diſtinguiſhing features of the people of England have been totally changed, and that a frivolous effeminacy was become the national character. Nothing could be more popular than that work. It was thought a great conſolation to us the light people of this country (who were and are light, but who were not and are not effeminate) that we had found the cauſes of our misfortunes in our vices. Pythagoras could not be more pleaſed with his leading diſcovery. But whilſt in that ſplenetick mood we amuſed ourſelves in a ſour critical ſpeculation, of which we were ourſelves the objects, and in which every man loſt his particular ſenſe of the publick diſgrace in the epidemick nature of the diſtemper; whilſt, as in the Alps *Goitre* kept *Goitre* in countenance; whilſt we were thus abandoning ourſelves to a direct confeſſion of our inferiority to France, and whilſt many, very many, were ready to act upon a ſenſe of that inferiority, a few months effected a total change in our variable minds. We emerged

from the gulph of that ſpeculative deſpondency; and were buoyed up to the higheſt point of practical vigour. Never did the maſculine ſpirit of England diſplay itſelf with more energy, nor ever did its genius ſoar with a prouder pre-eminence over France, than at the time when frivolity and effeminacy had been at leaſt tacitly acknowledged as their national character, by the good people of this kingdom.

For one (if they be properly treated) I deſpair neither of the publick fortune nor of the publick mind. There is much to be done undoubtedly, and much to be retrieved. We muſt walk in new ways, or we can never encounter our enemy in his devious march. We are not at an end of our ſtruggle nor near it. Let us not deceive ourſelves: we are at the beginning of great troubles. I readily acknowledge that the ſtate of publick affairs is infinitely more unpromiſing than at the period I have juſt now alluded to, and the poſition of all the powers of Europe, in relation to us, and in relation to each other, is more intricate and critical beyond all compariſon. Difficult indeed is our ſituation. In all ſituations of difficulty men will be influenced in the part they take, not only by the reaſon of the caſe, but by the peculiar turn of their own character. The ſame ways to ſafety do not preſent themſelves to all men, nor to the ſame men in different tempers. There is a courageous wiſdom:

there is alſo a falſe reptile prudence, the reſult not of caution but of fear. Under misfortunes it often happens that the nerves of the underſtanding are ſo relaxed, the preſſing peril of the hour ſo completely confounds all the faculties, that no future danger can be properly provided for, can be juſtly eſtimated, can be ſo much as fully ſeen. The eye of the mind is dazzled and vanquiſhed. An abject diſtruſt of ourſelves, an extravagant admiration of the enemy, preſent us with no hope but in a compromiſe with his pride, by a ſubmiſſion to his will. This ſhort plan of policy is the only counſel which will obtain a hearing. We plunge into a dark gulph with all the raſh precipitation of fear. The nature of courage is, without a queſtion, to be converſant with danger; but in the palpable night of their terrours, men under conſternation ſuppoſe, not that it is the danger, which, by a ſure inſtinct, calls out the courage to reſiſt it, but that it is the courage which produces the danger. They therefore ſeek for a refuge from their fears in the fears themſelves, and conſider a temporizing meanneſs as the only ſource of ſafety.

The rules and definitions of prudence can rarely be exact; never univerſal. I do not deny that in ſmall truckling ſtates a timely compromiſe with power has often been the means, and the only means, of drawling out their puny exiſtence; but a great ſtate is too much envied, too much dreaded

to find ſafety in humiliation. To be ſecure, it muſt be reſpected. Power, and eminence, and conſideration, are things not to be begged. They muſt be commanded: and they who ſupplicate for mercy from others, can never hope for juſtice through themſelves. What juſtice they are to obtain, as the alms of an enemy, depends upon his character; and that they ought well to know before they implicitly confide.

Much controverſy there has been in Parliament, and not a little amongſt us out of doors, about the inſtrumental means of this nation towards the maintenance of her dignity, and the aſſertion of her rights. On the moſt elaborate and correct detail of facts, the reſult ſeems to be, that at no time has the wealth and power of Great Britain been ſo conſiderable as it is at this very perilous moment. We have a vaſt intereſt to preſerve, and we poſſeſs great means of preſerving it: but it is to be remembered that the artificer may be incumbered by his tools, and that reſources may be among impediments. If wealth is the obedient and laborious ſlave of virtue and of publick honour, than wealth is in its place, and has its uſe: but if this order is changed, and honour is to be ſacrificed to the conſervation of riches, riches which have neither eyes nor hands, nor any thing truly vital in them, cannot long ſurvive the being of their vivifying powers, their legitimate maſters, and their potent protectors.

If

If we command our wealth, we ſhall be rich and free: if our wealth commands us, we are poor indeed. We are bought by the enemy with the treaſure from our own coffers. Too great a ſenſe of the value of a ſubordinate intereſt may be the very ſource of its danger, as well as the certain ruin of intereſts of a ſuperiour order. Often has a man loſt his all becauſe he would not ſubmit to hazard all in defending it. A diſplay of our wealth before robbers is not the way to reſtrain their boldneſs, or to leſſen their rapacity. This diplay is made, I know, to perſuade the people of England that thereby we ſhall awe the enemy, and improve the terms of our capitulation: it is made, not that we ſhould fight with more animation, but that we ſhould ſupplicate with better hopes. We are miſtaken. We have an enemy to deal with who never regarded our conteſt as a meaſuring and weighing of purſes. He is the Gaul that puts his *ſword* into the ſcale. He is more tempted with our wealth as booty, then terrified with it as power. But let us be rich or poor, let us be either in what proportion we may, nature is falſe or this is true, that where the eſſential publick force (of which money is but a part) is in any degree upon a par in a conflict betwen nations, that ſtate which is reſolved to hazard its exiſtence rather than to abandon its objects, muſt have an infinite advantage over that which is reſolved to yield rather than to carry

carry its reſiſtance beyond a certain point. Humanly ſpeaking, that people which bounds its efforts only with its being, muſt give the law to that nation which will not puſh its oppoſition beyond its convenience.

If we look to nothing but our domeſtick condition, the ſtate of the nation is full even to plethory; but if we imagine that this country can long maintain its blood and its food, as disjoined from the community of mankind, ſuch an opinion does not deſerve refutation as abſurd, but pity as inſane.

I do not know that ſuch an improvident and ſtupid ſelfiſhneſs deſerves the diſcuſſion, which perhaps, I may beſtow upon it hereafter. We cannot arrange with our enemy in the preſent conjuncture, without abandoning the intereſt of mankind. If we look only to our own petty peculium in the war, we have had ſome advantages; advantages ambiguous in their nature, and dearly bought. We have not in the ſlighteſt degree impaired the ſtrength of the common enemy in any one of thoſe points in which his particular force conſiſts; at the ſame time that new enemies to ourſelves, new allies to the regicide republick, have been made out of the wrecks and fragments of the general confederacy. So far as to the ſelfiſh part. As compoſing a part of the community of Europe, and intereſted in its fate, it is not eaſy to conceive a ſtate of things more doubtful and perplexing.

When

When Louis the XIVth had made himſelf maſter of one of the largeſt and moſt important provinces of Spain; when he had in a manner overrun Lombardy, and was thundering at the gates of Turin; when he had maſtered almoſt all Germany on this ſide the Rhine; when he was on the point of ruining the auguſt fabrick of the empire; when with the elector of Bavaria in his alliance, hardly any thing interpoſed between him and Vienna; when the Turk hung with a mighty force over the empire on the other ſide; I do not know, that in the beginning of 1704 (that is in the third year of the renovated war with Louis the XIVth) the ſtate of Europe was ſo truly alarming. To England it certainly was not. Holland (and Holland is a matter to England of value ineſtimable) was then powerful was then independent, and though greatly endangered, was then full of energy and ſpirit. But the great reſource of Europe was in England: not in a ſort of England detached from the reſt of the world, and amuſing herſelf with the puppet-ſhew of a naval power, (it can be no better, whilſt all the ſources of that power, and of every ſort of power, are precarious) but in that ſort of England, who conſidered herſelf as embodied with Europe; but in that ſort of England, who, ſympathetick with the adverſity or the happineſs of mankind, felt that nothing in human affairs was foreign to her. We may conſider it as a ſure axiom that, as on the one hand

hand no confederacy of the leaſt effect or duration can exiſt againſt France, of which England is not only a part, but the head, ſo neither can England pretend to cope with France but as connected with the body of Chriſtendom.

Our account of the war, *as a war of communion*, to the very point in which we began to throw out lures, oglings, and glances for peace, was a war of diſaſter and of little elſe. The independent advantages obtained by us at the beginning of the war, and which were made at the expence of that common cauſe, if they deceive us about our largeſt and our ſureſt intereſt, are to be reckoned amongſt our heavieſt loſſes.

The allies, and Great Britain amongſt the reſt, (and perhaps among the foremoſt) have been miſerably deluded by this great fundamental errour; that it was in our power to make peace with this monſter of a ſtate, whenever we choſe to forget the crimes that made it great, and the deſigns that made it formidable. People imagined that their ceaſing to reſiſt was the ſure way to be ſecure. This "pale caſt of thought" ſicklied over all their enterpriſes and turned all their politicks awry. They could not, or rather they would not read, in the moſt unequivocal declarations of the enemy and in his uniform conduct, that more ſafety was to be found in the moſt ardous war, than in the friendſhip of that kind of being. Its hoſtile amity

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can be obtained on no terms that do not imply an inability hereafter to reſiſt its deſigns. This great prolifick errour (I mean that peace was always in our power) has been the cauſe that rendered the allies indifferent about the *direction* of the war; and perſuaded them that they might always riſk a choice, and even a change in its objects. They ſeldom improved any advantage: hoping that the enemy, affected by it, would make a proffer of peace. Hence it was, that all their early victories have been followed almoſt immediately with the uſual effects of a defeat; whilſt all the advantages obtained by the regicides, have been followed by the conſequences that were natural. The diſcomfitures, which the republick of aſſaſſins has ſuffered, have uniformly called forth new exertions, which not only repaired old loſſes, but prepared new conqueſts. The loſſes of the allies, on the contrary, (no proviſion having been made on the ſpeculation of ſuch an event) have been followed by deſertion, by diſmay, by diſunion, by a dereliction of their policy, by a flight from their principles, by an admiration of the enemy, by mutual accuſations, by a diſtruſt in every member of the alliance of its fellow, of its cauſe, its power, and its courage.

Great difficulties in conſequence of our erroneous policy, as I have ſaid, preſs upon every ſide of us. Far from deſiring to conceal or even to palliate the

the evil in the repreſentation, I wiſh to lay it down as my foundation, that never greater exiſted. In a moment when ſudden panick is apprehended, it may be wiſe, for a while to conceal ſome great publick diſaſter, or to reveal it by degrees, until the minds of the people have time to be recollected, that their underſtanding may have leiſure to rally, and that more ſteady councils may prevent their doing ſomething deſperate under the firſt impreſſions of rage or terrour. But with regard to a *general* ſtate of things, growing out of events and cauſes already known in the groſs, there is no piety in the fraud that covers its true nature; becauſe nothing but erroneous reſolutions can be the reſult of falſe repreſentations. Thoſe meaſures which in common diſtreſs might be available, in greater, are no better than playing with the evil. That the effort may bear a proportion to the exigence, it is fit it ſhould be known; known in its quality, in its extent, and in all the circumſtances which attend it. Great reverſes of fortune there have been, and great embarraſſments in council: a principled regicide enemy poſſeſſed of the moſt important part of Europe, and ſtruggling for the reſt: within ourſelves a total relaxation of all authority, whilſt a cry is raiſed againſt it, as if it were the moſt ferocious of all deſpotiſm. A worſe phænomenon;—our government diſowned by the moſt efficient member of its tribunals; ill ſupported by any of their

their conſtituent parts; and the higheſt tribunal of all (from cauſes not for our preſent purpoſe to examine) deprived of all that dignity and all that efficiency which might enforce, or regulate, or if the caſe required it, might ſupply the want of every other court. Publick proſecutions are become little better than ſchools for treaſon; of no uſe but to improve the dexterity of criminals in the myſtery of evaſion; or to ſhew with what complete impunity men may conſpire againſt the commonwealth; with what ſafety aſſaſſins may attempt its awful head. Every thing is ſecure, except what the laws have made ſacred; every thing is tameneſs and languor that is not fury and faction. Whilſt the diſtempers of a relaxed fibre prognoſticate and prepare all the morbid force of convulſion in the body of the ſtate, the ſteadineſs of the phyſician is overpowered by the very aſpect of the diſeaſe*. The doctor of the conſtitution, pretending to underrate what he is not able to contend with, ſhrinks from his own operation. He doubts and queſtions the ſalutary but critical terrours of the cautery and the knife. He takes a poor credit even from his defeat; and covers impotence under the maſk of lenity. He praiſes the moderation of the laws, as, in his hands, he ſees them baffled and deſpiſed. Is all this, becauſe in our day the ſtatutes of the

* "Muſſabat tacito medicina timore."

kingdom

kingdom are not engroſſed in as firm a character, and imprinted in as black and legible a type as ever? No! the law is a clear, but it is a dead letter. Dead and putrid, it is inſufficient to ſave the ſtate, but potent to infect and to kill. Living law, full of reaſon, and of equity and juſtice, (as it is, or it ſhould not exiſt) ought to be ſevere and awful too; or the words of menace, whether written on the parchment roll of England, or cut into the brazen tablet of Rome, will excite nothing but contempt. How comes it, that in all the ſtate proſecutions of magnitude, from the revolution to within theſe two or three years, the crown has ſcarcely ever retired diſgraced and defeated from its courts? Whence this alarming change? By a connection eaſily felt, and not impoſſible to be traced to its cauſe, all the parts of the ſtate have their correſpondence and conſent. They who bow to the enemy abroad will not be of power to ſubdue the conſpirator at home. It is impoſſible not to obſerve, that in proportion as we approximate to the poiſonous jaws of anarchy, the faſcination grows irreſiſtible. In proportion as we are attracted towards the focus of illegality, irreligion, and deſperate enterpriſe, all the venomous and blighting inſects of the ſtate are awakened into life. The promiſe of the year is blaſted, and ſhrivelled, and burned up before them. Our moſt ſalutary and moſt beautiful inſtitutions yield nothing but duſt and

and ſmut: the harveſt of our law is no more than ſtubble. It is in the nature of theſe eruptive diſeaſes in the ſtate to ſink in by fits and reappear. But the fuel of the malady remains; and in my opinion is not in the ſmalleſt degree mitigated in its malignity, though it waits the favourable moment of a freer communication with the ſource of regicide to exert and to increaſe its force.

Is it that the people are changed, that the commonwealth cannot be protected by its laws? I hardly think it. On the contrary, I conceive, that theſe things happen becauſe men are not changed, but remain always what they always were; they remain what the bulk of us muſt ever be, when abandoned to our vulgar propenſities, without guide, leader, or controul: that is, made to be full of a blind elevation in proſperity; to deſpiſe untried dangers; to be overpowered with unexpected reverſes; to find no clue in a labyrinth of difficulties; to get out of a preſent inconvenience with any riſk of future ruin; to follow and to bow to fortune; to admire ſucceſsful though wicked enterpriſe, and to imitate what we admire; to contemn the government which announces danger from ſacrilege and regicide, whilſt they are only in their infancy and their ſtruggle, but which finds nothing that can alarm in their adult ſtate and in the power and triumph of thoſe deſtructive principles. In a maſs

we cannot be left to ourſelves. We muſt have leaders. If none will undertake to lead us right, we ſhall find guides who will contrive to conduct us to ſhame and ruin.

We are in a war of a *peculiar* nature. It is not with an ordinary community, which is hoſtile or friendly as paſſion or as intereſt may veer about: not with a State which makes war through wantonneſs, and abandons it through laſſitude. We are at war with a ſyſtem, which, by its eſſence, is inimical to all other Governments, and which makes peace or war, as peace and war may beſt contribute to their ſubverſion. It is with an *armed doctrine*, that we are at war. It has, by its eſſence, a faction of opinion, and of intereſt, and of enthuſiaſm, in every country. To us it is a Coloſſus which beſtrides our channel. It has one foot on a foreign ſhore, the other upon the Britiſh ſoil. Thus advantaged, if it can at all exiſt, it muſt finally prevail. Nothing can ſo completely ruin any of the old Governments, ours in particular, as the acknowledgment, directly or by implication, of any kind of ſuperiority in this new power. This acknowledgment we make, if in a bad or doubtful ſituation of our affairs, we ſolicit peace; or if we yield to the modes of new humiliation, in which alone ſhe is content to give us an hearing. By that means the terms cannot be of our chooſing; no, not in any part.

It

It is laid in the unalterable conſtitution of things:—None can aſpire to act greatly, but thoſe who are of force greatly to ſuffer. They who made their arrangements in the firſt run of miſadventure, and in a temper of mind the common fruit of diſappointment and diſmay, put a ſeal on their calamities. To their power they take a ſecurity againſt any favours which they might hope from the uſual inconſtancy of fortune. I am therefore, my dear friend, invariably of your opinion (though full of reſpect for thoſe who think differently) that neither the time choſen for it, nor the manner of ſoliciting a negotiation, were properly conſidered; even though I had allowed (I hardly ſhall allow) that with the horde of regicides we could by any ſelection of time, or uſe of means, obtain any thing at all deſerving the name of peace.

In one point we are lucky. The regicide has received our advances with ſcorn. We have an enemy, to whoſe virtues we can owe nothing; but on this occaſion we are infinitely obliged to one of his vices. We owe more to his inſolence than to our own precaution. The haughtineſs by which the proud repel us, has this of good in it; that in making us keep our diſtance, they muſt keep their diſtance too. In the preſent caſe, the pride of the regicide may be our ſafety. He has given time for our reaſon to operate; and for Britiſh dignity to recover from its ſurpriſe. From firſt to laſt he

has rejected all our advances. Far as we have gone he has ſtill left a way open to our retreat.

There is always an augury to be taken of what a peace is likely to be, from the preliminary ſteps that are made to bring it about. We may gather ſomething from the time in which the firſt overtures are made; from the quarter whence they come; from the manner in which they are received. Theſe diſcover the temper of the parties. If your enemy offers peace in the moment of ſucceſs, it indicates that he is ſatisfied with ſomething. It ſhews that there are limits to his ambition or his reſentment. If he offers nothing under misfortune, it is probable, that it is more painful to him to abandon the proſpect of advantage than to endure calamity. If he rejects ſolicitation, and will not give even a nod to the ſuppliants for peace, until a change in the fortune of the war threatens him with ruin, then I think it evident, that he wiſhes nothing more than to diſarm his adverſary to gain time. Afterwards a queſtion ariſes, which of the parties is likely to obtain the greater advantages, by continuing diſarmed and by the uſe of time.

With theſe few plain indications in our minds, it will not be improper to re-conſider the conduct of the enemy together with our own, from the day that a queſtion of peace has been in agitation. In conſidering this part of the queſtion, I do not proceed on my own hypotheſis. I ſuppoſe, for a moment,

moment, that this body of regicide, calling itſelf a republick, is a politick perſon, with whom ſomething deſerving the name of peace may be made. On that ſuppoſition, let us examine our own proceeding. Let us compute the profit it has brought, and the advantage that it is likely to bring hereafter. A peace too eagerly ſought, is not always the ſooner obtained. The diſcovery of vehement wiſhes generally fruſtrates their attainment; and your adverſary has gained a great advantage over you when he finds you impatient to conclude a treaty. There is in reſerve, not only ſomething of dignity, but a great deal of prudence too. A ſort of courage belongs to negotiation as well as to operations of the field. A negotiator muſt often ſeem willing to hazard the whole iſſue of his treaty, if he wiſhes to ſecure any one material point.

The regicides were the firſt to declare war. We are the firſt to ſue for peace. In proportion to the humility and perſeverance we have ſhewn in our addreſſes, has been the obſtinacy of their arrogance in rejecting our ſuit. The patience of their pride ſeems to have been worn out with the importunity of our courtſhip. Diſguſted as they are with a conduct ſo different from all the ſentiments by which they are themſelves filled, they think to put an end to our vexatious ſolicitation by redoubling their inſults.

It happens frequently, that pride may reject a publick advance, while intereſt liſtens to a ſecret ſuggeſtion of advantage. The opportunity has been afforded. At a very early period in the diplomacy of humiliation, a gentleman was ſent on an errand *, of which, from the motive of it, whatever the event might be, we can never be aſhamed. Humanity cannot be degraded by humiliation. It is its very character to ſubmit to ſuch things. There is a conſanguinity between benevolence and humility. They are virtues of the ſame ſtock. Dignity is of as good a race; but it belongs to the family of fortitude. In the ſpirit of that benevolence, we ſent a gentleman to beſeech the directory of regicide, not to be quite ſo prodigal as their republick had been of judicial murder. We ſolicited them to ſpare the lives of ſome unhappy perſons of the firſt diſtinction, whoſe ſafety at other times could not have been an object of ſolicitation. They had quitted France on the faith of the declaration of the rights of citizens. They never had been in the ſervice of the regicides, nor at their hands had received any ſtipend. The very ſyſtem and conſtitution of government that now prevails, was ſettled ſubſequent to their emigration. They were under the protection of Great Britain, and in his Majeſty's pay and ſervice. Not an hoſtile invaſion, but the

* Mr. Bird ſent to ſtate the real ſituation of the Duc de Choiſeul.

diſaſters

diſaſters of the ſea had thrown them upon a ſhore more barbarous and inhoſpitable than the inclement ocean under the moſt pitileſs of its ſtorms. Here was an opportunity to expreſs a feeling for the miſeries of war; and to open ſome ſort of converſation, which (after our publick overtures had glutted their pride), at a cautious and jealous diſtance, might lead to ſomething like an accomodation. What was the event? A ſtrange uncouth thing, a theatrical figure of the opera, his head ſhaded with three-coloured plumes, his body fantaſtically habited, ſtrutted from the back ſcenes, and after a ſhort ſpeech, in the mock heroick falſetto of ſtupid tragedy, delivered the gentleman who came to make the repreſentation into the cuſtody of a guard, with directions not to loſe ſight of him for a moment; and then ordered him to be ſent from Paris in two hours.

Here it is impoſſible, that a ſentiment of tenderneſs ſhould not ſtrike athwart the ſternneſs of politicks, and make us recal to painful memory, the difference between this inſolent and bloody theatre and the temperate, natural majeſty of a civilized court, where the afflicted family of Aſgill did not in vain ſolicit the mercy of the higheſt of rank, and the moſt compaſſionate of the compaſſionate ſex.

In this intercourſe, at leaſt, there was nothing to promiſe a great deal of ſucceſs in our future advances. Whilſt the fortune of the field was wholly

with the regicides, nothing was thought of but to follow where it led; and it led to every thing. Not ſo much as a talk of treaty. Laws were laid down with arrogance. The moſt moderate politician in their clan *, was choſen as the organ, not ſo much for preſcribing limits to their claims, as to mark what, for the preſent, they are content to leave to others. They made, not laws, not conventions, not late poſſeſſion, but phyſical nature, and political convenience, the ſole foundation of their claims. The Rhine, the Mediterranean, and the ocean were the bounds which, for the time, they aſſigned to the empire of regicide. What was the chamber of union of Louis the Fourteenth, which aſtoniſhed and provoked all Europe, compared to this declaration? In truth, with theſe limits, and their principle, they would not have left even the ſhadow of liberty or ſafety to any nation. This plan of empire was not taken up in the firſt intoxication of unexpected ſucceſs. You muſt recollect, that it was projected, juſt as the report has ſtated it, from the very firſt revolt of the faction againſt their monarchy; and it has been uniformly purſued, as a ſtanding maxim of national policy, from that time to this. It is, generally, in the ſeaſon of proſperity that men diſcover their real temper, principles, and deſigns. But this principle ſuggeſted in their firſt ſtruggles, fully avowed in their

* Boiſſy d' Anglas.

proſperity,

proſperity, has, in the moſt adverſe ſtate of their affairs, been tenaciouſly adhered to. The report, combined with their conduct, forms an infallible criterion of the views of this republic.

In their fortune there has been ſome fluctuation. We are to ſee how their minds have been affected with a change. Some impreſſion it made on them undoubtedly. It produced ſome oblique notice of the ſubmiſſions that were made by ſuppliant nations. The utmoſt they did, was to make ſome of thoſe cold, formal, general profeſſions of a love of peace which no Power has ever refuſed to make; becauſe they mean little, and coſt nothing. The firſt paper I have ſeen (the publication at Hamburgh) making a ſhew of that pacifick diſpoſition, diſcovered a rooted animoſity againſt this nation, and an incurable rancour, even more than any one of their hoſtile acts. In this Hamburgh declaration, they chooſe to ſuppoſe, that the war, on the part of England, *is a war of government, begun and carried on againſt the ſenſe and intereſts of the people*; thus ſowing in their very overtures towards peace, the ſeeds of tumult and ſedition: for they never have abandoned, and never will they abandon, in peace, in war, in treaty, in any ſituation, or for one inſtant, their old ſteady maxim of ſeparating the people from their Government. Let me add—and it is with unfeigned anxiety for the character and credit of miniſters

miniſters that I do add—if our government perſeveres, in its as uniform courſe, of acting under inſtruments with ſuch preambles, it pleads guilty to the charges made by our enemies againſt it, both on its own part, and on the part of parliament itſelf. The enemy muſt ſucceed in his plan for looſening and diſconnecting all the internal holdings of the kingdom.

It was not enough, that the ſpeech from the Throne in the opening of the ſeſſion in 1795, threw out oglings and glances of tenderneſs. Leſt this coquetting ſhould ſeem too cold and ambiguous, without waiting for its effect, the violent paſſion for a relation to the regicides, produced a direct meſſage from the crown, and its conſequences from the two Houſes of parliament. On the part of the regicides theſe declarations could not be entirely paſſed by without notice; but in that notice they diſcovered ſtill more clearly the bottom of their character. The offer made to them by the meſſage to Parliament was hinted at in their anſwer; but in an obſcure and oblique manner as before. They accompanied their notice of the indications manifeſted on our ſide, with every kind of inſolent and taunting reflection. The regicide directory, on the day which, in their gipſey jargon, they call the 5th of Pluvioſe, in return for our advances, charge us with eluding our declarations under "evaſive formalities

"and

"and frivolous pretexts." What theſe pretexts and evaſions were, they do not ſay, and I have never heard. But they do not reſt there. They proceed to charge us, and, as it ſhould ſeem, our allies in the maſs, with direct *perfidy*; they are ſo conciliatory in their language as to hint that this perfidious character is not new in our proceedings. However, notwithſtanding this our habitual perfidy, they will offer peace "on conditions *as* moderate"—as what? as reaſon and as equity require? No! as moderate "as are ſuitable to "their *national dignity*." National dignity in all treaties I do admit is an important conſideration. They have given us an uſeful hint on that ſubject: but dignity, hitherto, has belonged to the mode of proceeding, not to the matter of a treaty. Never before has it been mentioned as the ſtandard for rating the conditions of peace; no, never by the moſt violent of conquerors. Indemnification is capable of ſome eſtimate; dignity has no ſtandard. It is impoſſible to gueſs what acquiſitions pride and ambition may think fit for their *dignity*. But leſt any doubt ſhould remain on what they think for their dignity, the regicides in the next paragraph tell us "that they will have no peace with their "enemies, until they have reduced them to a "ſtate, which will put them under an *impoſſibility* "of purſuing their wretched projects;" that is, in plain French or Engliſh, until they have accomplished

pliſhed our utter and irretrievable ruin. This is their *pacifick* language. It flows from their unalterable principle in whatever language they ſpeak, or whatever ſteps they take, whether of real war, or of pretended pacification. They have never, to do them juſtice, been at much trouble in concealing their intentions. We were as obſtinately reſolved to think them not in earneſt: but I confeſs jeſts of this ſort, whatever their urbanity may be, are not much to my taſte.

To this conciliatory and amicable publick communication, our ſole anſwer, in effect, is this— "Citizen regicides! whenever *you* find yourſelves "in the humour, you may have a peace with *us*. "That is a point you may always command. We "are conſtantly in attendance, and nothing you "can do ſhall hinder us from the renewal of our "ſupplications. You may turn us out at the "door; but we will jump in at the window."

To thoſe who do not love to contemplate the fall of human greatneſs, I do not know a more mortifying, ſpectacle, than to ſee the aſſembled majeſty of the crowned heads of Europe waiting as patient ſuitors in the anti-chamber of regicide. They wait, it ſeems, until the ſanguinary tyrant *Carnot*, ſhall have ſnorted away the fumes of the indigeſted blood of his ſovereign. Then, when ſunk on the down of uſurped pomp, he ſhall have ſufficiently indulged his meditations with what monarch

monarch he ſhall next glut his ravening maw, he may condeſcend to ſignify that it is his pleaſure to be awake; and that he is at leiſure to receive the propoſals of his high and mighty clients for the terms on which he may reſpite the execution of the ſentence he has paſſed upon them. At the opening of thoſe doors, what a ſight it muſt be to behold the plenipotentiaries of royal impotence, in the precedency which they will intrigue to obtain, and which will be granted to them according to the ſeniority of their degradation, ſneaking into the regicide preſence, and with the relicks of the ſmile, which they had dreſſed up for the levee of their maſters, ſtill flickering on their curled lips, preſenting the faded remains of their courtly graces, to meet the ſcornful, ferocious, ſardonick grin of a bloody ruffian, who, whilſt he his receiving their homage, is meaſuring them with his eye, and fitting to their ſize the ſlider of his guillotine! Theſe ambaſſadors may eaſily return as good courtiers as they went; but can they ever return from that degrading reſidence, loyal and faithful ſubjects; or with any true affection to their maſter, or true attachment to the conſtitution, religion, or laws of their country? There is great danger that they who enter ſmiling into this Trophonian cave, will come out of it ſad and ſerious conſpirators; and ſuch will continue as long as they live. They will become true conductors of contagion to every country,

country, which has had the misfortune to ſend them to the ſource of that electricity. At beſt they will become totally indifferent to good and evil, to one inſtitution or another. This ſpecies of indifference is but too generally diſtinguiſhable in thoſe who have been much employed in foreign courts; but in the preſent caſe the evil muſt be aggravated without meaſure; for they go from their country, not with the pride of the old character, but in a ſtate of the loweſt degradation; and what muſt happen in their place of reſidence can have no effect in raiſing them to the level of true dignity, or of chaſte ſelf-eſtimation, either as men, or as repreſentatives of crowned heads.

Our early proceeding, which has produced theſe returns of affront, appeared to me totally new, without being adapted to the new circumſtances of affairs. I have called to my mind the ſpeeches and meſſages in former times. I find nothing like theſe. You will look in the journals to find whether my memory fails me. Before this time, never was a ground of peace laid, (as it were, in a parliamentary record) until it had been as good as concluded. This was a wiſe homage paid to the diſcretion of the crown. It was known how much a negotiation muſt ſuffer by having any thing in the train towards it prematurely diſcloſed. But when thoſe parliamentary declarations were made,

made, not ſo much as a ſtep had been taken towards a negotiation in any mode whatever. The meaſure was an unpleaſant and unſeaſonable diſcovery.

I conceive that another circumſtance in that tranſaction has been as little authorized by any example; and that it is as little prudent in itſelf; I mean the formal recognition of the French Republick. Without entering, for the preſent, into a queſtion on the good faith manifeſted in that meaſure, or on its general policy, I doubt, upon mere temporary conſiderations of prudence, whether it was perfectly adviſeable. It is not within the rules of dexterous conduct to make an acknowledgment of a conteſted title in your enemy, before you are morally certain that your recognition will ſecure his friendſhip. Otherwiſe it is a meaſure worſe than thrown away. It adds infinitely to the ſtrength, and conſequently to the demands of the adverſe party. He has gained a fundamental point without an equivalent. It has happened as might have been foreſeen. No notice whatever was taken of this recognition. In fact, the directory never gave themſelves any concern about it; and they received our acknowledgment with perfect ſcorn. With them it is not for the ſtates of Europe to judge of their title: the very reverſe. In their eye the title of every other power depends wholly on their pleaſure.

Preliminary declarations of this ſort, thrown out

out at random, and ſown, as it were, broad-caſt, were never to be found in the mode of our proceeding with France and Spain, whilſt the great monarchies of France and Spain exiſted. I do not ſay, that a diplomatick meaſure ought to be, like a parliamentary or a judicial proceeding, according to ſtrict precedent. I hope I am far from that pedantry: But this I know, that a great ſtate ought to have ſome regard to its ancient maxims; eſpecially where they indicate its dignity; where they concur with the rules of prudence; and above all, where the circumſtances of the time require that a ſpirit of innovation ſhould be reſiſted, which leads to the humiliation of ſovereign powers. It would be ridiculous to aſſert, that thoſe powers have ſuffered nothing in their eſtimation. I admit that the greater intereſts of ſtate will for a moment ſuperſede all other conſiderations: but if there was a rule that a ſovereign never ſhould let down his dignity without a ſure payment to his intereſt, the dignity of Kings would be held high enough. At preſent, however, faſhion governs in more ſerious things than furniture and dreſs. It looks as if ſovereigns abroad were emulous in bidding againſt their eſtimation. It ſeems as if the preeminence of regicide was acknowledged; and that kings tacitly ranked themſelves below their ſacrilegious murderers, as natural magiſtrates and judges over them. It appears as if dignity were the

prerogative

prerogative of crime; and a temporiſing humiliation the proper part for venerable authority. If the vileſt of mankind are reſolved to be the moſt wicked, they loſe all the baſeneſs of their origin, and take their place above kings. This example in foreign princes, I truſt, will not ſpread. It is the concern of mankind, that the deſtruction of order ſhould not be a claim to rank: that crimes ſhould not be the only title to pre-eminence and honour.

At this ſecond ſtage of humiliation, (I mean the inſulting declaration in conſequence of the meſſage to both Houſes of Parliament) it might not have been amiſs to pauſe; and not to ſquander away the fund of our ſubmiſſions, until we knew what final purpoſes of publick intereſt they might anſwer. The policy of ſubjecting ourſelves to further inſults is not to me quite apparent. It was reſolved, however, to hazard a third trial. Citizen Barthelemi had been eſtabliſhed on the part of the new republick, at Baſle; where, with his proconſulate of Switzerland and the adjacent parts of Germany, he was appointed as a ſort of factor to deal in the degradation of the crowned heads of Europe. At Baſle it was thought proper, in order to keep others, I ſuppoſe, in countenance, that Great Britain ſhould appear at this market, and bid with the reſt, for the mercy of the people-king.

On the 6th of March 1796, Mr. Wickham, in

conſequence of authority, was deſired to ſound France on her diſpoſition towards a general pacification; to know whether ſhe would conſent to ſend miniſters to a congreſs at ſuch a place as might be hereafter agreed upon; whether there would be a diſpoſition to communicate the general grounds of a pacification ſuch as France (the diplomatick name of the regicide power) would be willing to propoſe, as a foundation for a negotiation for peace with his majeſty *and his allies*; or to ſuggeſt any other way of arriving at the ſame end of a general pacification; but he had no authority to enter into any negotiation or diſcuſſion with Citizen Barthelemi upon theſe ſubjects.

On the part of Great Britain this meaſure was a voluntary act, wholly uncalled for on the part of regicide. Suits of this ſort are at leaſt ſtrong indications of a deſire for accomodation. Any other body of men but the directory would be ſomewhat ſoothed with ſuch advances. They could not however begin their anſwer, which was given without much delay, and communicated on the 28th of the ſame month, without a preamble of inſult and reproach. "They doubt the ſincerity of the pacifick intentions of this court." She did not begin, ſay they, yet to "know her real intereſts," "ſhe did not ſeek peace *with good faith.*" This, or ſomething to this effect, has been the conſtant preliminary obſervation, (now grown into a

ſort of office-form) on all our overtures to this power: a perpetual charge on the Britiſh government of fraud, evaſion, and habitual perfidy.

It might be aſked, from whence did theſe opinions of our inſincerity and ill faith ariſe? It was, becauſe the Britiſh miniſtry (leaving to the directory however to propoſe a better mode) propoſed a *congreſs* for the purpoſe of a general pacification, and this they ſaid "would render negotiation endleſs." From hence they immediately inferred a fraudulent intention in the offer. Unqueſtionably their mode of giving the law would bring matters to a more ſpeedy concluſion. As to any other method more agreeable to them than a congreſs, an alternative expreſsly propoſed to them, they did not condeſcend to ſignify their pleaſure.

This refuſal of treating conjointly with the powers allied againſt this republick, furniſhes matter for a great deal of ſerious reflection. They have hitherto conſtantly declined any other than a treaty with a ſingle power. By thus diſſociating every ſtate from every other, like deer ſeparated from the herd, each power is treated with, on the merit of his being a deſerter from the common cauſe. In that light the regicide power finding each of them inſulated and unprotected, with great facility gives the law to them all. By this ſyſtem, for the preſent an incurable diſtruſt is ſown amongſt confederates; and in future all alliance is

rendered impracticable. It is thus they have treated with Pruſſia, with Spain, with Sardinia, with Bavaria, with the Eccleſiaſtical State, with Saxony; and here we ſee them refuſe to treat with Great Britain in any other mode. They muſt be worſe than blind who do not ſee with what undeviating regularity of ſyſtem, in this caſe and in all caſes, they purſue their ſcheme for the utter deſtruction of every independent power; eſpecially the ſmaller, who cannot find any refuge whatever but in ſome common cauſe.

Renewing their taunts and reflections, they tell Mr. Wickham, "that *their* policy has no guides "but openneſs and good faith, and that their con- "duct ſhall be conformable to theſe principles." They ſay concerning their government, that "yield- "ing to the ardent deſire by which it is animated "to procure peace for the French republick, and "for all nations, it will not *fear to declare itſelf* "*openly.* Charged by the conſtitution with the "execution of the *laws*, it cannot *make* or *liſten* to "any propoſal that would be contrary to them. "The conſtitutional act does not permit it to con- "ſent to any alienation of that which, according "to the exiſting laws, conſtitutes the territory of "the republick."

"With reſpect to the countries *occupied by the* "*French armies and which have not been united to* "*France*, they, as well as other intereſts political

"and

" and commercial, may become the ſubject of a " negotiation, which will preſent to the directory " the means of proving how much it deſires to " attain ſpeedily to a happy pacification. That " the directory is ready to receive in this reſpect " any overtures that ſhall be juſt, reaſonable, and " compatible *with the dignity of the republick.*" On the head of what is *not* to be the ſubject of negotiation, the directory is clear and open. As to what may be a matter of treaty, all this open dealing is gone. She retires into her ſhell. There ſhe expects overtures from *you*—and you are to gueſs what ſhe ſhall judge juſt, reaſonable, and above all, *compatible with her dignity.*

In the records of pride there does not exiſt ſo inſulting a declaration. It is inſolent in words, in manner, but in ſubſtance it is not only inſulting but alarming. It is a ſpecimen of what may be expected from the maſters we are preparing for our humbled country. Their openneſs and candour conſiſt in a direct avowal of their deſpotiſm and ambition. We know that their declared reſolution had been to ſurrender no object belonging to France previous to the war. They had reſolved, that the republick was entire, and muſt remain ſo. As to what ſhe has conquered from the allies and united to the ſame indiviſible body, it is of the ſame nature. That is, the allies are to give up whatever conqueſts they have made or may make

upon France, but all which ſhe has violently raviſhed from her neighbours, and thought fit to appropriate, are not to become ſo much as objects of negotiation.

In this unity and indiviſibility of poſſeſſion are ſunk ten immenſe and wealthy provinces, full of ſtrong, flouriſhing and opulent cities, (the Auſtrian Netherlands,) the part of Europe the moſt neceſſary to preſerve any communication between this kingdom and its natural allies, next to Holland the moſt intereſting to this country, and without which Holland muſt virtually belong to France. Savoy and Nice, the keys of Italy, and the citadel in her hands to bridle Switzerland, are in that conſolidation. The important territory of Liege is torn out of the heart of the empire. All theſe are integrant parts of the republick, not to be ſubject to any diſcuſſion, or to be purchaſed by any equivalent. Why? becauſe there is a law which prevents it. What law? The law of nations? The acknowledged publick law of Europe? Treaties and conventions of parties? No! not a pretence of the kind. It is a declaration not made in conſequence of any preſcription on her ſide, not on any ceſſion or dereliction, actual or tacit, of other powers. It is a declaration *pendente lite* in the middle of a war, one principal object of which was originally the defence, and has ſince been the recovery of theſe very countries.

This

This ſtrange law is not made for a trivial object, not for a ſingle port, or for a ſingle fortreſs, but for a great kingdom; for the religion, the morals, the laws, the liberties, the lives and fortunes of millions of human creatures, who without their conſent, or that of their lawful government, are, by an arbitrary act of this regicide and homicide government, which they call a law, incorporated into their tyranny.

In other words, their will is the law, not only at home, but as to the concerns of every nation. Who has made that law but the regicide republick itſelf, whoſe laws, like thoſe of the Medes and Perſians, they cannot alter or abrogate, or even ſo much as take into conſideration? Without the leaſt ceremony or compliment, they have ſent out of the world whole ſets of laws and lawgivers. They have ſwept away the very conſtitutions under which the legiſlators acted, and the laws were made. Even the fundamental ſacred rights of man they have not ſcrupled to profane. They have ſet this holy code at nought with ignominy and ſcorn. Thus they treat all their domeſtick laws and conſtitutions, and even what they had conſidered as a law of Nature; but whatever they have their ſeal on for the purpoſes of their ambition, and the ruin of their neighbours, this alone is invulnerable, impaſſable, immortal. Aſſuming to be maſters of every thing human and divine, here,

and here alone, it ſeems they are limited, "cooped and cabined in;" and this omnipotent legiſlature finds itſelf wholly without the power of exerciſing its favourite attribute, the love of peace. In other words, they are powerful to uſurp, impotent to reſtore; and equally by their power and their impotence they aggrandize themſelves, and weaken and impoveriſh you and all other nations.

Nothing can be more proper or more manly than the ſtate publication called a *note* on this proceeding, dated Downing-ſtreet, the 10th of April, 1796. Only that it is better expreſſed, it perfectly agrees with the opinion I have taken the liberty of ſubmitting to your conſideration.* I place it below

* "This Court has ſeen, with regret, how far the tone and ſpirit of that anſwer, the nature and extent of the demands which it contains, and the manner of announcing them, are remote from any diſpoſitions for peace.

"The inadmiſſible pretenſion is there avowed of appropriating to France all that the laws exiſting there may have compriſed under the denomination of French territory. To a demand ſuch as this is added an expreſs declaration that no propoſal contrary to it will be made, or even liſtened to. And even this, under the pretence of an internal regulation, the proviſions of which are wholly foreign to all other nations.

"While theſe diſpoſitions ſhall be perſiſted in, nothing is left for the King, but to proſecute a war equally juſt and neceſſary.

"Whenever his enemies ſhall manifeſt more pacific ſentiments, his Majeſty will, at all times, be eager to concur in them,

by

below at full length as my juſtification in thinking that this aſtoniſhing paper from the Directory is not only a direct negative to all treaty, but is a rejection of every principle upon which treaties could be made. To admit it for a moment were to erect this power, uſurped at home, into a legiſlature to govern mankind. It is an authority that on a thouſand occaſions they have aſſerted in claim, and whenever they are able, exerted in practice. The dereliction of this whole ſcheme of policy became, therefore, an indiſpenſable previous condition to all renewal of treaty. The remark of the Britiſh cabinet on this arrogant and tyrannical claim is natural and unavoidable. Our miniſtry ſtate, "*That while theſe diſpoſitions ſhall be perſiſted in, nothing is left for the King but to proſecute a war that is juſt and neceſſary.*"

It was of courſe, that we ſhould wait until the enemy ſhewed ſome ſort of diſpoſition on his part to

by lending himſelf, in concert with his allies, to all ſuch meaſures as ſhall be calculated to re-eſtabliſh general tranquillity on conditions juſt, honourable and permanent, either by the eſtabliſhment of a general congreſs, which has been ſo happily the means of reſtoring peace to Europe, or by a preliminary diſcuſſion of the principles which may be propoſed, on either ſide, as a foundation of a general pacification; or, laſtly, by an impartial examination of any other way which may be pointed out to him for arriving at the ſame ſalutary end."

Downing-ſtreet, April 10, 1796.

to fulfil this condition. It was hoped indeed that our ſuppliant ſtrains might be ſuffered to ſteal into the auguſt ear in a more propitious ſeaſon. That ſeaſon, however, invoked by ſo many vows, conjurations and prayers, did not come. Every declaration of hoſtility renovated, and every act purſued with double animoſity—the over-running of Lombardy—the ſubjugation of Piedmont—the poſſeſſion of its impregnable fortreſſes—the ſeizing on all the neutral ſtates of Italy—our expulſion from Leghorn—inſtances for ever renewed, for our expulſion from Genoa—Spain rendered ſubject to them and hoſtile to us—Portugal bent under the yoke—half the empire over-run and ravaged, were the only ſigns which this mild republick thought proper to manifeſt of her pacifick ſentiments. Every demonſtration of an implacable rancour and an untameable pride were the only encouragements we received to the renewal of our ſupplications.

Here therefore they and we were fixed. Nothing was left to the Britiſh miniſtry but "to proſecute a war juſt and neceſſary"—a war equally juſt as at the time of our engaging in it—a war become ten times more neceſſary by every thing which happened afterwards. This reſolution was ſoon, however, forgot. It felt the heat of the ſeaſon and melted away. New hopes were entertained from ſupplication. No expectations, indeed, were then formed

formed from renewing a direct application to the French regicides through the agent-general for the humiliation of ſovereigns. At length a ſtep was taken in degradation which even went lower than all the reſt. Deficient in merits of our own, a mediator was to be ſought—and we looked for that mediator at Berlin! The king of Pruſſia's merits in abandoning the general cauſe might have obtained for him ſome ſort of influence in favour of thoſe whom he had deſerted; but I have never heard that his Pruſſian majeſty had lately diſcovered ſo marked an affection for the court of St. James's, or for the court of Vienna, as to excite much hope of his interpoſing a very powerful mediation to deliver them from the diſtreſſes into which he had brought them.

If humiliation is the element in which we live, if it is become not only our occaſional policy but our habit, no great objection can be made to the modes in which it may be diverſified; though, I confeſs, I cannot be charmed with the idea of our expoſing our lazar ſores at the door of every proud ſervitor of the French republick, were the court-dogs will not deign to lick them. We had, if I am not miſtaken, a miniſter at that court, who might try its temper, and recede and advance as he found backwardneſs or encouragement. But to ſend a gentleman there on no other errand than this, and with no aſſurance whatever that he ſhould not

not find, what he did find, a repulſe, ſeems to me to go far beyond all the demands of a humiliation merely politick. I hope, it did not ariſe from a predilection for that mode of conduct.

The cup of bitterneſs was not, however, drained to the dregs. Baſle and Berlin were not ſufficient. After ſo many and ſo diverſified repulſes, we were reſolved to make another experiment, and to try another mediator. Among the unhappy gentlemen in whoſe perſons royalty is inſulted and degraded at the ſeat of plebeian pride, and upſtart inſolence, there is a miniſter from Denmark at Paris. Without any previous encouragement to that, any more than the other ſteps, we ſent through this turnpike to demand a paſſport for a perſon who on our part was to ſolicit peace in the metropolis, at the footſtool of regicide itſelf. It was not to be expected that any one of thoſe degraded beings could have influence enough to ſettle any part of the terms in favour of the candidates for further degradation; beſides, ſuch intervention would be a direct breach in their ſyſtem, which did not permit one foverergn power to utter a word in the concerns of his equal.—Another repulſe.—We were deſired to apply directly in our perſons.—We ſubmitted and made the application.

It might be thought that here, at length, we had touched the bottom of humiliation; our lead was brought up covered with mud. But "in the

" loweſt deep, a lower deep" was to open for us ſtill more profound abyſſes of diſgrace and ſhame However, in we leaped. We came forward in our own name. The paſſport, ſuch a paſſport and ſafe conduct as would be granted to thieves, who might come in to betray their accomplices, and no better was granted to Britiſh ſupplication. To leave no doubt of its ſpirit, as ſoon as the rumour of this act of condeſcenſion could get abroad, it was formally announced with an explanation from authority, containing an invective againſt the miniſtry of Great Britain, their habitual frauds, their proverbial, *punick* perfidy. No ſuch ſtate paper, as a preliminary to a negotiation for peace, has ever yet appeared. Very few declarations of war have ever ſhewn ſo much and ſo unqualified animoſity. I place it below* as a diplomatick curioſity, and in order to be the better underſtood, in the few remarks I have to make upon a piece which indeed defies all

* *Official Note, extracted from the Journal of the Defenders of the Country.*

" *Executive Directory.*

" Different Journals have advanced that an Engliſh plenipotentiary had reached Paris, and had preſented himſelf to the executive directory, but that his propoſitions not having appeared ſatisfactory, he had received orders inſtantly to quit France.

" All theſe aſſertions are equally falſe.

" The notices given, in the Engliſh papers, of a miniſter having been ſent to Paris, there to treat of peace, bring to recollection

all deſcription—" None but itſelf can be its parallel."

I paſs by all the inſolence and contumely of the performance, as it comes from them. The preſent queſtion

collection the overtures of Mr. Wickham to the ambaſſador of the publick at Baſle, and the rumours circulated relative to the miſſion of Mr Hammond to the court of Pruſſia. The *inſignificance*, or rather the *ſubtle duplicity*, the *PUNICK ſtyle of* Mr. Wickham's note, is not forgotten. According to the partiſans of the Engliſh miniſtry, it was to Paris that Mr. Hammond was to come to ſpeak for peace: when his deſtination became publick, and it was known that he went to Pruſſia, the ſame writer repeated that it was to accelerate a peace, and, notwithſtanding the object, now well known, of this negotiation, was to engage Pruſſia to break her treaties with the republick, and to return into the coalition—the court of Berlin, faithful to its engagements, repulſed theſe *perfidious* propoſitions. But in converting this intrigue into a miſſion for peace, the Engliſh miniſtry joined to the hope of giving a new enemy to France, *that of juſtifying the continuance of the war in the eyes of the Engliſh nation, and of throwing all the odium of it on the French government.* Such was alſo the aim of Mr. Wickham's note. *Such is ſtill that of the notices given at this time in the Engliſh papers.*

" This aim will appear evident, if we reflect how difficult it is, that the ambitious government of England ſhould ſincerely wiſh for a peace that would *snatch from it its maritime preponderancy, would re-eſtabliſh the freedom of the ſeas, would give a new impulſe to the Spaniſh, Dutch, and French marines*, and would carry to the higheſt degree of proſperity the induſtry and commerce of thoſe nations in which it has always found *rivals*, and which it has conſidered as *enemies* of its commerce, when they were tired of being its *dupes*.

" But there will *no longer be any credit given to the pacifick inten-*

tions

queſtion is not how we are to be affected with it in regard to our dignity. That is gone. I ſhall ſay no more about it. Light lie the earth on the aſhes of Engliſh pride. I ſhall only obſerve upon it *politically*, and as furniſhing a direction for our own conduct in this low buſineſs.

The very idea of a negotiation for peace, whatever the inward ſentiments of the party may be, implies ſome confidence in their faith, ſome degree of belief in the profeſſions which are made concerning it. A temporary and occaſional credit, at leaſt, is granted. Otherwiſe men ſtumble on the very threſhold. I therefore wiſh to aſk what hope we can have of their good faith, who, as the very baſis of the negotiation, aſſume the ill faith and treachery of thoſe they have to deal with? The

tions of the Engliſh miniſtry, when it is known, that its gold and its intrigues, its open practices, and its inſinuations, beſiege more than ever the cabinet of Vienna, and are one of the principal obſtacles to the negotiation which that cabinet *would of itſelf be induced to enter on for peace.*

" They will no longer *be credited*, finally, when the moment of the rumour of theſe overtures being circulated is conſidered. *The Engliſh nation ſupports impatiently the continuance of the war, a reply muſt be made to its complaints, its reproaches:* the parliament is about to re-open its ſittings; the mouths of the orators who will declaim againſt the war muſt be ſhut, the demand of new taxes muſt be juſtified; and to obtain theſe reſults, it is neceſſary to be enabled to advance, that the French government refuſes every reaſonable propoſition of peace."

The terms, as againſt us, muſt be ſuch as imply a full ſecurity againſt a treacherous conduct—that is, ſuch terms as this directory ſtated in its firſt declaration, to place us "in an utter impoſſibility of "executing our wretched projects." This is the omen, and the ſole omen, under which we have conſented to open our treaty.

The ſecond obſervation I have to make upon it, (much connected undoubtedly with the firſt,) is, that they have informed you of the reſult they propoſe from the kind of peace they mean to grant you; that is to ſay, the union they propoſe among nations, with the view of rivalling our trade and deſtroying our naval power: and this they ſuppoſe (and with good reaſon too) muſt be the inevitable effect of their peace. It forms one of their principal grounds for ſuſpecting our miniſters could not be in good earneſt in their propoſition. They make no ſcruple before hand to tell you the whole of what they intend; and this is what we call, in the modern ſtyle, the acceptance of a propoſition for peace! In old language it would be called a moſt haughty, offenſive, and inſolent rejection of all treaty.

Thirdly, they tell you what they conceive to be the perfidious policy which dictates your deluſive offer; that is, the deſign of cheating not only them, but the people of England, againſt whoſe intereſt and inclination this war is ſuppoſed to be carried on.

If

If we proceed in this buſineſs, under this preliminary declaration, it ſeems to me, that we admit, (now for the third time) by ſomething a great deal ſtronger than words, the truth of the charges of every kind which they make upon the Britiſh miniſtry, and the grounds of thoſe foul imputations. The language uſed by us, which in other circumſtances would not be exceptionable, in this caſe tends very ſtrongly to confirm and realiſe the ſuſpicion of our enemy. I mean the declaration, that if we do not obtain ſuch terms of peace as ſuits our opinion of what our intereſts require, *then*, and in *that* caſe, we ſhall continue the war with vigour. This offer ſo reaſoned, plainly implies, that without it, our leaders themſelves entertain great doubts of the opinion and good affections of the Britiſh people; otherwiſe there does not appear any cauſe, why we ſhould proceed under the ſcandalous conſtruction of our enemy, upon the former offer made by Mr. Wickham, and on the new offer made directly at Paris. It is not, therefore, from a ſenſe of dignity, but from the danger of radicating that falſe ſentiment in the breaſts of the enemy, that I think, under the auſpices of this declaration, we cannot with the leaſt hope of a good event, or indeed, with any regard to the common ſafety, proceed in the train of this negotiation. I wiſh miniſtry would ſeriouſly conſider the importance of their ſeeming to confirm the enemy in an opinion, that his

frequent uſe of appeals to the people againſt their government has not been without its effect. If it puts an end to this war it will render another impracticable.

Whoever goes to the directorial preſence under this paſſport, with this offenſive comment, and foul explanation, goes, in the avowed ſenſe of the court to which he is ſent, as the inſtrument of a government diſſociated from the intereſts and wiſhes of the nation, for the purpoſe of cheating both the people of France and the people of England. He goes out the declared emiſſary of a faithleſs miniſtry. He has perfidy for his credentials. He has national weakneſs for his full powers. I yet doubt whether any one can be found to inveſt himſelf with that character. If there ſhould, it would be pleaſant to read his inſtructions on the anſwer which he is to give to the directory, in caſe they ſhould repeat to him the ſubſtance of the manifeſto which he carries with him in his portfolio.

So much for the *firſt* manifeſto of the regicide court which went along with the paſſport. Leſt this declaration ſhould ſeem the effect of haſte, or a mere ſudden effuſion of pride and inſolence, on full deliberation, about a week after comes out a ſecond. This manifeſto is dated the fifth of October, one day before the ſpeech from the throne, on the vigil of the feſtive day of cordial unanimity ſo happily celebrated by all parties in the Britiſh parliament.

parliament. In this piece the regicides, our worthy friends (I call them by advance and by courteſy what by law I ſhall be obliged to call them hereafter), our worthy friends, I ſay, renew and enforce the former declaration concerning our faith and ſincerity, which they pinned to our paſſport. On three other points which run through all their declarations, they are more explicit than ever.

Firſt, they more directly undertake to be the real repreſentatives of the people of this kingdom: and on a ſuppoſition, in which they agree with our parliamentary reformers, that the houſe of commons is not that repreſentative, the function being vacant, they, as our true conſtitutional organ, inform his majeſty and the world of the ſenſe of the nation. They tell us that "the Engliſh people "ſee with regret his majeſty's government ſquan-"dering away the funds which had been granted "to him." This aſtoniſhing aſſumption of the publick voice of England, is but a ſlight foretaſte of the uſurpation which, on a peace, we may be aſſured they will make of all the powers in all the parts of our vaſſal conſtitution. "If they do theſe "things in the green tree, what ſhall be done in "the dry?"

Next they tell us a condition to our treaty, that "this government muſt abjure the unjuſt hatred it "bears to them, and at laſt open its ears to the "voice of humanity."—Truly this is, even from

them, an extraordinary demand. Hitherto it ſeems we have put wax into our ears to ſhut them up againſt the tender, ſoothing ſtrains, in the *affettuoſo* of humanity, warbled from the throats of Reubel, Carnot, Tallien, and the whole chorus of confiſcators, domiciliary viſitors, committee-men of reſearch, jurors and preſidents of revolutionary tribunals, regicides, aſſaſſins, maſſacrers, and ſeptembriſers. It is not difficult to diſcern what ſort of humanity our government is to learn from theſe ſyren ſingers. Our government alſo, I admit with ſome reaſon, as a ſtep towards the propoſed fraternity, is required to abjure the unjuſt hatred which it bears to this body of honour and virtue. I thank God I am neither a miniſter nor a leader of oppoſition. I proteſt I cannot do what they deſire. I could not do it if I were under the guillotine; or as they ingeniouſly and pleaſantly expreſs it, "looking out of the little national window." Even at that opening I could receive none of their light. I am fortified againſt all ſuch affections by the declaration of the government, which I muſt yet conſider as lawful, made on the 29th of October 1793*, and ſtill ringing in my ears. This declaration

* "In their place has ſucceeded a ſyſtem deſtructive of all "publick order, maintained by proſcriptions, exiles and confiſ-"cations without number; by arbitrary impriſonment; by maſ-"ſacres which cannot be remembered without horrour; and at "length

declaration was tranſmitted not only to all our commanders by ſea and land, but to our miniſters in every court of Europe. It is the moſt eloquent and highly finiſhed in the ſtyle, the moſt judicious in the

"length by the execrable murder of a juſt and beneficent ſove-
" reign, and of the illuſtrious princeſs, who, with an unſhaken
" firmneſs, has ſhared all the misfortunes of her royal conſort,
" his protracted ſufferings, his cruel captivity and his ignomi-
" nious death."—"They (the allies) have had to encounter acts
" of aggreſſion without pretext, open violations of all treaties,
" unprovoked declarations of war; in a word, whatever cor-
" ruption, intrigue or violence could effect for the purpoſe of
" openly avowed, of ſubverting all the inſtitutions of ſociety, and
" of extending over all the nations of Europe that confuſion,
" which has produced the miſery of France."—

"This ſtate of things cannot exiſt in France without involving
" all the ſurrounding powers in one common danger, without
" giving them the right, without impoſing it upon them as a
" duty, to ſtop the progreſs of an evil, which exiſts only by the
" ſucceſſive violation of all law and all property, and which at-
" tacks the fundamental principles by which mankind is united
" in the bonds of civil ſociety."—"The king would impoſe none
" other than equitable and moderate conditions, not ſuch as the
" expence, the riſks and the ſacrifices of the war might juſtify;
" but ſuch as his majeſty thinks himſelf under the indiſpenſable
" neceſſity of requiring, with a view to theſe conſiderations, and
" ſtill more to that of his own ſecurity and of the future tran-
" quillity of Europe. His majeſty deſires nothing more ſincerely
" than thus to terminate a war, which he in vain endeavoured to
" avoid, and all the calamities of which, as now experienced by
" France, are to be attributed only to the ambition, the perfidy
" and the violence of thoſe, whoſe crimes have involved their
" own country in miſery, and [illegible] aced all civilized nations."—

the choice of topicks, the moſt orderly in the arrangement, and the moſt rich in the colouring, without employing the ſmalleſt degree of exaggeration, of any ſtate paper that has ever yet appeared. An ancient writer, Plutarch, I think it is, quotes ſome verſes on the eloquence of Pericles, who is called "the only orator that left ſtings in "the minds of his hearers." Like his, the eloquence of the declaration, not contradicting, but enforcing ſentiments of the trueſt humanity, has left ſtings that have penetrated more than ſkin-deep into my mind; and never can they be extracted by all the ſurgery of murder; never can the

"The king promiſes on his part the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, "friendſhip, and (as far as the courſe of events will allow, of "which the will of man cannot diſpoſe) ſecurity and protec-"tion to all thoſe who, by declaring for a monarchical form of "government, ſhall ſhake off the yoke of ſanguinary anarchy; "of that anarchy which has broken all the moſt ſacred bonds of "ſociety, diſſolved all the relations of civil life, violated every "right, confounded every duty; which uſes the name of liberty "to exerciſe the moſt cruel tyranny, to annihilate all property, "to ſeize on all poſſeſſions; which founds its power on the pre-"tended conſent of the people, and itſelf carries fire and ſword "through extenſive provinces for having demanded their laws, "their religion, and their *lawful ſovereign.*"

Declaration ſent by his majeſty's command to the commanders of his majeſty's fleets and armies employed againſt France, and to his majeſty's miniſters employed at foreign courts.

Whitehall, Oct. 29, 1793.

the throbbings they have created, be aſſuaged by all the emollient cataplaſms of robbery and confiſcation. I *cannot* love the republick.

The third point which they have more clearly expreſſed than ever, is of equal importance with the reſt; and with them furniſhes a complete view of the regicide ſyſtem. For they demand as a condition, without which our ambaſſador of obedience cannot be received with any hope of ſucceſs, that he ſhall be "provided with full powers to negotiate a peace between the French republick and "Great Britain, and to conclude it *definitively* "between the two powers." With their ſpear they draw a circle about us. They will hear nothing of a joint treaty. We muſt make a peace ſeparately from our allies. We muſt, as the very firſt and preliminary ſtep, be guilty of that perfidy towards our friends and aſſociates, with which they reproach us in our tranſactions with them our enemies. We are called upon ſcandalouſly to betray the fundamental ſecurities to ourſelves and to all nations. In my opinion (it is perhaps but a poor one) if we are meanly bold enough to ſend an ambaſſador ſuch as this official note of the enemy requires, we cannot even diſpatch our emiſſary without danger of being charged with a breach of our alliance. Government now underſtands the full meaning of the paſſport.

Strange revolutions have happened in the ways of thinking and in the feelings of men: but, it is a very extraordinary coalition of parties indeed, and a kind of unheard-of unanimity in publick councils, which can impoſe this new-diſcovered ſyſtem of negotiation, as ſound national policy on the underſtanding of a ſpectator of this wonderful ſcene, who judges on the principles of any thing he ever before ſaw, read, or heard of, and above all, on the underſtanding of a perſon who has in his eye the tranſactions of the laſt ſeven years.

I know it is ſuppoſed, that if good terms of capitulation are not granted, after we have thus ſo repeatedly hung out the white flag, the national ſpirit will revive with tenfold ardour. This is an experiment cautiouſly to be made. *Reculer pour mieux ſauter*, according to the French by-word, cannot be truſted to as a general rule of conduct. To diet a man into weakneſs and languor, afterwards to give him the greater ſtrength, has more of the empirick than the rational phyſician. It is true that ſome perſons have been kicked into courage; and this is no bad hint to give to thoſe who are too forward and liberal in beſtowing inſults and outrages on their paſſive companions. But ſuch a courſe does not at firſt view appear a well-choſen diſcipline to form men to a nice ſenſe of honour, or a quick reſentment of injuries. A long

long habit of humiliation does not ſeem a very good preparative to manly and vigorous ſentiment. It may not leave, perhaps, enough of energy in the mind fairly to diſcern what are good terms or what are not. Men low and diſpirited may regard thoſe terms as not at all amiſs, which in another ſtate of mind they would think intolerable: if they grow peeviſh in this ſtate of mind, they may be rouſed, not againſt the enemy whom they have been taught to fear, but againſt the miniſtry,* who are more within their reach, and who have refuſed conditions that are not unreaſonable, from power that they have been taught to conſider as irreſiſtible.

If all that for ſome months I have heard have the leaſt foundation, I hope it has not, the miniſters are, perhaps, not quite ſo much to be blamed, as their condition is to be lamented. I have been given to underſtand, that theſe proceedings are not in their origin properly theirs. It is ſaid that there is a ſecret in the houſe of commons. It is ſaid that miniſters act not according to the votes, but according to the diſpoſitions of the majority. I hear that the minority has long ſince ſpoken the general ſenſe of the nation; and that to prevent thoſe who compoſe it from having the open and avowed lead in that houſe, or perhaps in both houſes, it was neceſſary to pre-occupy their ground,

* Ut lethargicus hic, cum ſit pugil, et medicum urget. Hor.

and

and to take their propoſitions out of their mouths, even with the hazard of being afterwards reproached with a compliance which it was foreſeen would be fruitleſs.

If the general diſpoſition of the people be, as I hear it is, for an immediate peace with regicide, without ſo much as conſidering our publick and ſolemn engagements to the party in France whoſe cauſe we had eſpouſed, or the engagements expreſſed in our general alliances, not only without an inquiry into the terms, but with a certain knowledge that none but the worſt terms will be offered, it is all over with us. It is ſtrange, but it may be true, that as the danger from jacobiniſm is increaſed in my eyes and in yours, the fear of it is leſſened in the eyes of many people who formerly regarded it with horrour. It ſeems, they act under the impreſſion of terrours of another ſort, which have frightened them out of their firſt apprehenſions. But let their fears or their hopes, or their deſires, be what they will, they ſhould recollect, that they who would make peace without a previous knowledge of the terms, make a ſurrender. They are conquered. They do not treat; they receive the law. Is this the diſpoſition of the people of England? Then the people of England are contented to ſeek in the kindneſs of a foreign ſyſtematick enemy, combined with a dangerous faction at home, a ſecurity which they cannot find in their own patriotiſm and their own courage.

They are willing to truſt to the ſympathy of regicides, the guarantee of the Britiſh monarchy. They are content to reſt their religion on the piety of atheiſts by eſtabliſhment. They are ſatisfied to ſeek in the clemency of practiſed murderers the ſecurity of their lives. They are pleaſed to confide their property to the ſafeguard of thoſe who are robbers by inclination, intereſt, habit, and ſyſtem. If this be our deliberate mind, truly we deſerve to loſe, what it is impoſſible we ſhould long retain, the name of a nation.

In matters of ſtate, a conſtitutional competence to act, is in many caſes the ſmalleſt part of the queſtion. Without diſputing (God forbid I ſhould diſpute) the ſole competence of the king and the parliament, each in its province, to decide on war and peace, I venture to ſay, no war *can* be long carried on againſt the will of the people. This war, in particular, cannot be carried on unleſs they are enthuſiaſtically in favour of it. Acquieſcence will not do. There muſt be zeal. Univerſal zeal in ſuch a cauſe, and at ſuch a time as this is, cannot be looked for; neither is it neceſſary. Zeal in the larger part carries the force of the whole. Without this, no government, certainly not our government, is capable of a great war. None of the ancient regular governments have wherewithal to fight abroad with a foreign foe, and at home to overcome repining, reluctance, and chicane. It

muſt

muſt be ſome portentous thing, like regicide France, that can exhibit ſuch a prodigy. Yet even ſhe, the mother of monſters, more prolifick than the country of old called *Ferax monſtrorum*, ſhews ſymptons of being almoſt effete already; and ſhe will be ſo, unleſs the fallow of a peace comes to recruit her fertility. But whatever may be repreſented concerning the meanneſs of the popular ſpirit, I, for one, do not think ſo deſperately of the Britiſh nation. Our minds, as I ſaid, are light, but they are not depraved. We are dreadfully open to deluſion and to dejection; but we are capable of being animated and undeceived.

It cannot be concealed. We are a divided people. But in diviſions, where a part is to be taken, we are to make a muſter of our ſtrength. I have often endeavoured to compute and to claſs thoſe who, in any political view, are to be called the people. Without doing ſomething of this ſort we muſt proceed abſurdly. We ſhould not be much wiſer, if we pretended to very great accuracy in our eſtimate: but I think, in the calculation I have made, the errour cannot be very material. In England and Scotland, I compute that thoſe of adult age, not declining in life, of tolerable leiſure for ſuch diſcuſſions, and of ſome means of information, more, or leſs, and who are above menial dependence, (or what virtually is ſuch) may amount to about four hundred thouſand. There is ſuch a thing

thing as a natural repreſentative of the people. This body is that repreſentative; and on this body, more than on the legal conſtituent, the artificial repreſentative depends. This is the Britiſh publick; and it is a publick very numerous. The reſt, when feeble, are the objects of protection; when ſtrong, the means of force. They who affect to conſider that part of us in any other light, inſult while they cajole us; they do not want us for counſellors in deliberation, but to liſt us as ſoldiers for battle.

Of theſe four hundred thouſand political citizens, I look upon one fifth, or about eighty thouſand, to be pure jacobins; utterly incapable of amendment; objects of eternal vigilance; and when they break out, of legal conſtraint. On theſe, no reaſon, no argument, no example, no venerable authority, can have the ſlighteſt influence. They deſire a change; and they will have it if they can. If they cannot have it by Engliſh cabal, they will make no ſort of ſcruple of having it by the cabal of France, into which already they are virtually incorporated. It is only their aſſured and confident expectation of the advantages of French fraternity and the approaching bleſſings of regicide intercourſe, that ſkins over their miſchievous diſpoſitions with a momentary quiet.

This minority is great and formidable. I do not know whether if I aimed at the total overthrow of a kingdom,

a kingdom, I ſhould wiſh to be encumbered with a larger body of partiſans. They are more eaſily diſciplined and directed than if the number were greater. Theſe, by their ſpirit of intrigue, and by their reſtleſs agitating activity, are of a force far ſuperiour to their numbers; and if times grew the leaſt critical, have the means of debauching or intimidating many of thoſe who are now found, as well as of adding to their force large bodies of the more paſſive part of the nation. This minority is numerous enough to make a mighty cry for peace, or for war, or for any object they are led vehemently to deſire. By paſſing from place to place with a velocity incredible, and diverſifying their character and deſcription, they are capable of mimicking the general voice. We muſt not always judge of the generality of the opinion by the noiſe of the acclamation.

The majority, the other four fifths, is perfectly ſound; and of the beſt poſſible diſpoſition to religion, to government, to the true and undivided intereſt of their country. Such men are generally diſpoſed to peace. They who are in poſſeſſion of all they wiſh are languid and improvident. With this fault (and I admit its exiſtence in all its extent) they would not endure to hear of a peace that led to the ruin of every thing for which peace is dear to them. However, the deſire of peace is eſſentially the weak ſide of that kind of men. All

men

men that are ruined, are ruined on the ſide of their natural propenſities. There they are unguarded. Above all, good men do not ſuſpect that their deſtruction is attempted through their virtues. This their enemies are perfectly aware of: and accordingly, they, the moſt turbulent of mankind, who never make a ſcruple to ſhake the tranquillity of their country to its center, raiſe a continual cry for peace with France. Peace with regicide, and war with the reſt of the world, is their motto. From the beginning, and even whilſt the French gave the blows, and we hardly oppoſed the *vis inertiæ* to their efforts, from that day to this hour, like importunate Guinea-fowls crying one note day and night, they have called for peace.

In this they are, as I confeſs in all things they are, perfectly conſiſtent. They who wiſh to unite themſelves to your enemies, naturally deſire, that you ſhould diſarm yourſelf by a peace with theſe enemies. But it paſſes my conception, how they, who wiſh well to their country on its ancient ſyſtem of laws and manners, come not to be doubly alarmed, when they find nothing but a clamour for peace, in the mouths of the men on earth the leaſt diſpoſed to it in their natural or in their habitual character.

I have a good opinion of the general abilities of the Jacobins: not that I ſuppoſe them better born than others; but ſtrong paſſions awaken the faculties.

faculties. They ſuffer not a particle of the man to be loſt. The ſpirit of enterpriſe gives to this deſcription the full uſe of all their native energies. If I have reaſon to conceive that my enemy, who, as ſuch, muſt have an intereſt in my deſtruction, is alſo a perſon of diſcernment and ſagacity, then I muſt be quite ſure, that in a conteſt, the object he violently purſues, is the very thing by which my ruin is likely to be the moſt perfectly accompliſhed. Why do the Jacobins cry for peace? Becauſe they know, that this point gained, the reſt will follow of courſe. On our part, why are all the rules of prudence, as ſure as the laws of material nature, to be at this time reverſed? How comes it, that now, for the firſt time, men think it right to be governed by the counſels of their enemies? Ought they not rather to tremble, when they are perſuaded to travel on the ſame road; and to tend to the ſame place of reſt?

The minority I ſpeak of, is not ſuſceptible of an impreſſion from the topicks of argument to be uſed to the larger part of the community. I therefore do not addreſs to them any part of what I have to ſay. The more forcibly I drive my arguments againſt their ſyſtem, ſo as to make an impreſſion where I wiſh to make it, the more ſtrongly I rivet them in their ſentiments. As for us, who compoſe the far larger, and what I call the far better part of the people; let me ſay, that we have not been

quite

quite fairly dealt with when called to this deliberation. The Jacobin minority have been abundantly ſupplied with ſtores and proviſions of all kinds towards their warfare. No ſort of argumentative materials, ſuited to their purpoſes, have been withheld. Falſe they are, unſound, ſophiſtical; but they are regular in their direction. They all bear one way: and they all go to the ſupport of the ſubſtantial merits of their cauſe. The others have not had the queſtion ſo much as fairly ſtated to them.

There has not been in this century, any foreign peace or war, in its origin, the fruit of popular deſire; except the war that was made with Spain in 1739. Sir Robert Walpole was forced into the war by the people, who were inflamed to this meaſure by the moſt leading politicians, by the firſt orators, and the greateſt poets of the time. For that war, Pope ſung his dying notes. For that war, Johnſon, in more energetick ſtrains, employed the voice of his early genius. For that war, Glover diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the way in which his muſe was the moſt natural and happy. The crowd readily followed the politicians in the cry for a war, which threatened little bloodſhed, and which promiſed victories that were attended with ſomething more ſolid than glory. A war with Spain was a war of plunder. In the preſent conflict with regicide, Mr. Pitt has not hitherto had, nor will perhaps for a few days have, many prizes to hold out

in the lottery of war, to tempt the lower part of our character. He can only maintain it by an appeal to the higher; and to thoſe, in whom that higher part is the moſt predominant, he muſt look the moſt for his ſupport. Whilſt he holds out no inducements to the wiſe, nor bribes to the avaricious, he may be forced by a vulgar cry into a peace ten times more ruinous than the moſt diſaſtrous war. The weaker he is in the fund of motives which apply to our avarice, to our lazineſs, and to our laſſitude, if he means to carry the war to any end at all, the ſtronger he ought to be in his addreſſes to our magnanimity and to our reaſon.

In ſtating that Walpole was driven by a popular clamour into a meaſure not to be juſtified, I do not mean wholly to excuſe his conduct. My time of obſervation did not exactly coincide with that event: but I read much of the controverſies then carried on. Several years after the conteſts of parties had ceaſed, the people were amuſed, and in a degree warmed with them. The events of that æra ſeemed then of magnitude, which the revolutions of our time have reduced to parochial importance; and the debates, which then ſhook the nation, now appear of no higher moment than a diſcuſſion in a veſtry. When I was very young, a general faſhion told me I was to admire ſome of the writings againſt that miniſter; a little more maturity taught me as much to deſpiſe them. I obſerved

obſerved one fault in his general proceeding. He never manfully put forward the entire ſtrength of his cauſe. He temporiſed; he managed; and adopting very nearly the ſentiments of his adverſaries, he oppoſed their inferences. This, for a political commander, is the choice of a weak poſt. His adverſaries had the better of the argument, as he handled it, not as the reaſon and juſtice of his cauſe enabled him to manage it. I ſay this, after having ſeen, and with ſome care examined, the original documents concerning certain important tranſactions of thoſe times. They perfectly ſatisfied me of the extreme injuſtice of that war, and of the falſehood of the colours, which to his own ruin, and guided by a miſtaken policy, he ſuffered to be daubed over that meaſure. Some years after, it was my fortune to converſe with many of the principal actors againſt that miniſter, and with thoſe, who principally excited that clamour. None of them, no not one, did in the leaſt defend the meaſure, or attempt to juſtify their conduct. They condemned it as freely as they would have done in commenting upon any proceeding in hiſtory, in which they were totally unconcerned. Thus it will be. They who ſtir up the people to improper deſires, whether of peace or war, will be condemned by themſelves. They who weakly yield to them will be condemned by hiſtory.

In my opinion, the preſent miniſtry are as far

from doing full juſtice to their cauſe in this war, as Walpole was from doing juſtice to the peace which at that time he was willing to preſerve. They throw the light on one ſide only of their caſe; though it is impoſſible they ſhould not obſerve, that the other ſide which is kept in the ſhade has its importance too. They muſt know, that France is formidable, not only as ſhe is France, but as ſhe is Jacobin France. They knew from the beginning that the jacobin party was not confined to that country. They knew, they felt, the ſtrong diſpoſition of the ſame faction in both countries to communicate and to co-operate. For ſome time paſt, theſe two points have been kept, and even induſtriouſly kept, out of ſight. France is conſidered as merely a foreign power; and the ſeditious Engliſh only as a domeſtick faction. The merits of the war with the former have been argued ſolely on political grounds. To prevent the miſchievous doctrines of the latter, from corrupting our minds, matter and argument have been ſupplied abundantly, and even to ſurfeit, on the excellency of our own government. But nothing has been done to make us feel in what manner the ſafety of that government is connected with the principle and with the iſſue of this war. For any thing, which in the late diſcuſſion has appeared, the war is entirely collateral to the ſtate of jacobiniſm; as truly a foreign war to us and to all our home concerns,

as

as the war with Spain in 1739, about *Garda-Coſtas*, the Madrid Convention, and the fable of Captain *Jenkins*'s ears.

Whenever the adverſe party has raiſed a cry for peace with the regicide, the anſwer has been little more then this, "that the adminiſtration wiſhed for "ſuch a peace, full as much as the oppoſition; but "that the time was not convenient for making it." Whatever elſe has been ſaid was much in the ſame ſpirit Reaſons of this kind never touched the ſubſtantial merits of the war. They were in the nature of dilatory pleas, exceptions of form, previous queſtions. Accordingly all the arguments againſt a compliance with what was repreſented as the popular deſire, (urged on with all poſſible vehemence and earneſtneſs by the jacobins) have appeared flat and languid, feeble and evaſive. They appeared to aim only at gaining time. They never entered into the peculiar and diſtinctive character of the war. They ſpoke neither to the underſtanding nor to the heart. Cold as ice themſelves, they never could kindle in our breaſt a ſpark of that zeal, which is neceſſary to a conflict with an adverſe zeal; much leſs were they made to infuſe into our minds, that ſtubborn perſevering ſpirit, which alone is capable of bearing up againſt thoſe viciſſitudes of fortune, which will probably occur, and thoſe burthens which muſt be inevitably borne in a long war. I ſpeak it emphatically, and with a

deſire that it ſhould be marked, in a *long* war; becauſe, without ſuch a war, no experience has yet told us, that a dangerous power has ever been reduced to meaſure or to reaſon. I do not throw back my view to the Peloponneſian war of twenty-ſeven years; nor to two of the punick wars, the firſt of twenty-four, the ſecond of eighteen; nor to the more recent war concluded by the treaty of Weſtphalia, which continued, I think, for thirty. I go to what is but juſt fallen behind living memory, and immediately touches our own country. Let the portion of our hiſtory from the year 1689 to 1713 be brought before us. We ſhall find, that in all that period of twenty-four years, there were hardly five that could be called a ſeaſon of peace; and the interval between the two wars was in reality, nothing more then a very active preparation for renovated hoſtility. During that period, every one of the propoſitions of peace came from the enemy; The firſt, when they were accepted, at the peace of Ryſwick; the ſecond, where they were rejected, at the congreſs at Gertrudenburgh; the laſt, when the war ended by the treaty of Utrecht. Even then, a very great part of the nation, and that which contained by far the moſt intelligent ſtateſmen, was againſt the concluſion of the war. I do not enter into the merits of that queſtion as between the parties. I only ſtate the exiſtence of that opinion as a fact, from whence

you

you may draw ſuch an inference as you think properly ariſes from it.

It is for us at preſent to recollect what we have been; and to conſider what, if we pleaſe, we may be ſtill. At the period of thoſe wars, our principal ſtrength was found in the reſolution of the people; and that in the reſolution of a part only of the then whole, which bore no proportion to our exiſting magnitude. England and Scotland were not united at the beginning of that mighty ſtruggle. When, in the courſe of the conteſt, they were conjoined, it was in a raw, an ill-cemented, an unproductive union. For the whole duration of the war, and long after, the names, and other outward and viſible ſigns of approximation, rather augmented than diminiſhed our inſular feuds. They were rather the cauſes of new diſcontents and new troubles, than promoters of cordiality and affection. The now ſingle and potent Great Britain was then, not only two countries, but, from the party heats in both, and the diviſions formed in each of them, each of the old kingdoms within itſelf, in effect, was made up of two hoſtile nations. Ireland, now ſo large a ſource of the common opulence and power, and which wiſely managed might be made much more beneficial and much more effective, was then the heavieſt of the burthens. An army not much leſs than forty thouſand men, was drawn from the general effort, to keep that

kingdom in a poor, unfruitful, and reſourceleſs ſubjection.

Such was the ſtate of the empire. The ſtate of our finances was worſe, if poſſible. Every branch of the revenue became leſs productive after the revolution. Silver, not as now a ſort of counter, but the body of the current coin, was reduced ſo low, as not to have above three parts in four of the value in the ſhilling. In the greater part the value hardly amounted to a fourth. It required a dead expence of three millions ſterling to renew the coinage. Publick credit, that great but ambiguous principle, which has ſo often been predicted as the cauſe of our certain ruin, but which for a century has been the conſtant companion, and often the means, of our proſperity and greatneſs, had its origin, and was cradled, I may ſay, in bankruptcy and beggary. At this day we have ſeen parties contending to be admitted, at a moderate premium, to advance eighteen millions to the Exchequer. For infinitely ſmaller loans, the chancellor of the exchequer of that day, Montagu, the father of publick credit, counter-ſecuring the ſtate by the appearance of the city with the Lord Mayor of London at his ſide, was obliged, like a ſolicitor for an hoſpital, to go cap in hand from ſhop to ſhop, to borrow an hundred pound and even ſmaller ſums. When made up in driblets as they could, their beſt ſecurities were at an intereſt of 12 per cent. Even

the paper of the Bank (now at par with caſh, and generally preferred to it) was often at a diſcount of twenty per cent. By this the ſtate of the reſt may be judged.

As to our commerce, the imports and exports of the nation, now ſix and forty million, did not then amount to ten. The inland trade, which is commonly paſſed by in this ſort of eſtimates, but which, in part growing out of the foreign, and connected with it, is more advantageous, and more ſubſtantially nutritive to the ſtate, is not only grown in a proportion of near five to one as the foreign, but has been augmented, at leaſt, in a tenfold proportion. When I came to England, I remember but one river navigation, the rate of carriage on which was limited by an act of parliament. It was made in the reign of William the Third; I mean that of the Aire and Calder. The rate was ſettled at thirteen pence. So high a price demonſtrated the feebleneſs of theſe beginnings of our inland intercourſe. In my time, one of the longeſt and ſharpeſt conteſts I remember in your houſe, and which rather reſembled a violent contention amongſt national parties than a local diſpute, was, as well as I can recollect, to hold the price up to three pence. Even this, which a very ſcanty juſtice to the proprietors required, was done with infinite difficulty. As to private credit, there were not, as I believe, twelve bankers ſhops at that time out of London.

In

In this their number, when I firſt ſaw the country, I cannot be quite exact; but certainly thoſe machines of domeſtick credit were then very few. They are now in almoſt every market town; and this circumſtance (whether the thing be carried to an exceſs or not) demonſtrates the aſtoniſhing increaſe of private confidence, of general circulation, and of internal commerce; an increaſe out of all proportion to the growth of the foreign trade. Our naval ſtrength in the time of King William's war was nearly matched by that of France; and though conjoined with Holland, then a maritime power hardly inferiour to our own, even with that force we were not always victorious. Though finally ſuperiour, the allied fleets experienced many unpleaſant reverſes on their own element. In two years three thouſand veſſels were taken from the Engliſh trade. On the continent we loſt almoſt every battle we fought.

In 1697, (it is not quite an hundred years ago,) in that ſtate of things, amidſt the general debaſement of the coin, the fall of the ordinary revenue, the failure of all the extraordinary ſupplies, the ruin of commerce and the almoſt total extinction of an infant credit, the chancellor of the exchequer himſelf whom we have juſt ſeen begging from door to door—came forward to move a reſolution, full of vigour, in which far from being diſcouraged by the generally adverſe fortune, and the long

long continuance of the war, the commons agreed to addreſs the crown in the following manly, ſpirited, and truly animating ſtyle.

"This is the EIGHTH year in which your ma-
"jeſty's moſt dutiful and loyal ſubjects the com-
"mons in parliament aſſembled, have aſſiſted your
"majeſty with large ſupplies for carrying on a juſt
"and neceſſary war, in defence of our religion, and
"preſervation of our laws, and vindication of the
"rights and liberties of the people of England."

Afterwards they proceed in this manner:—
"To ſhew to your majeſty and all chriſtendom,
"that the commons of England will not be *amuſed*
"or diverted from their firm reſolutions of obtain-
"ing by WAR, a ſafe and honourable peace, we do,
"in the name of thoſe we repreſent, renew our
"aſſurances to ſupport your majeſty and your go-
"vernment againſt all your enemies at home and
"abroad; and that we will effectually aſſiſt you in
"carrying on the war againſt France."

The amuſement and diverſion they ſpeak of, was the ſuggeſtion of a treaty *propoſed by the enemy*, and announced from the throne. Thus the people of England felt in the *eighth*, not in the *fourth* year of the war. No ſighing or panting after negotiation; no motions from the oppoſition to force the miniſtry into a peace; no meſſages from miniſters to palſy and deaden the reſolution of parliament or the ſpirit of the nation. They did not ſo much

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as adviſe the king to liſten to the propoſitions of the enemy, nor to ſeek for peace but through the mediation of a vigorous war. This addreſs was moved in a hot, a divided, a factious, and in a great part, diſaffected houſe of commons, and it was carried *nemine contradicente.*

While that firſt war (which was ill ſmothered by the treaty of Ryſwick) ſlept in the thin aſhes of a ſeeming peace, a new conflagration was in its immediate cauſes. A freſh and a far greater war was in preparation. A year had hardly elapſed when arrangements were made for renewing the conteſt with tenfold fury. The ſteps which were taken, at that time, to compoſe, to reconcile, to unite, and to diſcipline all Europe againſt the growth of France, certainly furniſh to a ſtateſman the fineſt and moſt intereſting part in the hiſtory of that great period. It formed the maſter-piece of king William's policy, dexterity, and perſeverance. Full of the idea of preſerving, not only a local civil liberty united with order, to our country, but to embody it in the political liberty, the order, and the independence of nations united under a natural head, the king called upon his parliament to put itſelf into a poſture "*to preſerve to England the* "*weight and influence it at preſent had on the councils* "*and affairs* ABROAD. It will be requiſite *Europe* "ſhould ſee you will not be wanting to your- "ſelves."

Baffled

Baffled as that monarch was, and almoſt heart-broken at the diſappointment he met with in the mode he firſt propoſed for that great end, he held on his courſe. He was faithful to his object; and in councils, as in arms, over and over again repulſed, over and over again he returned to the charge. All the mortifications he had ſuffered from the laſt parliament, and the greater he had to apprehend from that newly choſen, were not capable of relaxing the vigour of his mind. He was in Holland when he combined the vaſt plan of his foreign negotiations. When he came to open his deſign to his miniſters in England, even the ſober firmneſs of Somers, the undaunted reſolution of Shrewſbury, and the adventurous ſpirit of Montagu and Orford, were ſtaggered. They were not yet mounted to the elevation of the king. The cabinet, then the regency, met on the ſubject at Tunbridge Wells the 28th of Auguſt, 1698; and there, Lord Somers holding the pen, after expreſſing doubts on the ſtate of the continent, which they ultimately refer to the king, as beſt informed, they give him a moſt diſcouraging portrait of the ſpirit of this nation. "So far as relates to Eng-"land," ſay theſe miniſters, "it would be want of "duty not to give your majeſty this clear account, "that *there* is a *deadneſs and want of ſpirit in the na-"tion univerſally*, ſo as not to be at all diſpoſed to "*entering into a new war*. That they ſeem to be *tired*

"*out*

" *out with taxes* to a degree beyond what was diſ-
" cerned, till it appeared upon occaſion of the *late*
" *elections.* This is the truth of the fact upon
" which your majeſty will determine what reſolu-
" tion ought to be taken."

His majeſty did determine; and did take and purſue his reſolution. In all the tottering imbeci-lity of a new government, and with parliament to-tally unmanageable, he perſevered. He perſevered to expel the fears of his people, by his fortitude—To ſteady their ficklenefs, by his conſtancy—To expand their narrow prudence, by his enlarged wiſ-dom—To ſink their factious temper in his publick ſpirit.—In ſpite of his people he reſolved to make them great and glorious; to make England in-clined to ſhrink into her narrow ſelf, the arbitreſs of Europe, the tutelary angel of the human race. In ſpite of the miniſters, who ſtaggered under the weight that his mind impoſed upon theirs, unſup-ported as they felt themſelves by the popular ſpirit, he infuſed into them his own ſoul; he renewed in them their ancient heart; he rallied them in the ſame cauſe.

It required ſome time to accompliſh this work. The people were firſt gained, and through them their diſtracted repreſentatives. Under the influ-ence of king William, Holland had rejected the al-lurements of every ſeduction, and had reſiſted the terrours of every menace. With Hannibal at her gates,

gates, ſhe had nobly and magnanimouſly refuſed all ſeparate treaty, or any thing which might for a moment appear to divide her affection or her intereſt, or even to diſtinguiſh her in identity from England. Having ſettled the great point of the conſolidation (which he hoped would be eternal) of the countries made for a common intereſt, and common ſentiment, the king, in his meſſage to both houſes, calls their attention to the affairs of the *States General.* The houſe of lords was perfectly ſound, and entirely impreſſed with the wiſdom and dignity of the king's proceedings. In anſwer to the meſſage, which you will obſerve was narrowed to a ſingle point (the danger of the States General) after the uſual profeſſions of zeal for his ſervice, the lords opened themſelves at large. They go far beyond the demands of the meſſage. They expreſs themſelves as follows: "We take this occaſion *further* to aſſure your majeſty, that we are "ſenſible of the *great and imminent danger to which* "*the States General are expoſed. And we perfectly* "*agree with them in believing that their ſafety and* "*ours are ſo inſeparably united, that whatſoever is* "*ruin to the one muſt be fatal to the other.*

"We humbly deſire your majeſty will be pleaſed, "*not only* to make good all the articles of any "*former* treaties to the States General, but that you "will enter into a ſtrict league, offenſive and defen-"ſive, with them, *for their common preſervation;*

"*and*

" *and that you will invite into it all princes and ſtates*
" *who are concerned in the preſent viſible danger,*
" *ariſing from the union of France and Spain.*

" And we further deſire your majeſty, that you " will be pleaſed to enter into ſuch alliances with " the *emperour*, as your majeſty ſhall think fit, pur- " ſuant to the ends of the treaty of 1689; towards " all which we aſſure your majeſty of our hearty " and ſincere aſſiſtance; not doubting, but when- " ever your majeſty ſhall be obliged to be engaged " for the defence of your allies, *and ſecuring the* " *liberty and quiet of Europe*, Almighty God will " protect your ſacred perſon in ſo righteous a cauſe. " And that the unanimity, wealth, and courage of " your ſubjects will carry your majeſty with ho- " nour and ſucceſs *through all the difficulties of a* " JUST WAR."

The houſe of commons was more reſerved; the late popular diſpoſition was ſtill in a great degree prevalent in the repreſentative, after it had been made to change in the conſtituent body. The principle of the grand alliance was not directly recogniſed in the reſolution of the commons, nor the war announced, though they were well aware the alliance was formed for the war. However, compelled by the returning ſenſe of the people, they went ſo far as to fix the three great immoveable pillars of the ſafety and greatneſs of England, as they were then, as they are now, and as they muſt

ever

ever be to the end of time. They aſſerted in general terms the neceſſity of ſupporting Holland; of keeping united with our allies; and maintaining the liberty of Europe; though they reſtricted their vote to the ſuccours ſtipulated by actual treaty. But now they were fairly embarked; they were obliged to go with the courſe of the veſſel; and the whole nation, ſplit before into an hundred adverſe factions, with a king at its head evidently declining to his tomb, the whole nation, lords, commons, and people, proceeded as one body, informed by one ſoul. Under the Britiſh union, the union of Europe was conſolidated; and it long held together with a degree of coheſion, firmneſs, and fidelity not known before or ſince in any political combination of that extent.

Juſt as the laſt hand was given to this immenſe and complicated machine, the maſter workman died: but the work was formed on true mechanical principles: and it was as truly wrought. It went by the impulſe it had received from the firſt mover. The man was dead: but the grand alliance ſurvived in which king William lived and reigned. That heartleſs and diſpirited people, whom lord Somers nad repreſented, about two years before, as dead in energy and operation, continued that war to which it was ſuppoſed they were unequal in mind, and in means, for near thirteen years.

For what have I entered into all this detail? To

what purpoſe have I recalled your view to the end of the laſt century? It has been done to ſhew that the Britiſh nation was then a great people—to point out how and by what means they came to be exalted above the vulgar level, and to take that lead which they aſſumed among mankind. To qualify us for that pre-eminence, we had then an high mind, and a conſtancy unconquerable; we were then inſpired with no flaſhy paſſions; but ſuch as were durable as well as warm; ſuch as correſponded to the great intereſts we had at ſtake. This force of character was inſpired, as all ſuch ſpirit muſt ever be, from above. Government gave the impulſe. As well may we fancy, that, of itſelf the ſea will ſwell, and that without winds the billows will inſult the adverſe ſhore, as that the groſs maſs of the people will be moved, and elevated, and continue by a ſteady and permanent direction to bear upon one point, without the influence of ſuperiour authority, or ſuperiour mind.

This impulſe ought, in my opinion, to have been given in this war; and it ought to have been continued to it at every inſtant. It is made, if ever war was made, to touch all the great ſprings of action in the human breaſt. It ought not to have been a war of apology. The miniſter had, in this conflict, wherewithal to glory in ſucceſs; to be conſoled in adverſity; to hold high his principle in all fortunes. If it were not given him to ſupport the falling edifice,

edifice, he ought to bury himſelf under the ruins of the civilized world. All the art of Greece, and all the pride and power of eaſtern monarchs, never heaped upon their aſhes ſo grand a monument.

There were days when his great mind was up to the criſis of the world he is called to act in.* His manly eloquence was equal to the elevated wiſdom of ſuch ſentiments. But the little have triumphed over the great; an unnatural (as it ſhould ſeem) not an unuſual victory. I am ſure you cannot forget with how much uneaſineſs we heard in converſation, the language of more than one gentleman at the opening of this conteſt, "that he was willing to "try the war for a year or two, and if it did not "ſucceed, then to vote for peace." As if war was a matter of experiment! As if you could take it up or lay it down as an idle frolick! As if the dire goddeſs that preſides over it, with her murderous ſpear in her hand, and her gorgon at her breaſt, was a coquette to be flirted with! We ought with reverence to approach that tremendous divinity, that loves courage, but commands counſel. War never leaves, where it found a nation. It is never to be entered into without a mature deliberation; not a deliberation lengthened out into a perplexing indeciſion, but a deliberation leading to a ſure and fixed judgment. When ſo taken up, it is not to be abandoned without reaſon as valid,

* See the Declaration.

as fully, and as extenſively conſidered. Peace may be made as unadviſedly as war. Nothing is ſo raſh as fear; and the counſels of puſillanimity very rarely put off, whilſt they are always ſure to aggravate, the evils from which they would fly.

In that great war carried on againſt Louis the XIVth, for near eighteen years, government ſpared no pains to ſatisfy the nation, that though they were to be animated by a deſire of glory, glory was not their ultimate object; but that every thing dear to them, in religion, in law, in liberty, every thing which as freemen, as Engliſhmen, and as citizens of the great commonwealth of Chriſtendom, they had at heart, was then at ſtake. This was to know the true art of gaining the affections and confidence of an high-minded people; this was to underſtand human nature. A danger to avert a danger—a preſent inconvenience and ſuffering to prevent a foreſeen future, and a worſe calamity—theſe are the motives that belong to an animal, who, in his conſtitution, is at once adventurous and provident; circumſpect and daring; whom his Creator has made, as the poet ſays, "of large diſ-"courſe, looking before and after." But never can a vehement and ſuſtained ſpirit of fortitude be kindled in a people by a war of calculation. It has nothing that can keep the mind erect under the guſts of adverſity. Even where men are willing, as ſometimes they are, to barter their blood

for

for lucre, to hazard their ſafety for the gratification of their avarice, the paſſion, which animates them to that ſort of conflict, like all the ſhort-ſighted paſſions, muſt ſee its objects diſtinct and near at hand. The paſſions of the lower order are hungry and impatient. Speculative plunder; contingent ſpoil; future, long adjourned, uncertain booty; pillage which muſt enrich a late poſterity, and which poſſibly may not reach to poſterity at all; theſe, for any length of time, will never ſupport a mercenary war. The people are in the right. The calculation of profit in all ſuch wars is falſe. On balancing the account of ſuch wars, ten thouſand hogſheads of ſugar are purchaſed at ten thouſand times their price. The blood of man ſhould never be ſhed but to redeem the blood of man. It is well ſhed for our family, for our friends, for our God, for our country, for our kind. The reſt is vanity; the reſt is crime.

In the war of the grand alliance, moſt of theſe conſiderations voluntarily and naturally had their part. Some were preſſed into the ſervice. The political intereſt eaſily went in the track of the natural ſentiment. In the reverſe courſe the carriage does not follow freely. I am ſure the natural feeling, as I have juſt ſaid, is a far more predominant ingredient in this war, than in that of any other that ever was waged by this kingdom.

If the war made to prevent the union of two

crowns upon one head was a juſt war, this, which is made to prevent the tearing all crowns from all heads which ought to wear them, and with the crowns to ſmite off the ſacred heads themſelves, this is a juſt war.

If a war to prevent Louis the XIVth from impoſing his religion was juſt, a war to prevent the murderers of Louis the XVIth from impoſing their irreligion upon us is juſt; a war to prevent the operation of a ſyſtem, which makes life without dignity, and death without hope, is a juſt war.

If to preſerve political independence and civil freedom to nations, was a juſt ground of war; a war to preſerve national independence, property, liberty, life, and honour, from certain, univerſal havock, is a war juſt, neceſſary, manly, pious; and we are bound to perſevere in it by every principle, divine and human, as long as the ſyſtem which menaces them all, and all equally, has an exiſtence in the world.

You, who have looked at this matter with as fair and impartial an eye as can be united with a feeling heart, you will not think it an hardy aſſertion, when I affirm, that it were far better to be conquered by any other nation, than to have this faction for a neighbour. Before I felt myſelf authorized to ſay this, I conſidered the ſtate of all the countries in Europe for theſe laſt three hundred years, which have been obliged to ſubmit to a foreign

foreign law. In moſt of thoſe I found the condition of the annexed countries even better, certainly not worſe, than the lot of thoſe which were the patrimony of the conqueror. They wanted ſome bleſſings—but they were free from many very great evils. They were rich and tranquil. Such was Artois, Flanders, Lorrain, Alſatia, under the old government of France. Such was Sileſia under the king of Pruſſia. They who are to live in the vicinity of this new fabrick, are to prepare to live in perpetual conſpiracies and ſeditions; and to end at laſt, in being conquered, if not to her dominion, to her reſemblance. But when we talk of conqueſt by other nations, it is only to put a caſe. This is the only power in Europe by which it is *poſſible* we ſhould be conquered. To live under the continual dread of ſuch immeaſurable evils is itſelf a grievous calamity. To live without the dread of them is to turn the danger into the diſaſter. The influence of ſuch a France is equal to a war; its example, more waſting than an hoſtile irruption. The hoſtility with any other power is ſeparable and accidental; this power, by the very condition of its exiſtence, by its very eſſential conſtitution, is in a ſtate of hoſtility with us, and with all civiliſed people*.

A government of the nature of that ſet up at our very door has never been hitherto ſeen, or even imagined, in Europe. What our relation to it will

* See Declaration, Whitehall, October 29, 1793.

be cannot be judged by other relations. It is a ſerious thing to have a connection with a people, who live only under poſitive, arbitrary, and changeable inſtitutions; and thoſe not perfected nor ſupplied, nor explained, by any common acknowledged rule of moral ſcience. I remember that in one of my laſt converſations with the late lord Camden, we were ſtruck much in the ſame manner with the abolition in France of the law, as a ſcience of methodiſed and artificial equity. France, ſince her revolution, is under the ſway of a ſect, whoſe leaders have deliberately, at one ſtroke, demoliſhed the whole body of that juriſprudence which France had pretty nearly in common with other civiliſed countries. In that juriſprudence were contained the elements and principles of the law of nations, the great ligament of mankind. With the law they have of courſe deſtroyed all ſeminaries in which juriſprudence was taught, as well as all the corporations eſtabliſhed for its conſervation. I have not heard of any country, whether in Europe or Aſia, or even in Africa on this ſide of mount Atlas, which is wholly without ſome ſuch colleges and ſuch corporations, except France. No man, in a publick or private concern, can divine by what rule or principle her judgments are to be directed; nor is there to be found a profeſſor in any univerſity, or a practitioner in any court, who will hazard an opinion of what is or is not law in France, in any caſe whatever.

whatever. They have not only annulled all their old treaties; but they have renounced the law of nations from whence treaties have their force. With a fixed deſign they have outlawed themſelves, and to their power outlawed all other nations.

Inſtead of the religion and the law by which they were in a great politick communion with the chriſtian world, they have conſtructed their republick on three baſes, all fundamentally oppoſite to thoſe on which the communities of Europe are built. Its foundation is laid in regicide; in jacobiniſm; and in atheiſm; and it has joined to thoſe principles, a body of ſyſtematick manners, which ſecures their operation.

If I am aſked, how I would be underſtood in the uſe of theſe terms, regicide, jacobiniſm, atheiſm, and a ſyſtem of correſponding manners, and their eſtabliſhment, I will tell you.

I call a commonwealth *regicide*, which lays it down as a fixed law of nature, and a fundamental right of man, that all government, not being a democracy, is an uſurpation*. That all kings,

* Nothing could be more ſolemn than their promulgation of this principle as a preamble to the deſtructive code of their famous articles for the decompoſition of ſociety into whatever country they ſhould enter. "La convention nationale, après avoir entendu le rapport de ſes comités de finances, de la guerre & diplomatiques réunis, fidelle *au principe de ſouveraineté de peuples qui ne lui permet pas de reconnoître aucune inſtitution qui y porte atteinte*," &c. &c. Décret ſur le rapport de Cambon, Dec. 18, 1792, and ſee the ſubſequent proclamation.

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as ſuch, are uſurpers; and for being kings, may and ought to be put to death, with their wives, families and adherents. The commonwealth which acts uniformly upon thoſe principles; and which after aboliſhing every feſtival of religion, chooſes the moſt flagrant act of a murderous regicide treaſon for a feaſt of eternal commemoration, and which forces all her people to obſerve it—This I call *regicide by eſtabliſhment.*

Jacobiniſm is the revolt of the enterpriſing talents of a country againſt its property. When private men form themſelves into aſſociations for the purpoſe of deſtroying the pre-exiſting laws and inſtitutions of their country; when they ſecure to themſelves an army by dividing amongſt the people of no property, the eſtates of the ancient and lawful proprietors; when a ſtate recogniſes thoſe acts; when it does not make confiſcations for crimes, but makes crimes for confiſcations; when it has its principal ſtrength, and all its reſources in ſuch a violation of property; when it ſtands chiefly upon ſuch a violation; maſſacring by judgments, or otherwiſe, thoſe who make any ſtruggle for their old legal government, and their legal, hereditary, or acquired poſſeſſions—I call this *jacobiniſm by eſtabliſhment.*

I call it *atheiſm by eſtabliſhment*, when any ſtate, as ſuch, ſhall not acknowledge the exiſtence of God as a moral governour of the world; when it ſhall offer to him no religious or moral worſhip;—when

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it ſhall aboliſh the Chriſtian religion by a regular decree;—when it ſhall perſecute with a cold, unrelenting, ſteady cruelty, by every mode of confiſcation, impriſonment, exile, and death, all its miniſters;—when it ſhall generally ſhut up, or pull down, churches; when the few buildings which remain of this kind ſhall be opened only for the purpoſe of making a profane apotheoſis of monſters, whoſe vices and crimes have no parallel amongſt men, and whom all other men conſider as objects of general deteſtation, and the ſevereſt animadverſion of law. When, in the place of that religion of ſocial benevolence, and of individual ſelf-denial, in mockery of all religion, they inſtitute impious, blaſphemous, indecent theatrick rites, in honour of their vitiated, perverted reaſon, and erect altars to the perſonification of their own corrupted and bloody republick;—when ſchools and ſeminaries are founded at publick expence to poiſon mankind, from generation to generation, with the horrible maxims of this impiety;—when wearied out with inceſſant martyrdom, and the cries of a people hungering and thirſting for religion, they permit it, only as a tolerated evil—I call this *atheiſm by eſtabliſhment.*

When to theſe eſtabliſhments of regicide, of jacobiniſm, and of atheiſm, you add the *correſpondent ſyſtem of manners,* no doubt can be left on the mind of a thinking man, concerning their determined hoſtility

hoſtility to the human race. Manners are of more importance than laws. Upon them, in a great meaſure, the laws depend. The law touches us but here and there, and now and then. Manners are what vex or ſooth, corrupt or purify, exalt or debaſe, barbarize or refine us, by a conſtant, ſteady, uniform, inſenſible operation, like that of the air we breathe in. They give their whole form and colour to our lives. According to their quality, they aid morals, they ſupply them, or they totally deſtroy them. Of this the new French legiſlators were aware; therefore, with the ſame method, and under the ſame authority, they ſettled a ſyſtem of manners, the moſt licentious, proſtitute, and abandoned that ever has been known, and at the ſame time the moſt coarſe, rude, ſavage, and ferocious. Nothing in the revolution, no, not to a phraſe or a geſture, not to the faſhion of a hat or a ſhoe, was left to accident. All has been the reſult of deſign; all has been matter of inſtitution. No mechanical means could be deviſed in favour of this incredible ſyſtem of wickedneſs and vice, that has not been employed. The nobleſt paſſions, the love of glory, the love of country, have been debauched into means of its preſervation and its propagation. All ſorts of ſhews and exhibitions, calculated to inflame and vitiate the imagination, and pervert the moral ſenſe, have been contrived. They have ſometimes brought forth five or ſix hundred

hundred drunken women, calling at the bar of the aſſembly for the blood of their own children, as being royaliſts or conſtitutionaliſts. Sometimes they have got a body of wretches, calling themſelves fathers, to demand the murder of their ſons; boaſting that Rome had but one Brutus, but that they could ſhew five hundred. There were inſtances, in which they inverted, and retaliated the impiety, and produced ſons, who called for the execution of their parents. The foundation of their republick is laid in moral paradoxes. Their patrioiſm is always prodigy. All thoſe inſtances to be found in hiſtory, whether real or fabulous, of a doubtful publick ſpirit, at which morality is perplexed, reaſon is ſtaggered, and from which affrighted nature recoils, are their choſen, and almoſt ſole examples for the inſtruction of their youth.

The whole drift of their inſtitution is contrary to that of the wiſe legiſlators of all countries, who aimed at improving inſtincts into morals, and at grafting the virtues on the ſtock of the natural affections. They, on the contrary, have omitted no pains to eradicate every benevolent and noble propenſity in the mind of men. In their culture it is a rule always to graft virtues on vices. They think every thing unworthy of the name of publick virtue, unleſs it indicates violence on the private. All their new inſtitutions, (and with them every thing is new) ſtrike at the root of our ſocial nature.

nature. Other legiſlators, knowing that marriage is the origin of all relations, and conſequently the firſt element of all duties, have endeavoured, by every art, to make it ſacred. The Chriſtian religion, by confining it to the pairs, and by rendering that relation indiſſoluble, has, by theſe two things, done more towards the peace, happineſs, ſettlement, and civiliſation of the world, than by any other part in this whole ſcheme of Divine Wiſdom. The direct contrary courſe has been taken in the ſynagogue of antichriſt, I mean in that forge and manufactory of all evil, the ſect which predominated in the conſtituent aſſembly of 1789. Thoſe monſters employed the ſame, or greater induſtry, to deſecrate and degrade that ſtate, which other legiſlators have uſed to render it holy and honourable. By a ſtrange, uncalled-for declaration, they pronounced, that marriage was no better than a common, civil contract. It was one of their ordinary tricks, to put their ſentiments into the mouths of certain perſonated characters, which they theatrically exhibited at the bar of what ought to be a ſerious aſſembly. One of theſe was brought out in the figure of a proſtitute, whom they called by the affected name of "a mother without being a wife." This creature they made to call for a repeal of the incapacities, which in civiliſed ſtates are put upon baſtards. The proſtitutes of the aſſembly gave to this their puppet the

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ſanction of their greater impudence. In conſequence of the principles laid down, and the manners authorized, baſtards were not long after put on the footing of the iſſue of lawful unions. Proceeding in the ſpirit of the firſt authors of their conſtitution, ſucceeding aſſemblies went the full length of the principle, and gave a licence to divorce at the mere pleaſure of either party, and at a month's notice. With them the matrimonial connection is brought into ſo degraded a ſtate of concubinage, that I believe, none of the wretches in London, who keep warehouſes of infamy, would give out one of their victims to private cuſtody on ſo ſhort and inſolent a tenure. There was indeed a kind of profligate equity in given to women the ſame licentious power. The reaſon they aſſigned was as infamous as the act; declaring that women had been too long under the tyranny of parents and of huſbands. It is not neceſſary to obſerve upon the horrible conſequences of taking one half of the ſpecies wholly out of the guardianſhip and protection of the other.

The practice of divorce, though in ſome countries permitted, has been diſcouraged in all. In the Eaſt, polygamy and divorce are in diſcredit; and the manners correct the laws. In Rome, whilſt Rome was in its integrity, the few cauſes allowed for divorce amounted in effect to a prohibition. They were only three. The arbitrary was totally excluded;

excluded; and accordingly ſome hundreds of years paſſed, without a ſingle example of that kind. When manners were corrupted, the laws were relaxed; as the latter always follow the former, when they are not able to regulate them, or to vanquiſh them. Of this circumſtance the legiſlators of vice and crime were pleaſed to take notice, as an inducement to adopt their regulation; holding out an hope, that the permiſſion would as rarely be made uſe of. They knew the contrary to be true; and they had taken good care, that the laws ſhould be well ſeconded by the manners. Their law of divorce, like all their laws, had not for its object the relief of domeſtick uneaſineſs, but the total corruption of all morals, the total diſconnexion of ſocial life.

It is a matter of curioſity to obſerve the operation of this encouragement to diſorder. I have before me the Paris paper, correſpondent to the uſual regiſter of births, marriages, and deaths. Divorce, happily, is no regular head of regiſtry amongſt civiliſed nations. With the jacobins it is remarkable, that divorce is not only a regular head, but it has the poſt of honour. It occupies the firſt place in the liſt. In the three firſt months of the year 1793, the number of divorces in that city amounted to 562. The marriages were 1785; ſo that the proportion of divorces to marriages was not much leſs than one to three; a thing unexampled,

unexampled, I believe, among mankind. I caused an inquiry to be made at Doctor's Commons, concerning the number of divorces; and found, that all the divorces, (which, except by special act of parliament, are separations, and not proper divorces) did not amount in all those courts, and in an hundred years, to much more than one fifth of those that passed, in the single city of Paris, in three months. I followed up the inquiry relative to that city through several of the subsequent months until I was tired, and found the proportions still the same. Since then I have heard that they have declared for a revisal of these laws: but I know of nothing done. It appears as if the contract that renovates the world was under no law at all. From this we may take our estimate of the havock that has been made through all the relations of life. With the jacobins of France, vague intercourse is without reproach; marriage is reduced to the vilest concubinage; children are encouraged to cut the throats of their parents; mothers are taught that tenderness is no part of their character; and to demonstrate their attachment to their party, that they ought to make no scruple to rake with their bloody hands in the bowels of those who came from their own.

To all this let us join the practice of *cannibalism*, with which, in the proper terms, and with

the greateſt truth, their ſeveral factions accuſe each other. By cannibaliſm, I mean their devouring, as a nutriment of their ferocity, ſome part of the bodies of thoſe they have murdered; their drinking the blood of their victims, and forcing the victims themſelves to drink the blood of their kindred ſlaughtered before their faces. By cannibaliſm, I mean alſo to ſignify all their nameleſs, unmanly, and abominable inſults on the bodies of thoſe they ſlaughter.

As to thoſe whom they ſuffer to die a natural death, they do not permit them to enjoy the laſt conſolations of mankind, or thoſe rights of ſepulture, which indicate hope, and which mere nature has taught to mankind in all countries, to ſoothe the afflictions, and to cover the infirmity of mortal condition. They diſgrace men in the entry into life; they vitiate and enſlave them through the whole courſe of it; and they deprive them of all comfort at the concluſion of their diſhonoured and depraved exiſtence. Endeavouring to perſuade the people that they are no better than beaſts, the whole body of their inſtitution tends to make them beaſts of prey, furious and ſavage. For this purpoſe the active part of them is diſciplined into a ferocity which has no parallel. To this ferocity there is joined not one of the rude, unfaſhioned virtues, which accompany the vices, where

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the whole are left to grow up together in the rankneſs of uncultivated nature. But nothing is left to nature in their ſyſtems.

The ſame diſcipline which hardens their hearts relaxes their morals. Whilſt courts of juſtice were thruſt out by revolutionary tribunals, and ſilent churches were only the funeral monuments of departed religion, there were no fewer than nineteen or twenty theatres, great and ſmall, moſt of them kept open at the publick expence, and all of them crowded every night. Among the gaunt, hagard forms of famine and nakedneſs, amidſt the yells of murder, the tears of affliction, and the cries of deſpair, the ſong, the dance, the mimick ſcene, the buffoon laughter, went on as regularly as in the gay hour of feſtive peace. I have it from good authority, that under the ſcaffold of judicial murder, and the gaping planks that poured down blood on the ſpectators, the ſpace was hired out for a ſhew of dancing dogs. I think, without concert, we have made the very ſame remark on reading ſome of their pieces, which being written for other purpoſes, let us into a view of their ſocial life. It ſtruck us that the habits of Paris had no reſemblance to the finiſhed virtues, or to the poliſhed vice, and elegant, though not blameleſs luxury, of the capital of a great empire. Their ſociety was more like that of a den of outlaws upon a doubtful frontier; of a lewd tavern for the revels

and debauches of banditti, aſſaſſins, bravos, ſmugglers, and their more deſperate paramours, mixed with bombaſtick players, the refuſe and rejected offal of ſtrolling theatres, puffing out ill-ſorted verſes about virtue, mixed with the licentious and blaſphemous ſongs, proper to the brutal and hardened courſe of life belonging to that ſort of wretches. This ſyſtem of manners in itſelf is at war with all orderly and moral ſociety, and is in its neighbourhood unſafe. If great bodies of that kind were any where eſtabliſhed in a bordering territory, we ſhould have a right to demand of their governments the ſuppreſſion of ſuch a nuiſance. What are we to do if the government and the whole community is of the ſame deſcription? Yet that government has thought proper to invite ours to lay by its unjuſt hatred, and to liſten to the voice of humanity as taught by their example.

The operation of dangerous and deluſive firſt principles obliges us to have recourſe to the true ones. In the intercourſe between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the inſtrumental part. We lay to much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts. We do not act much more wiſely when we truſt to the intereſts of men as guarantees of their engagements. The intereſts frequently tear to pieces the engagements: and the paſſions trample upon both. Entirely to truſt to either, is to diſregard our own ſafety, or not to know

know mankind. Men are not tied to one another by papers and ſeals. They are led to aſſociate by reſemblances, by conformities, by ſympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is ſo ſtrong a tie of amity, between nation and nation as correſpondence in laws, cuſtoms, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themſelves. They are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, without their knowledge, and ſometimes againſt their intentions. The ſecret, unſeen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourſe, holds them together, even when their preverſe and litigious nature ſets them to equivocate, ſcuffle, and fight about the terms of their written obligations.

As to war, if it be the means of wrong and violence, it is the ſole means of juſtice amongſt nations. Nothing can baniſh it from the world. They who ſay otherwiſe, intending to impoſe upon us, do not impoſe upon themſelves. But it is one of the greateſt objects of human wiſdom to mitigate thoſe evils which we are unable to remove. The conformity and analogy of which I ſpeak, incapable like every thing elſe, of preſerving perfect truſt and tranquillity among men, has a ſtrong tendency to facilitate accommodation, and to produce a generous oblivion of the rancour of their quarrels. With this ſimilitude, peace is more of peace, and war is leſs of war. I will go further. There have

been periods of time in which communities, apparently in peace with each other, have been more perfectly ſeparated than, in latter times, many nations in Europe have been in the courſe of long and bloody wars. The cauſe muſt be ſought in the ſimilitude throughout Europe of religion, laws, and manners. At bottom, theſe are all the ſame. The writers on publick law have often called this *aggregate* of nations a commonwealth. They had reaſon. It is virtually one great ſtate having the ſame baſis of general law; with ſome diverſity of provincial cuſtoms and local eſtabliſhments. The nations of Europe have had the very ſame chriſtian religion, agreeing in the fundamental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the ſubordinate doctrines. The whole of the polity and œconomy of every country in Europe has been derived from the ſame ſources. It was drawn from the old Germanick or Gothick cuſtumary; from the feudal inſtitutions which muſt be conſidered as an emanation from that cuſtumary; and the whole has been improved and digeſted into ſyſtem and diſcipline by the Roman law. From hence aroſe the ſeveral orders, with or without a monarch (which are called ſtates) in every European country; the ſtrong traces of which, where monarchy predominated, were never wholly extinguiſhed or merged in deſpotiſm. In the few places where monarchy was caſt off, the ſpirit of European monarchy was

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ſtill left. Thoſe countries ſtill continued countries of ſtates; that is, of claſſes, orders, and diſtinctions ſuch as had before ſubſiſted, or nearly ſo. Indeed the force and form of the inſtitution called ſtates, continued in greater perfection in thoſe republican communities then under monarchies. From all thoſe ſources aroſe a ſyſtem of manners and of education which was nearly ſimilar in all this quarter of the globe; and which ſoftened, blended, and harmonized the colours of the whole. There was little difference in the form of the univerſities for the education of their youth, whether with regard to faculties, to ſciences, or to the more liberal and elegant kinds of erudition. From this reſemblance in the modes of intercourſe, and in the whole form and faſhion of life, no citizen of Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it. There was nothing more than a pleaſing variety to recreate and inſtruct the mind; to enrich the imagination; and to meliorate the heart. When a man travelled or reſided for health, pleaſure, buſineſs or neceſſity, from his own country, he never felt himſelf quite abroad.

The whole body of this new ſcheme of manners in ſupport of the new ſcheme of politicks, I conſider as a ſtrong and deciſive proof of determined ambition and ſyſtematick hoſtility. I defy the moſt refining ingenuity to invent any other cauſe for the total departure of the jacobin republick

from every one of the ideas and uſages, religious, legal, moral, or ſocial, of this civilized world, and for her tearing herſelf from its communion with ſuch ſtudied violence, but from a formed reſolution of keeping no terms with that world. It has not been, as has been falſely and inſidiouſly repreſented, that theſe miſcreants had only broke with their old government. They made a ſchiſm with the whole univerſe; and that ſchiſm extended to almoſt every thing great and ſmall. For one, I wiſh, ſince it is gone thus far, that the breach had been ſo complete, as to make all intercourſe impracticable; but partly by accident, partly by deſign, partly from the reſiſtence of the matter, enough is left to preſerve intercourſe, whilſt amity is deſtroyed or corrupted in its principle.

This violent breach of the community of Europe, we muſt conclude to have been made (even if they had not expreſsly declared it over and over again) either to force mankind into an adoption of their ſyſtem, or to live in perpetual enmity with a community the moſt potent we have ever known. Can any perſon imagine, that in offering to mankind this deſperate alternative, there is no indication of a hoſtile mind, becauſe men in poſſeſſion of the ruling authority are ſuppoſed to have a right to act without coercion in their own territories? As to the right of men to act any where according to their pleaſure, without any moral tie, no ſuch

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right exiſts. Men are never in a ſtate of *total* independence of each other. It is not the condition of our nature: nor is it conceivable how any man can purſue a conſiderable courſe of action without its having ſome effect upon others; or, of courſe, without producing ſome degree of reſponſibility for his conduct. The *ſituations* in which men relatively ſtand produce the rules and principles of that reſponſibility, and afford directions to prudence in exacting it.

Diſtance of place does not extinguiſh the duties or the rights of men; but it often renders their exerciſe impracticable. The ſame circumſtance of diſtance renders the noxious effects of an evil ſyſtem in any community leſs pernicious. But there are ſituations where this difficulty does not occur; and in which, therefore, theſe duties are obligatory, and theſe rights are to be aſſerted. It has ever been the method of publick juriſts to draw a great part of the analogies on which they form the law of nations, from the principles of law which prevail in civil community. Civil laws are not all of them merely poſitive. Thoſe which are rather concluſions of legal reaſon, than matters of ſtatutable proviſion, belong to univerſal equity, and are univerſally applicable. Almoſt the whole prætorian law is ſuch. There is a *Law of Neighbourhood* which does not leave a man perfect maſter on his own ground. When a neighbour ſees a *new erection*, in

in the nature of a nuiſance, ſet up at his door, he has a right to repreſent it to the judge; who, on his part, has a right to order the work to be ſtaid; or if eſtabliſhed, to be removed. On this head the parent law is expreſs and clear; and has made many wiſe proviſions, which, without deſtroying, regulate and reſtrain the right of *ownerſhip*, by the right of *vicinage*. No *innovation* is permitted that may redound, even ſecondarily, to the prejudice of a neighbour. The whole doctrine of that important head of prætorian law, "*De novi operis nuncia-*"*tione*," is founded on the principle, that no *new* uſe ſhould be made of a man's private liberty of operating upon his private property, from whence a detriment may be juſtly apprehended by his neighbour. This law of denunciation is proſpective. It is to anticipate what is called *damnum infectum*, or *damnum nondum factum*, that is a damage juſtly apprehended but not actually done. Even before it is clearly known, whether the innovation be damageable or not, the judge is competent to iſſue a prohibition to innovate, until the point can be determined. This prompt interference is grounded on principles favourable to both parties. It is preventive of miſchief difficult to be repaired, and of ill blood difficult to be ſoftened. The rule of law, therefore, which comes before the evil, is amongſt the very beſt parts of equity, and juſtifies the promptneſs of the remedy; becauſe, as it is well obſerved,

obſerved, *Res damni infecti celeritatem deſiderat & periculoſa eſt dilatio.* This right of denunciation does not hold, when things continue, however inconveniently to the neighbourhood, according to the *antient* mode. For there is a ſort of preſumption againſt novelty, drawn out of a deep conſideration of human nature and human affairs; and the maxim of juriſprudence is well laid down, *Vetuſtas pro lege ſemper habetur.*

Such is the law of civil vicinity. Now where there is no conſtituted judge, as between independent ſtates there is not, the vicinage itſelf is the natural judge. It is, preventively, the aſſertor of its own rights, or remedially, their avenger. Neighbours are preſumed to take cogniſance of each others acts. "*Vicini, vicinorum facta preſumuntur "ſcire.*" This principle, which, like the reſt, is as true of nations, as of individual men, has beſtowed on the grand vicinage of Europe, a duty to know, and a right to prevent, any capital innovation which may amount to the erection of a dangerous nuiſance.* Of the importance of that innovation, and the miſchief of that nuiſance, they are, to be

* "This ſtate of things cannot exiſt in France without in-"volving all the ſurrounding powers in one common danger; "without giving them the right, without impoſing it on them "as a duty, to ſtop the progreſs of an evil which attacks the "fundamental principles by which mankind is united in civil "ſociety." Declaration, 29th Oct. 1793.

ſure,

ſure, bound to judge not litigiouſly: but it is in their competence to judge. They have uniformly acted on this right. What in civil ſociety is a ground of action, in politick ſociety is a ground of war. But the exerciſe of that competent juriſdiction is a matter of moral prudence. As ſuits in civil ſociety, ſo war in the political muſt ever be a matter of great deliberation. It is not this or that particular proceeding, picked out here and there, as a ſubject of quarrel, that will do. There muſt be an aggregate of miſchief. There muſt be marks of deliberation; there muſt be traces of deſign; there muſt be indications of malice; there muſt be tokens of ambition. There muſt be force in the body where they exiſt; there muſt be energy in the mind. When all theſe circumſtances combine, or the important parts of them, the duty of the vicinity calls for the exerciſe of its competence: and the rules of prudence do not reſtrain, but demand it.

In deſcribing the nuiſance erected by ſo peſtilential a manufactory, by the conſtruction of ſo infamous a brothel, by digging a night-cellar for ſuch thieves, murderers, and houſe-breakers, as never infeſted the world, I am ſo far from aggravating, that I have fallen infinitely ſhort of the evil. No man who has attended to the particulars of what has been done in France, and combined them with the principles there aſſerted, can poſſibly doubt it.

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When I compare with this great cauſe of nations, the trifling points of honour, the ſtill more contemptible points of intereſt, the light ceremonies, the undefinable punctilios, the diſputes about precedency, the lowering or the hoiſting of a ſail, the dealing in a hundred or two of wild cat-ſkins on the other ſide of the globe, which have often kindled up the flames of war between nations, I ſtand aſtoniſhed at thoſe perſons, who do not feel a reſentment, not more natural than politick, at the atrocious inſults that this monſtrous compound offers to the dignity of every nation, and who are not alarmed with what it threatens to their ſafety.

'I have therefore been decidedly of opinion, with our declaration at Whitehall, in the beginning of this war, that the vicinage of Europe had not only a right, but an indiſpenſable duty, and an exigent intereſt, to denunciate this new work before it had produced the danger we have ſo ſorely felt, and which we ſhall long feel. The example of what is done by France is too important not to have a vaſt and extenſive influence; and that example backed with its power, muſt bear with great force on thoſe who are near it; eſpecially on thoſe who ſhall recogniſe the pretended republick on the principle upon which it now ſtands. It is not an old ſtructure which you have found as it is, and are not to diſpute of the original end and deſign with which

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it had been ſo faſhioned. It is a recent wrong, and can plead no preſcription. It violates the rights upon which not only the community of France, but thoſe on which all communities are founded. The principles on which they proceed are *general* principles, and are as true in England as in any other country. They who (though with the pureſt intentions) recogniſe the authority of theſe regicides and robbers upon principle, juſtify there acts, and eſtabliſh them as precedents. It is a queſtion not between France and England. It is a queſtion beween property and force. The property claims; and its claim has been allowed. The property of the nation is the nation. They who maſſacre, plunder, and expel the body of the proprietary, are murderers, and robbers. The ſtate, in its eſſence, muſt be moral and juſt: and it may be ſo, though a tyrant or uſurper ſhould be accidentally at the head of it. This is a thing to be lamented: but this notwithſtanding, the body of the commonwealth may remain in all its integrity and be perfectly ſound in its compoſition. The preſent caſe is different. It is not a revolution in Government. It is not the victory of party over party. It is a deſtruction and decompoſition of the whole ſociety; which never can be made of right by any faction, however powerful, nor without terrible conſequences to all about it, both in the act and in the example. This pretended republick is founded

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in crimes, and exists by wrong and robbery; and wrong and robbery, far from a title to any thing, is war with mankind. To be at peace with robbery is to be an accomplice with it.

Mere locality does not constitute a body politick. Had Cade and his gang got possession of London, they would not have been the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council. The body politick of France existed in the majesty of its throne; in the dignity of its nobility; in the honour of its gentry: in the sanctity of its clergy; in the reverence of its magistracy; in the weight and consideration due to its landed property in the several bailliages; in the respect due to its moveable substance represented by the corporations of the kingdom. All these particular *moleculæ* united, form the great mass of what is truly the body politick in all countries. They are so many depositsand receptacles of justice; because they can only exist by justice. Nation is a moral essence, not a geographical arrangement, or a denomination of the nomenclator. France, though out of her territorial possession, exists; because the sole possible claimant, I mean the proprietary, and the government to which the proprietary adheres, exists and claims. God forbid, that if you were expelled from your house by ruffians and assassins, that I should call the material walls, doors and windows of ———, the ancient and honourable family of ———. Am I to transfer to the intruders, who,

not

not content to turn you out naked to the world, would rob you of your very name, all the eſteem and reſpect I owe to you? The regicides in France are not France. France is out of her bounds, but the kingdom is the ſame.

To illuſtrate my opinions on this ſubject, let us ſuppoſe a caſe, which, after what has happened, we cannot think abſolutely impoſſible, through the augury is to be abominated, and the event deprecated with our moſt ardent prayers. Let us ſuppoſe then, that our gracious ſovereign was ſacrilegiouſly murdered; his exemplary queen, at the head of the matronage of this land, murdered in the ſame manner; that thoſe princeſſes whoſe beauty and modeſt elegance are the ornaments of the country, and who are the leaders and patterns of the ingenuous youth of their ſex, were put to a cruel and ignominious death, with hundreds of others, mothers and daughters, ladies of the firſt diſtinction;—that the prince of Wales and the duke of York, princes the hope and pride of the nation, with all their brethren, were forced to fly from the knives of aſſaſſins—that the whole body of our excellent clergy were either maſſacred or robbed of all, and tranſported—the Chriſtian religion, in all its denominations, forbidden and perſecuted; the law totally, fundamentally, and in all its parts deſtroyed—the judges put to death by revolutionary tribunals—the peers and commons robbed to the laſt acre of their eſtates; maſſacred

exile and in beggary—that the whole landed property ſhould ſhare the very ſame fate—that every military and naval officer of honour and rank, almoſt to a man, ſhould be placed in the ſame deſcription of confiſcation and exile—that the principal merchants and bankers ſhould be drawn out, as from an hen-coop, for ſlaughter—that the citizens of our greateſt and moſt flouriſhing cities, when the hand and the machinery of the hangman were not found ſufficient, ſhould have been collected in the publick ſquares, and maſſacred by thouſands with cannon;—if three hundred thouſand others ſhould have been doomed to a ſituation worſe than death in noiſome and peſtilential priſons;—in ſuch a caſe, is it in the faction of robbers I am to look for my country? Would this be the England that you and I, and even ſtrangers, admired, honoured, loved, and cheriſhed? Would not the exiles of England alone be my government and my fellow citizens? Would not their places of refuge be my temporary country? Would not all my duties and all my affections be there and there only? Should I conſider myſelf as a traitor to my country, and deſerving of death, if I knocked at the door and heart of every potentate in Chriſtendom to ſuccour my friends, and to avenge them on their enemies? Could I, in any way, ſhew myſelf more a patriot? What ſhould I think of thoſe potentates who inſulted their ſuffering brethren; who

treated them as vagrants, or at leaſt as mendicants; and could find no allies, no friends, but in regicide murderers and robbers? What ought I to think and feel, if being geographers inſtead of kings, they recogniſed the deſolated cities, the waſted fields, and the rivers polluted with blood, of this geometrical meaſurement, as the honourable member of Europe, called England? In that condition what ſhould we think of Sweden, Denmark, or Holland, or whatever power afforded us a churliſh and treacherous hoſpitality, if they ſhould invite us to join the ſtandard of our king, our laws, and our religion, if they ſhould give us a direct promiſe of protection—if after all this, taking advantage of our deplorable ſituation, which left us no choice, they were to treat us as the loweſt and vileſt of all mercenaries? If they were to ſend us far from the aid of our king, and our ſuffering country, to ſquander us away in the moſt peſtilential climates for a venal enlargement of their own territories, for the purpoſe of trucking them, when obtained, with thoſe very robbers and murderers they had called upon us to oppoſe with our blood? What would be our ſentiments, if in that miſerable ſervice we were not to be conſidered either as Engliſh, or as Swedes, Dutch, Danes, but as outcaſts of the human race? Whilſt we were fighting thoſe battles of their intereſt, and as their ſoldiers, how ſhould we feel if we were to be excluded from

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all their cartels? How muſt we feel, if the pride and flower of the Engliſh nobility and gentry, who might eſcape the peſtilential clime, and the devouring ſword, ſhould, if taken priſoners, be delivered over as rebel ſubjects, to be condemned as rebels, as traitors, as the vileſt of all criminals, by tribunals formed of Maroon negro ſlaves, covered over with the blood of their maſters, who were made free and organized into judges, for their robberies and murders? What ſhould we feel under this inhuman, inſulting, and barbarious protection of Muſcovites, Swedes or Hollanders? Should we not obteſt Heaven, and whatever juſtice there is yet on earth? Oppreſſion makes wiſe men mad; but the diſtemper is ſtill the madneſs of the wiſe, which is better than the ſobriety of fools. Their cry is the voice of ſacred miſery, exalted, not into wild raving, but into the ſanctified phrenzy of prophecy and inſpiration—in that bitterneſs of ſoul, in that indignation of ſuffering virtue, in that exaltation of deſpair, would not perſecuted Engliſh loyalty cry out, with an awful warning voice, and denounce the deſtruction that waits on monarchs, who conſider fidelity to them as the moſt degrading of all vices; who ſuffer it to be puniſhed as the moſt abominable of all crimes; and who have no reſpect but for rebels, traitors, regicides, and furious negro ſlaves, whoſe crimes have broke their chains? Would not this warm language of high indigna-

tion have more of ſound reaſon in it, more of real affection, more of true attachment, than all the lullabies of flatterers, who would huſh monarchs to ſleep in the arms of death? Let them be well convinced, that if ever this example ſhould prevail in its whole extent, it will have its full operation. Whilſt kings ſtand firm on their baſe, though under that baſe there is a ſure-wrought mine, there will not be wanting to their levees a ſingle perſon of thoſe who are attached to their fortune, and not to their perſons or cauſe: but hereafter none will ſupport a tottering throne. Some will fly for fear of being cruſhed under the ruin; ſome will join in making it. They will ſeek in the deſtruction of royalty, fame, and power, and wealth, and the homage of kings, with *Reubel*, with *Carnot*, with *Revelliere*, and with the *Merlins* and the *Talliens*, rather than ſuffer exile and beggary with the *Condés*, or the *Broglios*, the *Caſtries*, the *D'Avrais*, the *Serrents*, the *Cazalés*, and the long line of loyal, ſuffering patriot nobility, or to be butchered with the oracles and the victims of the laws, the *D'Ormeſons*, the *D'Eſpremenils*, and the *Maleſherbes*. This example we ſhall give, if inſtead of adhering to our fellows in a cauſe which is an honour to us all, we abandon the lawful government and lawful corporate body of France, to hunt for a ſhameful and ruinous fraternity, with this odious uſurpation that diſgraces civilized ſociety and the human race.

And

And is then example nothing? It is every thing. Example is the ſchool of mankind, and they will learn at no other. This war is a war againſt that example. It is not a war for Louis the eighteenth, or even for the property, virtue, fidelity of France. It is a war for George the third, for Francis the ſecond, and for all the dignity, property, honour, virtue, and religion of England, of Germany, and of all nations.

I know that all I have ſaid of the ſyſtematick unſociability of this new-invented ſpecies of republick and the impoſſibility of preſerving peace, is anſwered by aſſerting that the ſcheme of manners, morals, and even of maxims and principles of ſtate, is of no weight in a queſtion of peace or war between communities. This doctrine is ſupported by example. The caſe of Algiers is cited, with an hint, as if it were the ſtronger caſe. I ſhould take no notice of this ſort of inducement, if I had found it only were firſt it was. I do not want reſpect for thoſe from whom I firſt heard it—but having no controverſy at preſent with them, I only think it not amiſs to reſt on it a little, as I find it adopted with much more of the ſame kind, by ſeveral of thoſe on whom ſuch reaſoning had formerly made no apparent impreſſion. If it had no force to prevent us from ſubmitting to this neceſſary war, it furniſhes no better ground for our making an unneceſſary and ruinous peace.

This analogical argument drawn from the caſe of Algiers would lead us a good way. The fact is, we ourſelves with a little cover, others more directly, pay a *tribute* to the republick of Algiers. Is it meant to reconcile us to the payment of a *tribute* to the French republick? That this, with other things more ruinous, will be demanded hereafter, I little doubt; but for the preſent, this will not be avowed—though our minds are to be gradually prepared for it. In truth, the arguments from this caſe are worth little, even to thoſe who approve the buying an Algerine forbearance of piracy. There are many things which men do not approve, that they muſt do to avoid a greater evil. To argue from thence, that they are to act in the ſame manner in all caſes, is turning neceſſity into a law. Upon what is matter of prudence, the argument concludes the contrary way. Becauſe we have done one humiliating act, we ought, with infinite caution, to admit more acts of the ſame nature, leſt humiliation ſhould become our habitual ſtate. Matters of prudence are under the dominion of circumſtances, and not of logical analogies. It is abſurd to take it otherwiſe.

I, for one, do more than doubt the policy of this kind of convention with Algiers. On thoſe who think as I do, the argument *ad hominem* can make no ſort of impreſſion. I know ſomething of the conſtitution and compoſition of this very extraordi-

nary republick. It has a conſtitution, I admit, ſimilar to the preſent tumultuous military tyranny of France, by which an handful of obſcure ruffians domineer over a fertile country, and a brave people. For the compoſition, too, I admit the Algerine community reſembles that of France; being formed out of the very ſcum, ſcandal, diſgrace, and peſt of the Turkiſh Aſia. The grand ſeignior, to diſburthen the country, ſuffers the dey to recruit, in his dominions, the corps of janiſaries, or aſaphs, which form the directory and council of elders of the African republick one and indiviſible. But notwithſtanding this reſemblance, which I allow, I never ſhall ſo far injure the janiſarian republick of Algiers, as to put it in compariſon for every ſort of crime, turpitude, and oppreſſion with the jacobin republick of Paris. There is no queſtion with me to which of the two I ſhould chooſe to be a neighbour or a ſubject. But ſituated as I am, I am in no danger of becoming to Algiers either the one or the other. It is not ſo in my relation to the atheiſtical fanaticks of France. I *am* their neighbour; I *may* become their ſubject. Have the gentlemen who borrowed this happy parallel, no idea of the different conduct to be held with regard to the very ſame evil at an immenſe diſtance, and when it is at your door? when its power is enormous, as when it is comparatively as feeble as its diſtance is remote? when there is a barrier of

language and uſages, which prevents corruption through certain old correſpondences and habitudes, from the contagion of the horrible novelties that are introduced into every thing elſe? I can contemplate, without dread, a royal or a national tyger on the borders of Pegu. I can look at him, with an eaſy curioſity, as priſoner within bars in the menagerie of the tower. But if, by habeas corpus, or otherwiſe, he was to come into the lobby of the houſe of commons whilſt your doors was open, any of you would be more ſtout than wiſe, who would not gladly make your eſcape out of the back windows. I certainly ſhould dread more from a wild cat in my bed-chamber, than from all the lions that roar in the deſarts behind Algiers. But in this parallel it is the cat that is at a diſtance, and the lions and tygers that are in our anti-chambers and our lobbies. Algiers is not near; Algiers is not powerful; Algiers is not our neighbour; Algiers is not infectious. Algiers, whatever it may be, is an old creation; and we have good data to calculate all the miſchief to be apprehended from it. When I find Algiers transferred to Calais, I will tell you what I think of that point. In the mean time, the caſe quoted from the Algerine reports, will not apply as authority. We ſhall put it out of court; and ſo far as that goes, let the counſel for the jacobin peace take nothing by their motion.

When we voted, as you and I did, with many more

more whom you and I reſpect and love, to reſiſt this enemy, we were providing for dangers that were direct, home, preſſing, and not remote, contingent, uncertain, and formed upon looſe analogies. We judged of the danger with which we were menaced by jacobin France, from the whole tenour of her conduct; not from one or two doubtful or detached acts or expreſſions. I not only concurred in the idea of combining with Europe in this war; but to the beſt of my power even ſtimulated miniſters to that conjunction of intereſts and of efforts. I joined them with all my ſoul, on the principles contained in that manly and maſterly ſtate-paper, which I have two or three times referred to,* and may ſtill more frequently hereafter. The diplomatick collection never was more enriched than with this piece. The hiſtorick facts juſtify every ſtroke of the maſter. "Thus painters write their names "at, Co."

Various perſons may concur in the ſame meaſure on various grounds. They may be various, without being contrary to, or excluſive of each other. I thought the inſolent, unprovoked aggreſſion of the regicide, upon our ally of Holland, a good ground of war. I think his manifeſt attempt to overturn the balance of Europe, a good ground of war. As a good ground of war, I conſider his

* Declaration, Whitehall Oct. 29. 1793.

declaration

declaration of war on his majeſty and his kingdom. But though I have taken all theſe to my aid, I conſider them as nothing more than as a ſort of evidence to indicate the treaſonable mind within. Long before their acts of aggreſſion, and their declaration of war, the faction in France had aſſumed a form, had adopted a body of principles and maxims, and had regularly and ſyſtematically acted on them by which ſhe virtually had put herſelf in a poſture, which was in itſelf a declaration of war againſt mankind.

It is ſaid by the directory in their ſeveral manifeſtoes, that we of the people are tumultuous for peace; and that miniſters pretend negotiation to amuſe us. This they have learned from the language of many amongſt ourſelves, whoſe converſations have been one main cauſe of whatever extent the opinion for peace with regicide may be. But I who think the miniſters unfortunately to be but too ſerious in their proceedings, find myſelf obliged to ſay a little more on this ſubject of the popular opinion.

Before our opinions are quoted againſt ourſelves, it is proper that, from our ſerious deliberation, they may be worth quoting. It is without reaſon we praiſe the wiſdom of our conſtitution, in putting under the diſcretion of the crown, the awful truſt of war and peace, if the miniſters of the crown virtually return it again into our hands. The truſt

truſt was placed there as a ſacred depoſit, to ſecure us againſt popular raſhneſs in plunging into wars, and againſt the effects of popular diſmay, diſguſt, or laſſitude in getting out of them as imprudently as we might firſt engage in them. To have no other meaſure in judging of thoſe great objects than our momentary opinions and deſires, is to throw us back upon that very democracy which, in this part, our conſtitution was formed to avoid.

It is no excuſe at all for a miniſter, who at our deſire takes a meaſure contrary to our ſafety, that it is our own act. He who does not ſtay the hand of ſuicide, is guilty of murder. On our part I ſay, that to be inſtructed, is not to be degraded or enſlaved. Information is an advantage to us; and we have a right to demand it. He that is bound to act in the dark cannot be ſaid to act freely. When it appears evident to our governours that our deſires and our intereſts are at variance, they ought not to gratify the former at the expence of the latter. Stateſmen are placed on an eminence, that they may have a larger horizon than we can poſſibly command. They have a whole before them, which we can contemplate only in the parts, and often without the neceſſary relations. Miniſters are not only our natural rulers but our natural guides. Reaſon clearly and manfully delivered, has in itſelf a mighty force: but reaſon in the mouth

mouth of legal authority, is, I may fairly ſay, irreſiſtible.

I admit that reaſon of ſtate will not, in many circumſtances, permit the diſcloſure of the true ground of a publick proceeding. In that caſe ſilence is manly and it is wiſe. It is fair to call for truſt when the principle of reaſon itſelf ſuſpends its publick uſe. I take the diſtinction to be this: The ground of a particular meaſure, making a part of a plan, it is rarely proper to divulge; all the broader grounds of policy on which the general plan is to be adopted, ought as rarely to be concealed. They who have not the whole cauſe before them, call them politicians, call them people, call them what you will, are no judges. The difficulties of the caſe, as well as its fair ſide, ought to be preſented. This ought to be done; and it is all that can be done. When we have our true ſituation diſtinctly preſented to us, if then we reſolve with a blind and headlong violence, to reſiſt the admonitions of our friends, and to caſt ourſelves into the hands of our potent and irreconcileable foes, then, and not till then, the miniſters ſtand acquitted before God and man, for whatever may come.

Lamenting as I do, that the matter has not had ſo full and free a diſcuſſion as it requires, I mean to omit none of the points which ſeem to me neceſſary

neceſſary for conſideration, previous to an arrangement which is for ever to decide the form and the fate of Europe. In the courſe, therefore, of what I ſhall have the honour to addreſs to you, I propoſe the following queſtions to your ſerious thoughts:—1. Whether the preſent ſyſtem which ſtands for a government in France, be ſuch as in peace and war affects the neighbouring ſtates in a manner different from the internal government that formerly prevailed in that country?—2. Whether that ſyſtem, ſuppoſing its views hoſtile to other nations, poſſeſſes any means of being hurtful to them peculiar to itſelf?—3. Whether there has been lately ſuch a change in France, as to alter the nature of its ſyſtem, or its effect upon other powers?—4. Whether any publick declarations or engagements exiſt, on the part of the allied powers, which ſtand in the way of a treaty of peace, which ſuppoſes the right and confirms the power of the regicide faction in France?—5. What the ſtate of the other powers of Europe will be with reſpect to each other, and their colonies, on the concluſion of a regicide peace?—6. Whether we are driven to the abſolute neceſſity of making that kind of peace?

Theſe heads of inquiry will enable us to make the application of the ſeveral matters of fact and topicks of argument, that occur in this vaſt diſcuſſion, to certain fixed principles. I do not

mean

mean to confine myſelf to the order in which they ſtand. I ſhall diſcuſs them in ſuch a manner as ſhall appear to me the beſt adapted for ſhewing their mutual bearings and relations. Here then I cloſe the publick matter of my letter; but before I have done, let me ſay one word in apology for myſelf.

In wiſhing this nominal peace not to be precipitated, I am ſure no man living is leſs diſpoſed to blame the preſent miniſtry than I am. Some of my oldeſt friends, (and I wiſh I could ſay it of more of them) make a part in that miniſtry. There are ſome indeed, "whom my dim eyes in vain explore." In my mind, a greater calamity could not have fallen on the publick than the excluſion of one of them. But I drive away that, with other melancholy thoughts. A great deal ought to be ſaid upon that ſubject or nothing. As to the diſtinguiſhed perſons to whom my friends who remain are joined, if benefits, nobly and generouſly conferred, ought to procure good wiſhes, they are entitled to my beſt vows; and they have them all. They have adminiſtered to me the only conſolation I am capable of receiving, which is to know that no individual will ſuffer by my thirty years ſervice to the publick. If things ſhould give us the comparative happineſs of a ſtruggle, I ſhall be found, I was going to ſay fighting, (that would be fooliſh) but dying by the ſide of Mr. Pitt. I muſt add, that

that if any thing defenſive in our domeſtick ſyſtem can poſſibly ſave us from the diſaſters of a regicide peace, he is the man to ſave us. If the finances in ſuch a caſe can be repaired, he is the man to repair them. If I ſhould lament any of his acts, it is only when they appear to me to have no reſemblance to acts of his. But let him not have a confidence in himſelf, which no human abilities can warrant. His abilities are fully equal (and that is to ſay much for any man) to thoſe which are oppoſed to him. But if we look to him as our ſecurity againſt the conſequences of a regicide peace, let us be aſſured, that a regicide peace and a conſtitutional miniſtry are terms that will not agree. With a regicide peace the king cannot long have a miniſter to ſerve him, nor the miniſter a king to ſerve. If the Great Diſpoſer, in reward of the royal and the private virtues of our ſovereign, ſhould call him from the calamitous ſpectacles, which will attend a ſtate of amity with regicide, his ſucceſſor will ſurely ſee them, unleſs the ſame Providence greatly anticipates the courſe of nature. Thinking thus (and not, as I conceive, on light grounds) I dare not flatter the reigning ſovereign, nor any miniſter he has or can have, nor his ſucceſſor apparent, nor any of thoſe who may be called to ſerve him, with what appears to me a falſe ſtate of their ſituation. We cannot have them and that peace together.

I do

I do not forget that there had been a conſiderable difference between ſeveral of our friends, (with my inſignificant ſelf) and the great man at the head of miniſtry, in an early ſtage of theſe diſcuſſions. But I am ſure there was a period in which we agreed better in the danger of a jacobin exiſtence in France. At one time he and all Europe ſeem to feel it. But why am not I converted with ſo many great powers, and ſo many great miniſters? It is becauſe I am old and ſlow.—I am in this year, 1796, only where all the powers of Europe were in 1793. I cannot move with this preceſſion of the equinoxes, which is preparing for us the return of ſome very old, I am afraid no golden æra, or the commencement of ſome new æra that muſt be denominated from ſome new metal. In this criſis I muſt hold my tongue, or I muſt ſpeak with freedom. Falſhood and deluſion are allowed in no caſe whatever: but, as in the exerciſe of all the virtues, there is an œconomy of truth. It is a ſort of temperance, by which a man ſpeaks truth with meaſure that he may ſpeak it the longer. But as the ſame rules do not hold in all caſes —what would be right for you, who may preſume on a ſeries of years before you, would have no ſenſe for me, who cannot, without abſurdity, calculate on ſix months of life. What I ſay, I *muſt* ſay at once. Whatever I write is in its nature teſtamentary. It may have the weakneſs but it has the ſincerity of a dying

a dying declaration. For the few days I have to linger here, I am removed completely from the buſy ſcene of the world; but I hold myſelf to be ſtill reſponſible for every thing that I have done whilſt I continued on the place of action. If the raweſt Tyro in politicks has been influenced by the authority of my grey hairs, and led by any thing in my ſpeeches, or my writings, to enter into this war, he has a right to call upon me to know why I have changed my opinions, or why, when thoſe I voted with, have adopted better notions, I perſevere in exploded errour?

When I ſeem not to acquieſce in the acts of thoſe I reſpect in every degree ſhort of ſuperſtition, I am obliged to give my reaſons fully. I cannot ſet my authority againſt their authority. But to exert reaſon is not to revolt againſt authority. Reaſon and authority do not move in the ſame parallel. That reaſon is an *amicus curiæ* who ſpeaks *de plano*, not *pro tribunali*. It is a friend who makes an uſeful ſuggeſtion to the court, without queſtioning its juriſdiction. Whilſt he acknowledges its competence, he promotes its efficiency. I ſhall purſue the plan I have chalked out in my letters that follow this.

LETTER II.

ON THE

GENIUS AND CHARACTER

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

AS IT REGARDS

OTHER NATIONS

1796.

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Genius and Character of the French Revolution as it regards other Nations.

MY DEAR SIR,

I CLOSED my firſt letter with ſerious matter, and I hope it has employed your thoughts. The ſyſtem of peace muſt have a reference to the ſyſtem of the war. On that ground, I muſt therefore again recal your mind to our original opinions, which time and events have not taught me to vary.

My ideas and my principle led me, in this conteſt, to encounter France, not as a ſtate, but as a faction. The vaſt territorial extent of that country, its immenſe population, its riches of production, its riches of commerce and convention—the whole aggregate maſs of what, in ordinary caſes, conſtitutes the force of a ſtate, to me were but objects of ſecondary conſideration. They might be balanced; and they have been often more than balanced. Great as theſe things are, they are not what make the faction formidable. It is

the faction that makes them truly dreadful. That faction is the evil ſpirit that poſſeſſes the body of France; that informs it as a ſoul; that ſtamps upon its ambition, and upon all its purſuits, a characteriſtick mark, which ſtrongly diſtinguiſhes them from the ſame general paſſions, and the ſame general views, in other men and in other communities. It is that ſpirit which inſpires into them, a new, a pernicious, a deſolating activity. Conſtituted as France was ten years ago, it was not in that France to ſhake, to ſhatter, and to overwhelm Europe in the manner that we behold. A ſure deſtruction impends over thoſe infatuated princes, who, in the conflict with this new and unheard-of power, proceed as if they were engaged in a war that bore a reſemblance to their former conteſts; or that they can make peace in the ſpirit of their former arrangements of pacification. Here the beaten path is the very reverſe of the ſafe road.

As to me, I was always ſteadily of opinion, that this diſorder was not in its nature intermittent. I conceived that the conteſt once begun, could not be laid down again, to be reſumed at our diſcretion; but that our firſt ſtruggle with this evil would alſo be our laſt. I never thought we could make peace with the ſyſtem; becauſe it was not for the ſake of an object we purſued in rivalry with each other, but with the ſyſtem itſelf that we were at war. As I underſtood the matter, we were at

war

war not with its conduct, but with its exiſtence; convinced that its exiſtence and its hoſtility were the ſame.

The faction is not local or territorial. It is a general evil. Where it leaſt appears in action, it is ſtill full of life. In its ſleep it recruits its ſtrength, and prepares its exertion. Its ſpirit lies deep in the corruption of our common nature. The ſocial order which reſtrains it, feeds it. It exiſts in every country in Europe; and among all orders of men in every country, who look up to France as to a common head. The centre is there. The circumference is the world of Europe where-ever the race of Europe may be ſettled. Every where elſe the faction is militant; in France it is triumphant. In France is the bank of depoſit, and the bank of circulation, of all the pernicious principles that are forming in every ſtate. It will be a folly ſcarcely deſerving of pity, and too miſchievous for contempt, to think of reſtraining it in any other country whilſt it is predominant there. War, inſtead of being the cauſe of its force, has ſuſpended its operation. It has given a reprieve, at leaſt, to the Chriſtian world.

The true nature of a jacobin war, in the beginning, was, by moſt of the Chriſtian powers, felt, acknowledged, and even in the moſt preciſe manner declared. In the joint manifeſto, publiſhed by the emperour and the king of Pruſſia, on the 4th

of Auguſt 1792, it is expreſſed in the cleareſt terms, and on principles, which could not fail, if they had adhered to them, of claſſing thoſe monarchs with the firſt benefactors of mankind. This manifeſto was publiſhed, as they themſelves expreſs it, "to lay open to the preſent generation, as well as "to poſterity, their motives, their intentions, and "the *diſintereſtedneſs* of their perſonal views; tak- "ing up arms for the purpoſe of preſerving ſocial "and political order amongſt all civilized nations, "and to ſecure to *each* ſtate its religion, happi- "neſs, independence, territories, and real con- "ſtitution."—"On this ground, they hoped that "all empires, and all ſtates would be unani- "mous; and becoming the firm guardians of "the happineſs of mankind, that they could not "fail to unite their efforts to reſcue a numerous "nation from its own fury, to preſerve Europe "from the return of barbariſm, and the univerſe "from the ſubverſion and anarchy with which it "was threatened." The whole of that noble per- formance ought to be read at the firſt meeting of any congreſs, which may aſſemble for the purpoſe of pacification. In that piece "theſe powers ex- "preſsly renounce all views of perſonal aggran- "dizement," and confine themſelves to objects worthy of ſo generous, ſo heroick, and ſo perfectly wiſe and politick an enterpriſe. It was to the prin- ciples of this confederation and to no other, that

we

we wiſhed our ſovereign and our country to accede, as a part of the commonwealth of Europe. To theſe principles with ſome trifling exceptions and limitations they did fully accede*. And all our friends who took office acceded to the miniſtry (whether wiſely or not) as I always underſtood the matter, on the faith and on the principles of that declaration.

As long as theſe powers flattered themſelves that the menace of force would produce the effect of force, they acted on thoſe declarations: but when their menaces failed of ſucceſs, their efforts took a new direction. It did not appear to them that virtue and heroiſm ought to be purchaſed by millions of rix-dollars. It is a dreadful truth, but it is a truth that cannot be concealed; in ability, in dexterity, in the diſtinctneſs of their views, the jacobins are our ſuperiours. They ſaw the thing right from the very beginning. Whatever were the firſt motives to the war among politicians, they ſaw that in its ſpirit, and for its objects, it was a *civil war*; and as ſuch they purſued it. It is a war between the partiſans of the antient, civil, moral, and political order of Europe againſt a ſect of fanatical and ambitious atheiſts which means to change them all. It is not France extending a foreign empire over other nations: it is a ſect aiming at univerſal empire, and beginning with the conqueſt of France.

* See Declaration, Whitehall, October 29, 1793.

The

The leaders of that ſect ſecured the *centre of Europe*; and that ſecured, they knew, that whatever might be the event of battles and ſieges, their *cauſe* was victorious. Whether its territory had a little more or a little leſs peeled from its ſurface, or whether an iſland or two was detached from its commerce, to them was of little moment. The conqueſt of France was a glorious acquiſition. That once well laid as a baſis of empire, opportunities never could be wanting to regain or to replace what had been loſt, and dreadfully to avenge themſelves on the faction of their adverſaries.

They ſaw it was a *civil war*. It was their buſineſs to perſuade their adverſaries that it ought to be a *foreign* war. The jacobins every where ſet up a cry againſt the new cruſade; and they intrigued with effect in the cabinet, in the field, and in every private ſociety in Europe. Their taſk was not difficult. The condition of princes, and ſometimes of firſt miniſters too, is to be pitied. The creatures of the deſk, and the creatures of favour, had no reliſh for the principles of the manifeſtoes. They promiſed no governments, no regiments, no revenues from whence emoluments might ariſe, by perquiſite or by grant. In truth, the tribe of vulgar politicians are the loweſt of our ſpecies. There is no trade ſo vile and mechanical as government in their hands. Virtue is not their habit. They are out of themſelves in any courſe of conduct recommended only

only by conſcience and glory. A large, liberal and proſpective view of the intereſts of ſtates paſſes with them for romance; and the principles that recommend it for the wanderings of a diſordered imagination. The calculators compute them out of their ſenſes. The jeſters and buffoons ſhame them out of every thing grand and elevated. Littleneſs in object and in means, to them appears ſoundneſs and ſobriety. They think there is nothing worth purſuit, but that which they can handle; which they can meaſure with a two-foot rule; which they can tell upon ten fingers.

Without the principles of the jacobins, perhaps without any principles at all, they played the game of that faction. There was a beaten road before them. The powers of Europe were armed; France had always appeared dangerous; the war was eaſily diverted from France as a faction, to France as a ſtate. The princes were eaſily taught to ſlide back into their old habitual courſe of politicks. They were eaſily led to conſider the flames that were conſuming France, not as a warning to protect their own buildings (which were without any party wall, and linked by a contignation into the edifice of France), but as an happy occaſion for pillaging the goods, and for carrying off the materials of their neighbour's houſe. Their provident fears were changed into avaricious hopes. They carried on their new deſigns without ſeeming to abandon the principles

principles of their old policy. They pretended to ſeek or they flattered themſelves that they fought, in the acceſſion of new fortreſſes, and new territories, a *defenſive* ſecurity. But the ſecurity wanted was againſt a kind of power, which was not ſo truly dangerous in its fortreſſes nor in its territories, as in its ſpirit and its principles. They aimed, or pretended to aim, at *defending* themſelves againſt a danger, from which there can be no ſecurity in any *defenſive* plan. If armies and fortreſſes were a defence againſt jacobiniſm, Louis the Sixteenth would this day reign a powerful monarch over an happy people.

This errour obliged them, even in their offenſive operations, to adopt a plan of war, againſt the ſucceſs of which there was ſomething little ſhort of mathematical demonſtration. They refuſed to take any ſtep which might ſtrike at the heart of affairs. They ſeemed unwilling to wound the enemy in any vital part. They acted through the whole, as if they really wiſhed the conſervation of the jacobin power; as what might be more favourable than the lawful government to the attainment of the petty objects they looked for. They always kept on the circumference; and the wider and remoter the circle was, the more eagerly they choſe it as their ſphere of action in this centrifugal war. The plan they purſued, in its nature demanded great length of time. In its execution, they, who went

went the neareſt way to work, were obliged to cover an incredible extent of country. It left to the enemy every means of deſtroying this extended line of weakneſs. Ill ſucceſs in any part was ſure to defeat the effect of the whole. This is true of Auſtria. It is ſtill more true of England. On this falſe plan, even good fortune, by further weakening the victor, put him but the further off from his object.

As long as there was any appearance of ſucceſs, the ſpirit of aggrandizement, and conſequently the ſpirit of mutual jealouſy, ſeized upon all the coaleſced powers. Some ſought an acceſſion of territory at the expence of France, ſome at the expence of each other; ſome at the expence of third parties; and when the viciſſitude of diſaſter took its turn, they found common diſtreſs a treacherous bond of faith and friendſhip.

The greateſt ſkill conducting the greateſt military apperatus has been employed; but it has been worſe than uſeleſsly employed, through the falſe policy of the war. The operations of the field ſuffered by the errours of the cabinet. If the ſame ſpirit continues when peace is made, the peace will fix and perpetuate all the errours of the war; becauſe it will be made upon the ſame falſe principle. What has been loſt in the field, in the field may be regained. An arrangement of peace in its nature is a permanent ſettlement; it is the effect of

counſel

counſel and deliberation, and not of fortuitous events. If built upon a baſis fundamentally erroneous, it can only be retrieved by ſome of thoſe unforeſeen diſpenſations, which the all-wiſe but myſterious Governour of the world, ſometimes interpoſes, to ſnatch nations from ruin. It would not be pious errour, but mad and impious preſumption for any one to truſt in an unknown order of diſpenſations, in defiance of the rules of prudence, which are formed upon the known march of the ordinary providence of God.

It was not of that ſort of war that I was amongſt the leaſt conſiderable, but amongſt the moſt zealous adviſers; and it is not by the ſort of peace now talked of, that I wiſh it concluded. It would anſwer no great purpoſe to enter into the particular errours of the war. The whole has been but one errour. It was but nominally a war of alliance. As the combined powers purſued it, there was nothing to hold an alliance together. There could be no tie of *honour*, in a ſociety for pillage. There could be no tie of a common *intereſt* were the object did not offer ſuch a diviſion amongſt the parties, as could well give them a warm concern in the gains of each other, or could indeed form ſuch a body of equivalents, as might make one of them willing to abandon a ſeparate object of his ambition for the gratification of any other member of the alliance. The partition of Poland offered an object of ſpoil in which

which the parties *might* agree. They were circum jacent; and each might take a portion convenient to his own territory. They might diſpute about the value of their ſeveral ſhares, but the contiguity to each of the demandants always furniſhed the means of an adjuſtment. Though hereafter the world will have cauſe to rue this iniquitous meaſure, and they moſt who were moſt concerned in it, for the moment, there was wherewithal in the object to preſerve peace amongſt confederates in wrong. But the ſpoil of France did not afford the ſame facilities for accomodation. What might ſatisfy the houſe of Auſtria in a Flemiſh frontier afforded no equivalent to tempt the cupidity of the king of Pruſſia. What might be deſired by Great Britain in the Weſt Indies, muſt be coldly and remotely, if at all, felt as an intereſt at Vienna; and it would be felt as ſomething worſe than a negative intereſt at Madrid. Auſtria, long poſſeſſed with unwiſe and dangerous deſigns on Italy, could not be very much in earneſt about the conſervation of the old patrimony of the houſe of Savoy: and Sardinia, who owed to an Italian force all her means of ſhutting out France from Italy, of which ſhe has been ſuppoſed to hold the key, would not purchaſe the means of ſtrength upon one ſide by yielding it on the other. She would not readily give the poſſeſſion of Novara for the hope of Savoy. No continental power was willing to loſe any of its continental

tinental objects for the increaſe of the naval power of Great Britain; and Great Britain would not give up any of the objects ſhe fought for as the means of an increaſe to her naval power, to further their aggrandizement.

The moment this war came to be conſidered as a war merely of profit, the actual circumſtances are ſuch, that it never could become really a war of alliance. Nor can the peace be a peace of alliance, until things are put upon their right bottom.

I don't find it denied, that when a treaty is entered into for peace, a demand will be made on the regicides to ſurrender a great part of their conqueſts on the continent. Will they, in the preſent ſtate of the war, make that ſurrender without an equivalent? This continental ceſſion muſt of courſe be made in favour of that party in the alliance, that has ſuffered loſſes. That party has nothing to furniſh towards an equivalent. What equivalent, for inſtance, has Holland to offer, who has loſt her all? What equivalent can come from the Emperour, every part of whoſe territories contiguous to France, is already within the pale of the regicide dominion? What equivalent has Sardinia to offer for Savoy and for Nice, I may ſay for her whole being? What has ſhe taken from the faction of France? ſhe has loſt very near her all; and ſhe has gained nothing. What equivalent has

Spain.

Spain to give? Alas! ſhe has already paid for her own ranſom the fund of equivalent, and a dreadful equivalent it is, to England and to herſelf. But I put Spain out of the queſtion; ſhe is a province of the jacobin empire, and ſhe muſt make peace or war according to the orders ſhe receives from the directory of aſſaſſins. In effect and ſubſtance, her crown is a fief of regicide.

Whence then can the compenſation be demanded? Undoubtedly from that power which alone has made ſome conqueſts. That power is England. Will the allies then give away their ancient patrimony; that England may keep iſlands in the Weſt Indies? They never can protract the war in good earneſt for that object; nor can they act in concert with us, in our refuſal to grant any thing towards their redemption. In that caſe we are thus ſituated. Either we muſt give Europe, bound hand and foot, to France; or we muſt quit the Weſt Indies without any one object, great or ſmall, towards indemnity and ſecurity. I repeat it without any advantage whatever: becauſe, ſuppoſing that our conqueſt could compriſe all that France ever poſſeſſed in the tropical America, it never can amount in any fair eſtimation to a fair equivalent for Holland, for the Auſtrian Netherlands, for the lower Germany, that is for the whole ancient kingdom or circle of Burgundy, now under the yoke of regicide, to ſay nothing of almoſt all Italy under

the ſame barbarous domination. If we treat in the preſent ſituation of things, we have nothing in our hands that can redeem Europe. Nor is the emperour, as I have obſerved, more rich in the fund of equivalents.

If we look to our ſtock in the eaſtern world, our moſt valuable and ſyſtematick acquiſitions are made in that quarter. Is it from France they are made? France has but one or two contemptible factories, ſubſiſting by the offal of the private fortunes of Engliſh individuals to ſupport them, in any part of India. I look on the taking of the Cape of Good Hope as the ſecuring of a poſt of great moment. It does honour to thoſe who planned, and to thoſe who executed that enterpriſe: but I ſpeak of it always as comparatively good; as good as any thing can be in a ſcheme of war that repels us from a centre, and employs all our forces where nothing can be finally deciſive. But giving, as I freely give, every poſſible credit to theſe eaſtern conqueſts, I aſk one queſtion, on whom are they made? It is evident, that if we can keep our eaſtern conqueſts, we keep them not at the expence of France, but at the expence of Holland our *ally*; of Holland the immediate cauſe of the war, the nation whom we had undertaken to protect, and not of the republick which it was our buſineſs to deſtroy. If we return the African and the Aſiatick conqueſts, we put them into the hands

of

of a nominal ſtate (to that Holland is reduced) unable to retain them; and which will virtually leave them under the direction of France. If we withhold them, Holland declines ſtill more as a ſtate. She loſes ſo much carrying trade and that means of keeping up the ſmall degree of naval power ſhe holds; for which policy alone, and not for any commercial gain ſhe maintains the Cape, or any ſettlement beyond it. In that caſe, reſentment, faction, and even neceſſity will throw her more and more into the power of the new miſchievous republick. But on the probable ſtate of Holland, I ſhall ſay more, when in this correſpondence I come to talk over with you the ſtate in which any ſort of jacobin peace will leave all Europe.

So far as to the Eaſt Indies.

As to the Weſt Indies, indeed as to either, if we look for matter of exchange in order to ranſom Europe, it is eaſy to ſhew that we have taken a terrible roundabout road. I cannot conceive, even if, for the ſake of holding conqueſts there, we ſhould refuſe to redeem Holland, and the Auſtrian Netherlands, and the hither Germany, that Spain, merely as ſhe is Spain (and forgetting that the regicide ambaſſador governs at Madrid) will ſee with perfect ſatisfaction, Great Britain ſole miſtreſs of the Iſles. In truth it appears to me, that, when we come to balance our account, we ſhall find in the propoſed peace only the pure, ſimple, and

unendowed charms of jacobin amity. We ſhall have the ſatisfaction of knowing, that no blood or treaſure has been ſpared by the allies for ſupport of the regicide ſyſtem. We ſhall reflect at leiſure on one great truth, that it was ten times more eaſy totally to deſtroy the ſyſtem itſelf, than when eſtabliſhed, it would be to reduce its power, and that this republick, moſt formidable abroad, was, of all things, the weakeſt at home; that her frontier was terrible, her interiour feeble; that it was matter of choice to attack her where ſhe is invincible, and to ſpare her where ſhe was ready to diſſolve by her own internal diſorders. We ſhall reflect, that our plan was good nelther for offence nor defence,

It would not be at all difficult to prove, that an army of a hundred thouſand men, horſe, foot, and artillery, might have been employed againſt the enemy on the very ſoil which he has uſurped at a far leſs expence than has been ſquandered away upon tropical adventures. In theſe adventures it was not an enemy we had to vanquiſh, but a cemetery to conquer. In carrying on the war in the Weſt Indies, the hoſtile ſword is merciful; the country in which we engage is the dreadful enemy. There the European conqueror finds a cruel defeat in the very fruits of his ſucceſs. Every advantage is but a new demand on England for recruits to the Weſt Indian grave. In a Weſt India war, the regicides have for their troops,

troops, a race of fierce barbarians, to whom the poiſoned air, in which our youth inhale certain death, is ſalubrity and life. To them the climate is the ſureſt and moſt faithful of allies.

Had we carried on the war on the ſide of France which looks towards the channel or the Atlantick, we ſhould have attacked our enemy on his weak and unarmed ſide. We ſhould not have to reckon on the loſs of a man, who did not fall in battle. We ſhould have an ally in the heart of the country, who to our hundred thouſand, would at one time have added eighty thouſand men at the leaſt, and all animated by principle, by enthuſiaſm and by vengeance; motives which ſecured them to the cauſe in a very different manner from ſome of thoſe allies whom we ſubſidized with millions. This ally (or rather this principle in the war) by the confeſſion of the regicide himſelf, was more formidable to him than all his other foes united. Warring there, we ſhould have led our arms to the capital of Wrong. Defeated, we could not fail (proper precautions taken) of a ſure retreat. Stationary, and only ſupporting the royaliſts, an impenetrable barrier, an impregnable rampart would have been formed between the enemy and his naval power. We are probably the only nation who have declined to act againſt an enemy, when it might have been done in his own country; and who having an armed, a powerful, and a long

victorious ally in that country, declined all effectual co-operation, and ſuffered him to periſh for want of ſupport. On the plan of a war in France, every advantage that our allies might obtain, would be doubled in its effect. Diſaſters on the one ſide, might have a fair chance of being compenſated by victories on the other. Had we brought the main of our force to bear upon that quarter, all the operations of the Britiſh and Imperial crowns would have been combined. The war would have had ſyſtem, correſpondence, and a certain direction. But as the war has been purſued, the operations of the two crowns have not the ſmalleſt degree of mutual bearing or relation.

Had acquiſitions in the Weſt Indies been our object, on ſucceſs in France, every thing reaſonable in thoſe remote parts might be demanded with decorum, and juſtice, and a ſure effect. Well might we call for a recompence in America, for thoſe ſervices to which Europe owed its ſafety. Having abandoned this obvious policy connected with principle, we have ſeen the regicide power taking the reverſe courſe, and making real conqueſts in the Weſt Indies, to which all our dear-bought advantages (if we could hold them) are mean and contemptible. The nobleſt iſland within the tropicks, worth all that we poſſeſs put together, is, by the vaſſal Spaniard, delivered into her hands. The iſland of Hiſpaniola (of which we have

have but one poor corner, by a ſlippery hold) is perhaps equal to England in extent, and in fertility is far ſuperiour. The part poſſeſſed by Spain, of that great iſland, made for the ſeat and center of a tropical empire, was not improved, to be ſure, as the French diviſion had been, before it was ſyſtematically deſtroyed by the cannibal republick; but it is not only the far larger, but the far more ſalubrious, and more fertile part.

It was delivered into the hands of the barbarians without, as I can find, any publick reclamation on our part, not only in contravention to one of the fundamental treaties that compoſe the publick law of Europe, but in defiance of the fundamental colonial policy of Spain herſelf. This part of the treaty of Utrecht was made for great general ends unqueſtionably; but whilſt it provided for thoſe general ends, it was in affirmance of that particular policy. It was not to injure but to ſave Spain by making a ſettlement of her eſtate, which prohibited her to alienate to France. It is her policy, not to ſee the balance of Weſt Indian power overturned by France or by Great Britain. Whilſt the monarchies ſubſiſted, this unprincipled ceſſion was what the influence of the elder branch of the houſe of Bourbon never dared to attempt on the younger: but cannibal terrour has been more powerful than family influence. The Bourbon monarchy of Spain

is united to the republick of France, by what may be truly called the ties of blood.

By this meaſure the balance of power in the Weſt Indies is totally deſtroyed. It has followed the balance of power in Europe. It is not alone what ſhall be left nominally to the aſſaſſins that is theirs. Theirs is the whole empire of Spain in America. That ſtroke finiſhes all. I ſhould be glad to ſee our ſuppliant negotiator in the act of putting his feather to the ear of the directory, to make it unclench the fiſt; and by his tickling, to charm that rich prize out of the iron gripe of robbery and ambition! It does not require much ſagacity to diſcern, that no power wholly baffled and defeated in Europe, can flatter itſelf with conqueſts in the Weſt Indies. In that ſtate of things it can neither keep nor hold. No! It cannot even long make war if the grand bank and depoſit of its force is at all in the Weſt Indies. But here a ſcene opens to my view too important to paſs by, perhaps too critical to touch. Is it poſſible, that it ſhould not preſent itſelf in all its relations, to a mind habituated to conſider either war or peace on a large ſcale, or as one whole?

Unfortunately other ideas have prevailed. A remote, an expenſive, a murderous, and in the end, an unproductive adventure, carried on upon ideas of mercantile knight-errantry, without any of the generous wildneſs of Quixotiſm, is conſidered as

found,

found, ſolid ſenſe; and a war in a wholeſome climate, a war at our door, a war directly on the enemy, a war in the heart of his country, a war in concert with an internal ally, and in combination with the external, is regarded as folly and romance.

My dear friend, I hold it impoſſible that theſe conſiderations ſhould have eſcaped the ſtateſmen on both ſides of the water, and on both ſides of the houſe of commons. How a queſtion of peace can be diſcuſſed without having them in view, I cannot imagine. If you or others ſee a way out of theſe difficulties I am happy. I ſee indeed a fund from whence equivalents will be propoſed. I ſee it. But I cannot juſt now touch it. It is a queſtion of high moment. It opens another Iliad of woes to Europe.

Such is the time propoſed for making *a common political peace*, to which no one circumſtance is propitious. As to the grand principle of the peace, it is left, as if by common conſent, wholly out of the queſtion.

Viewing things in this light, I have frequently ſunk into a degree of deſpondency and dejection hardly to be deſcribed; yet out of the profoundeſt depths of this deſpair, an impulſe which I have in vain endeavoured to reſiſt, has urged me to raiſe one feeble cry againſt this unfortunate coalition which is formed at home, in order to make a coalition

coalition with France, ſubverſive of the whole ancient order of the world. No diſaſter of war, no calamity of ſeaſon, could ever ſtrike me with half the horrour which I felt from what is introduced to us by this junction of parties, under the ſoothing name of peace. We are apt to ſpeak of a low and puſillanimous ſpirit as the ordinary cauſe by which dubious wars terminate in humiliating treaties. It is here the direct contrary. I am perfectly aſtoniſhed at the boldneſs of character, at the intrepidity of mind, the firmneſs of nerve, in thoſe who are able with deliberation to face the perils of jacobin fraternity.

This fraternity is indeed ſo terrible in its nature, and in its manifeſt conſequences, that there is no way of quieting our apprehenſions about it, but by totally putting it out of ſight, by ſubſtituting for it, through a ſort of periphraſis, ſomething of an ambiguous quality, and deſcribing ſuch a connection under the terms of "*the uſual relations of* "*peace and amity.*" By this means the propoſed fraternity is huſtled in the crowd of thoſe treaties, which imply no change in the publick law of Europe, and which do not upon ſyſtem affect the interiour condition of nations. It is confounded with thoſe conventions in which matters of diſpute among ſovereign powers are compromiſed, by the taking off a duty more or leſs, by the ſurrender of a frontier town, or a diſputed diſtrict on the one ſide

or

or the other; by pactions in which the pretenſions of families are ſettled, (as by a conveyancer, making family ſubſtitutions and ſucceſſions) without any alterations in the laws, manners, religion, privileges and cuſtoms of the cities or territories which are the ſubject of ſuch arrangements.

All this body of old conventions, compoſing the vaſt and voluminous collection called the *corps diplomatique*, forms the code or ſtatute law, as the methodized reaſonings of the great publiciſts and juriſts form the digeſt and juriſprudence of the Chriſtian world. In theſe treaſures are to be found the *uſual* relations of peace and amity in civilized Europe; and there the relations of ancient France were to be found amongſt the reſt.

The preſent ſyſtem in France is not the ancient France. It is not the ancient France with ordinary ambition and ordinary means. It is not a new power of an old kind. It is a new power of a new ſpecies. When ſuch a queſtionable ſhape is to be admitted for the firſt time into the brotherhood of Chriſtendom, it is not a mere matter of idle curioſity to conſider how far it is in its nature alliable with the reſt, or whether "the relations of peace "and amity" with this new ſtate are likely to be of the ſame nature with the *uſual* relations of the ſtates of Europe.

The revolution in France had the relation of France to other nations as one of its principal objects.

objects. The changes made by that revolution were not the better to accomodate her to the old and uſual relations, but to produce new ones. The revolution was made, not to make France free, but to make her formidable; not to make her a neighbour, but a miſtreſs; not to make her more obſervant of laws, but to put her in a condition to impoſe them. To make France truly formidable it was neceſſary that France ſhould be new-modelled. They who have not followed the train of the late proceedings, have been led by deceitful repreſentations (which deceit made a part in the plan) to conceive that this totally new model of a ſtate in which nothing eſcaped a change, was made with a view to its internal relations only.

In the Revolution of France two ſorts of men were principally concerned in giving a character and determination to its purſuits; the philoſophers and the politicians. They took different ways, but they met in the ſame end. The philoſophers had one predominant object, which they purſued with a fanatical fury, that is, the utter extirpation of religion. To that every queſtion of empire was ſubordinate. They had rather domineer in a pariſh of atheiſts, than rule over a chriſtian world. Their temporal ambition was wholly ſubſervient to their proſelytizing ſpirit, in which they were not exceeded by Mahomet himſelf.

They

They who have made but ſuperficial ſtudies in the natural hiſtory of the human mind, have been taught to look on religious opinions as the only cauſe of enthuſiaſtick zeal, and ſectarian propagation. But there is no doctrine whatever, on which men can warm, that is not capable of the very ſame effect. The ſocial nature of man impels him to propagate his principles, as much as phyſical impulſes urge him to propagate his kind. The paſſions give zeal and vehemence. The underſtanding beſtows deſign and ſyſtem. The whole man moves under the diſcipline of his opinions. Religion is among the moſt powerful cauſes of enthuſiaſm. When any thing concerning it becomes an object of much meditation, it cannot be indifferent to the mind. They who do not love religion, hate it. The rebels to God perfectly abhor the author of their being. They hate him "with "all their heart, with all their mind, with all their "ſoul, and with all their ſtrength." He never preſents himſelf to their thoughts, but to menace and alarm them. They cannot ſtrike the ſun out of Heaven, but they are able to raiſe a ſmouldering ſmoke that obſcures him from their own eyes. Not being able to revenge themſelves on God, they have a delight in vicariouſly defacing, degrading, torturing and tearing in pieces his image in man. Let no one judge of them by what he has conceived of them, when they were not incorporated,

and

and had no lead. They were then only paſſengers in a common vehicle. They were then carried along with the general motion of religion in the community, and without being aware of it, partook of its influence In that ſituation, at worſt, their nature was left free to counterwork their principles. They deſpaired of giving any very general currency to their opinions. They conſidered them as a reſerved privilege for the choſen few. But when the poſſibility of dominion, lead, and propagation preſented themſelves, and that the ambition, which before had ſo often made them hypocrites, might rather gain than loſe by a daring avowal of their ſentiments, then the nature of this infernal ſpirit, which has "evil for its good," appeared in its full perfection. Nothing indeed but the poſſeſſion of ſome power can with any certainty diſcover, what at the bottom is the true character of any man. Without reading the ſpeeches of Vergniaud, Français of Nantz, Iſnard, and ſome others of that ſort, it would not be eaſy to conceive the paſſion, rancour, and malice of their tongues and hearts. They worked themſelves up to a perfect frenzy againſt religion and all its profeſſors. They tore the reputation of the clergy to pieces by their infuriated declamations and invectives, before they lacerated their bodies by their maſſacres. This fanatical atheiſm left out, we omit the principal feature in the French revolution, and

a principal

a principal conſideration with regard to the effects to be expected from a peace with it.

The other ſort of men were the politicians. To them who had little or not at all reflected on the ſubject, religion was in itſelf no object of love or hatred. They diſbelieved it, and that was all. Neutral with regard to that object, they took the ſide which in the preſent ſtate of things might beſt anſwer their purpoſes. They ſoon found that they could not do without the philoſophers; and the philoſophers ſoon made them ſenſible, that the deſtruction of religion was to ſupply them with means of conqueſt firſt at home, and then abroad. The philoſophers were the active internal agitators, and ſupplied the ſpirit and principles: the ſecond gave the practical direction. Sometimes the one predominated in the compoſition, ſometimes the other. The only difference between them was in the neceſſity of concealing the general deſign for a time, and in their dealing with foreign nations; the fanaticks going ſtraight forward and openly, the politicians by the ſurer mode of zigzag. In the courſe of events this, among other cauſes, produced fierce and bloody contentions between them. But at the bottom they thoroughly agreed in all the objects of ambition and irreligion, and ſubſtantially in all the means of promoting theſe ends.

Without queſtion, to bring about the unexampled

pled event of the French revolution, the concurrence of a very great number of views and paſſions was neceſſary. In that ſtupendous work, no one principle by which the human mind may have its faculties at once invigorated and depraved, was left unemployed; but I can ſpeak it to a certainty, and ſupport it by undoubted proofs, that the ruling principle of thoſe who acted in the revolution *as ſtateſmen*, had the exterior aggrandizement of France as their ultimate end in the moſt minute part of the internal changes that were made. We, who of late years have been drawn from an attention to foreign affairs by the importance of our domeſtick diſcuſſions, cannot eaſily form a conception of the general eagerneſs of the active and energetick part of the French nation, itſelf the moſt active and energetick of all nations, previous to its revolution, upon that ſubject. I am convinced that the foreign ſpeculators in France, under the old government, were twenty to one of the ſame deſcription then or now in England; and few of that deſcription there were, who did not emulouſly ſet forward the revolution. The whole official ſyſtem, particularly in the diplomatick part, the regulars, the irregulars, down to the clerks in office, (a corps, without all compariſon, more numerous than the ſame amongſt us) co-operated in it. All the intriguers in foreign politicks, all the ſpies, all the

the intelligencers, actually or late in function, all the candidates for that ſort of employment, acted ſolely upon that principle.

On that ſyſtem of aggrandizement there was but one mind: but two violent factions aroſe about the means. The firſt wiſhed France, diverted from the politicks of the continent, to attend ſolely to her marine, to feed it by an increaſe of commerce, and thereby to overpower England on her own element. They contended, that if England were diſabled, the powers on the continent would fall into their proper ſubordination; that it was England which deranged the whole continental ſyſtem of Europe. The others, who were by far the more numerous, though not the moſt outwardly prevalent at court, conſidered this plan for France as contrary to her genius, her ſituation, and her natural means. They agreed as to the ultimate object, the reduction of the Britiſh power, and, if poſſible, its naval power; but they conſidered an aſcendancy on the continent as a neceſſary preliminary to that undertaking. They argued, that the proceedings of England herſelf had proved the ſoundneſs of this policy. That her greateſt and ableſt ſtateſmen had not conſidered the ſupport of a continental balance againſt France as a deviation from the principle of her naval power, but as one of the moſt effectual modes of carrying it into effect. That ſuch had been her policy ever ſince the revolution; during

which period the naval ſtrength of Great Britain had gone on increaſing in the direct ratio of her interference in the politicks of the continent. With much ſtronger reaſon ought the politicks of France to take the ſame direction; as well for purſuing objects which her ſituation would dictate to her, though England had no exiſtence, as for counteracting the politicks of that nation; to France continental politicks are primary; they looked on them only of ſecondry conſideration to England, and however neceſſary, but as means neceſſary to an end.

What is truly aſtoniſhing, the partiſans of thoſe two oppoſite ſyſtems were at once prevalent, and at once employed, and in the very ſame tranſactions, the one oſtenſibly, the other ſecretly, during the latter part of the reign of Louis XV. Nor was there one court in which an ambaſſador reſided on the part of the miniſters, in which another as a ſpy on him did not alſo reſide on the part of the king. They who purſued the ſcheme for keeping peace on the continent, and particularly with Auſtria, acting officially and publickly, the other faction counteracting and oppoſing them. Theſe private agents were continually going from their function to the Baſtile, and from the Baſtile to employment, and favour again. An inextricable cabal was formed, ſome of perſons of rank, others of ſubordinates. But by this means the corps of politicians was

augmented

augmented in number, and the whole formed a body of active, adventuring, ambitious, discontented people, despising the regular ministry, despising the courts at which they were employed, despising the court which employed them.

The unfortunate Louis the Sixteenth * was not the first cause of the evil by which he suffered. He came to it, as to a sort of inheritance, by the false politicks of his immediate predecessor. This system of dark and perplexed intrigue had come to its perfection before he came to the throne: and even then the revolution strongly operated in all its causes.

There was no point on which the discontented diplomatick politicians so bitterly arraigned their

* It may be right to do justice to Louis XVI. He did what he could to destroy the double diplomacy of France. He had all the secret correspondence burnt, except one piece, which was called, *Conjectures raisonnées sur la situation de la France dans le système politique de l'Europe*; a work executed by M. Favier, under the direction of count Broglie. A single copy of this was said to have been found in the cabinet of Louis XVI. It was published with some subsequent state papers of Vergennes, Turgot, and others, as, "a new benefit of the revolution;" and the advertisement to the publication ends with the following words "*Il sera facile de se convaincre, qu'*Y COMPRIS MÊME LA REVOLUTION, *en grande partie,* ON TROUVE DANS CES MEMOIRES ET SES CONJECTURES LE GERME DE TOUT CE QU'ARRIVA AUJOURD'HUI, *& qu'on ne peut sans les avoir lus, être bien au fait des intérêts, & même des vues actuelles des diverses puissances de l'Europe.*" The book is entitled, *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les regnes de Louis* XV. *& Louis* XVI. It is altogether very curious, and worth reading.

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cabinet, as for the decay of French influence in all others. From quarrelling with the court, they began to complain of monarchy itſelf; as a ſyſtem of government too variable for any regular plan of national aggrandizement. They obſerved, that in that ſort of regimen too much depended on the perſonal character of the prince; that the viciſſitudes produced by the ſucceſſion of princes of a different character, and even the viciſſitudes produced in the ſame man, by the different views and inclinations belonging to youth, manhood, and age, diſturbed and diſtracted the policy of a country made by nature for extenſive empire, or what was ſtill more to their taſte, for that ſort of general over-ruling influence which prepared empire or ſupplied the place of it. They had continually in their hands the obſervations of *Machiavel* on *Livy*. They had *Monteſquieu's Grandeur & Décadence des Romains* as a manual; and they compared with mortification the ſyſtematick proceedings of a Roman ſenate with the fluctuations of a monarchy. They obſerved, the very ſmall additions of territory which all the power of France, actuated by all the ambition of France, had acquired in two centuries. The Romans had frequently acquired more in a ſingle year. They ſeverely and in every part of it criticiſed the reign of Louis the XIV, whoſe irregular and deſultory ambition had more provoked than endangered Europe. Indeed, they who will be at

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the pains of ſeriouſly conſidering the hiſtory of that period will ſee, that thoſe French politicians had ſome reaſon. They who will not take the trouble of reviewing it through all its wars and all its negotiations, will conſult the ſhort but judicious criticiſm of the marquis de Montalembert on that ſubject. It may be read ſeparately from his ingenious ſyſtem of fortification and military defence, on the practical merit of which I am unable to form a judgement.

The diplomatick politicians of whom I ſpeak, and who formed by far the majority in that claſs, made diſadvantageous compariſons even between their more legal and formaliſing monarchy, and the monarchies of other ſtates, as a ſyſtem of power and influence. They obſerved, that France not only loſt ground herſelf, but through the langour and unſteadineſs of her purſuits, and from her aiming through commerce at naval force which ſhe never could attain without loſing more on one ſide than ſhe could gain on the other, three great powers, each of them (as military ſtates) capable of balancing her, had grown up on the continent. Ruſſia and Pruſſia had been created almoſt within memory; and Auſtria, though not a new power, and even curtailed in territory, was by the very colliſion in which ſhe loſt that territory, greatly improved in her military diſcipline and force. During the reign of Maria Thereſa the interiour œconomy of

of the country was made more to correſpond with the ſupport of great armies than formerly it had been. As to Pruſſia, a merely military power, they obſerved that one war had enriched her with as conſiderable a conqueſt as France had acquired in centuries. Ruſſia had broken the Turkiſh power by which Auſtria might be, as formerly ſhe had been, balanced in favour of France. They felt it with pain, that the two northern powers of Sweden and Denmark were in general under the ſway of Ruſſia; or that at beſt, France kept up a very doubtful conflict, with many fluctuations of fortune, and at an enormous expence in Sweden. In Holland, the French party ſeemed, if not extinguiſhed, at leaſt utterly obſcured, and kept under by a ſtadtholder, leaning for ſupport ſometimes on Great Britain, ſometimes on Pruſſia, ſometimes on both, never on France. Even the ſpreading of the Bourbon family had become merely a family accommodation; and had little effect on the national politicks. This alliance, they ſaid, extinguiſhed Spain by deſtroying all its energy, without adding any thing to the real power of France in the acceſſion of the forces of its great rival. In Italy, the ſame family accommodation, the ſame national inſignificance were equally viſible. What cure for the radical weakneſs of the French monarchy, to which all the means which wit could deviſe, or nature and fortune could beſtow, towards univerſal empire,

empire, was not of force to give life, or vigour, or conſiſtency,—but in a republick? Out the word came; and it never went back.

Whether they reaſoned right or wrong, or that there was ſome mixture of right and wrong in their reaſoning, I am ſure, that in this manner they felt and reaſoned. The different effects of a great military and ambitious republick, and of a monarchy of the ſame deſcription were conſtantly in their mouths. The principle was ready to operate when opportunities ſhould offer, which few of them indeed foreſaw in the extent in which they were afterwards preſented; but theſe opportunities, in ſome degree or other, they all ardently wiſhed for.

When I was in Paris in 1773, the treaty of 1756 between Auſtria and France was deplored as a national calamity; becauſe it united France in friendſhip with a power, at whoſe expence alone they could hope any continental aggrandizement. When the firſt partition of Poland was made, in which France had no ſhare, and which had farther aggrandized every one of the three powers of which they were moſt jealous, I found them in a perfect phrenzy of rage and indignation: not that they were hurt at the ſhocking and uncoloured violence and injuſtice of that partition, but at the debility, improvidence, and want of activity in their government, in not preventing it as a means of aggrandizement to their rivals, or in not contriving, by

exchanges of ſome kind or other, to obtain their ſhare of advantage from that robbery.

In that or nearly in that ſtate of things and of opinions, came the Auſtrian match; which promiſed to draw the knot, as afterwards in effect it did, ſtill more cloſely between the old rival houſes. This added exceedingly to their hatred and contempt of their monarchy. It was for this reaſon that the late glorious queen, who on all accounts was formed to produce general love and admiration, and whoſe life was as mild and beneficent as her death was beyond example great and heroick, became ſo very ſoon and ſo very much the object of an implacable rancour, never to be extinguiſhed but in her blood. When I wrote my letter in anſwer to M. de Menonville, in the beginning of January 1791, I had good reaſon for thinking that this deſcription of revolutioniſts did not ſo early nor ſo ſteadily point their murderous deſigns at the martyr king as at the royal heroine. It was accident, and the momentary depreſſion of that part of the faction, that gave to the huſband the happy priority in death.

From this their reſtleſs deſire of an over-ruling influence, they bent a very great part of their deſigns and efforts to revive the old French party, which was a democratick party in Holland, and to make a revolution there. They were happy at the troubles which the ſingular imprudence of Joſeph

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the ſecond had ſtirred up in the Auſtrian Netherlands. They rejoiced, when they ſaw him irritate his ſubjects, profeſs philoſophy, ſend away the Dutch garriſons, and diſmantle his fortifications. As to Holland, they never forgave either the king or the miniſtry, for ſuffering that object, which they juſtly looked on as principal in their deſign of reducing the power of England, to eſcape out of their hands. This was the true ſecret of the commercial treaty, made, on their part, againſt all the old rules and principles of commerce, with a view of diverting the Engliſh nation, by a purſuit of immediate profit, from an attention to the progreſs of France in its deſigns upon that republick. The ſyſtem of the œconomiſts, which led to the general opening of commerce, facilitated that treaty, but did not produce it. They were in deſpair when they found that by the vigour of Mr. Pitt, ſupported in this point by Mr. Fox and the oppoſition, the object, to which they had ſacrificed their manufactures, was loſt to their ambition.

This eager deſire of raiſing France from the condition into which ſhe had fallen, as they conceived, from her monarchical imbecility, had been the main ſpring of their precedent interference in that unhappy American quarrel, the bad effects of which to this nation have not, as yet, fully diſcloſed themſelves. Theſe ſentiments had been long lurking in their breaſts, though their views were only diſcovered

diſcovered now and then, in heat and as by eſcapes; but on this occaſion they exploded ſuddenly. They were profeſſed with oſtentation, and propagated with zeal. Theſe ſentiments were not produced, as ſome think, by their American alliance. The American alliance was produced by their republican principles and republican policy. This new relation undoubtedly did much. The diſcourſes and cabals that it produced, the intercourſe that it eſtabliſhed, and above all, the example, which made it ſeem practicable to eſtabliſh a republick in a great extent of country, finiſhed the work, and gave to that part of the revolutionary faction a degree of ſtrength, which required other energies than the late king poſſeſſed, to reſiſt, or even to reſtrain. It ſpread every where; but it was no where more prevalent than in the heart of the court. The palace of Verſailles, by its language, ſeemed a forum of democracy. To have pointed out to moſt of thoſe politicians, from their diſpoſitions and movements, what has ſince happened, the fall of their own monarchy, of their own laws, of their own religion, would have been to furniſh a motive the more for puſhing forward a ſyſtem on which they conſidered all theſe things as incumbrances. Such in truth they were. And we have ſeen them ſucceed not only in the deſtruction of their monarchy; but in all the objects of ambition that they propoſed from that deſtruction.

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When I contemplate the ſcheme on which France is formed, and when I compare it with theſe ſyſtems, with which it is, and ever muſt be in conflict, thoſe things which ſeem as defects in her polity, are the very things which make me tremble. The ſtates of the Chriſtian world have grown up to their preſent magnitude in a great length of time, and by a great variety of accidents. They have been improved to what we ſee them with greater or leſs degrees of felicity and ſkill. Not one of them has been formed upon a regular plan or with any unity of deſign. As their conſtitutions are not ſyſtematical, they have not been directed to any *peculiar* end, eminently diſtinguiſhed, and ſuperſeding every other. The objects which they embrace are of the greateſt poſſible variety, and have become in a manner infinite. In all theſe old countries the ſtate has been made to the people, and not the people conformed to the ſtate. Every ſtate has purſued, not only every ſort of ſocial advantage, but it has cultivated the welfare of every individual. His wants, his wiſhes, even his taſtes have been conſulted. This comprehenſive ſcheme, virtually produced a degree of perſonal liberty in forms the moſt adverſe to it. That liberty was found, under monarchies ſtiled abſolute, in a degree unknown to the ancient commonwealths. From hence the powers of all our modern ſtates, meet in all their movements, with ſome obſtruction. It is therefore

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no wonder that when theſe ſtates are to be conſidered as machines to operate for ſome one great end, that this diſſipated and balanced force is not eaſily concentered, or made to bear with the whole force of the nation upon one point.

The Britiſh ſtate is, without queſtion, that which purſues the greateſt variety of ends, and is the leaſt diſpoſed to ſacrifice any one of them to another, or to the whole. It aims at taking in the entire circle of human deſires, and ſecuring for them their fair enjoyment. Our legiſlature has been ever cloſely connected in its moſt efficient part, with individual feeling, and individual intereſt. Perſonal liberty, the moſt lively of theſe feelings and the moſt important of theſe intereſts, which in other European countries has rather ariſen from the ſyſtem of manners and the habitudes of life, than from the laws of the ſtate, (in which it flouriſhed more from neglect than attention) in England, has been a direct object of government.

On this principle England would be the weakeſt power in the whole ſyſtem. Fortunately, however, the great riches of this kingdom ariſing from a variety of cauſes, and the diſpoſition of the people, which is as great to ſpend as to accumulate, has eaſily afforded a diſpoſeable ſurplus that gives a mighty momentum to the ſtate. This difficulty, with theſe advantages to overcome it, has called forth the talents of the Engliſh financiers, who, by the

the ſurplus of induſtry poured out by prodigality, have outdone every thing which has been accompliſhed in other nations. The preſent miniſter has outdone his predeceſſors; and as a miniſter of revenue, is far above my power of praiſe. But ſtill there are caſes in which England feels more than ſeveral others, (though they all feel) the perplexity of an immenſe body of balanced advantages, and of individual demands, and of ſome irregularity in the whole maſs.

France differs eſſentially from all thoſe governments which are formed without ſyſtem, which exiſt by habit, and which are confuſed with the multitude, and with the complexity of their purſuits. What now ſtands as government in France is ſtruck out at a heat. The deſign is wicked, immoral, impious, oppreſſive; but it is ſpirited and daring; it is ſyſtematick; it is ſimple in its principle; it has unity and conſiſtency in perfection. In that country entirely to cut off a branch of commerce, to extinguiſh a manufacture, to deſtroy the circulation of money, to violate credit, to ſuſpend the courſe of agriculture, even to burn a city, or to lay waſte a province of their own, does not coſt them a moment's anxiety. To them the will, the wiſh, the want, the liberty, the toil, the blood of individuals is as nothing. Individuality is left out of their ſcheme of government. The ſtate is all in all. Every thing is referred to the production

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of force; afterwards, every thing is truſted to the uſe of it. It is military in its principle, in its maxims, in its ſpirit, and in all its movements. The ſtate has dominion and conqueſt for its ſole objects; dominion over minds by proſelytiſm, over bodies by arms.

Thus conſtituted, with an immenſe body of natural means which are leſſened in their amount only to be increaſed in their effect, France has, ſince the accompliſhment of the revolution, a complete unity in its direction. It has deſtroyed every reſource of the ſtate, which depends upon opinion and the good-will of individuals. The riches of convention diſappear. The advantages of nature in ſome meaſure remain: even theſe, I admit, are aſtoniſhingly leſſened; the command over what remains is complete and abſolute. We go about aſking when aſſignats will expire, and we laugh at the laſt price of them. But what ſignifies the fate of thoſe tickets of deſpotiſm? The deſpotiſm will find deſpotick means of ſupply. They have found the ſhort cut to the productions of nature, while others in purſuit of them, are obliged to wind through the labyrinth of a very intricate ſtate of ſociety. They ſeize upon the fruit of the labour; they ſeize upon the labourer himſelf. Were France but half of what it is in population, in compactneſs, in applicability of its force, ſituated as it is, and being what it is, it would be too ſtrong for

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moſt of the ſtates of Europe, conſtituted as they are, and proceeding as they proceed. Would it be wiſe to eſtimate what the world of Europe, as well as the world of Aſia, had to dread from Genghiz Khàn, upon a contemplation of the reſources of the cold and barren ſpot in the remoteſt Tartary, from whence firſt iſſued that ſcourge of the human race? Ought we to judge from the exciſe and ſtamp duties of the rocks, or from the paper circulation of the ſands of Arabia, the power by which Mahomet and his tribes laid hold at once on the two moſt powerful empires of the world, beat one of them totally to the ground, broke to pieces the other, and, in not much longer ſpace of time than I have lived, overturned governments, laws, manners, religion, and extended an empire from the Indus to the Pyrenees?

Material reſources never have ſupplied, nor ever can ſupply the want of unity in deſign and conſtancy in purſuit. But unity in deſign, and perſeverance, and boldneſs in purſuit, have never wanted reſources, and never will. We have not conſidered as we ought the dreadful energy of a ſtate, in which the property has nothing to do with the government. Reflect, my dear ſir, reflect again and again on a government, in which the property is in complete ſubjection, and where nothing rules but the mind of deſperate men. The condition of a commonwealth not governed by its

property

property was a combination of things, which the learned and ingenious ſpeculator Harrington, who has toſſed about ſociety into all forms, never could imagine to be poſſible. We have ſeen it; the world has felt it; and if the world will ſhut their eyes to this ſtate of things, they will feel it more. The rulers there have found their reſources in crimes. The diſcovery is dreadful: the mine exhauſtleſs. They have every thing to gain, and they have nothing to loſe. They have a boundleſs inheritance in hope; and there is no medium for them, betwixt the higheſt elevation, and death with infamy. Never can they who from the miſerable ſervitude of the deſk have been raiſed to empire, again ſubmit to the bondage of a ſtarving bureau, or the profit of copying muſick, or writing plaidoyers by the ſheet. It has made me often ſmile in bitterneſs, when I have heard talk of an indemnity to ſuch men, provided they returned to their allegiance.

From all this, what is my inference? It is, that this new ſyſtem of robbery in France, cannot be rendered ſafe by any art; that it *muſt* be deſtroyed, or that it will deſtroy all Europe; that to deſtroy that enemy, by ſome means or other, the force oppoſed to it ſhould be made to bear ſome analogy and reſemblance to the force and ſpirit which that ſyſtem exerts; that war ought to be made againſt it, in its vulnerable parts. Theſe are my inferences.

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rences. In one word, with this republick nothing independent can co-exiſt. The errours of Louis the XVIth were more pardonable to prudence, than any of thoſe of the ſame kind into which the allied courts may fall. They have the benefit of his dreadful example.

The unhappy Louis XVI. was a man of the beſt intentions that probably ever reigned. He was by no means deficient in talents. He had a moſt laudable deſire to ſupply by general reading, and even by the acquiſition of elemental knowledge, an education in all points originally defective; but nobody told him (and it was no wonder he ſhould not himſelf divine it) that the world of which he read, and the world in which he lived, were no longer the ſame. Deſirous of doing every thing for the beſt, fearful of cabal, diſtruſting his own judgment, he ſought his miniſters of all kinds upon public teſtimony. But as courts are the field for caballers, the publick is the theatre for mountebanks and impoſtors. The cure for both thoſe evils is in the diſcernment of the prince. But an accurate and penetrating diſcernment is what in a young prince could not be looked for.

His conduct in its principle was not unwiſe; but, like moſt other of his well-meant deſigns, it failed in his hands. It failed partly from mere ill fortune, to which ſpeculators are rarely pleaſed to aſſign that very large ſhare to which ſhe is juſtly

entitled in all human affairs. The failure, perhaps, in part was owing to his ſuffering his ſyſtem to be vitiated and diſturbed by thoſe intrigues, which it is, humanly ſpeaking, impoſſible wholly to prevent in courts, or indeed under any form of government. However, with theſe aberrations, he gave himſelf over to a ſucceſſion of the ſtateſmen of publick opinion. In other things he thought that he might be a king on the terms of his predeceſſors. He was conſcious of the purity of his heart and the general good tendency of his government. He flattered himſelf, as moſt men in his ſituation will, that he might conſult his eaſe without danger to his ſafety. It is not at all wonderful that both he and his miniſters, giving way abundantly in other reſpects to innovation, ſhould take up in policy with the tradition of their monarchy. Under his anceſtors the monarchy had ſubſiſted, and even been ſtrengthened by the generation or ſupport of republicks. Firſt, the Swiſs republicks grew under the guardianſhip of the French monarchy. The Dutch republicks were hatched and cherished under the ſame incubation. Afterwards, a republican conſtitution was, under the influence of France, eſtabliſhed in the empire againſt the pretenſions of its chief. Even whilſt the monarchy of France, by a ſeries of wars and negotiations, and laſtly by the treaties of Weſtphalia, had obtained the eſtabliſhment of the proteſtants in Germany

many as a law of the empire, the ſame monarchy under Louis the XIIIth, had force enough to deſtroy the republican ſyſtem of the proteſtants at home.

Louis the XVIth was a diligent reader of hiſtory. But the very lamp of prudence blinded him. The guide of human life led him aſtray. A ſilent revolution in the moral world preceded the political, and prepared it. It became of more importance than ever what examples were given, and what meaſures were adopted. Their cauſes no longer lurked in the receſſes of cabinets, or in the private conſpiracies of the factious. They were no longer to be controlled by the force and influence of the grandees, who formerly had been able to ſtir up troubles by their diſcontents, and to quiet them by their corruption. The chain of ſubordination, even in cabal and ſedition, was broken in its moſt important links. It was no longer the great and the populace. Other intereſts were formed, other dependencies, other connexions, other communications. The middle claſſes had ſwelled far beyond their former proportion. Like whatever is the moſt effectively rich and great in ſociety, theſe claſſes became the ſeat of all the active politicks; and the preponderating weight to decide on them. There were all the energies by which fortune is acquired; there the conſequence of their ſucceſs. There were all the talents which aſſert their pre-

tenſions, and are impatient of the place which ſettled ſociety preſcribes to them. Theſe deſcriptions had got between the great and the populace; and the influence on the lower claſſes was with them. The ſpirit of ambition had taken poſſeſſion of this claſs as violently as ever it had done of any other. They felt the importance of this ſituation. The correſpondence of the monied and the mercantile world, the literary intercourſe of academies; but, above all, the preſs, of which they had in a manner entire poſſeſſion, made a kind of electrick communication every where. The preſs, in reality, has made every government, in its ſpirit, almoſt democratick. Without the great, the firſt movements in this revolution could not, perhaps, have been given. But the ſpirit of ambition, now for the firſt time connected with the ſpirit of ſpeculation, was not to be reſtrained at will. There was no longer any means of arreſting a principle in its courſe. When Louis the XVIth, under the influence of the enemies to monarchy, meant to found but one republick, he ſet up two. When he meant to take away half the crown of his neighbour, he loſt the whole of his own. Louis the XVIth could not with impunity countenance a new republick: yet between his throne and that dangerous lodgment for an enemy, which he had erected, he had the whole Atlantick for a ditch. He had for an out-work the Engliſh nation itſelf,

friendly

friendly to liberty, adverſe to that mode of it. He was ſurrounded by a rampart of monarchies, moſt of them allied to him, and generally under his influence. Yet even thus ſecured, a republick erected under his auſpices, and dependent on his power, became fatal to his throne. The very money which he had lent to ſupport this republick, by a good faith, which to him operated as perfidy, was punctually paid to his enemies, and became a reſource in the hands of his aſſaſſins.

With this example before their eyes, do any miniſters in England, do any miniſters in Auſtria, really flatter themſelves, that they can erect, not on the remote ſhores of the Atlantick, but in their view, in their vicinity, in abſolute contact with one of them, not a commercial but a martial republick—a republick not of ſimple huſbandmen or fiſhermen, but of intriguers, and of warriors—a republick of a character the moſt reſtleſs, the moſt enterpriſing, the moſt impious, the moſt fierce and bloody, the moſt hypocritical and perfidious, the moſt bold and daring that ever has been ſeen, or indeed that can be conceived to exiſt, without bringing on their own certain ruin?

Such is the republick to which we are going to give a place in civiliſed fellowſhip: The republick, which with joint conſent we are going to eſtabliſh in the centre of Europe, in a poſt that overlooks and commands every other ſtate, and

which eminently confronts and menaces this kingdom.

You cannot fail to obſerve, that I ſpeak as if the allied powers were actually conſenting, and not compelled by events to the eſtabliſhment of this faction in France. The words have not eſcaped me. You will hereafter naturally expect that I ſhould make them good. But whether in adopting this meaſure we are madly active, or weakly paſſive, or puſillanimouſly panick-ſtruck, the effects will be the ſame. You may call this faction, which has eradicated the monarchy,—expelled the proprietary, perſecuted religion, and trampled upon law,*—you may call this France if you pleaſe: but of the ancient France nothing remains, but its central geography; its iron frontier; its ſpirit of ambition; its audacity of enterpriſe; its perplexing intrigue. Theſe and theſe alone remain; and they remain heightened in their principle and augmented in their means. All the former correctives, whether of virtue or of weakneſs, which exiſted in the old monarchy, are gone. No ſingle new corrective is to be found in the whole body of the new inſtitutions. How ſhould ſuch a thing be found there, when every thing has been choſen with care and ſelection to forward all thoſe ambitious deſigns and diſpoſitions, not to control them? The whole

* See our Declaration.

is

is a body of ways and means for the fupply of dominion, without one heterogeneous particle in it.

Here I ſuffer you to breathe, and leave to your meditation what has occurred to me on the *genius and character* of the French revolution. From having this before us, we may be better able to determine on the firſt queſtion I propoſed, that is, how far nations, called foreign, are likely to be affected with the ſyſtem eſtabliſhed within that territory. I intended to proceed next on the queſtion of her facilities, from *the internal ſtate of other nations, and particularly of this*, for obtaining her ends: but I ought to be aware, that my notions are controverted.—I mean, therefore, in my next letter, to take notice of what, in that way, has been recommended to me as the moſt deſerving of notice. In the examination of thoſe pieces, I ſhall have occaſion to diſcuſs ſome others of the topicks to which I have called your attention. You know, that the letters which I now ſend to the preſs, as well as a part of what is to follow, have been in their ſubſtance long ſince written. A circumſtance which your partiality alone could make of importance to you, but which to the publick is of no importance at all, retarded their appearance. The late events which preſs upon us obliged me to make ſome additions; but no ſubſtantial change in the matter.

This diſcuſſion, my friend, will be long. But the matter is ſerious; and if ever the fate of the world could be truly ſaid to depend on a particular meaſure, it is upon this peace. For the preſent, farewell.

LETTER III.

ON THE

RUPTURE OF THE NEGOTIATION;

THE

TERMS OF PEACE PROPOSED;

AND THE

RESOURCES OF THE COUNTRY

FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF

THE WAR.

1797.

LETTER III.

On the Rupture of the Negotiation; the Terms of Peace propoſed; and the Reſources of the Country for the Continuance of the War.

DEAR SIR,

I THANK you for the bundle of ſtate-papers, which I received yeſterday. I have travelled through the negotiation; and a ſad, founderous road it is. There is a ſort of ſtanding jeſt againſt my countrymen, that one of them on his journey having found a piece of pleaſant road, he propoſed to his companion to go over it again. This propoſal, with regard to the worthy traveller's final deſtination, was certainly a blunder. It was no blunder as to his immediate ſatisfaction; for the way was pleaſant. In the irkſome journey of the regicide negotiations, it is otherwiſe: our "paths "are not paths of pleaſantneſs, nor our ways the "ways to peace." All our miſtakes (if ſuch they are) like thoſe of our Hibernian traveller, are miſtakes of repetition; and they will be full as far from bringing us to our place of reſt, as his well conſidered project was from forwarding him to his inn.

inn. Yet I ſee we perſevere. Fatigued with our former courſe; too liſtleſs to explore a new one; kept in action by inertneſs; moving only becauſe we have been in motion; with a ſort of plodding perſeverance, we reſolve to meaſure back again the very ſame joyleſs, hopeleſs, and inglorious track. Backward and forward; oſcillation not progreſſion; much going in a ſcanty ſpace; the travels of a poſtilion, miles enough to circle the globe in one ſhort ſtage; we have been, and we are yet to be jolted and rattled over the looſe, miſplaced ſtones, and the treacherous hollows of this rough, ill kept, broken up, treacherous French cauſeway!

The declaration which brings up the rear of the papers laid before parliament, contains a review and a reaſoned ſummary of all our attempts, and all our failures; a conciſe but correct narrative of the painful ſteps taken to bring on the eſſay of a treaty at Paris; a clear expoſure of all the rebuffs we received in the progreſs of that experiment; an honeſt confeſſion of our departure from all the rules and all the principles of political negotiation, and of common prudence, in the conduct of it; and to crown the whole, a fair account of the atrocious manner in which the regicide enemies had broken up what had been ſo inauſpiciouſly begun and ſo feebly carried on, by finally, and with all ſcorn driving our ſuppliant ambaſſador, out of the limits of their uſurpation.

Even

Even after all that I have lately ſeen, I was a little ſurpriſed at this expoſure. A minute diſplay of hopes formed without foundation, and of labours purſued without fruit, is a thing not very flattering to ſelf-eſtimation. But truth has its rights, and it will aſſert them. The declaration, after doing all this with a mortifying candour, concludes the whole recapitulation with an engagement ſtill more extraordinary than all the unuſual matter it contains. It ſays, "That his majeſty, who had entered into this negotiation with *good faith*, who has ſuffered *no* impediment to prevent his proſecuting it with *earneſtneſs and ſincerity*, has now *only to lament* its abrupt termination, and to renew *in the face of all Europe the ſolemn declaration*, that whenever his enemies ſhall be *diſpoſed* to enter upon the work of a general pacification in a ſpirit of conciliation and equity, nothing ſhall be wanting on his part to contribute to the accompliſhment of that great object."

If the diſguſting detail of the accumulated inſults we have received, in what we have properly called our "ſolicitation," to a gang of felons and murderers, had been produced as a proof of the utter inefficacy of that mode of proceeding with that deſcription of perſons, I ſhould have nothing at all to object to it. It might furniſh matter concluſive in argument, and inſtructive in policy: but with

with all due ſubmiſſion to high authority, and with all decent deference to ſuperiour lights, it does not ſeem quite clear to a diſcernment no better than mine, that the premiſes in that piece conduct irreſiſtibly to the concluſion. A laboured diſplay of the ill conſequences which have attended an uniform courſe of ſubmiſſion to every mode of contumelious inſult, with which the deſpotiſm of a proud, capricious, inſulting and implacable foe has choſen to buffet our patience, does not appear, to my poor thoughts, to be properly brought forth as a preliminary to juſtify a reſolution of perſevering in the very ſame kind of conduct, towards the very ſame ſort of perſon, and on the very ſame principles. We ſtate our experience, and then we come to the manly reſolution of acting in contradiction to it. All that has paſſed at Paris, to the moment of our being ſhamefully hiſſed off that ſtage, has been nothing but a more ſolemn repreſentation, on the theatre of the nation, of what had been before in rehearſal at Baſle. As it is not only confeſſed by us, but made a matter of charge on the enemy, that he had given us no encouragement to believe there was a change in his diſpoſition or in his policy at any time ſubſequent to the period of his rejecting our firſt overtures, there ſeems to have been no aſſignable motive for ſending Lord Malmeſbury to Paris, except to expoſe his humbled

country

country to the worſt indignities and the firſt of the kind, as the declaration very truly obſerves, that have been known in the world of negotiation.

An honeſt neighbour of mine is not altogether unhappy in the application of an old common ſtory to a preſent occaſion. It may be ſaid of my friend, what Horace ſays of a neighbour of his, "*garrit* "*aniles ex re fabellas.*" Converſing on this ſtrange ſubject, he told me a current ſtory of a ſimple Engliſh country 'ſquire, who was perſuaded by certain *dilettanti* of his acquaintance to ſee the world, and to become knowing in men and manners.

Among other celebrated places, it was recommended to him to viſit Conſtantinople. He took their advice. After various adventures, not to our purpoſe to dwell upon, he happily arrived at that famous city. As ſoon as he had a little repoſed himſelf from his fatigue, he took a walk into the ſtreets; but he had not gone far, before a "malig- "nant and a turban'd Turk" had his choler roufed by the careleſs and aſſured air, with which this infidel ſtrutted about in the metropolis of true believers. In this temper, he loſt no time in doing to our traveller the honours of the place. The Turk croſſed over the way, and with perfect goodwill gave him two or three luſty kicks on the ſeat of honour. To reſent, or to return the compliment in Turkey, was quite out of the queſtion. Our traveller, ſince he could no otherwiſe acknowledge this

this kind of favour, received it with the beſt grace in the world—he made one of his moſt ceremonious bows, and begged the kicking muſſulman, " to ac- " cept his perfect aſſurances of high conſideration." Our countryman was too wiſe to imitate Othello in the uſe of the dagger. He thought it better, as better it was, to aſſuage his bruiſed dignity with half a yard ſquare of balmy diplomatick diachylon. In the diſaſters of their friends, people are ſeldom wanting in a laudable patience. When they are ſuch as do not threaten to end fatally, they become even matter of pleaſantry. The Engliſh fellow-travellers of our ſufferer, finding him a little out of ſpirits, entreated him not to take ſo ſlight a buſi- neſs ſo very ſeriouſly. They told him it was the cuſtom of the country; that every country had its cuſtoms; that the Turkiſh manners were a little rough; but that in the main the Turks were a good-natured people; that what would have been a deadly affront any where elſe, was only a little freedom there; in ſhort, they told him to think no more of the matter, and to try his fortune in ano- ther *promenade*. But the 'ſquire, though a little clowniſh, had ſome home-bred ſenſe. What! have I come, at all this expence and trouble, all the way to Conſtantinople only to be kicked? Without going beyond my own ſtable, my groom, for half a crown, would have kicked me to my heart's con- tent. I don't mean to ſtay in Conſtantinople eight

and

and forty hours, nor ever to return to this rough, good-natured people, that have their own cuſtoms.

In my opinion the ſquire was in the right. He was ſatisfied with his firſt ramble and his firſt injuries. But reaſon of ſtate and common ſenſe are two things. If it were not for this difference it might not appear of abſolute neceſſity, after having received a certain quantity of buffetings by advance, that we ſhould ſend a peer of the realm to the ſcum of the earth, to collect the debt to the laſt farthing; and to receive, with infinite aggravation, the ſame ſcorns which had been paid to our ſupplication through a commoner: but it was proper, I ſuppoſe, that the whole of our country, in all its orders, ſhould have a ſhare of the indignity; and, as in reaſon, that the higher orders ſhould touch the larger proportion.

This buſineſs was not ended, becauſe our dignity was wounded, or becauſe our patience was worn out with contumely and ſcorn. We had not diſgorged one particle of the nauſeous doſes with which we were ſo liberally crammed by the mountebanks of Paris, in order to drug and diet us into perfect tameneſs. No; we waited, till the morbid ſtrength of our *boulimia* for their phyſick had exhauſted the well-ſtored diſpenſary of their empiriciſm. It is impoſſible to gueſs at the term to which our forbearance would have extended. The regicides were more fatigued with giving

blows than the callous cheek of Britiſh diplomacy was hurt in receiving them. They had no way left for getting rid of this mendicant perſeverance, but by ſending for the beadle, and forcibly driving our embaſſy 'of ſhreds and patches,' with all its mumping cant, from the inhoſpitable door of cannibal caſtle—

"Where the gaunt maſtiff, growling at the gate,
"Affrights the beggar whom he longs to eat."

I think we might have found, before the rude hand of inſolent office was on our ſhoulder, and the ſtaff of uſurped authority brandiſhed over our heads, that contempt of the ſuppliant is not the beſt forwarder of a ſuit; that national diſgrace is not the high road to ſecurity, much leſs to power and greatneſs. Patience, indeed, ſtrongly indicates the love of peace: but mere love does not always lead to enjoyment. It is the power of winning that palm which enſures our wearing it. Virtues have their place; and out of their place they hardly deſerve the name. They paſs into the neighbouring vice. The patience of fortitude and the endurance of puſillanimity are things very different, as in their principle, ſo in their effects.

In truth this declaration, containing a narrative of the firſt tranſaction of the kind (and I hope it will be the laſt) in the intercourſe of nations, as a compoſition, is ably drawn. It does credit to our official

official ſtyle. The report of the ſpeech of the miniſter in a great aſſembly, which I have read, is a comment upon the declaration. Without inquiry how far that report is exact, (inferiour I believe it may be to what it would repreſent,) yet ſtill it reads as a moſt eloquent and finiſhed performance. Hardly one galling circumſtance of the indignities offered by the directory of regicide to the ſupplications made to that junto in his majeſty's name, has been ſpared. Every one of the aggravations attendant on theſe acts of outrage is, with wonderful perſpicuity and order, brought forward in its place, and in the manner moſt fitted to produce its effect. They are turned to every point of view in which they can be ſeen to the beſt advantage. All the parts are ſo arranged as to point out their relation, and to furniſh a true idea of the ſpirit of the whole tranſaction.

This ſpeech may ſtand for a model. Never, for the triumphal decoration of any theatre, not for the decoration of thoſe of Athens and Rome, or even of this theatre of Paris, from the embroideries of Babylon or from the loom of the Gobelins, has there been ſent any hiſtorick tiſſue, ſo truly drawn, ſo cloſely and ſo finely wrought, or in which the forms are brought out in the rich purple of ſuch glowing and bluſhing colours. It puts me in mind of the piece of tapeſtry, with which Virgil propoſed to adorn the theatre he was to erect to Auguſtus,

upon the banks of the Mincio, who now hides his head in his reeds, and leads his ſlow and melancholy windings through banks waſted by the barbarians of Gaul. He ſuppoſes that the artifice is ſuch, that the figures of the conquered nations in his tapeſtry are made to play their part, and are confounded in the machine:

"———————— utque
" Purpurea intexti tollant aulæa Britanni;"

Or as Dryden tranſlates it ſomewhat paraphraſtically, but not leſs in the ſpirit of the prophet than of the poet,

Where the proud theatres diſcloſe the ſcene,
Which, interwoven, Britons ſeem to raiſe,
And ſhew the triumph which their ſhame diſplays.

It is ſomething wonderful, that the ſagacity ſhown in the declaration and the ſpeech (and, ſo far as it goes, greater was never ſhown) ſhould have failed to diſcover to the writer and to the ſpeaker, the inſeparable relation between the parties to this tranſaction; and that nothing can be ſaid to diſplay the imperious arrogance of a baſe enemy, which does not deſcribe with equal force and equal truth the contemptible figure of an abject embaſſy to that imperious power.

It is no leſs ſtriking, that the ſame obvious reflexion

reflexion ſhould not occur to thoſe gentlemen who conducted the oppoſition to government. But their thoughts were turned another way. They ſeem to have been ſo entirely occupied with the defence of the French directory, ſo very eager in finding recriminatory precedents to juſtify every act of its intolerable inſolence, ſo animated in their accuſations of miniſtry for not having, at the very outſet, made conceſſions proportioned to the dignity of the great victorious power we had offended, that every thing concerning the ſacrifice in this buſineſs of national honour, and of the moſt fundamental principles in the policy of negotiation, ſeemed wholly to have eſcaped them. To this fatal hour, the contention in parliament appeared in another form, and was animated by another ſpirit. For three hundred years and more, we have had wars with what ſtood as government in France. In all that period the language of miniſters, whether of boaſt or of apology, was, that they had left nothing undone for the aſſertion of the national honour; the oppoſition, whether patriotically or factiouſly, contending, that the miniſters had been oblivious of the national glory, and had made improper ſacrifices of that publick intereſt, which they were bound not only to preſerve, but by all fair methods to augment. This total change of tone on both ſides of your houſe, forms itſelf no inconſiderable revolution; and I am afraid it

prognoſticates others of ſtill greater importance. The miniſters exhauſted the ſtores of their eloquence in demonſtrating, that they had quitted the ſafe, beaten high-way of treaty between independent powers; that to pacify the enemy they had made every ſacrifice of the national dignity; and that they had offered to immolate at the ſame ſhrine the moſt valuable of the national acquiſitions. The oppoſition inſiſted, that the victims were not fat nor fair enough to be offered on the altars of blaſphemed regicide; and it was inferred from thence, that the ſacrifical miniſters, (who were a ſort of intruders in the worſhip of the new divinity) in their ſchiſmatical devotion had diſcovered more of hypocriſy than zeal. They charged them with a concealed reſolution to perſevere in what theſe gentlemen have (in perfect conſiſtency, indeed, with themſelves, but moſt irreconcileably with fact and reaſon) called an unjuſt and impolitick war.

That day was, I fear, the fatal term of *local* patriotiſm. On that day, I fear, there was an end of that narrow ſcheme of relations called our country, with all its pride, its prejudices, and its partial affections. All the little quiet rivulets, that watered an humble, a contracted, but not an unfruitful field, are to be loſt in the waſte expanſe, and boundleſs, barren ocean of the homicide philanthropy of France. It is no longer an object of terrour, the aggrandizement of a new power, which teaches as

a profeſſor that philanthropy in the chair; whilſt it propagates by arms, and eſtabliſhes by conqueſt, the comprehenſive ſyſtem of univerſal fraternity. In what light is all this viewed in a great aſſembly? The party which takes the lead there has no longer any apprehenſions, except thoſe that ariſe from not being admitted to the cloſeſt and moſt confidential connexions with the metropolis of that fraternity. That reigning party no longer touches on its favourite ſubject, the diſplay of thoſe horrours, that muſt attend the exiſtence of a power, with ſuch diſpoſitions and principles, ſeated in the heart of Europe. It is ſatisfied to find ſome looſe ambiguous expreſſions in its former declarations, which may ſet it free from its profeſſions and engagements. It always ſpeaks of peace with the regicides as a great and an undoubted bleſſing; and ſuch a bleſſing as, if obtained, promiſes, as much as any human diſpoſition of things can promiſe, ſecurity and permanence. It holds out nothing at all definite towards this ſecurity. It only ſeeks, by a reſtoration, to ſome of their former owners, of ſome fragments of the general wreck of Europe, to find a plauſible plea for a preſent retreat from an embaraſſing poſition. As to the future, that party is content to leave it, covered in a night of the moſt palpable obſcurity. It never once has entered into a particle of detail of what our own ſituation, or that of other powers muſt be, under

the bleſſings of the peace we ſeek. This defect, to my power, I mean to ſupply; that if any perſons ſhould ſtill continue to think an attempt at foreſight is any part of the duty of a ſtateſman, I may contribute my trifle to the materials of his ſpeculation.

As to the other party, the minority of to-day, poſſibly the majority of to-morrow, ſmall in number but full of talents and every ſpecies of energy, which, upon the avowed ground of being more acceptable to France, is a candidate for the helm of this kingdom, it has never changed from the beginning. It has preſerved a perennial conſiſtency. This would be a never-failing ſource of true glory, if ſpringing from juſt and right; but it is truly dreadful if it be an arm of Styx, which ſprings out of the profoundeſt depths of a poiſoned ſoil. The French maxims were by theſe gentlemen at no time condemned. I ſpeak of their language in the moſt moderate terms. There are many who think that they have gone much further; that they have always magnified and extolled the French maxims; that not in the leaſt diſguſted or diſcouraged by the monſtrous evils, which have attended theſe maxims from the moment of their adoption, both at home and abroad, they ſtill continue to predict, that in due time they muſt produce the greateſt good to the poor human race. They obſtinately perſiſt in ſtating thoſe evils as matter

matter of accident; as things wholly collateral to the ſyſtem.

It is obſerved, that this party has never ſpoken of an ally of Great Britain with the ſmalleſt degree of reſpect or regard; on the contrary, it has generally mentioned them under opprobrious appellations, and in ſuch terms of contempt or execration, as never had been heard before, becauſe no ſuch would have formerly been permitted in our publick aſſemblies. The moment, however, that any of thoſe allies quitted this obnoxious connexion, the party has inſtantly paſſed an act of indemnity and oblivion in their favour. After this, no ſort of cenſure on their conduct; no imputation on their character! From that moment their pardon was ſealed in a reverential and myſterious ſilence. With the gentlemen of this minority, there is no ally, from one end of Europe to the other, with whom we ought not to be aſhamed to act. The whole college of the ſtates of Europe is no better than a gang of tyrants. With them all our connexions were broken off at once. We ought to have cultivated France, and France alone, from the moment of her revolution. On that happy change, all our dread of that nation as a power was to ceaſe. She became in an inſtant dear to our affections, and one with our intereſts. All other nations we ought to have commanded not to trouble her ſacred throes, whilſt in labour to bring into an happy birth

birth her abundant litter of conſtitutions. We ought to have acted under her auſpices, in extending her ſalutary influence upon every ſide. From that moment England and France were become natural allies, and all the other ſtates natural enemies. The whole face of the world was changed. What was it to us if ſhe acquired Holland and the Auſtrian Netherlands? By her conqueſts ſhe only enlarged the ſphere of her beneficence; ſhe only extended the bleſſings of liberty to ſo many more fooliſhly reluctant nations. What was it to England, if by adding theſe, among the richeſt and moſt peopled countries of the world to her territories, ſhe thereby left no poſſible link of communication between us and any other power with whom we could act againſt her? On this new ſyſtem of optimiſm, it is ſo much the better;—ſo much the further are we removed from the contact with infectious deſpotiſm. No longer a thought of a barrier in the Netherlands to Holland againſt France. All that is obſolete policy. It is fit that France ſhould have both Holland and the Auſtrian Netherlands too, as a barrier to her againſt the attacks of deſpotiſm. She cannot multiply her ſecurities too much; and as to our ſecurity, it is to be found in her's. Had we cheriſhed her from the beginning, and felt for her when attacked, ſhe poor good ſoul, would never have invaded any foreign nation; never murdered her ſovereign and his family; never proſcribed,

proſcribed, never exiled, never impriſoned, never been guilty of extrajudicial maſſacre, or of legal murder. All would have been a golden age, full of peace, order, and liberty! and philoſophy, raying out from Europe, would have warmed and enlightened the univerſe: but unluckily, irritable philoſophy, the moſt irritable of all things, was put into a paſſion, and provoked into ambition abroad and tyranny at home. They find all this very natural and very juſtifiable. They chuſe to forget, that other nations ſtruggling for freedom, have been attacked by their neighbours; or that their neighbours have otherwiſe interfered in their affairs. Often have neighbours interfered in favour of princes againſt their rebellious ſubjects; and often in favour of ſubjects againſt their prince. Such caſes fill half the pages of hiſtory, yet never were they uſed as an apology, much leſs as a juſtification, for atrocious cruelty in princes, or for general maſſacre and confiſcation on the part of revolted ſubjects; never as a politick cauſe for ſuffering any ſuch powers to aggrandize themſelves without limit and without meaſure. A thouſand times have we ſeen it aſſerted in publick prints and pamphlets, that if the nobility and prieſthood of France had ſtaid at home, their property never would have been confiſcated. One would think that none of the clergy had been robbed previous to their deportation, or that their deportation had, on their part, been a voluntary act. One would think that the nobility

nobility and gentry, and merchants and bankers, who ſtaid at home, had enjoyed their property in ſecurity and repoſe. The aſſertors of theſe poſitions well know, that the lot of thouſands who remained at home was far more terrible; that the moſt cruel impriſonment was only a harbinger of a cruel and ignominious death; and that in this mother country of freedom, there were no leſs than *Three Hundred Thouſand* at one time in priſon. I go no further. I inſtance only theſe repreſentations of the party as ſtaring indications of partiality to that ſect, to whoſe dominion they would have left this country nothing to oppoſe but her own naked force, and conſequently ſubjected us, on every reverſe of fortune, to the imminent danger of falling under thoſe very evils in that very ſyſtem, which are attributed, not to its own nature, but to the perverſeneſs of others. There is nothing in the world ſo difficult as to put men in a ſtate of judicial neutrality. A leaning there muſt ever be, and it is of the firſt importance to any nation to obſerve to what ſide that leaning inclines—whether to our own community, or to one with which it is in a ſtate of hoſtility.

Men are rarely without ſome ſympathy in the ſufferings of others; but in the immenſe and diverſified maſs of human miſery, which may be pitied, but cannot be relieved, in the groſs, the mind muſt make a choice. Our ſympathy is always more forcibly attracted towards the misfortunes of certain perſons,

perſons, and in certain deſcriptions: and this ſympathetick attraction diſcovers, beyond a poſſibilty of miſtake, our mental affinities, and elective affections. It is a much ſurer proof, than the ſtrongeſt declaration, of a real connexion and of an overruling bias in the mind. I am told that the active ſympathies of this party have been chiefly, if not wholly, attracted to the ſufferings of the patriarchal rebels, who were amongſt the promulgators of the maxims of the French revolution, and who have ſuffered, from their apt and forward ſcholars, ſome part of the evils, which they had themſelves ſo liberally diſtributed to all the other parts of the community. Some of theſe men, flying from the knives which they had ſharpened againſt their country and its laws, rebelling againſt the very powers they had ſet over themſelves by their rebellion againſt their ſovereign, given up by thoſe very armies to whoſe faithful attachment they truſted for their ſafety and ſupport, after they had completely debauched all military fidelity in its ſource; ſome of theſe men, I ſay, had fallen into the hands of the head of that family, the moſt illuſtrious perſon of which they had three times cruelly impriſoned, and delivered in that ſtate of captivity to thoſe hands from which they were able to relieve neither her, nor their own neareſt and moſt venerable kindred. One of theſe men, connected with this country by no circumſtance of birth; not related

to

to any diſtinguiſhed families here; recommended by no ſervice; endeared to this nation by no act or even expreſſion of kindneſs; comprehended in no league or common cauſe; embraced by no laws of publick hoſpitality; this man was the only one to be found in Europe, in whoſe favour the Britiſh nation, paſſing judgment, without hearing, on its almoſt only ally, was to force (and that not by ſoothing interpoſition, but with every reproach for inhumanity, cruelty, and breach of thel aws of war) from priſon. We were to releaſe him from that priſon out of which, in abuſe of the lenity of government amidſt its rigour, and in violation of at leaſt an underſtood parole, he had attempted an eſcape; an eſcape excuſeable if you will, but naturally productive of ſtrict and vigilant confinement. The earneſtneſs of gentlemen to free this perſon was the more extraordinary, becauſe there was full as little in him to raiſe admiration, from any eminent qualities he poſſeſſed, as there was to excite an intereſt, from any that were amiable. A perſon, not only of no real civil or literary talents, but of no ſpecious appearance of either; and in his military profeſſion, not marked as a leader in any one act of able or ſucceſsful enterpriſe—unleſs his leading on (or his following) the allied army of Amazonian and male cannibal Pariſians to Verſailles, on the famous fifth of October, 1789, is to make his glory. Any other exploit of his, as a general,

general, I never heard of. But the triumph of general fraternity, was but the more ſignalized by the total want of particular claims, in that caſe; and by poſtponing all ſuch claims, in a caſe where they really exiſted, where they ſtood emboſſed, and in a manner forced themſelves on the view of common ſhort-ſighted benevolence. Whilſt, for its improvement, the humanity of thoſe gentlemen was thus on its travels, and had got as far off as Olmutz, they never thought of a place and a perſon much nearer to them, or of moving an inſtruction to Lord Malmeſbury in favour of their own ſuffering countryman, Sir Sydney Smith.

This officer, having attempted, with great gallantry, to cut out a veſſel from one of the enemy's harbours, was taken after an obſtinate reſiſtance; ſuch as obtained him the marked reſpect of thoſe who were witneſſes of his valour, and knew the circumſtances in which it was diſplayed. Upon his arrival at Paris, he was inſtantly thrown into priſon; where the nature of his ſituation will beſt be underſtood, by knowing, that amongſt its *mitigations*, was the permiſſion to walk occaſionally in the court, and to enjoy the privilege of ſhaving himſelf. On the old ſyſtem of feelings and principles, his ſufferings might have been entitled to conſideration, and even in a compariſon with thoſe of citizen la Fayette, to a priority in the order of compaſſion. If the miniſters had neglected to take

take any ſteps in his favour, a declaration of the ſenſe of the houſe of commons would have ſtimulated them to their duty. If they had cauſed a repreſentation to be made, ſuch a proceeding would have added force to it. If repriſal ſhould be thought adviſeable, the addreſs of the houſe would have given an additional ſanction to a meaſure which would have been, indeed, juſtifiable without any other ſanction than its own reaſon. But no. Nothing at all like it. In fact, the merit of Sir Sydney Smith, and his claim on Britiſh compaſſion, was of a kind altogether different from that which intereſted ſo deeply the authors of the motion in favour of citizen la Fayette. In my humble opinion, Captain Sir Sydney Smith has another ſort of merit with the Britiſh nation, and ſomething of a higher claim on Britiſh humanity than citizen la Fayette. Faithful, zealous, and ardent in the ſervice of his king and country; full of ſpirit; full of reſources; going out of the beaten road, but going right, becauſe his uncommon enterpriſe was not conducted by a vulgar judgment; —in his profeſſion, Sir Sydney Smith might be conſidered as a diſtinguiſhed perſon, if any perſon could well be diſtinguiſhed in a ſervice in which ſcarce a commander can be named without putting you in mind of ſome action of intrepidity, ſkill, and vigilance, that has given them a fair title to contend with any men and in any age. But I will

will ſay nothing farther of the merits of Sir Sydney Smith: the mortal animoſity of the regicide enemy ſuperſedes all other panegyrick. Their hatred is a judgment in his favour without appeal. At preſent he is lodged in the tower of the Temple, the laſt priſon of Louis the Sixteenth, and the laſt but one of Maria Antonietta of Auſtria; the priſon of Louis the Seventeenth; the priſon of Elizabeth of Bourbon. There he lies, unpitied by the grand philanthropy, to meditate upon the fate of thoſe who are faithful to their king and country. Whilſt this priſoner, ſecluded from intercourſe, was indulging in theſe cheering reflections, he might poſſibly have had the further conſolation of learning (by means of the inſolent exultation of his guards) that there was an Engliſh ambaſſador at Paris; he might have had the proud comfort of hearing, that this ambaſſador had the honour of paſſing his mornings in reſpectful attendance at the office of a regicide pettifogger; and that in the evening he relaxed in the amuſements of the opera, and in the ſpectacle of an audience totally new; an audience in which he had the pleaſure of ſeeing about him not a ſingle face that he could formerly have known in Paris; but in the place of that company, one indeed more than equal to it in diſplay of gaiety, ſplendour and luxury; a ſet of abandoned wretches, ſquandering in inſolent

riot the ſpoils of their bleeding country. A ſubject of profound reflection both to the priſoner and to the ambaſſador.

Whether all the matter upon which I have grounded my opinion of this laſt party be fully authenticated or not, muſt be left to thoſe who have had the opportunity of a nearer view of its conduct, and who have been more attentive in their peruſal of the writings, which have appeared in its favour. But for my part, I have never heard the groſs facts on which I ground my idea of their marked partiality to the reigning tyranny in France, in any part, denied. I am not ſurpriſed at all this. Opinions, as they ſometimes follow, ſo they frequently guide and direct the affections; and men may become more attached to the country of their principles, than to the country of their birth. What I have ſtated here is only to mark the ſpirit which ſeems to me, though in ſomewhat different ways, to actuate our great party-leaders; and to trace this firſt pattern of a negotiation to its true ſource.

Such is the preſent ſtate of our publick counſels. Well might I be aſhamed of what ſeems to be a cenſure of two great factions, with the two moſt eloquent men, which this country ever ſaw, at the head of them, if I had found that either of them could ſupport their conduct by any example in the hiſtory of their country. I ſhould very much prefer their

their judgment to my own, if I were not obliged, by an infinitely overbalancing weight of authority; to prefer the collected wiſdom of ages to the abilities of any two men living. I return to the declaration, with which the hiſtory of the abortion of a treaty with the regicides is cloſed.

After ſuch an elaborate diſplay had been made of the injuſtice and inſolence of an enemy, who ſeems to have been irritated by every one of the means, which had been commonly uſed with effect to ſoothe the rage of intemperate power, the natural reſult would be, that the ſcabbard, in which we in vain attempted to plunge our ſword, ſhould have been thrown away with ſcorn. It would have been natural, that, riſing in the fulneſs of their might, inſulted majeſty, deſpiſed dignity, violated juſtice, rejected ſupplication, patience goaded into fury, would have poured out all the length of the reins upon all the wrath which they had ſo long reſtrained. It might have been expected, that emulous of the glory of the youthful hero * in alliance with him, touched by the example of what one man well formed and well placed, may do in the moſt deſperate ſtate of affairs, convinced there is a courage of the cabinet full as powerful and far leſs vulgar than that of the field, our miniſter would have changed the whole line of that unleſs

* The Archduke Charles of Auſtria.

proſperous prudence, which hitherto had produced all the effects of the blindeſt temerity. If he found his ſituation full of danger, (and I do not deny that it is perilous in the extreme) he muſt feel that it is alſo full of glory; and that he is placed on a ſtage, than which no muſe of fire that had aſcended the higheſt heaven of invention, could imagine any thing more awful and auguſt. It was hoped, that in this ſwelling ſcene in which he moved with ſome of the firſt potentates of Europe for his fellow actors, and with ſo many of the reſt for the anxious ſpectators of a part, which, as he plays it, determines for ever their deſtiny and his own, like Ulyſſes in the unravelling point of the epick ſtory, he would have thrown off his patience and his rags together; and ſtripped of unworthy diſguiſes, he would have ſtood forth in the form, and in the attitude of an hero. On that day, it was thought he would have aſſumed the port of Mars; that he would bid to be brought forth from their hideous kennel (where his ſcrupulous tenderneſs had too long immured them) thoſe impatient dogs of war, whoſe fierce regards affright even the miniſter of vengeance that feeds them; that he would let them looſe, in famine, fever, plagues, and death, upon a guilty race, to whoſe frame, and to all whoſe habit, order, peace, religion, and virtue are alien and abhorrent. It was expected that he would at laſt have thought

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of active and effectual war; that he would no longer amuſe the Britiſh lion in the chace of mice and rats; that he would no longer employ the whole naval power of Great Britain, once the terrour of the world, to prey upon the miſerable remains of a peddling commerce, which the enemy did not regard, and from which none could profit. It was expected that he would have re-aſſerted the juſtice of his cauſe; that he would have re-animated whatever remained to him of his allies, and endeavoured to recover thoſe whom their fears had led aſtray; that he would have re-kindled the martial ardour of his citizens; that he would have held out to them the example of their anceſtry, the aſſertor of Europe, and the ſcourge of French ambition; that he would have reminded them of a poſterity, which if this neſarious robbery, under the fraudulent name and falſe colour of a government, ſhould in full power be ſeated in the heart of Europe, muſt for ever be conſigned to vice, impiety, barbariſm, and the moſt ignominious ſlavery of body and mind. In ſo holy a cauſe it was preſumed, that he would (as in the beginning of the war he did) have opened all the temples; and with prayer, with faſting, and with ſupplication (better directed than to the grim Moloch of regicide in France), have called upon us to raiſe that united cry, which has ſo often ſtormed Heaven, and with a pious violence forced down bleſſings upon a

repentant people. It was hoped that when he had invoked upon his endeavours the favourable regard of the Protector of the human race, it would be ſeen that his menaces to the enemy, and his prayers to the Almighty, were, not followed, but accompanied, with correſpondent action. It was hoped that his ſhrilling trumpet ſhould be heard, not to announce a ſhew, but to ſound a charge.

Such a concluſion to ſuch a declaration and ſuch a ſpeech, would have been a thing of courſe; ſo much a thing of courſe, that I will be bold to ſay, if in any ancient hiſtory, the Roman for inſtance, (ſuppoſing that in Rome the matter of ſuch a detail could have been furniſhed) a conſul had gone through ſuch a long train of proceedings, and that there was a chaſm in the manuſcripts by which we had loſt the concluſion of the ſpeech and the ſubſequent part of the narrative, all criticks would agree, that a *Freinſhemius* would have been thought to have managed the ſupplementary buſineſs of a continuator moſt unſkilfully, and to have ſupplied the hiatus moſt improbably, if he had not filled up the gaping ſpace, in a manner ſomewhat ſimilar (though better executed) to what I have imagined. But too often different is rational conjecture from melancholy fact. This exordium, as contrary to all the rules of rhetorick, as to thoſe more eſſential rules of policy which our ſituation would dictate, is intended as a prelude to a deadening

deadening and diſheartening propoſition; as if all that a miniſter had to fear in a war of his own conducting, was, that the people ſhould purſue it with too ardent a zeal. Such a tone, as I gueſſed the miniſter would have taken, I am very ſure, is the true, unſuborned, unſophiſticated language of genuine natural feeling under the ſmart of patience exhauſted and abuſed. Such a conduct as the facts ſtated in the declaration gave room to expect, is that which true wiſdom would have dictated under the impreſſion of thoſe genuine feelings. Never was there a jar or diſcord, between genuine ſentiment and ſound policy. Never, no, never did nature ſay one thing and wiſdom ſay another. Nor are ſentiments of elevation in themſelves turgid and unnatural. Nature is never more truly herſelf, than in her grandeſt forms. The Apollo of Belvedere (if the univerſal robber has yet left him at Belvedere) is as much in nature, as any figure from the pencil of Rembrandt, or any clown in the ruſtick revels of Teniers. Indeed it is when a great nation is in great difficulties, that minds muſt exalt themſelves to the occaſion, or all is loſt. Strong paſſion under the direction of a feeble reaſon feeds a low fever, which ſerves only to deſtroy the body that entertains it. But vehement paſſion does not always indicate an infirm judgment. It often accompanies, and actuates, and is even auxiliary to a powerful underſtanding; and when they

both conſpire and act harmoniouſly, their force is great to deſtroy diſorder within, and to repel injury from abroad. If ever there was a time that calls on us for no vulgar conception of things, and for exertions in no vulgar ſtrain, it is the awful hour that Providence has now appointed to this nation. Every little meaſure is a great errour; and every great errour will bring on no ſmall ruin. Nothing can be directed above the mark that we muſt aim at: Every thing below it is abſolutely thrown away.

Except with the addition of the unheard-of inſult offered to our ambaſſador by his rude expulſion, we are never to forget that the point on which the negotiation with De la Croix broke off, was exactly that which had ſtifled in its cradle the negotiation we had attempted with Barthélémy. Each of theſe tranſactions, concluded with a manifeſto upon our part: but the laſt of our manifeſtoes very materially differed from the firſt. The firſt declaration ſtated, that "*nothing was left* but "to proſecute a war *equally juſt and neceſſary*" In the ſecond, the juſtice and neceſſity of the war is dropped: the ſentence importing that nothing was left but the proſecution of ſuch a war, diſappears alſo. Inſtead of this reſolution to proſecute the war, we ſink into a whining lamentation on the abrupt termination of the treaty. We have nothing left but the laſt reſource of female weakneſs,

of

of helpleſs infancy, of doting decrepitude,—wailing and lamentation. We cannot even utter a ſentiment of vigour—" his majeſty has only to " lament." A poor poſſeſſion, to be left to a great monarch! Mark the effect produced on our councils by continued inſolence, and inveterate hoſtility! We grow more malleable under their blows. In reverential ſilence, we ſmother the cauſe and origin of the war. On that fundamental article of faith, we leave every one to abound in his own ſenſe. In the miniſter's ſpeech, gloſſing on the declaration, it is indeed mentioned; but very feebly. The lines are ſo faintly drawn as hardly to be traced. They only make a part of our *conſolation* in the circumſtances which we ſo dolefully lament. We reſt our merits on the humility, the earneſtneſs of ſolicitation, and the perfect good faith of thoſe ſubmiſſions, which have been uſed to perſuade our regicide enemies to grant us ſome ſort of peace. Not a word is ſaid, which might not have been full as well ſaid, and much better too, if the Britiſh nation had appeared in the ſimple character of a penitent convinced of his errours and offences, and offering, by penances, by pilgrimages, and by all the modes of expiation ever deviſed by anxious, reſtleſs guilt, to make all the atonement in his miſerable power.

The declaration ends as I have before quoted it, with a ſolemn voluntary pledge, the moſt full and the moſt ſolemn that ever was given, of our reſolution

reſolution (if ſo it may be called) to enter again into the very ſame courſe. It requires nothing more of the regicides, than to furniſh ſome ſort of excuſe, ſome ſort of colourable pretext, for our renewing the ſupplications of innocence at the feet of guilt. It leaves the moment of negotiation a moſt important moment, to the choice of the enemy. He is to regulate it according to the convenience of his affairs. He is to bring it forward at that time when it may beſt ſerve to eſtabliſh his authority at home, and to extend his power abroad. A dangerous aſſurance for this nation to give, whether it is broken or whether it is kept. As all treaty was broken off, and broken off in the manner we have ſeen, the field of future conduct ought to be reſerved free and unincumbered to our future diſcretion. As to the ſort of condition prefixed to the pledge, namely, "that the enemy ſhould be "diſpoſed to enter into the work of general paci-"fication with the ſpirit of reconciliation and "equity," this phraſeology cannot poſſibly be conſidered otherwiſe, than as ſo many words thrown in to fill the ſentence, and to round it to the ear. We prefixed the ſame plauſible conditions to any renewal of the negotiation, in our manifeſto on the rejection of our propoſals at Baſle. We did not conſider thoſe conditions as binding. We opened a much more ſerious negotiation without any ſort of regard to them; and there is no new negotiation, which we can poſſibly open upon fewer indications of

of conciliation and equity, than were to be diſcovered, when we entered into our laſt at Paris. Any of the ſlighteſt pretences, any of the moſt looſe, formal equivocating expreſſions, would juſtify us under the peroration of this piece, in again ſending the laſt, or ſome other Lord Malmeſbury to Paris.

I hope I miſunderſtand this pledge; or that we ſhall ſhew no more regard to it, than we have done to all the faith, that we have plighted to vigour and reſolution in our former declaration. If I am to underſtand the concluſion of the declaration to be what unfortunately it ſeems to me, we make an engagement with the enemy, without any correſpondent engagement on his ſide. We ſeem to have cut ourſelves off from any benefit which an intermediate ſtate of things might furniſh to enable us totally to overturn that power, ſo little connected with moderation and juſtice. By holding out no hope, either to the juſtly diſcontented in France, or to any foreign power, and leaving the re-commencement of all treaty to this identical junto of aſſaſſins, we do in effect aſſure and guarantee to them, the full poſſeſſion of the rich fruits of their confiſcations, of their murders of men, women, and children, and of all the multiplied, endleſs, nameleſs iniquities by which they have obtained their power. We gurantee to them the poſſeſſion of a country, ſuch and ſo ſituated as

France

France, round, entire, immenſely perhaps augmented.

Well! ſome will ſay, in this caſe we have only ſubmitted to the nature of things. The nature of things is, I admit, a ſturdy adverſary. This might be alleged as a plea for our attempt at a treaty. But what plea of that kind can be alledged, after the treaty was dead and gone, in favour of this poſthumous declaration? No neceſſity has driven us to *that* pledge. It is without a counterpart even in expectation. And what can be ſtated to obviate the evil which that ſolitary engagement muſt produce on the underſtanding or the fears of men? I aſk, what have the regicides promiſed you in return, in caſe *you* ſhould ſhew what *they* would call diſpoſitions to conciliation and equity, whilſt you are giving that pledge from the throne, and engaging parliament to counter-ſecure it? It is an awful conſideration. It was on the very day of the date of this wonderful pledge*, in which we aſſumed the directorial government as lawful, and in which we engaged ourſelves to treat with them whenever they pleaſed; it was on that very day the regicide fleet was weighing anchor from one of your harbours, where it had remained four days in perfect quiet. Theſe harbours of the Britiſh dominions are the ports of France. They are of no uſe but to

* Dec. 27, 1796.

protect

protect an enemy from our beſt allies, the ſtorms of Heaven, and his own raſhneſs. Had the *Weſt* of Ireland been an unportuous coaſt, the French naval power would have been undone. The enemy uſes the moment for hoſtility, without the leaſt regard to your future diſpoſition of equity and conciliation. They go out of what were once your harbours, and they return to them at their pleaſure. Eleven days they had the full uſe of Bantry Bay, and at length their fleet returns from their harbour of Bantry to their harbour of Breſt. Whilſt you are invoking the propitious ſpirit of regicide equity and conciliation, they anſwer you with an attack. They turn out the pacifick bearer of your "how do you does," Lord Malmeſbury; and they return your viſit, and their "thanks for your obliging inquiries," by their old practiſed aſſaſſin *Hoche*. They come to attack—What? A town, a fort, a naval ſtation? They come to attack your king, your conſtitution, and the very being of that parliament, which was holding out to them theſe pledges, together with the entireneſs of the empire, the laws, liberties, and properties of all the people. We know that they meditated the very ſame invaſion, and for the very ſame purpoſes, upon this kingdom; and had the coaſt been as opportune, would have effected it.

Whilſt *you* are in vain torturing your invention to aſſure them of *your* ſincerity and good faith, they have

have left no doubt concerning *their* good faith, and *their* ſincerity towards thoſe to whom they have engaged their honour. To their power they have been true to the only pledge they have ever yet given to you, or to any of yours, I mean the ſolemn engagement which they entered into with the deputation of traitors who appeared at their bar, from England and from Ireland, in 1792. They have been true and faithful to the engagement which they had made more largely; that is their engagement to give effectual aid to inſurrection and treaſon, wherever they might appear in the world. We have ſeen the Britiſh declaration. This is the counter-declaration of the directory. This is the reciprocal pledge which regicide amity gives to the concilitory pledges of kings! But, thank God, ſuch pledges cannot exiſt ſingle. They have no counterpart; and if they had, the enemy's conduct cancels ſuch declarations; and I truſt, along with them, cancels every thing of miſchief and diſhonour that they contain.

There is one thing in this buſineſs which appears to be wholly unaccountable, or accountable, on a ſuppoſition I dare not entertain for a moment. I cannot help aſking; Why all this pains, to clear the Britiſh nation of ambition, perfidy, and the inſatiate thirſt of war? At what period of time was it that our country has deſerved that load of infamy, of which nothing but preternatural humiliation in language

language and conduct can ſerve to clear us? If we have deſerved this kind of evil fame from any thing we have done in a ſtate of proſperity, I am ſure that it is not an abject conduct in adverſity that can clear our reputation. Well is it known that ambition can creep as well as ſoar. The pride of no perſon in a flouriſhing condition is more juſtly to be dreaded than that of him who is mean and cringing under a doubtful and unproſperous fortune. But it ſeems it was thought neceſſary to give ſome out-of-the-way proofs of our ſincerity, as well as of our freedom from ambition. Is then fraud and falſehood become the diſtinctive character of Engliſhmen? Whenever your enemy chooſes to accuſe you of perfidy and ill faith, will you put it into his power to throw you into the purgatory of ſelf-humiliation? Is his charge equal to the finding of the grand jury of Europe, and ſufficient to put you upon your trial? But on that trial I will defend the Engliſh miniſtry. I am ſorry that on ſome points I have, on the principles I have always oppoſed, ſo good a defence to make. They were not the firſt to begin the war. They did not excite the general confederacy in Europe, which was ſo properly formed on the alarm given by the jacobiniſm of France. They did not begin with an hoſtile aggreſſion on the regicides or any of their allies. Theſe parricides of their own country, diſciplining themſelves for foreign by domeſtick violence,

violence, were the first to attack a power that was our ally, by nature, by habit, and by the sanction of multiplied treaties. Is it not true, that they were the first to declare war upon this kingdom? Is every word in the declaration from Downing-street, concerning their conduct, and concerning ours and that of our allies, so obviously false that it is necessary to give some new invented proofs of our good faith in order to expunge the memory of all this perfidy?

We know that over-labouring a point of this kind, has the direct contrary effect from what we wish. We know that there is a legal presumption against men *quando se nimis purgitant*; and if a charge of ambition is not refuted by an affected humility, certainly the character of fraud and perfidy is still less to be washed away by indications of meanness. Fraud and prevarication are servile vices. They sometimes grow out of the necessities, always out of the habits of slavish and degenerate spirits: and on the theatre of the world, it is not by assuming the mask of a Davus or a Geta that an actor will obtain credit for manly simplicity and a liberal openness of proceeding. It is an erect countenance; it is a firm adherence to principle; it is a power of resisting false shame and frivolous fear, that assert our good faith and honour, and assure to us the confidence of mankind. Therefore all these negotiations, and all the declarations with which

they

they were preceded and followed, can only ſerve to raiſe preſumptions againſt that good faith and publick integrity, the fame of which to preſerve inviolate is ſo much the intereſt and duty of every nation.

The pledge is an engagement "to all Europe." This is the more extraordinary, becauſe it is a pledge, which no power in Europe, whom I have yet heard of, has thought proper to require at our hands. I am not in the ſecrets of office; and therefore I may be excuſed for proceeding upon probabilities and exterior indications. I have ſurveyed all Europe from the eaſt to the weſt, from the north to the ſouth, in ſearch of this call upon us to purge ourſelves of "ſubtle *duplicity* and a *punick* ſtyle" in our proceedings. I have not heard that his excellency the Ottoman ambaſſador has expreſſed his doubts of the Britiſh ſincerity in our negotiation with the moſt unchriſtian republick lately ſet up at our door. What ſympathy, in that quarter, may have introduced a remonſtrance upon the want of faith in this nation, I cannot poſitively ſay. If it exiſts, it is in Turkiſh or Arabick, and poſſibly is not yet tranſlated. But none of the nations which compoſe the old Chriſtian world have I yet heard as calling upon us for thoſe judicial purgations and ordeals, by fire and water, which we have choſen to go through;—for the other great proof, by battle, we ſeem to decline.

For whoſe uſe, entertainment, or inſtruction, are all thoſe overſtrained and over-laboured proceedings in council, in negotiation, and in ſpeeches in parliament, intended? What royal cabinet is to be enriched with theſe high-finiſhed pictures of the arrogance of the ſworn enemies of kings, and the meek patience of a Britiſh adminiſtration? In what heart is it intended to kindle pity towards our multiplied mortifications and diſgraces? At beſt it is ſuperfluous. What nation is unacquainted with the haughty diſpoſition of the common enemy of all nations? It has been more than ſeen, it has been felt; not only by thoſe who have been the victims of their imperious rapacity, but, in a degree, by thoſe very powers who have conſented to eſtabliſh this robbery, that they might be able to copy it, with the impunity to make new uſurpations of their own. The king of Pruſſia has hypothecated in truſt to the regicides his rich and fertile territories on the Rhine, as a pledge of his zeal and affection to the cauſe of liberty and equality. He has ſeen them robbed with unbounded liberty, and with the moſt levelling equality. The woods are waſted; the country is ravaged; property is confiſcated; and the people are put to bear a double yoke, in the exactions of a tyrannical government and in the contributions of an hoſtile irruption. Is it to ſatisfy the court of Berlin, that the court of London is to give the ſame ſort of pledge of its

ſincerity

ſincerity and good faith to the French directory? It is not that heart full of ſenſibility,—it is not Luccheſini, the miniſter of his Pruſſian Majeſty, the late ally of England, and the preſent ally of its enemy, who has demanded this pledge of our ſincerity, as the price of renewal of the long leaſe of his ſincere friendſhip to this kingdom.

It is not to our enemy, the now faithful ally of regicide, late the faithful ally of Great Britain, the Catholick king, that we addreſs our doleful lamentation: it is not to the *Prince of Peace*, whoſe declaration of war was one of the firſt auſpicious omens of general tranquillity, which our dove-like ambaſſador, with the olive-branch in his beak, was ſaluted with at his entrance into the ark of clean birds at Paris.

Surely it is not to the Tetrarch of Sardinia, now the faithful ally of a power who has ſeized upon all his fortreſſes, and confiſcated the oldeſt dominions of his houſe; it is not to this once powerful, once reſpected, and once cheriſhed ally of Great Britain, that we mean to prove the ſincerity of the peace which we offered to make at his expence. Or is it to him we are to prove the arrogance of the power who, under the name of friend, oppreſſes him, and the poor remains of his ſubjects, with all the ferocity of the moſt cruel enemy?

It is not to Holland, under the name of an ally, laid under a permanent military contribution, filled

with their double garriſon of barbarous jacobin troops, and ten times more barbarous jacobin clubs and aſſemblies, that we find ourſelves obliged to give this pledge.

Is it to Genoa, that we make this kind promiſe; a ſtate which the regicides were to defend in a favourable neutrality, but whoſe neutrality has been, by the gentle influence of jacobin authority, forced into the trammels of an alliance; whoſe alliance has been ſecured by the admiſſion of French garriſons; and whoſe peace has been for ever ratified by a forced declaration of war againſt ourſelves?

It is not the grand duke of Tuſcany who claims this declaration; not the grand duke, who for his early ſincerity, for his love of peace, and for his entire confidence in the amity of the aſſaſſins of his houſe, has been complimented in the Britiſh parliament with the name of "*the wiſeſt ſovereign in* "*Europe*:"—It is not this pacifick Solomon, or his philoſophick cudgelled miniſtry, cudgelled by Engliſh and by French, whoſe wiſdom and philoſophy between them, have placed Leghorn in the hands of the enemy of the Auſtrian family, and driven the only profitable commerce of Tuſcany from its only port. It is not this ſovereign, a far more able ſtateſman than any of the *Medici* in whoſe chair he ſits: it is not the philoſopher *Carletti*, more ably ſpeculative than *Galileo*, more profoundly politick than *Machiavel*, that call upon us ſo loudly to give the

the ſame happy proofs of the ſame good faith to the republick, always the ſame, always one and indiviſible.

It is not Venice, whoſe principal cities the enemy has appropriated to himſelf, and ſcornfully deſired the ſtate to indemnify itſelf from the emperour, that we wiſh to convince of the pride and the deſpotiſm of an enemy, who loads us with his ſcoffs and buffets.

It is not for his holineſs we intend this conſolatory declaration of our own weakneſs, and of the tyrannous temper of his grand enemy. That prince has known both the one and the other from the beginning. The artiſts of the French revolution, had given their very firſt eſſays and ſketches of robbery and deſolation againſt his territories, in a far more cruel "murdering piece" than had ever entered into the imagination of painter or poet. Without ceremony they tore from his cheriſhing arms, the poſſeſſions which he held for five hundred years, undiſturbed by all the ambition of all the ambitious monarchs who, during that period, have reigned in France. Is it to him, in whoſe wrong we have in our late negotiation ceded his now unhappy countries near the Rhone, lately amongſt the moſt flouriſhing (perhaps the moſt flouriſhing for their extent) of all the countries upon earth, that we are to prove the ſincerity of our reſolution to make peace with the republick of barbariſm? That

venerable potentate and pontiff, is ſunk deep into the vale of years; he is half diſarmed by his peaceful character; his dominions are more than half diſarmed by a peace of two hundred years, defended as they were, not by force but by reverence; yet in all theſe ſtraits, we ſee him diſplay, amidſt the recent ruins and the new defacements of his plundered capital, along with the mild and decorated piety of the modern, all the ſpirit and magnanimity of antient Rome! Does he, who, though himſelf unable to defend them, nobly refuſed to receive pecuniary compenſations for the protection he owed to his people of Avignon, Carpentras, and the Venaiſin;—does he want proofs of our good diſpoſition to deliver over that people without any ſecurity for them, or any compenſation to their ſovereign, to this cruel enemy? Does he want to be ſatisfied of the ſincerity of our humiliation to France, who has ſeen his free, fertile and happy city and ſtate of Bologna, the cradle of regenerated law, the ſeat of ſciences and of arts, ſo hideouſly metamorphoſed, whilſt he was crying to Great Britain for aid, and offering to purchaſe that aid at any price? Is it him, who ſees that choſen ſpot of plenty and delight converted into a jacobin ferocious republick, dependent on the homicides of France? Is it him, who, from the miracles of his beneficent induſtry, has done a work which defied the power of the Roman emperors, though with an enthralled

enthralled world to labour for them; is it him, who has drained and cultivated the *Pontine Marſhes*, that we are to ſatisfy of our cordial ſpirit of conciliation, with thoſe who, in their equity, are reſtoring Holland again to the ſeas, whoſe maxims poiſon more than the exhalations of the moſt deadly fens, and who turn all the fertilities of nature and of art, into an howling deſart? Is it to him, that we are to demonſtrate the good faith of our ſubmiſſions to the cannibal republick; to him who is commanded to deliver into their hands Ancona and Civita Vecchia, ſeats of commerce, raiſed by the wiſe and liberal labours and expences of the preſent and late pontiffs; ports not more belonging to the Eccleſiaſtical State then to the commerce of Great Britain; thus wreſting from his hands the power of the keys of the centre of Italy, as before they had taken poſſeſſion of the keys of the northern part, from the hands of the unhappy king of Sardinia, the natural ally of England? Is it to him we are to prove our good faith in the peace which we are ſoliciting to receive from the hands of his and our robbers, the enemies of all arts, all ſciences, all civilization, and all commerce?

Is it to the Ciſpadane or to the Tranſpadane republicks, which have been forced to bow under the galling yoke of French liberty, that we addreſs all theſe pledges of our ſincerity and love of peace with their unnatural parents?

Are we by this declaration to ſatisfy the king of Naples whom we have left to ſtruggle as he can, after our abdication of Corſica, and the flight of the whole naval force of England out of the whole circuit of the Mediterranean, abandoning our allies, our commerce, and the honour of a nation, once the protectreſs of all other nations, becauſe ſtrengthened by the independence, and enriched by the commerce of them all? By the expreſs proviſions of a recent treaty, we had engaged with the king of Naples to keep a naval force in the Mediterranean. But, good God! was a treaty at all neceſſary for this? The uniform policy of this kingdom as a ſtate, and eminently ſo as a commercial ſtate, has at all times led us to keep a powerful ſquadron and a commodious naval ſtation in that central ſea, which borders upon, and which connects, a far greater number and variety of ſtates, European, Aſiatick, and African, than any other. Without ſuch a naval force France muſt become deſpotick miſtreſs of that ſea, and of all the countries whoſe ſhores it waſhes. Our commerce muſt become vaſſal on her, and dependent on her will. Since we are come no longer to truſt to our force in arms, but to our dexterity in negotiation, and begin to pay a deſperate court to a proud and coy uſurpation, and have finally ſent an ambaſſador to the Bourbon regicides at Paris; the king of Naples, who ſaw, that no reliance was to be placed on our

engagements,

engagements, or on any pledge of our adherence to our neareſt and deareſt intereſts, has been obliged to ſend his ambaſſador alſo to join the reſt of the ſqualid tribe of the repreſentatives of degraded kings. This monarch, ſurely, does not want any proof of the ſincerity of our amicable diſpoſitions to that amicable republick, into whoſe arms he has been given by our deſertion of him.

To look to the powers of the north, it is not to the Daniſh ambaſſador, inſolently treated, in his own character and in ours, that we are to give proofs of the regicide arrogance, and of our diſpoſition to ſubmit to it.

With regard to Sweden, I cannot ſay much. The French influence is ſtruggling with her independence; and they who conſider the manner in which the ambaſſador of that power was treated not long ſince at Paris, and the manner in which the father of the preſent king of Sweden (himſelf the victim of regicide principles and paſſions) would have looked on the preſent aſſaſſins of France, will not be very prompt to believe that the young king of Sweden has made this kind of requiſition to the king of Great Britain, and has given this kind of auſpice of his new government.

I ſpeak laſt of the moſt important of all. It certainly was not the laſt empreſs of Ruſſia at whoſe inſtance we have given this pledge. It is not the new emperour, the inheritor of ſo much glory, and placed in a ſituation of ſo much delicacy, and difficulty

culty for the preſer ation of tha i heritance, who calls on England, the natural ally of his dominions, to deprive herſelf of her power of action, and to bind herſelf to France. France at no time, and in none of its faſhions, leaſt of all in its laſt, has been ever looked upon as the friend either of Ruſſia or of Great Britain. Every thing good, I truſt, is to be expected from this prince; whatever may be without authority, given out of an influence over his mind poſſeſſed by that only potentate, from whom he has any thing to apprehend, or with whom he has much even to diſcuſs.

This ſovereign knows, I have no doubt, and feels, on what ſort of bottom is to be laid the foundation of a Ruſſian throne. He knows what a rock of native granite is to form the pedeſtal of his ſtatue, who is to emulate Peter the Great. His renown will be in continuing with eaſe and ſafety, what his predeceſſor was obliged to achieve through mighty ſtruggles. He is ſenſible, that his buſineſs is not to innovate, but to ſecure and to eſtabliſh; that reformations at this day are attempts at beſt of ambiguous utility. He will revere his father with the piety of a ſon; but in his government he will imitate the policy of his mother. His father, with many excellent qualities, had a ſhort reign; becauſe, being a native Ruſſian, he was unfortunately adviſed to act in the ſpirit of a foreigner. His mother reigned over Ruſſia three and thirty years with the greateſt glory; becauſe, with the diſadvantage

of

of being a foreigner born, ſhe made herſelf a Ruſſian. A wiſe prince like the preſent will improve his country; but it will be cautiouſly and progreſſively, upon its own native ground-work of religion, manners, habitudes, and alliances. If I prognoſticate right, it is not the emperour of Ruſſia that ever will call for extravagant proofs of our deſire to reconcile ourſelves to the irreconcileable enemy of all thrones.

I do not know why I ſhould not include America among the European powers, becauſe ſhe is of European origin; and has not yet, like France, deſtroyed all traces of manners, laws, opinions, and uſages which ſhe drew from Europe. As long as that Europe ſhall have any poſſeſſions either in the ſouthern or the northern parts of that America, even ſeparated as it is by the ocean, it muſt be conſidered as a part of the European ſyſtem. It is not America, menaced with internal ruin from the attempts to plant jacobiniſm inſtead of liberty in that country; it is not America, whoſe independence is directly attacked by the French, the enemies of the independence of all nations, that calls upon us to give ſecurity by diſarming ourſelves in a treacherous peace. By ſuch a peace, we ſhall deliver the Americans, their liberty, and their order, without reſource, to the mercy of their imperious allies, who will have peace or neutrality with

no

no ſtate, which is not ready to join her in war againſt England.

Having run round the whole circle of the European ſyſtem wherever it acts, I muſt affirm, that all the foreign powers who are not leagued with France for the utter deſtruction of all balance through Europe and throughout the world, demand other aſſurances from this kingdom than are given in that declaration. They require aſſurances, not of the ſincerity of our good diſpoſitions towards the uſurpation in France, but of our affection towards the college of the ancient ſtates of Europe, and pledges of our conſtancy, our fidelity, and of our fortitude in reſiſting to the laſt the power that menaces them all. The apprehenſion from which they wiſh to be delivered cannot be from any thing they dread in the ambition of England. Our power muſt be their ſtrength. They hope more from us than they fear. I am ſure the only ground of their hope, and of our hope, is in the greatneſs of mind hitherto ſhewn by the people of this nation, and its adherence to the unalterable principles of its ancient policy, whatever government may finally prevail in France. I have entered into this detail of the wiſhes and expectations of the European powers, in order to point out more clearly, not ſo much what their diſpoſition, as (a conſideration of far greater importance) what their ſituation demands,

according

according as that ſituation is related to the regicide republick and to this kingdom.

Then if it is not to ſatisfy the foreign powers we make this aſſurance, to what power at home is it that we pay all this humiliating court? Not to the old whigs or to the ancient tories of this kingdom; if any memory of ſuch ancient diviſions ſtill exiſts amongſt us. To which of the principles of theſe parties is this aſſurance agreeable? Is it to the whigs we are to recommend the aggrandizement of France, and the ſubverſion of the balance of power? Is it to the tories we are to recommend our eagerneſs to cement ourſelves with the enemies of royalty and religion? But if theſe parties, which by their diſſentions have ſo often diſtracted the kingdom, which by their union have once ſaved it, and which by their colliſion and mutual reſiſtance, have preſerved the variety of this conſtitution in its unity, be (as I believe they are) nearly extinct by the growth of new ones, which have their roots in the preſent circumſtances of the times—I wiſh to know; to which of theſe new deſcriptions this declaration is addreſſed? It can hardly be to thoſe perſons, who, in the new diſtribution of parties, conſider the conſervation in England of the ancient order of things, as neceſſary to preſerve order every where elſe, and who regard the general conſervation of order in other countries, as reciprocally neceſſary to preſerve the ſame ſtate of things in theſe iſlands.

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That party never can wiſh to ſee Great Britain pledge herſelf to give the lead and the ground of advantage and ſuperiority to the France of to-day, in any treaty which is to ſettle Europe. I inſiſt upon it, that ſo far from expecting ſuch an engagement, they are generally ſtupefied and confounded with it. That the other party which demands great changes here, and is ſo pleaſed to ſee them every where elſe, which party I call jacobin, that this faction does from the bottom of its heart, approve the declaration, and does erect its creſt upon the engagement, there can be little doubt. To them it may be addreſſed with propriety, for it anſwers their purpoſes in every point.

The party in oppoſition within the houſe of lords and commons, it is irreverent, and half a breach of privilege (far from my thoughts) to conſider as jacobin. This party has always denied the exiſtence of ſuch a faction; and has treated the machinations of thoſe, whom you and I call jacobins, as ſo many forgeries and fictions of the miniſter and his adherents, to find a pretext for deſtroying freedom, and ſetting up an arbitrary power in this kingdom. However, whether this minority has a leaning towards the French ſyſtem, or only a charitable toleration of thoſe who lean that way, it is certain, that they have always attacked the ſincerity of the miniſter in the ſame modes, and on the very ſame grounds, and nearly in the ſame terms, with the

directory. It muſt, therefore, be at the tribunal of the minority, (from the whole tenour of the ſpeech) that the miniſter appeared to conſider himſelf obliged to purge himſelf of duplicity. It was at their bar that he held up his hand. It was on their *ſellette* that he ſeemed to anſwer interrogatories; it was on their principles that he defended his whole conduct. They certainly take what the French call the *haute du pavé*. They have loudly called for the negotiation. It was accorded to them. They engaged their ſupport of the war with vigour, in caſe peace was not granted on honourable terms. Peace was not granted on any terms, honourable or ſhameful. Whether theſe judges, few in number but powerful in juriſdiction, are ſatisfied; whether they to whom this new pledge is hypothecated, have redeemed their own; whether they have given one particle more of their ſupport to miniſtry, or even favoured them with their good opinion, or their candid conſtruction, I leave it to thoſe who recollect that memorable debate, to determine.

The fact is, that neither this declaration, nor the negotiation which is its ſubject, could ſerve any one good purpoſe, foreign or domeſtick; it could conduce to no end either with regard to allies or neutrals. It tends neither to bring back the miſled; nor to give courage to the fearful; nor to animate

animate and confirm thoſe, who are hearty and zealous in the cauſe.

I hear it has been ſaid (though I can ſcarcely believe it) by a diſtinguiſhed perſon in an aſſembly, where if there be leſs of the torrent and tempeſt of eloquence, more guarded expreſſion is to be expected, that, indeed, there was no juſt ground of hope in this buſineſs from the beginning.

It is plain, that this noble perſon, however converſant in negotiation, having been employed in no leſs than four embaſſies, and in two hemiſpheres, and in one of thoſe negotiations having fully experienced what it was to proceed to treaty without previous encouragement, was not at all conſulted in this experiment. For his majeſty's principal miniſter declared, on the very ſame day, in another houſe, "his majeſty's deep and ſincere "regret at its unfortunate and abrupt termination, "ſo different from the wiſhes and *hopes* that were "entertained;"—and in other parts of the ſpeech ſpeaks of this abrupt termination as a great diſappointment, and as a fall from ſincere endeavours and ſanguine expectation. Here are, indeed, ſentiments diametrically oppoſite, as to the hopes with which the negotiation was commenced and carried on, and what is curious is, the grounds of the hopes on the one ſide, and the deſpair on the other, are exactly the ſame. The logical concluſion from the common premiſes, is indeed in favour of

of the noble lord, for they are agreed that the enemy was far from giving the leaſt degree of countenance to any ſuch hopes; and that they proceeded, in ſpite of every diſcouragement which the enemy had thrown in their way. But there is another material point in which they do not ſeem to differ; that is to ſay, the reſult of the deſperate experiment of the noble lord, and of the promiſing attempt of the great miniſter, in ſatisfying the people of England, and in cauſing diſcontent to the people of France; or, as the miniſter expreſſes it, "in uniting England and in dividing France."

For my own part, though I perfectly agreed with the noble lord, that the attempt was deſperate, ſo deſperate indeed, as to deſerve *his* name of an experiment, yet no fair man can poſſibly doubt, that the miniſter was perfectly ſincere in his proceeding, and that, from his ardent wiſhes for peace with the regicides, he was led to conceive hopes which were founded rather in his vehement deſires than in any rational ground of political ſpeculation. Convinced as I am of this, it had been better, in my humble opinion, that perſons of great name and authority had abſtained from thoſe topicks which had been uſed to call the miniſter's ſincerity into doubt, and had not adopted the ſentiments of the directory upon the ſubject of all our negotiations; for the noble lord expreſsly ſays, that the experiment was made for the ſatisfaction

of the country. The directory ſays exactly the ſame thing. Upon granting, in conſequence of our ſupplications, the paſſport to lord Malmeſbury, in order to remove all ſort of hope from its ſucceſs, they charged all our previous ſteps, even to that moment of ſubmiſſive demand to be admitted to their preſence, on duplicity and perfidy; and aſſumed, that the object of all the ſteps we had taken, was that "of juſtifying the continuance of the war in the eyes of the Engliſh "nation, and of throwing all the odium of it upon "the French:"—"The Engliſh nation (ſaid they) "ſupports impatiently the continuance of the war, "and a *reply muſt be made to its complaints and its "reproaches*; the parliament is about to be opened, "*and the mouths of the orators who will declaim "againſt the war muſt be ſhut; the demands for new "taxes muſt be juſtified; and to obtain theſe reſults, "it is neceſſary to be able to advance, that the French "government refuſes every reaſonable propoſition for "peace.*" I am ſorry that the language of the friends to miniſtry and the enemies to mankind ſhould be ſo much in uniſon.

As to the fact in which theſe parties are ſo well agreed, that the experiment ought to have been made for the ſatisfaction of this country, (meaning the country of England) it were well to be wiſhed, that perſons of eminence would ceaſe to make themſelves repreſentatives of the people of England without

without a letter of attorney, or any other act of procuration. In legal conſtruction, the ſenſe of the people of England is to be collected from the houſe of commons; and, though I do not deny the poſſibility of an abuſe of this truſt as well as any other, yet I think, that without the moſt weighty reaſons, and in the moſt urgent exigencies, it is highly dangerous to ſuppoſe that the houſe ſpeaks any thing contrary to the ſenſe of the people, or that the repreſentative is ſilent when the ſenſe of the conſtituent ſtrongly, decidedly, and upon long deliberation, ſpeaks audibly upon any topick of moment. If there is a doubt, whether the houſe of commons repreſents perfectly the whole commons of Great Britain, (I think there is none) there can be no queſtion but that the lords and the commons together repreſent the ſenſe of the whole people to the crown, and to the world. Thus it is, when we ſpeak legally and conſtitutionally. In a great meaſure, it is equally true, when we ſpeak prudentially; but I do not pretend to aſſert, that there are no other principles to guide diſcretion than thoſe which are or can be fixed by ſome law, or ſome conſtitution; yet before the legally preſumed ſenſe of the people ſhould be ſuperſeded by a ſuppoſition of one more real (as in all caſes, where a legal preſumption is to be aſcertained) ſome ſtrong proofs ought to exiſt of a contrary diſpoſition in the people at large, and ſome deciſive

indications of their deſire upon this ſubject. There can be no queſtion, that previouſly to a direct meſſage from the crown neither houſe of parliament did indicate any thing like a wiſh for ſuch advances as we have made, or ſuch negotiations as we have carried on. The parliament has aſſented to miniſtry; it is not miniſtry that has obeyed the impulſe of parliament. The people at large have their organs through which they can ſpeak to parliament, and to the crown by a reſpectful petition, and, though not with abſolute authority, yet with weight, they can inſtruct their repreſentatives. The freeholders and other electors in this kingdom have another, and a ſurer mode of expreſſing their ſentiments concerning the conduct which is held by members of parliament. In the middle of theſe tranſactions, this laſt opportunity has been held out to them. In all theſe points of view, I poſitively aſſert, that the people have no where, and in no way, expreſſed their wiſh of throwing themſelves and their ſovereign at the feet of a wicked and rancorous foe, to ſupplicate mercy, which, from the nature of that foe, and from the circumſtances of affairs, we had no ſort of ground to expect. It is undoubtedly the buſineſs of miniſters very much to conſult the inclinations of the people, but they ought to take great care that they do not receive that inclination from the few perſons who may happen to approach them. The

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petty intereſts of ſuch gentlemen, their low conceptions of things, their fears ariſing from the danger to which the very arduous and critical ſituation of publick affairs may expoſe their places; their apprehenſions from the hazards to which the diſcontents of a few popular men at elections may expoſe their ſeats in parliament; all theſe cauſes trouble and confuſe the repreſentations which they make to miniſters of the real temper of the nation. If miniſters, inſtead of following the great indications of the conſtitution, proceed on ſuch reports, they will take the whiſpers of a cabal for the voice of the people, and the counſels of imprudent timidity for the wiſdom of a nation.

I well remember, that when the fortune of the war began, and it began pretty early, to turn, as it is common and natural, we were dejected by the loſſes that had been ſuſtained, and with the doubtful iſſue of the conteſts that were foreſeen. But not a word was uttered that ſuppoſed peace upon any proper terms, was in our power, or therefore that it ſhould be in our deſire. As uſual, with or without reaſon, we criticiſed the conduct of the war, and compared our fortunes with our meaſures. The maſs of the nation went no further. For I ſuppoſe that you always underſtood me as ſpeaking of that very preponderating part of the nation, which had always been equally adverſe to the French principles, and to the general progreſs of

their revolution throughout Europe; conſidering the final ſucceſs of their arms and the triumph of their principles as one and the ſame thing.

The firſt means that were uſed, by any one profeſſing our principles, to change the minds of this party upon that ſubject, appeared in a ſmall pamphlet circulated with conſiderable induſtry. It was commonly given to the noble perſon himſelf, who has paſſed judgment upon all hopes from negotiation, and juſtified our late abortive attempt only as an experiment made to ſatisfy the country; and yet that pamphlet led the way in endeavouring to diſſatisfy that very country with the continuance of the war, and to raiſe in the people the moſt ſanguine expectations from ſome ſuch courſe of negotiation as has been fatally purſued. This leads me to ſuppoſe (and I am glad to have reaſon for ſuppoſing) that there was no foundation for attributing the performance in queſtion to that author; but without mentioning his name in the title-page, it paſſed for his, and does ſtill paſs uncontradicted. It was entitled "Remarks on the apparent Circumſtances of the War in the fourth Week of October, 1795."

This ſanguine little king's-fiſher (not preſcient of the ſtorm, as by his inſtinct he ought to be) appearing at that uncertain ſeaſon, before the riggs of old Michaelmas were yet well compoſed, and when the inclement ſtorms of winter were approaching,

approaching, began to flicker over the ſeas, and was buſy in building its halcyon neſt, as if the angry ocean had been ſoothed by the genial breath of May. Very unfortunately this auſpice was inſtantly followed by a ſpeech from the throne, in the very ſpirit and principles of that pamphlet.

I ſay nothing of the newſpapers, which are undoubtedly in the intereſt, and which are ſuppoſed by ſome to be directly or indirectly under the influence of miniſters, and which, with leſs authority than the pamphlet I ſpeak of, had indeed for ſome time before held a ſimilar language, in direct contradiction to their more early tone: in ſo much, that I can ſpeak it with a certain aſſurance, that very many who wiſhed to adminiſtration as well as you and I do, thought that in giving their opinion in favour of this peace, they followed the opinion of miniſtry—they were conſcious that they did not lead it. My inference therefore is this, that the negotiation whatever its merits may be, in the general principle and policy of undertaking it, is, what every political meaſure in general ought to be, the ſole work of adminiſtration; and that if it was an experiment to ſatisfy any body, it was to ſatisfy thoſe, whom the miniſters were in the daily habit of condemning, and by whom they were daily condemned; I mean, the *leaders* of the *oppoſition* in *parliament*. I am certain that the miniſters were then, and are now, inveſted with the

fulleſt confidence of the major part of the nation, to purſue ſuch meaſures of peace or war as the nature of things ſhall ſuggeſt as moſt adapted to the publick ſafety. It is in this light therefore as a meaſure which ought to have been avoided, and ought not to be repeated, that I take the liberty of diſcuſſing the merits of this ſyſtem of regicide negotiations. It is not a matter of light experiment that leaves us where it found us. Peace or war are the great hinges upon which the very being of nations turns. Negotiations are the means of making peace or preventing war, and are therefore of more ſerious importance than almoſt any ſingle event of war can poſſibly be.

At the very outſet I do not heſitate to affirm, that this country in particular, and the publick law in general, have ſuffered more by this negotiation of experiment, than by all the battles together that we have loſt from the commencement of this century to this time, when it touches ſo nearly to its cloſe. I therefore have the misfortune not to coincide in opinion with the great ſtateſman who ſet on foot a negotiation, as he ſaid, "in ſpite of the conſtant "oppoſition he had met with from France." He admits, "that the difficulty in this negotiation be-"came moſt ſeriouſly increaſed indeed; by the "ſituation in which we were placed, and the man-"ner in which alone the enemy would *admit* of a "negotiation." This ſituation ſo deſcribed, and

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ſo truly deſcribed, rendered our ſolicitation not only degrading, but from the very outſet evidently hopeleſs.

I find it aſſerted, and even a merit taken for it, "that this country ſurmounted every difficulty of "form and etiquette which the enemy had thrown "in our way." An odd way of ſurmounting a difficulty by cowering under it! I find it aſſerted that an heroick reſolution had been taken, and avowed in parliament, previous to this negotiation, "that no conſideration of etiquette ſhould ſtand "in the way of it."

Etiquette, if I underſtand rightly the term, which in any extent is of modern uſage, had its original application to thoſe ceremonial and formal obſervances practiſed at courts, which had been eſtabliſhed by long uſage, in order to preſerve the ſovereign power from the rude intruſion of licentious familiarity, as well as to preſerve majeſty itſelf from a diſpoſition to conſult its eaſe at the expence of its dignity. The term came afterwards to have a greater latitude, and to be employed to ſignify certain formal methods uſed in the tranſactions between ſovereign ſtates.

In the more limited as well as in the larger ſenſe of the term, without knowing what the etiquette is, it is impoſſible to determine whether it is a vain and captious punctilio, or a form neceſſary to preſerve decorum in character and order in buſi-

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neſs. I readily admit, that nothing tends to facilitate the iſſue of all publick tranſactions more than a mutual diſpoſition in the parties treating, to wave all ceremony. But the uſe of this temporary ſuſpenſion of the recogniſed modes of reſpect conſiſts in its being mutual, and in the ſpirit of conciliation in which all ceremony is laid aſide. On the contrary, when one of the parties to a treaty intrenches himſelf up to the chin in theſe ceremonies, and will not, on his ſide, abate a ſingle punctilio, and that all the conceſſions are upon one ſide only, the party ſo conceding does by this act place himſelf in a relation of inferiority, and thereby fundamentally ſubverts that equality which is of the very eſſence of all treaty.

After this formal act of degradation, it was but a matter of courſe, that groſs inſult ſhould be offered to our ambaſſador, and that he ſhould tamely ſubmit to it. He found himſelf provoked to complain of the atrocious libels againſt his publick character and his perſon, which appeared in a paper under the avowed patronage of that government. The regicide directory, on this complaint, did not recogniſe the paper; and that was all. They did not puniſh, they did not diſmiſs, they did not even reprimand the writer. As to our ambaſſador, this total want of reparation for the injury was paſſed by under the pretence of deſpiſing it.

In this, but too ſerious buſineſs, it is not poſſible here

here to avoid a ſmile. Contempt is not a thing to be deſpiſed. It may be borne with a calm and equal mind, but no man by lifting his head high can pretend that he does not perceive the ſcorns that are poured down upon him from above. All theſe ſudden complaints of injury, and all theſe deliberate ſubmiſſions to it, are the inevitable conſequences of the ſituation in which we had placed ourſelves; a ſituation wherein the inſults were ſuch as nature would not enable us to bear, and circumſtances would not permit us to reſent.

It was not long, however, after this contempt of contempt upon the part of our ambaſſador (who by the way repreſented his ſovereign) that a new object was furniſhed for diſplaying ſentiments of the ſame kind, though the caſe was infinitely aggravated. Not the ambaſſador, but the king himſelf was libelled and inſulted; libelled, not by a creature of the directory, but by the directory itſelf. At leaſt ſo lord Malmeſbury underſtood it, and ſo he anſwered it in his note of the 12th December, 1796, in which he ſays, "With regard to the *offenſive* "*and injurious* inſinuations which are contained in "that paper, and which are only calculated to throw "new obſtacles in the way of that accommodation, "which the French government profeſs to deſire, "THE KING HAS DEEMED IT FAR BE-"NEATH HIS DIGNITY to permit an anſwer

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" to be made to them on his part, in any manner " whatſoever."

I am of opinion, that if his majeſty had kept aloof from that waſh and off-ſcouring of every thing that is low and barbarous in the world, it might be well thought unworthy of his dignity to take notice of ſuch ſcurrilities. They muſt be conſidered as much the natural expreſſion of that kind of animal, as it is the expreſſion of the feelings of a dog to bark; but when the king had been adviſed to recogniſe not only the monſtrous compoſition as a ſovereign power, but, in conduct, to admit ſomething in it like a ſuperiority; when the bench of regicide was made, at leaſt, co-ordinate with his throne, and raiſed upon a platform full as elevated, this treatment could not be paſſed by under the appearance of deſpiſing it. It would not, indeed, have been proper to keep up a war of the ſame kind, but an immediate, manly, and decided reſentment ought to have been the conſequence. We ought not to have waited for the diſgraceful diſmiſſal of our ambaſſador. There are caſes in which we may pretend to ſleep: but the wittol rule has ſome ſenſe in it, *Non omnibus dormio*. We might, however, have ſeemed ignorant of the affront; but what was the fact? Did we diſſemble or paſs it by in ſilence? When dignity is talked of, a language which I did not expect to hear in ſuch a tranſaction, I muſt ſay what all the world muſt

muſt feel, that it was not for the king's dignity to notice this inſult, and not to reſent it. This mode of proceeding is formed on new ideas of the correſpondence between ſovereign powers.

This was far from the only ill effect of the policy of degradation. The ſtate of inferiority in which we were placed in this vain attempt at treaty, drove us headlong from errour into errour, and led us to wander far away, not only from the old paths which have been beaten in the old courſe of political communication between mankind, but out of the ways even of the moſt common prudence. Againſt all rules, after we had met nothing but rebuffs in return to all our propoſals, we made *two confidential communications* to thoſe in whom we had no confidence, and who repoſed no confidence in us. What was worſe, we were fully aware of the madneſs of the ſtep we were taking. Ambaſſadors are not ſent to a hoſtile power, perſevering in ſentiments of hoſtility, to make candid, confidential, and amicable communications. Hitherto the world has conſidered it as the duty of an ambaſſador in ſuch a ſituation to be cautious, guarded, dexterous, and circumſpect. It is true that mutual confidence and common intereſt diſpenſe with all rules, ſmooth the rugged way, remove every obſtacle, and make all things plain and level. When, in the laſt century, *Temple* and *De Witt* negotiated the famous triple alliance, their candour, their freedom, and

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the moſt *confidential* diſcloſures, were the reſult of true policy. Accordingly, in ſpite of all the dilatory forms of the complex government of the United Provinces, the treaty was concluded in three days. It did not take a much longer time to bring the ſame ſtate (that of Holland) through a ſtill more complicated tranſaction, that of the *Grand Alliance*. But in the preſent caſe, this unparalleled candour, this unpardonable want of reſerve, produced what might have been expected from it, the moſt ſerious evils. It inſtructed the enemy in the whole plan of our demands and conceſſions. It made the moſt fatal diſcoveries.

And firſt, it induced us to lay down the baſis of a treaty which itſelf had nothing to reſt upon; it ſeems, we thought we had gained a great point in getting this baſis admitted—that is, a baſis of mutual compenſation and exchange of conqueſts. If a diſpoſition to peace, and with any reaſonable aſſurance, had been previouſly indicated, ſuch a plan of arrangement might with propriety and ſafety be propoſed, becauſe theſe arrangements were not, in effect, to make the baſis, but a part of the ſuperſtructure of the fabrick of pacification. The order of things would thus be reverſed. The mutual diſpoſition to peace, would form the reaſonable baſe upon which the ſcheme of compenſation, upon one ſide or the other, might be conſtructed. This truly fundamental baſe being once laid, all differences

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ariſing from the ſpirit of huckſtering and barter might be eaſily adjuſted. If the reſtoration of peace, with a view to the eſtabliſhment of a fair balance of power in Europe, had been made the real baſis of the treaty, the reciprocal value of the compenſations could not be eſtimated according to their proportion to each other, but according to their proportionate relation to that end: to that great end the whole would be ſubſervient. The effect of the treaty would be in a manner ſecured before the detail of particulars was begun, and for a plain reaſon, becauſe the hoſtile ſpirit on both ſides had been conjured down; but if in the full fury, and unappeaſed rancour of war, a little traffick is attempted, it is eaſy to divine what muſt be the conſequence to thoſe who endeavour to open that kind of petty commerce.

To illuſtrate what I have ſaid, I go back no further than to the two laſt treaties of Paris, and to the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which preceded the firſt of theſe two treaties of Paris by about fourteen or fifteen years. I do not mean here to criticiſe any of them. My opinions upon ſome particulars of the treaty of Paris in 1763, are publiſhed in a pamphlet,* which your recollection will readily bring into your view. I recur to them only to ſhew that their baſis had not been, and never could have been a mere dealing of truck and barter, but that

* Obſervations on a late ſtate of the nation.

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the parties being willing, from common fatigue or common ſuffering, to put an end to a war, the firſt object of which had either been obtained or deſpaired of, the leſſer objects were not thought worth the price of further conteſt. The parties underſtanding one another, ſo much was given away without conſidering from whoſe budget it came, not as the value of the objects, but as the value of peace to the parties might require. At the laſt treaty of Paris the ſubjugation of America being deſpaired of on the part of Great Britain, and the independence of America being looked upon as ſecure on the part of France, the main cauſe of the war was removed; and the conqueſts which France had made upon us (for we had made none of importance upon her) were ſurrendered with ſufficient facility. Peace was reſtored as peace. In America the parties ſtood as they were poſſeſſed. A limit was to be ſettled, but ſettled as a limit to ſecure that peace, and not at all on a ſyſtem of equivalents, for which, as we then ſtood with the United States, there were little or no materials.

At the preceding treaty of Paris, I mean that of 1763, there was nothing at all on which to fix a baſis of compenſation from reciprocal ceſſion of conqueſts. They were all on one ſide. The queſtion with us was not what we were to receive, and on what conſideration, but what we were to keep for indemnity, or to cede for peace. Accordingly

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no place being left for barter, ſacrifices were made on our ſide to peace; and we ſurrendered to the French their moſt valuable poſſeſſions in the Weſt Indies without any equivalent. The reſt of Europe fell ſoon after into its ancient order; and the German war ended exactly where it had begun.

The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was built upon a ſimilar baſis. All the conqueſts in Europe had been made by France. She had ſubdued the Auſtrian Netherlands, and broken open the gates of Holland. We had taken nothing in the Weſt Indies, and Cape Breton was a trifling buſineſs indeed. France gave up all for peace. The allies had given up all that was ceded at Utrecht. Louis the fourteenth made all, or nearly all, the ceſſions at Ryſwick, and at Nimeguen. In all thoſe treaties, and in all the preceding, as well as in the others which intervened, the queſtion never had been that of barter. The balance of power had been ever aſſumed as the known common law of Europe at all times, and by all powers: the queſtion had only been (as it muſt happen) on the more or leſs inclination of that balance.

This general balance was regarded in four principal points of view:—the GREAT MIDDLE BALANCE, which comprehended Great Britain, France, and Spain; the BALANCE OF THE NORTH; the BALANCE, external and internal, of GERMANY; and the BALANCE OF ITALY. In all thoſe ſyſtems of balance,

England was the power to whoſe cuſtody it was thought it might be moſt ſafely committed.

France, as ſhe happened to ſtand, ſecured the balance, or endangered it. Without queſtion ſhe had been long the ſecurity for the balance of Germany, and under her auſpices, the ſyſtem, if not formed, had been at leaſt perfected. She was ſo in ſome meaſure with regard to Italy, more than occaſionally. She had a clear intereſt in the balance of the north, and had endeavoured to preſerve it. But when we began to treat with the preſent France, or more properly to proſtrate ourſelves to her, and to try if we ſhould be admitted to ranſom our allies, upon a ſyſtem of mutual conceſſion and compenſation, we had not one of the uſual facilities. For firſt, we had not the ſmalleſt indication of a deſire for peace on the part of the enemy; but rather the direct contrary. Men do not make ſacrifices to obtain what they do not deſire: and as for the balance of power, it was ſo far from being admitted by France either on the general ſyſtem, or with regard to the particular ſyſtems that I have mentioned, that in the whole body of their authorized or encouraged reports and diſcuſſions upon the theory of the diplomatick ſyſtem, they conſtantly re ected the very idea of the balance of power, and treated it as the true cauſe of all the wars and calamities that had afflicted Europe: and their practice was correſpondent to the dogmatick

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poſitions they had laid down. The Empire and the Papacy it was their great object to deſtroy, and this now openly avowed and ſtedfaſtly acted upon, might have been diſcerned with very little acuteneſs of ſight, from the very firſt dawnings of the revolution, to be the main drift of their policy. For they profeſſed a reſolution to deſtroy every thing which can hold ſtates together by the tie of opinion.

Exploding, therefore, all ſorts of balances, they avow their deſign to erect themſelves into a new deſcription of empire, which is not grounded on any balance, but forms a ſort of impious hierarchy, of which France is to be the head and the guardian. The law of this their empire is any thing rather than the publick law of Europe, the ancient conventions of its ſeveral ſtates, or the ancient opinions which aſſign to them ſuperiority or pre-eminence of any ſort, or any other kind of connection in virtue of ancient relations. They permit, and that is all, the temporary exiſtence of ſome of the old communities; but whilſt they give to theſe tolerated ſtates this temporary reſpite in order to ſecure them in a condition of real dependence on themſelves, they inveſt them on every ſide by a body of republicks, formed on the model, and dependent oſtenſibly, as well as ſubſtantially, on the will of the mother republick, to which they owe their origin. Theſe are to be ſo many garriſons to check and

control the ſtates, which are to be permitted to remain on the old model, until they are ripe for a change. It is in this manner, that France, on her new ſyſtem, means to form an univerſal empire, by producing an univerſal revolution. By this means, forming a new code of communities according to what ſhe calls the natural rights of man and of ſtates, ſhe pretends to ſecure eternal peace to the world, guaranteed by her generoſity and juſtice, which are to grow with the extent of her power. To talk of the balance of power to the governours of ſuch a country, was a jargon which they could not underſtand even through an interpreter. Before men can tranſact any affair, they muſt have a common language to ſpeak, and ſome common recogniſed principles on which they can argue, otherwiſe all is croſs-purpoſe and confuſion. It was, therefore, an eſſential preliminary to the whole proceeding, to fix, whether the balance of power, the liberties and laws of the empire, and the treaties of different belligerent powers in paſt times, when they put an end to hoſtilities, were to be conſidered as the baſis of the preſent negotiation.

The whole of the enemy's plan was known when Lord Malmeſbury was ſent with his ſcrap of equivalents to Paris. Yet, in this unfortunate attempt at negotiation, inſtead of fixing theſe points, and aſſuming the balance of power and the peace of Europe as the baſis to which all ceſſions on all ſides

were to be ſubſervient, our ſolicitor for peace was directed to reverſe that order. He was directed to make mutual conceſſions, on a mere compariſon of their marketable value, the baſe of treaty. The balance of power was to be thrown in as an inducement, and a ſort of make-weight, to ſupply the manifeſt deficiency which muſt ſtare him and the world in the face, between thoſe objects which he was to require the enemy to ſurrender, and thoſe which he had to offer as a fair equivalent.

To give any force to this inducement, and to make it anſwer even a ſecondary purpoſe of equalizing equivalents having in themſelves no natural proportionate value, it ſuppoſed, that the enemy, contrary to the moſt notorious fact, did admit this balance of power to be of ſome value, great or ſmall; whereas it is plain, that in the enemy's eſtimate of things, the conſideration of the balance of power, as we have ſaid before, was ſo far from going in diminution of the value of what the directory was deſired to ſurrender, or of giving an additional price to our objects offered in exchange, that the hope of the utter deſtruction of that balance, became a new motive to the junto of regicides for preſerving, as a means for realiſing that hope, what we wiſhed them to abandon.

Thus ſtood the baſis of the treaty on laying the firſt ſtone of the foundation. At the very beſt, upon our ſide, the queſtion ſtood upon a mere

naked bargain and ſale. Unthinking people here triumphed when they thought they had obtained it whereas when obtained as a baſis of treaty, it was juſt the worſt we could poſſibly have choſen. As to our offer to cede a moſt unprofitable, and, indeed, beggarly, chargeable counting-houſe or two in the Eaſt Indies, we ought not to preſume that they could conſider this as any thing elſe than a mockery. As to any thing of real value, we had nothing under Heaven to offer (for which we were not ourſelves in a very dubious ſtruggle) except the iſland of Martinico only. When this object was to be weighed againſt the directorial conqueſts, merely as an object of a value at market, the principle of barter became perfectly ridiculous; a ſingle quarter in the ſingle city of Amſterdam, was worth ten Martinicos; and would have ſold for many more years purchaſe in any market overt in Europe. How was this groſs and glaring defect in the objects of exchange to be ſupplied?—It was to be made up by argument. And what was that argument?—The extreme utility of poſſeſſions in the Weſt Indies to the augmentation of the naval power of France. A very curious topick of argument to be propoſed and inſiſted on by an ambaſſador of Great Britain. It is directly and plainly this—"Come, we know that of all things you wiſh a naval power, and it is natural you ſhould, who wiſh to deſtroy the very ſources of the Britiſh greatneſs,

neſs, to overpower our marine, to deſtroy our commerce, to eradicate our foreign influence, and to lay us open to an invaſion, which, at one ſtroke, may complete our ſervitude and ruin, and expunge us from among the nations of the earth. Here I have it in my budget, the infallible arcanum for that purpoſe. You are but novices in the art of naval reſources. Let you have the Weſt Indies back, and your maritime preponderance is ſecured, for which you would do well to be moderate in your demands upon the Auſtrian Netherlands."

Under any circumſtances, this is a moſt extraordinary topick of argument; but it is rendered by much the more unaccountable, when we are told, that if the war has been diverted from the great object of eſtabliſhing ſociety and good order in Europe by deſtroying the uſurpation in France; this diverſion was made to increaſe the naval reſources and power of Great Britain, and to lower, if not annihilate, thoſe of the marine of France. I leave all this to the very ſerious reflection of every Engliſhmen.

This baſis was no ſooner admitted, than the rejection of a treaty upon that ſole foundation was a thing of courſe. The enemy did not think it worthy of a diſcuſſion, as in truth it was not; and immediately as uſual, they began, in the moſt opprobrious, and moſt inſolent manner, to queſtion our ſincerity and good faith. Whereas, in truth, there

was no one ſympton wanting of openneſs and fair dealing. What could be more fair than to lay open to an enemy all that you wiſhed to obtain, and the price you meant to pay for it, and to deſire him to imitate your ingenuous proceeding, and in the ſame manner to open his honeſt heart to you? Here was no want of fair dealing, but there was too evidently a fault of another kind; there was much weakneſs—there was an eager and impotent deſire of aſſociating with this unſocial power, and of attempting the connection by any means, however manifeſtly feeble and ineffectual. The event was committed to chance; that is, to ſuch a manifeſtation of the deſire of France for peace, as would induce the directory to forget the advantages they had in the ſyſtem of barter. Accordingly the general deſire for ſuch a peace was triumphantly reported from the moment that Lord Malmeſbury had ſet his foot on ſhore at Calais.

It has been ſaid, that the directory was compelled againſt its will to accept the baſis of barter (as if that had tended to accelerate the work of pacification!) by the voice of all France. Had this been the caſe, the directors would have continued to liſten to that voice to which it ſeems they were ſo obedient: they would have proceeded with the negotiation upon that baſis. But the fact is, that they inſtantly broke up the negotiation, as ſoon as they had obliged our ambaſſador to violate all the

principles

principles of treaty, and weakly, raſhly, and unguardedly, to expoſe, without any counter-propoſition, the whole of our project with regard to ourſelves and our allies, and without holding out the ſmalleſt hope that they would admit the ſmalleſt part of our pretenſions.

When they had thus drawn from us all that they could draw out, they expelled Lord Malmeſbury, and they appealed for the propriety of their conduct, to that very France which, we thought proper to ſuppoſe, had driven them to this fine conceſſion; and I do not find that in either diviſion of the family of thieves, the younger branch, or the elder, or in any other body whatſoever, there was any indignation excited, or any tumult raiſed; or any thing like the virulence of oppoſition which was ſhewn to the king's miniſters here, on account of that tranſaction.

Notwithſtanding all this, it ſeems a hope is ſtill entertained, that the directory will have that tenderneſs for the carcaſe of their country, by whoſe very diſtemper, and on whoſe feſtering wounds, like vermin, they are fed; that theſe pious patriots will of themſelves come into a more moderate and reaſonable way of thinking and acting. In the name of wonder, what has inſpired our miniſtry with this hope any more than with their former expectations?

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Do theſe hopes only ariſe from continual diſappointment? Do they grow out of the uſual grounds of deſpair? What is there to encourage them, in the conduct, or even in the declarations of the ruling powers in France, from the firſt formation of their miſchievous republick to the hour in which I write? Is not the directory compoſed of the ſame junto? Are they not the identical men, who, from the baſe and ſordid vices which belonged to their original place and ſituation, aſpired to the dignity of crimes; and from the dirtieſt, loweſt, moſt fraudulent, and moſt knaviſh of chicaners, aſcended in the ſcale of robbery, ſacrilege, and aſſaſſination in all its forms, till at laſt they had imbrued their impious hands in the blood of their ſovereign? Is it from theſe men that we are to hope for this paternal tenderneſs to their country, and this ſacred regard for the peace and happineſs of all nations!

But it ſeems there is ſtill another lurking hope, akin to that which duped us ſo egregiouſly before, when our delightful baſis was accepted; we ſtill flatter ourſelves that the publick voice of France will compel this directory to more moderation. Whence does this hope ariſe? What publick voice is there in France? There are, indeed, ſome writers, who, ſince this monſter of a directory has obtained a great regular military force to guard them, are indulged in a ſufficient liberty of writing, and,

and ſome of them write well undoubtedly. But the world knows that in France there is no publick, that the country is compoſed but of two deſcriptions; audacious tyrants and trembling ſlaves. The conteſts between the tyrants is the only vital principle that can be diſcerned in France. The only thing which there appears like ſpirit, is amongſt their late aſſociates, and faſteſt friends of the directory, the more furious and untameable part of the jacobins. This diſcontented member of the faction does almoſt balance the reigning diviſions; and it threatens every moment to predominate. For the preſent, however, the dread of their fury forms ſome ſort of ſecurity to their fellows, who now exerciſe a more regular, and therefore a ſomewhat leſs ferocious tyranny. Moſt of the ſlaves chooſe a quiet, however reluctant ſubmiſſion to thoſe who are ſomewhat ſatiated with blood, and who, like wolves, are a little more tame from being a little leſs hungry, in preference to an irruption of the famiſhed devourers, who are prowling and howling about the fold.

This circumſtance aſſures ſome degree of permanence to the power of thoſe, whom we know to be permanently our rancorous and implacable enemies. But to thoſe very enemies, who have ſworn our deſtruction, we have ourſelves given a further and far better ſecurity by rendering the

cauſe

cauſe of the royaliſts deſperate. Thoſe brave and virtuous, but unfortunate adherents to the ancient conſtitution of their country, after the miſerable ſlaughters which have been made in that body, after all their loſſes by emigration, are ſtill numerous, but unable to exert themſelves againſt the force of the uſurpation, evidently countenanced and upheld by thoſe very princes who had called them to arm for the ſupport of the legal monarchy. Where then, after chacing theſe fleeting hopes of ours from point to point of the political horizon, are they at laſt really found? Not where, under Providence, the hopes of Engliſhmen uſed to be placed, in our own courage and in our own virtues, but in the moderation and virtue of the moſt atrocious monſters that have ever diſgraced and plagued mankind.

The only excuſe to be made for all our mendicant diplomacy is the ſame as in the caſe of all other mendicancy;—namely, that it has been founded on abſolute neceſſity. This deſerves conſideration. Neceſſity, as it has no law, ſo it has no ſhame; but moral neceſſity is not like metaphyſical, or even phyſical. In that category, it is a word of looſe ſignification, and conveys different ideas to different minds. To the low-minded, the ſlighteſt neceſſity becomes an invincible neceſſity. "The ſlothful man ſaith, There "is a lion in the way, and I ſhall be devoured in "the

" the ſtreets." But when the neceſſity pleaded is not in the nature of things, but in the vices of him who alleges it, the whining tones of common-place beggarly rhetorick, produce nothing but indignation; becauſe they indicate a deſire of keeping up a diſhonourable exiſtence, without utility to others, and without dignity to itſelf; becauſe they aim at obtaining the dues of labour without induſtry; and by frauds would draw from the compaſſion of others, what men ought to owe to their own ſpirit and their own exertions.

I am thoroughly ſatisfied that if we degrade ourſelves, it is the degradation which will ſubject us to the yoke of neceſſity, and not that it is neceſſity, which has brought on our degradation. In this ſame chaos, where light and darkneſs are ſtruggling together, the open ſubſcription of laſt year, with all its circumſtances, muſt have given us no little glimmering of hope; not (as I have heard, it was vainly diſcourſed) that the loan could prove a crutch to a lame negotiation abroad; and that the whiff and wind of it muſt at once have diſpoſed the enemies of all tranquillity to a deſire for peace. Judging on the face of facts, if on them it had any effect at all, it had the direct contrary effect; for very ſoon after the loan became publick at Paris, the negotiation ended, and our ambaſſador was ignominiouſly expelled. My view of this was different: I liked the loan, not from the

the influence which it might have on the enemy, but on account of the temper which it indicated in our own people. This alone is a conſideration of any importance; becauſe, all calculation formed upon a ſuppoſed relation of the habitudes of others to our own, under the preſent circumſtances, is weak and fallacious. The adverſary muſt be judged, not by what we are, or by what we wiſh him to be, but by what we muſt know he actually is: unleſs we chooſe to ſhut our eyes and our ears to the uniform tenour of all his diſcourſes, and to his uniform courſe in all his actions. We may be deluded; but we cannot pretend that we have been diſappointed. The old rule of, *Ne te quæſiveris extra*, is a precept as available in policy as it is in morals. Let us leave off ſpeculating upon the diſpoſition and the wants of the enemy. Let us deſcend into our own boſoms; let us aſk ourſelves what are our duties and what are our means of diſcharging them. In what heart are you at home? How far may an Engliſh miniſter confide in the affections, in the confidence, in the force of an Engliſh people? What does he find us when he puts us to the proof of what Engliſh intereſt and Engliſh honour demand? It is, as furniſhing an anſwer to theſe queſtions that I conſider the circumſtances of the loan. The effect on the enemy is not in what he may ſpeculate on our reſources, but in what he ſhall feel from our arms.

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The circumſtances of the loan have proved beyond a doubt three capital points, which, if they are properly uſed, may be advantageous to the future liberty and happineſs of mankind. In the firſt place, the loan demonſtrates, in regard to inſtrumental reſources, the competency of this kingdom to the aſſertion of the common cauſe, and to the maintenance and ſuperintendance of that, which it is its duty, and its glory to hold, and to watch over—the balance of power throughout the chriſtian world. Secondly, it brings to light what, under the moſt diſcouraging appearances, I always reckoned on; that with its ancient phyſical force, not only unimpaired, but augmented, its ancient ſpirit is ſtill alive in the Britiſh nation. It proves, that for their application there is a ſpirit equal to the reſources, for its energy above them. It proves that there exiſts though not always viſible, a ſpirit which never fails to come forth whenever it is ritually invoked; a ſpirit which will give no equivocal reſponſe, but ſuch as will hearten the timidity, and fix the irreſolution of heſitating prudence; a ſpirit which will be ready to perform all the taſks that ſhall be impoſed upon it by publick honour. Thirdly, the loan diſplays an abundant confidence in his Majeſty's government, as adminiſtered by his preſent ſervants, in the proſecution of a war which the people conſider, not as a war made on the ſuggeſtion of miniſters, and to anſwer

anſwer the purpoſes of the ambition or pride of ſtateſman, but as a war of their own, and in defence of that very property which they expend for its ſupport; a war for that order of things, from which every thing valuable that they poſſeſs is derived, and in which order alone it can poſſibly be maintained.

I hear in derogation of the value of the fact, from which I draw inferences ſo favourable to the ſpirit of the people and to its juſt expectation from miniſters, that the eighteen million loan is to be conſidered in no other light, than as taking advantage of a very lucrative bargain held out to the ſubſcribers. I do not in truth believe it. All the circumſtances which attended the ſubſcription ſtrongly ſpoke a different language. Be it, however, as theſe detractors ſay. This with me derogates little, or rather nothing at all, from the political value and importance of the fact. I ſhould be very ſorry if the tranſaction was not ſuch a bargain, otherwiſe it would not have been a fair one. A corrupt and improvident loan, like every thing elſe corrupt or prodigal, cannot be too much condemned: but there is a ſhort-ſighted parſimony ſtill more fatal than an unforeſeeing expence. The value of money muſt be judged like every thing elſe from its rate at market. To force that market, or any market, is of all things the moſt dangerous. For a ſmall temporary benefit, the ſpring

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of all publick credit might be relaxed for ever. The monied men have a right to look to advantage in the inveſtment of their property. To advance their money, they riſk it; and the riſk is to be included in the price. If they were to incur a loſs, that loſs would amount to a tax on that peculiar ſpecies of property. In effect, it would be the moſt unjuſt and impolitick of all things, unequal taxation. It would throw upon one deſcription of perſons in the community, that burden which ought by fair and equitable diſtribution to reſt upon the whole. None on account of their dignity ſhould be exempt; none (preſerving due proportion) on account of the ſcantineſs of their means. The moment a man is exempted from the maintenance of the community, he is in a ſort ſeparated from it. He loſes the place of a citizen.

So it is in all *taxation*; but in a *bargain*, when terms of loſs are looked for by the borrower from the lender, compulſion, or what virtually is compulſion, introduces itſelf into the place of treaty. When compulſion may be at all uſed by a ſtate in borrowing, the occaſion muſt determine. But the compulſion ought to be known, and well defined, and well diſtinguiſhed: for otherwiſe treaty only weakens the energy of compulſion, while compulſion deſtroys the freedom of a bargain. The advantage of both is loſt by the confuſion,

of things in their nature utterly unſociable. It would be to introduce compulſion into that in which freedom and exiſtence are the ſame; I mean credit. The moment that ſhame, or fear, or force, are directly or indirectly applied to a loan, credit periſhes.

There muſt be ſome impulſe beſides publick ſpirit, to put private intereſt into motion along with it. Monied men ought to be allowed to ſet a value on their money; if they did not, there could be no monied men. This deſire of accumulation, is a principle without which the means of their ſervice to the ſtate could not exiſt. The love of lucre, though ſometimes carried to a ridiculous, ſometimes to a vicious exceſs, is the grand cauſe of proſperity to all ſtates. In this natural, this reaſonable, this powerful, this prolifick principle, it is for the ſatyriſt to expoſe the ridiculous; it is for the moraliſt to cenſure the vicious; it is for the ſympathetick heart to reprobate the hard and cruel; it is for the judge to animadvert on the fraud, the extortion, and the oppreſſion; but it is for the ſtateſman to employ it as he finds it, with all its concomitant excellencies, with all its imperfections on its head. It is his part, in this caſe, as it is in all other caſes, where he is to make uſe of the general energies of nature, to take them as he finds them.

After all, it is a great miſtake to imagine, as too

commonly, almoſt indeed generally, it is imagined, that the publick borrower and the private lender are two adverſe parties with different and contending intereſts; and that what is given to the one, is wholly taken from the other. Conſtituted as our ſyſtem of finance and taxation is, the intereſts of the contracting parties cannot well be ſeparated, whatever they may reciprocally intend. He who is the hard lender of to-day, to-morrow is the generous contributor to his own payment. For example, the laſt loan is raiſed on publick taxes, which are deſigned to produce annually two millions ſterling. At firſt view, this is an annuity of two millions dead charge upon the publick in favour of certain monied men: but inſpect the thing more nearly, follow the ſtream in its meanders, and you will find that there is a good deal of fallacy in this ſtate of things.

I take it, that whoever conſiders any man's expenditure of his income, old or new (I ſpeak of certain claſſes in life), will find a full third of it go in taxes, direct or indirect. If ſo, this new-created income of two millions will probably furniſh 665,000*l.* (I avoid broken numbers) towards the payment of its own intereſt, or to the ſinking of its own capital. So it is with the whole of the publick debt. Suppoſe it any given ſum, it is a fallacious eſtimate of the affairs of a nation to conſider it as a mere burthen; to a degree it is ſo

without queſtion, but not wholly ſo, nor any thing like it. If the income from the intereſt be ſpent, the above proportion returns again into the publick ſtock; inſomuch, that taking the intereſt of the whole debt to be twelve millions three hundred thouſand pound, (it is ſomething more) not leſs than a ſum of four million one hundred thouſand pound comes back again to the publick through the channel of impoſition. If the whole, or any part, of that income be ſaved, ſo much new capital is generated; the infallible operation of which is to lower the value of money, and conſequently to conduce towards the improvement of publick credit.

I take the expenditure of the *capitaliſt*, not the value of the capital, as my ſtandard; becauſe it is the ſtandard upon which amongſt us, property as an object of taxation, is rated. In this country, land and offices only excepted, we raiſe no faculty tax. We preſerve the faculty from the expence. Our taxes, for the far greater portion, fly over the heads of the loweſt claſſes. They eſcape too who, with better ability, voluntarily ſubject themſelves to the harſh diſcipline of a rigid neceſſity. With us, labour and frugality, the parents of riches, are ſpread, and wiſely too. The moment men ceaſe to augment the common ſtock, the moment they no longer enrich it by their induſtry or their ſelf-denial, their luxury and even their eaſe are obliged to pay contribution to the publick; not becauſe they

they are vicious principles, but becauſe they are unproductive. If, in fact, the intereſt paid by the publick had not thus revolved again into its own fund; if this ſecretion had not again been abſorbed into the maſs of blood, it would have been impoſſible for the nation to have exiſted to this time under ſuch a debt. But under the debt it does exiſt and flouriſh; and this flouriſhing ſtate of exiſtence in no ſmall degree is owing to the contribution from the debt to the payment. Whatever, therefore, is taken from that capital by too cloſe a bargain, is but a deluſive advantage, it is ſo much loſt to the publick in another way. This matter cannot on the one ſide or the other, be metaphyſically purſued to the extreme, but it is a conſideration of which, in all diſcuſſions of this kind, we ought never wholly to loſe ſight.

It is never, therefore, wiſe to quarrel with the intereſted views of men, whilſt they are combined with the publick intereſt and promote it: it is our buſineſs to tie the knot, if poſſible, cloſer. Reſources that are derived from extraordinary virtues, as ſuch virtues are rare, ſo they muſt be unproductive. It is a good thing for a monied man to pledge his property on the welfare of his country; he ſhews that he places his treaſure where his heart is; and, revolving in this circle, we know that "wherever "a man's treaſure is, there his heart will be alſo." For theſe reaſons and on theſe principles, I have

been ſorry to ſee the attempts which have been made, with more good meaning than foreſight and conſideration, towards raiſing the annual intereſt of this loan by private contributions. Wherever a regular revenue is eſtabliſhed, there voluntary contribution can anſwer no purpoſe, but to diſorder and diſturb it in its courſe. To recur to ſuch aids is, for ſo much to diſſolve the community, and to return to a ſtate of unconnected nature. And even if ſuch a ſupply ſhould be productive, in a degree commenſurate to its object, it muſt alſo be productive of much vexation, and much oppreſſion. Either the citizens, by the propoſed duties, pay their proportion according to ſome rate made by publick authority, or they do not. If the law be well made, and the contributions founded on juſt proportions, every thing ſuperadded by ſomething that is not as regular as law, and as uniform in its operation, will become more or leſs out of proportion. If, on the contrary, the law be not made upon proper calculation, it is a diſgrace to the publick wiſdom, which fails in ſkill to aſſeſs the citizen in juſt meaſure, and according to his means. But the hand of authority is not always the moſt heavy hand. It is obvious, that men may be oppreſſed by many ways, beſides thoſe which take their courſe from the ſupreme power of the ſtate. Suppoſe the payment to be wholly diſcretionary. Whatever has its origin in caprice, is ſure not to improve in its

its progreſs, nor to end in reaſon. It is impoſſible for each private individual to have any meaſure conformable to the particular condition of each of his fellow-citizens, or to the general exigencies of his country. 'Tis a random ſhot at beſt.

When men proceed in this irregular mode, the firſt contributor is apt to grow peeviſh with his neighbours. He is but too well diſpoſed to meaſure their means by his own envy, and not by the real ſtate of their fortunes, which he can rarely know, and which it may in them be an act of the groſſeſt imprudence to reveal. Hence the odium and laſſitude, with which people will look upon a proviſion for the publick, which is bought by diſcord at the expence of ſocial quiet. Hence the bitter heart-burnings, and the war of tongues which is ſo often the prelude to other wars. Nor is it every contribution, called voluntary, which is according to the free will of the giver. A falſe ſhame, or a falſe glory, againſt his feelings, and his judgment, may tax an individual to the detriment of his family, and in wrong of his creditors. A pretence of publick ſpirit may diſable him from the performance of his private duties. It may diſable him even from paying the legitimate contributions which he is to furniſh according to the preſcript of law; but what is the moſt dangerous of all is, that malignant diſpoſition to which this mode of contribution evidently tends, and which at length leaves the com-

paratively indigent, to judge of the wealth, and to preſcribe to the opulent, or thoſe whom they conceive to be ſuch, the uſe they are to make of their fortunes. From thence it is but one ſtep to the ſubverſion of all property.

Far, very-far am I from ſuppoſing that ſuch things enter into the purpoſes of thoſe excellent perſons whoſe zeal has led them to this kind of meaſure; but the meaſure itſelf will lead them beyond their intention, and what is begun with the beſt deſigns, bad men will perverſely improve to the worſt of their purpoſes. An ill-founded plauſibility in great affairs is a real evil. In France we have ſeen the wickedeſt and moſt fooliſh of men, the conſtitution-mongers of 1789, purſuing this very courſe, and ending in this very event. Theſe projectors of deception ſet on foot two modes of voluntary contribution to the ſtate. The firſt they called patriotick gifts. Theſe, for the greater part were not more ridiculous in the mode, than contemptible in the project. The other, which they called the patriotick contribution, was expected to amount to a fourth of the fortunes of individuals, but at their own will and on their own eſtimate; but this contribution threatening to fall infinitely ſhort of their hopes, they ſoon made it compulſory both in the rate and in the levy, beginning in fraud and ending as all the frauds of power end, in plain violence. All theſe devices to produce an involuntary will, were

were under the pretext of relieving the more indigent claſſes, but the principle of voluntary contribution, however deluſive, being once eſtabliſhed, theſe lower claſſes firſt, and then all claſſes, were encouraged to throw off the regular methodical payments to the ſtate as ſo many badges of ſlavery. Thus all regular revenue failing, theſe impoſtors raiſing the ſuperſtructure on the ſame cheats with which they had laid the foundation of their greatneſs, and not content with a portion of the poſſeſſions of the rich, confiſcated the whole, and to prevent them from reclaiming their rights, murdered the proprietors. The whole of the proceſs has paſſed before our eyes, and been conducted indeed with a greater degree of rapidity, than could be expected.

My opinion then is, that publick contributions ought only to be raiſed by the publick will. By the judicious form of our conſtitution, the publick contribution is in its name and ſubſtance a grant. In its origin it is truly voluntary; not voluntary according to the irregular, unſteady, capricious will of individuals, but according to the will and wiſdom of the whole popular maſs, in the only way in which will and wiſdom can go together. This voluntary grant obtaining in its progreſs the force of a law, a general neceſſity which takes away all merit, and conſequently all jealouſy from individuals, compreſſes, equalizes, and ſatisfies the whole; ſuffering

ſuffering no man to judge of his neighbour, or to arrogate any thing to himſelf. If their will complies with their obligation, the great end is anſwered in the happieſt mode; if the will reſiſts the burthen, every one loſes a great part of his own will as a common lot. After all, perhaps contributions raiſed by a charge on luxury, or that degree of convenience which approaches ſo near as to be confounded with luxury, is the only mode of contribution which may be with truth termed voluntary.

I might reſt here, and take the loan I ſpeak of as leading to a ſolution of that queſtion, which I propoſed in my firſt letter: "Whether the inability of the country to proſecute the war, did neceſſitate a ſubmiſſion to the indignities and the calamities of a peace with the regicide power?" But give me leave to purſue this point a little further.

I know that it has been a cry uſual on this occaſion, as it has been upon occaſions where ſuch a cry could have leſs apparent juſtification, that great diſtreſs and miſery have been the conſequence of this war, by the burthens brought and laid upon the people. But to know where the burthen really lies and where it preſſes, we muſt divide the people. As to the common people, their ſtock is in their perſons and in their earnings. I deny that the ſtock of their perſons is diminiſhed in a greater proportion than the common ſources of populouſneſs abundantly

abundantly fill up; I mean conſtant employment; proportioned pay according to the produce of the ſoil, and where the ſoil fails, according to the operation of the general capital; plentiful nouriſhment to vigorous labour; comfortable proviſion to decrepid age, to orphan infancy, and to accidental malady. I ſay nothing to the policy of the proviſion for the poor, in all the variety of faces under which it preſents itſelf. This is the matter of another inquiry. I only juſt ſpeak of it as of a fact, taken with others to ſupport me in my denial, that hitherto any one of the ordinary ſources of the increaſe of mankind is dried up by this war. I affirm what I can well prove, that the waſte has been leſs than the ſupply. To ſay that in war no man muſt be killed, is to ſay that there ought to be no war. This they may ſay, who wiſh to talk idly, and who would diſplay their humanity at the expence of their honeſty, or their underſtanding. If more lives are loſt in this war than neceſſity requires, they are loſt by miſconduct or miſtake, but if the hoſtility be juſt, the errour is to be corrected: the war is not to be abandoned.

That the ſtock of the common people, in numbers, is not leſſened, any more than the cauſes are impaired, is manifeſt, without being at the pains of an actual numeration. An improved and improving agriculture, which implies a great augmentation of labour, has not yet found itſelf at a ſtand,

no,

no, not for a ſingle moment, for want of the neceſſary hands, either in the ſettled progreſs of huſbandry, or in the occaſional preſſure of harveſt. I have even reaſon to believe that there has been a much ſmaller importation, or the demand of it, from a neighbouring kingdom than in former times, when agriculture was more limited in its extent and its means, and when the time was a ſeaſon of profound peace. On the contrary the prolifick fertility of country life has poured its ſuperfluity of population into the canals, and into other publick works, which of late years have been undertaken to ſo amazing an extent, and which have not only not been diſcontinued, but beyond all expectation puſhed on with redoubled vigour, in a war that calls for ſo many of our men, and ſo much of our riches. An increaſing capital calls for labour: and an increaſing population anſwers to the call. Our manufactures, augmented both for the ſupply of foreign and domeſtick conſumption, reproducing with the means of life, the multitudes which they uſe and waſte, (and which many of them devour much more ſurely and much more largely than the war) have always found the laborious hand ready for the liberal pay. That the price of the ſoldier is highly raiſed is true. In part this riſe may be owing to ſome meaſures not ſo well conſidered in the beginning of this war; but the grand cauſe has been the

reluctance

reluctance of that claſs of people from whom the ſoldiery is taken, to enter into a military life, not that but once entered into, it has its conveniences, and even its pleaſures. I have ſeldom known a ſoldier who, at the interceſſion of his friends, and at their no ſmall charge, had been redeemed from that diſcipline, that in a ſhort time, was not eager to return to it again. But the true reaſon is the abundant occupation, and the augmented ſtipend found in towns, and villages, and farms, which leaves a ſmaller number of perſons to be diſpoſed of. The price of men for new and untried ways of life, muſt bear a proportion to the profits of that mode of exiſtence from whence they are to be bought.

So far as to the ſtock of the common people as it conſiſts in their perſons. As to the other part, which conſiſts in their earnings, I have to ſay, that the rates of wages are very greatly augmented almoſt through the kingdom. In the pariſh where I live, it has been raiſed from ſeven to nine ſhillings in the week for the ſame labourer, performing the ſame taſk and no greater. Except ſomething in the malt taxes, and the duties upon ſugars, I do not know any one tax impoſed for very many years paſt which affects the labourer in any degree whatſoever; while on the other hand, the tax upon houſes not having more than ſeven windows (that is, upon cottages) was repealed the very year before the commencement of the preſent war. On the

the whole, I am ſatisfied that the humbleſt claſs, and that claſs which touches the moſt nearly on the loweſt, out of which it is continually emerging, and to which it is continually falling, receives far more from publick impoſitions than it pays. That claſs receives two millions ſterling annually from the claſſes above it. It pays to no ſuch amount towards any publick contribution.

I hope it is not neceſſary for me to take notice of that language, ſo ill ſuited to the perſons to whom it has been attributed, and ſo unbecoming the place in which it is ſaid to have been uttered, concerning the preſent war as the cauſe of the high price of proviſions during the greater part of the year 1796. I preſume it is only to be aſcribed to the intolerable licence with which the newſpapers break not only the rules of decorum, in real life, but even the dramatick decorum, when they perſonate great men, and, like bad poets, make the heroes of the piece talk more like us Grub-ſtreet ſcribblers, than in a ſtyle conſonant to perſons of gravity and importance in the ſtate. It was eaſy to demonſtrate the cauſe, and the ſole cauſe, of that riſe in the grand article and firſt neceſſary of life. It would appear that it had no more connexion with the war, than the moderate price to which all ſorts of grain were reduced, ſoon after the return of Lord Malmeſbury, had with the ſtate of politicks and the fate of his Lordſhip's treaty. I have quite as good reaſon (that is, no reaſon at all)

to

to attribute this abundance to the longer continuance of the war, as the gentlemen who perſonate leading members of parliament, have had for giving the enhanced price to that war, at a more early period of its duration. Oh, the folly of us poor creatures, who, in the midſt of our diſtreſſes, or our eſcapes, are ready to claw or careſs one another, upon matters that ſo ſeldom depend on our wiſdom or our weakneſs, on our good or evil conduct towards each other.

An untimely ſhower, or an unſeaſonable drought; a froſt too long continued, or too ſuddenly broken up, with rain and tempeſt; the blight of the ſpring, or the ſmut of the harveſt; will do more to cauſe the diſtreſs of the belly, than all the contrivances of all ſtateſmen can do to relieve it. Let government protect and encourage induſtry, ſecure property, repreſs violence, and diſcountenance fraud, it is all that they have to do. In other reſpects, the leſs they meddle in theſe affairs the better; the reſt is in the hands of our Maſter and theirs. We are in a conſtitution of things wherein—"*Modo ſol nimius, modo corripit* "*imber.*" But I will puſh this matter no further. As I have ſaid a good deal upon it at various times during my publick ſervice, and have lately written ſomething on it, which may yet ſee the light, I ſhall content myſelf now with obſerving, that the vigorous and laborious claſs of life has lately

lately got from the *bon ton* of the humanity of this day, the name of the "*labouring poor.*" We have heard many plans for the relief of the "*labouring poor.*" This puling jargon is not as innocent as it is fooliſh. In meddling with great affairs weakneſs is never innoxious. Hitherto the name of poor (in the ſenſe in which it is uſed to excite compaſſion) has not been uſed for thoſe who can, but for thoſe who cannot labour—for the ſick and infirm; for orphan infancy; for languiſhing and decrepid age: but when we affect to pity as poor, thoſe who muſt labour or the world cannot exiſt, we are trifling with the condition of mankind. It is the common doom of man that he muſt eat his bread by the ſweat of his brow, that is, by the ſweat of his body, or the ſweat of his mind. If this toil was inflicted as a curſe, it is as might be expected from the curſes of the Father of all Bleſſings—it is tempered with many alleviations, many comforts. Every attempt to fly from it, and to refuſe the very terms of our exiſtence, becomes much more truly a curſe, and heavier pains and penalties fall upon thoſe who would elude the taſks which are put upon them by the great Maſter Workman of the World, who in his dealings with his creatures ſympathizes with their weakneſs, and ſpeaking of a creation wrought by mere will out of nothing, ſpeaks of ſix days of *labour* and one of *reſt.* I do not call a healthy young man, chearful in his mind,

mind, and vigorous in his arms, I cannot call ſuch a man, *poor*; I cannot pity my kind as a kind, merely becauſe they are men. This affected pity, only tends to diſſatisfy them with their condition, and to teach them to ſeek reſources where no reſources are to be found, in ſomething elſe than their own induſtry, and frugality, and ſobriety. Whatever may be the intention (which, becauſe I do not know, I cannot diſpute) of thoſe who would diſcontent mankind by this ſtrange pity, they act towards us in the conſequences, as if they were our worſt enemies

In turning our view from the lower to the higher claſſes, it will not be neceſſary for me to ſhew at any length that the ſtock of the latter, as it conſiſts in their numbers, has not yet ſuffered any material diminution. I have not ſeen or heard it aſſerted: I have no reaſon to believe it: there is no want of officers, that I have ever underſtood, for the new ſhips which we commiſſion, or the new regiments which we raiſe. In the nature of things it is not with their perſons, that the higher claſſes principally pay their contingent to the demands of war. There is another, and not leſs important, part which reſts with almoſt excluſive weight upon them. They furniſh the means,

"——————— How war may beſt upheld,
"Move by her two main nerves, iron and gold,
"In all her equipage."

Not that they are exempt from contributing alſo by their perſonal ſervice in the fleets and armies of their country. They do contribute, and in their full and fair proportion, according to the relative proportion of their numbers in the community. They contribute all the mind that actuates the whole machine. The fortitude required of them, is very different from the unthinking alacrity of the common ſoldier, or common ſailor, in the face of danger and death; it is not a paſſion, it is not an impulſe, it is not a ſentiment; it is a cool, ſteady, deliberate principle, always preſent, always equable; having no connexion with anger; tempering honour with prudence; incited, invigorated, and ſuſtained by a generous love of fame; informed, moderated and directed by an enlarged knowledge of its own great publick ends; flowing in one blended ſtream from the oppoſite ſources of the heart and the head; carrying in itſelf its own commiſſion, and proving its title to every other command, by the firſt and moſt difficult command, that of the boſom in which it reſides; it is a fortitude, which unites with the courage of the field the more exalted and refined courage of the council; which knows, as well to retreat as to advance; which can conquer as well by delay, as by the rapidity of a march, or the impetuoſity of an attack; which can be, with Fabius, the black cloud that lowers on the tops of the mountains, or with Scipio, the thunderbolt of war; which undiſmayed

by

by falſe ſhame, can patiently endure the ſevereſt trial that a gallant ſpirit can undergo, in the taunts and provocations of the enemy, the ſuſpicions, the cold reſpect, and "mouth-honour" of thoſe, from whom it ſhould meet a cheerful obedience; which undiſturbed by falſe humanity, can calmly aſſume that moſt awful moral reſponſibility of deciding, when victory may be too dearly purchaſed by the loſs of a ſingle life, and when the ſafety and glory of their country may demand the certain ſacrifice of thouſands. Different ſtations of command may call for different modifications of this fortitude, but the character ought to be the ſame in all. And never, in the moſt "palmy ſtate" of our martial renown, did it ſhine with brighter luſtre, than in the preſent ſanguinary and ferocious hoſtilities, wherever the Britiſh arms have been carried. But, in this moſt arduous, and momentous conflict, which from its nature ſhould have rouſed us to new and unexampled efforts, I know not how it has been, that we have never put forth half the ſtrength, which we have exerted in ordinary wars. In the fatal battles, which have drenched the continent with blood, and ſhaken the ſyſtem of Europe to pieces, we have never had any conſiderable army of a magnitude to be compared to the leaſt of thoſe by which, in former times, we ſo glorioufly aſſerted our place as protectors, not oppreſſors, at the head of the great commonwealth of Europe. We

have never manfully met the danger in front: and when the enemy, reſigning to us our natural dominion of the ocean, and abandoning the defence of his diſtant poſſeſſions to the infernal energy of the deſtroying principles, which he had planted there for the ſubverſion of the neighbouring colonies, drove forth by one ſweeping law of unprecedented deſpotiſm, his armed multitudes on every ſide, to overwhelm the countries and ſtates, which had for centuries ſtood the firm barriers againſt the ambition of France; we drew back the arm of our military force, which had never been more than half raiſed to oppoſe him. From that time we have been combating only with the other arm of our naval power; the right arm of England I admit; but which ſtruck almoſt unreſiſted, with blows, that could never reach the heart of the hoſtile miſchief. From that time, without a ſingle effort to regain thoſe outworks, which ever till now we ſo ſtrenuouſly maintained, as the ſtrong frontier of our own dignity and ſafety, no leſs than the liberties of Europe; with but one feeble attempt to ſuccour thoſe brave, faithful, and numerous allies, whom for the firſt time ſince the days of our Edwards and Henrys, we now have in the boſom of France itſelf; we have been intrenching, and fortifying, and garriſoning ourſelves at home: we have been redoubling ſecurity on ſecurity, to protect ourſelves from invaſion, which has now firſt become

become to us a ſerious object of alarm and terrour. Alas! the few of us, who have protracted life in any meaſure near to the extreme limits of our ſhort period, have been condemned to ſee ſtrange things; new ſyſtems of policy, new principles, and not only new men, but what might appear a new ſpecies of men. I believe that any perſon who was of age to take a part in publick affairs forty years ago (if the intermediate ſpace of time were expunged from his memory) would hardly credit his ſenſes, when he ſhould hear from the higheſt authority, that an army of two hundred thouſand men was kept up in this iſland, and that in the neighbouring iſland there were at leaſt fourſcore thouſand more. But when he had recovered from his ſurpriſe on being told of this army, which has not its parallel, what muſt be his aſtoniſhment to be told again, that this mighty force was kept up for the mere purpoſe of an inert and paſſive defence, and that, in its far greater part, it was diſabled by its conſtitution and very eſſence, from defending us againſt an enemy by any one preventive ſtroke, or any one operation of active hoſtility? What muſt his reflections be, on learning further, that a fleet of five hundred men of war, the beſt appointed, and to the full as ably commanded as this country ever had upon the ſea, was for the greater part employed in carrying on the ſame ſyſtem of unenterpriſing defence? What muſt be the ſentiments and feelings

of one who remembers the former energy of England, when he is given to underſtand, that theſe two iſlands, with their extenſive, and every where vulnerable coaſt, ſhould be conſidered as a garriſoned ſea-town; what would ſuch a man, what would any man think, if the garriſon of ſo ſtrange a fortreſs ſhould be ſuch, and ſo feebly commanded, as never to make a ſally; and that, contrary to all which has hitherto been ſeen in war, an infinitely inferiour army, with the ſhattered relicks of an almoſt annihilated navy, ill found, and ill manned, may with ſafety beſiege this ſuperiour garriſon, and without hazarding the life of a man, ruin the place, merely by the menaces and falſe appearances of an attack? Indeed, indeed, my dear friend, I look upon this matter of our defenſive ſyſtem as much the moſt important of all conſiderations at this moment. It has oppreſſed me with many anxious thoughts, which, more than any bodily diſtemper, have ſunk me to the condition, in which you know that I am. Should it pleaſe Providence to reſtore to me, even the late weak remains of my ſtrength, I propoſe to make this matter the ſubject of a particular diſcuſſion. I only mean here to argue, that the mode of conducting the war on our part, be it good or bad, has prevented even the common havock of war in our population, and eſpecially among that claſs, whoſe duty and privilege of ſuperiority it is, to lead the way

way amidſt the perils and ſlaughter of the field of battle.

The other cauſes, which ſometimes affect the numbers of the lower claſſes, but which I have ſhewn not to have exiſted to any ſuch degree during this war;—penury, cold, hunger, nakedneſs,—do not eaſily reach the higher orders of ſociety. I do not dread for them the ſlighteſt taſte of theſe calamities from the diſtreſs and preſſure of the war. They have much more to dread in that way from the confiſcations, the rapines, the burnings, and the maſſacres that may follow in the train of a peace, which ſhall eſtabliſh the devaſtating and depopulating principles and example of the French regicides, in ſecurity, and triumph and dominion. In the ordinary courſe of human affairs any check to population among men in eaſe and opulence, is leſs to be apprehended from what they may ſuffer, than from what they enjoy. Peace is more likely to be injurious to them in that reſpect than war. The exceſſes of delicacy, repoſe, and ſatiety, are as unfavourable as the extremes of hardſhip, toil, and want, to the increaſe and multiplication of our kind. Indeed, the abuſe of the bounties of nature, much more ſurely than any partial privation of them, tends to intercept that precious boon of a ſecond and dearer life in our progeny, which was beſtowed in the firſt great command to man from the All-gracious Giver of all, whoſe name be bleſſed, whe-

ther he gives or takes away. His hand, in every page of his book, has written the leſſon of moderation. Our phyſical well-being, our moral worth, our ſocial happineſs, our political tranquillity, all depend on that controul of all our appetites and paſſions, which the ancients deſigned by the cardinal virtue of temperance.

The only real queſtion to our preſent purpoſe, with regard to the higher claſſes, is, how ſtands the account of their ſtock, as it conſiſts in wealth of every deſcription? Have the burthens of the war compelled them to curtail any part of their former expenditure; which I have before obſerved, affords the only ſtandard of eſtimating property as an object of taxation? Do they enjoy all the ſame conveniencies, the ſame comforts, the ſame elegancies, the luxuries, in the ſame, or in as many different modes as they did before the war?

In the laſt eleven years, there have been no leſs than three ſolemn inquiries into the finances of the kingdom, by three different committees of your houſe. The firſt was in the year 1786. On that occaſion, I remember, the report of the committee was examined, and ſifted and bolted to the bran, by a gentleman whoſe keen and powerful talents I have ever admired. He thought there was not ſufficient evidence to warrant the pleaſing repreſentation, which the committee had made, of our national proſperity. He did not believe that our

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publick revenue could continue to be ſo productive, as they had aſſumed. He even went the length of recording his own inferences of doubt, in a ſet of reſolutions, which now ſtand upon your journals. And perhaps the retroſpect, on which the report proceeded, did not go far enough back, to allow any ſure and ſatisfactory average for a ground of ſolid calculation. But what was the event? When the next committee ſate in 1791, they found, that, on an average of the laſt four years, their predeceſſors had fallen ſhort in their eſtimate of the permanent taxes, by more than three hundred and forty thouſand pounds a year. Surely then if I can ſhow, that in the produce of thoſe ſame taxes, and more particularly of ſuch as affect articles of luxurious uſe and conſumption, the four years of the war have equalled thoſe four years of peace, flouriſhing, as they were, beyond the moſt ſanguine ſpeculations, I may expect to hear no more of the diſtreſs occaſioned by the war.

The additional burdens which have been laid on ſome of thoſe ſame articles, might reaſonably claim ſome allowance to be made. Every new advance of the price to the conſumer, is a new incentive to him to retrench the quantity of his conſumption; and if, upon the whole, he pays the ſame, his property computed by the ſtandard of what he voluntarily pays, muſt remain the ſame. But I am willing

ling to forego that fair advantage in the inquiry. I am willing that the receipts of the permanent taxes which exiſted before January 1793, ſhould be compared during the war, and during the period of peace which I have mentioned. I will go further. Complete accounts of the year 1791 were ſeparately laid before your houſe. I am ready to ſtand by a compariſon of the produce of four years up to the beginning of the year 1792, with that of the war. Of the year immediately previous to hoſtilities, I have not been able to obtain any perfect documents; but I have ſeen enough to ſatisfy me, that although a compariſon, including that year, might be leſs favourable, yet it would not eſſentially injure my argument.

You will always bear in mind, my dear ſir, that I am not conſidering whether, if the common enemy of the quiet of Europe had not forced us to take up arms in our own defence, the ſpring-tide of our proſperity might not have flowed higher than the mark at which it now ſtands. That conſideration is connected with the queſtion of the juſtice and the neceſſity of the war. It is a queſtion which I have long ſince diſcuſſed. I am now endeavouring to aſcertain whether there exiſts, in fact, any ſuch neceſſity as we hear every day aſſerted, to furniſh a miſerable pretext for counſelling us to ſurrender, at diſcretion, our conqueſts, our honour

our

our dignity, our very independence, and, with it, all that is dear to man. It will be more than ſufficient for that purpoſe, if I can make it appear that we have been ſtationary during the war. What then will be ſaid, if, in reality, it ſhall be proved that there is every indication of increaſed and increaſing wealth, not only poured into the grand reſervoir of the national capital, but diffuſed through all the channels of all the higher claſſes, and giving life and activity, as it paſſes, to the agriculture, the manufactures, the commerce, and the navigation of the country?

The finance committee, which has been appointed in this ſeſſion, has already made two reports. Every concluſion that I had before drawn, as you know, from my own obſervation, I have the ſatisfaction of ſeeing there confirmed by that great publick authority. Large as was the ſum, by which the committee of 1791 found the eſtimate of 1786 to have been exceeded in the actual produce of four years of peace, their own eſtimate has been exceeded, during the war, by a ſum more than one-third larger. The ſame taxes have yielded more than half a million beyond their calculation. They yielded this, notwithſtanding the ſtoppage of the diſtilleries, againſt which, you may remember, I privately remonſtrated. With an allowance for that defalcation, they have yielded ſixty thouſand pounds annually above the actual average of the preceding

preceding four years of peace. I believe this to have been without parallel in all former wars. If regard be had to the great and unavoidable burthens of the preſent war, I am confident of the fact.

But let us deſcend to particulars. The taxes, which go by the general name of aſſeſſed taxes, comprehend the whole, or nearly the whole domeſtick eſtabliſhment of the rich. They include ſome things, which belong to the middling, and even to all, but the very loweſt, claſſes. They now conſiſt of the duties on houſes and windows, on male ſervants, horſes, and carriages. They did alſo extend to cottages, to female ſervants, waggons, and carts uſed in huſbandry, previous to the year 1792; when, with more enlightened policy, at the moment that the poſſibility of war could not be out of the contemplation of any ſtateſman, the wiſdom of parliament confined them to their preſent objects. I ſhall give the groſs aſſeſſment for five years, as I find it in the appendix to the ſecond report of your committee.

1791 ending 5th April	1792	£.	1,706,334
1792	1793		1,585,291
1793	1794		1,597,623
1794	1795		1,608,196
1795	1796		1,625,874

Here will be ſeen a gradual increaſe during the whole

whole progreſs of the war: and if I am correctly informed, the riſe in the laſt year, after every deduction that can be made, affords the moſt conſoling and encouraging proſpect. It is enormouſly out of all proportion.

There are ſome other taxes, which ſeem to have a reference to the ſame general head. The preſent miniſter, many years ago, ſubjected bricks and tiles to a duty under the exciſe. It is of little conſequence to our preſent conſideration, whether theſe materials have been employed in building more commodious, more elegant, and more magnificent habitations, or in enlarging, decorating, and remodelling thoſe, which ſufficed for our plainer anceſtors. During the firſt two years of the war, they paid ſo largely to the publick revenue, that in 1794 a new duty was laid upon them, which was equal to one half of the old, and which has produced upwards of 165,000*l.* in the laſt three years. Yet notwithſtanding the preſſure of this additional weight*, there has been an actual augmentation in

* This and the following tables on the ſame conſtruction are compiled from the reports of the finance committee in 1791 and 1797, with the addition of the ſeparate paper laid before the houſe of commons, and ordered to be printed on the 7th of February 1792.

BRICKS

in the conſumption. The only two other articles which come under this deſcription, are, the ſtamp-duty on gold and ſilver plate, and the cuſtoms on glaſs plates. This latter is now, I believe, the ſingle inſtance

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BRICKS AND TILES.

Yrs. of Peace.			Yrs. of War.			
	1787	£. 94,521		1793	£. 122,975	
	1788	96,278		1794	106,811	
	1789	91,773		1795	83,804	
	1790	104,409		1796	94,668	
		£. 386,981			£. 408,258	Increaſe to 1790 £. 31,277
	1791	- 115,382	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 407,842	Increaſe to 1791 £. 416

PLATE.

Yrs. of Peace.			Yrs. of War.			
	1787	£. 22,707		1793	£. 25,920	
	1788	23,295		1794	23,637	
	1789	22,453		1795	25,607	
	1790	18,483		1796	28,513	
		£. 86,888			£. 103,677	Increaſe to 1790 £. 16,789
	1791	- 31,523	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 95,754	Increaſe to 1791 £. 7,923

GLASS PLATES.

Yrs. of Peace.			Yrs. of War.			
	1787	£. —		1793	£. 5,655	
	1788	5,406		1794	5,456	
	1789	4,686		1795	5,839	
	1790	6,008		1796	8,871	
		£. 16,190			£. 25,821	
	1791	- 7,880	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 24,070	Increaſe to 1791 £. 1,721

inſtance of coſtly furniture to be found in the catalogue of our imports. If it where wholly to vaniſh, I ſhould not think we were ruined. Both the duties have riſen, during the war, very conſiderably in proportion to the total of their produce.

We have no tax among us on the moſt neceſſary articles of food. The receipts of our Cuſtom-houſe, under the heads of groceries, afford us, however, ſome means of calculating our luxuries of the table. The articles of tea, coffee, and cocoa-nuts, I would propoſe to omit, and to take them in ſtead from the exciſe, as beſt ſhewing what is conſumed at home. Upon this principle, adding them all together (with the exception of ſugar, for a reaſon which I ſhall afterwards mention) I find that they have produced, in one mode of compariſon, upwards of 272,000*l.*, and in the other mode, upwards of 165,000*l.* more during the war than in peace*. An additional duty was alſo laid

* GROCERIES.

Yrs. of Peace.			Yrs. of War.			
	1787	£. 167,389		1793	£. 124,635	
	1788	133,191		1794	195,840	
	1789	142,871		1795	208,242	
	1790	156,311		1796	159,826	
		£. 599,762			£. 688,563	Increaſe to 1796 £. 88,801
	1791	236,727	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 669,100	Increaſe to 1791 £. 19,463

TEA

laid in 1795, on tea, another on coffee, and a third on raiſins; an article, together with currants, of much more extenſive uſe, than would readily be imagined. The balance in favour of our argument would have been much enhanced, if our coffee and fruit ſhips from the Mediterranean had arrived, laſt year, at their uſual ſeaſon. They do not appear in theſe accounts. This was one conſequence ariſing

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TEA.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 424,144	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 477,644	
	1788	426,660		1794	467,132	
	1789	539,575		1795	507,518	
	1790	417,636		1796	526,307	
		£. 1,808,115			£. 1,978,601	Increaſe to 1796 £. 170,486
	1791	448,709	4 Yrs to 1791		£. 1,832,680	Increaſe to 1791 £. 145,921

The additional duty impoſed in 1795, produced in that year £.137,656, and in 1796 £. 200,107.

COFFEE AND COCOA NUTS.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 17,006	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 36,846	
	1788	30,217		1794	49,177	
	1789	34,784		1795	27,913	
	1790	38,647		1796	19,711	
		£. 120,654			£. 133,647	Increaſe to 1796 £. 12,993
	1791	41,194	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 144,842	Decreaſe to 1791 £. 11,195

The additional duty of 1795 in that year gave £. 16,775, and in 1796 £. 15,319.

ariſing (would to God, that none more afflicting to Italy, to Europe, and the whole civilized world had ariſen!) from our impolitick and precipitate deſertion of that important maritime ſtation. As to ſugar,* I have excluded it from the groceries, becauſe the account of the cuſtoms is not a perfect criterion of the conſumption, much having been re-exported to the north of Europe, which uſed to be ſupplied by France; and in the official papers which I have followed, there are no materials to furniſh grounds for computing this re-exportation. The increaſe on the face of our entries is immenſe during the four years of war, little ſhort of thirteen hundred thouſand pounds.

The increaſe of the duties on beer has been regularly progreſſive, or nearly ſo, to a very large

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* SUGAR.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 1,065,109	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 1,473,139	
	1788	1,184,458		1794	1,392,965	
	1789	1,095,106		1795	1,338,246	
	1790	1,069,108		1796	1,474,899	
		£. 4,413,781			£. 5,679,249	£. 1,265,468 Increaſe to 1790
	17	1,044,053	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 4,392,725	£. 1,286,524 Increaſe to 1791

There was a new duty on *Sugar* in 1791, which produced in 1794 £. 234,292, in 1795 £. 206,932. and in 1796 £. 245,024. It is not clear from the report of the Committee, whether the additional duty is included in the account given above.

amount.* It is a good deal above a million, and is more than equal to one-eighth of the whole produce. Under this general head, ſome other liquors are included,—cyder, perry, and mead, as well as vinegar, and verjuice; but theſe are of very trifling conſideration. The exciſe duties on wine, having ſunk a little during the two firſt years of the war, were

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* BEER, &c.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£.1,761,429	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 2,043,902	
	1788	1,705,199		1794	2,082,053	
	1789	1,742,514		1795	1,931,101	
	1790	1,858,043		1796	2,294,377	
		£.7,067,185			£. 8,351,433	Increaſe to 1790 £.284,248
	1791	1,880,478	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 7,186 234	Increaſe to 1791 £.1,165,199

WINE.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 219,934	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 222,887	
	1788	215,578		1794	283,644	
	1789	252,649		1795	317,072	
	1790	308,624		1796	187,818	
		£. 996,785.			£. 1,011,421	Increaſe to 1790 £. 14,638.
	1791	336,549	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 1,113,400	Decreaſe to 1791 £. 101,979.

QUANTITY IMPORTED.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	Tons 29,978	Yrs. of War.	1793	Tons 22,788	
	1788	25,442		1794	27,868	
	1789	27,414		1795	32,033	
	1790	29,182		1796	19,079	

The additional duty of 1795 produced that year £. 730,871,

and

were rapidly recovering their level again. In 1795, a heavy additional duty was impoſed upon them, and a ſecond in the following year; yet being compared with four years of peace to 1790, they actually exhibit a ſmall gain to the revenue. And low as the importation may ſeem in 1796, when contraſted with any year ſince the French treaty in 1787, it is ſtill more than 3000 tons above the average importation for three years previous to that period. I have added ſweets, from which our factitious wines are made; and I would have added ſpirits, but that the total alteration of the duties in 1789, and the recent interruption of our diſtilleries, rendered any compariſon impracticable.

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and in 1796 £.394,686. A ſecond additional duty which produced £.98,165 was laid in 1796.

SWEETS.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 11,167	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 11,016	
	1788	7,375		1794	10,612	
	1789	7,202		1795	13,321	
	1790	4,953		1796	15,050	
		£. 30,697			£. 49,990	Increaſe to 1790 £. 19,302.
	1791	13,282	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 32,812	Increaſe to 1791 £. 17,178.

In 1795 an additional duty was laid on this article, which produced that year £.5,679 and in 1796 £.9,443 and in 1796 a ſecond to commence on the 20th of June; its produce in that year was £. 2,325.

The ancient ſtaple of our iſland, in which we are clothed, is very imperfectly to be traced on the books of the cuſtom-houſe: but I know, that our woollen manufactures flouriſh. I recollect to have ſeen that fact very fully eſtabliſhed, laſt year, from the regiſters kept in the Weſt-Riding of Yorkſhire. This year, in the weſt of England, I received a ſimilar account, on the authority of a reſpectable clothier, in that quarter, whoſe teſtimony can leſs be queſtioned, becauſe, in his political opinions, he is adverſe, as I underſtand, to the continuance of the war. The principal articles of female dreſs, for ſome time paſt, have been muſlins and callicoes.* Theſe elegant fabricks of our own looms in the eaſt, which ſerve for the remittance of our own revenues, have lately been imitated at home, with improving ſucceſs, by the ingenious and enterpriſing manufacturers of Mancheſter, Paiſley, and Glaſgow. At the ſame time the importa-

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* MUSLINS AND CALLICOES.

Yrs. of Peace.	1788	£. 129,297	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 173,050	
	1789	138,600		1794	104,902	
	1790	126,267		1795	103,856	
	1791	128,364		1796	272,544	
		£. 522,588			£. 654,353	Increaſe to 1791 £. 131,764.

This table begins with 1788. The net produce of the preceding year is not in the report whence the table is taken.

tion

tion from Bengal has kept pace with the extenſion of our own dexterity and induſtry; while the ſale of our * printed goods, of both kinds, has been with equal ſteadineſs advanced, by the taſte and execution of our deſigners and artiſts. Our woollens and cottons, it is true, are not all for the home market. They do not diſtinctly prove what is my preſent point; our own wealth by our own expence. I admit it: we export them in great and growing quantities: and they, who croak themſelves hoarſe about the decay of our trade, may put as much of this account, as they chuſe, to the creditor ſide of money received from other countries in payment for Britiſh ſkill and labour. They may ſettle the items to their own liking, where all goes to demonſtrate our riches. I ſhall be contented here, with whatever they will have the goodneſs to leave me,

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* PRINTED GOODS.

Yrs. of Peace.			Yrs. of War.			
	1787	£. 142,000		1793	£. 191,566	
	1788	154,486		1794	190,554	
	1789	153,202		1795	197,416	
	1790	167,156		1796	230,530	
		£. 616,844			£. 810,066	Increaſe to 1790 £. 193,222.
	1791	£. 191,489	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 666,333	Increaſe to 1791 £. 143,733.

Theſe duties for 1787, are blended with ſeveral others. The proportion of printed goods to other articles for four years was found to be one-fourth. The proportion is here taken.

and paſs to another entry, which is leſs ambiguous; I mean that of ſilk.* The manufactory itſelf is a forced plant. We have been obliged to guard it from foreign competition by very ſtrict prohibitory laws. What we import, is the raw and prepared material, which is worked up in various ways, and worn in various ſhapes by both ſexes. After what we have juſt ſeen, you will probably be ſurpriſed to learn, that the quantity of ſilk, imported during the war, has been much greater, than it was previouſly in peace; and yet we muſt all remember to our mortification, that ſeveral of our ſilk ſhips fell a prey to citizen admiral Richery. You will hardly expect me to go through the tape and thread, and all the other ſmall wares of haberdaſhery and millinery to be gleaned up among our imports. But I ſhall make one obſervation, and with great ſatisfaction, reſpecting them. They gradually diminiſh, as our manufactures of the ſame deſcription ſpread into their places; while the account of orna-

* SILK.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 159,912	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 209,915	
	1788	123,998		1794	221,306	
	1789	157,730		1795	210,725	
	1790	212,522		1796	221,007	
		£. 654,162			£. 862,955	Increaſe to 1790 £. 208,793.
	1791	£. 379,128	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 773,378	Increaſe to 1791 £. 89,577.

mental

mental articles which our country does not produce, and we cannot wiſh it to produce, continues, upon the whole, to riſe, in ſpite of all the caprices of fancy and faſhion. Of this kind are the different furs* uſed for muffs, trimmings and linings, which, as the chief of the kind, I ſhall particularize. You will find them below.

The diverſions of the higher claſſes form another, and the only remaining head of inquiry into their expences. I mean thoſe diverſions which diſtinguiſh the country and the town life? which are viſible and tangible to the ſtateſman; which have ſome publick meaſure and ſtandard. And here when I look to the report of your committee, I for the firſt time, perceive a failure. It is clearly ſo. Whichever way I reckon the four years of peace, the old tax on the ſports of the field has

* FURS.

Yrs. of Peace.			Yrs. of War.			
	1787	£. 3,463		1793	£. 2,829	
	1788	2,957		1794	3,353	
	1789	1,151		1795	3,266	
	1790	3,328		1796	6,138	
		£. 10,899			£. 15,586	Increaſe to 1790 £. 4,687.
	1791	£. 5,731	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 13,167	Increaſe to 1791 £. 2,419.

The ſkins here ſelected from the cuſtom-houſe accounts are, *Black Bear, Ordinary Fox, Marten, Mink, Muſquaſh, Otter, Racoon,* and *Wolf.*

certainly proved deficient ſince the war. The ſame money, however, or nearly the ſame, has been paid to government; though the ſame number of individuals have not contributed to the payment. An additional tax was laid in 1791, and, during the war, has produced upwards of 61,000*l.*; which is about 4,000 *l.* more than the decreaſe of the old tax, in one ſcheme of compariſon; and about 4,000*l.* leſs, in the other ſcheme. I might remark that the amount of the new tax, in the ſeveral years of the war, by no means bears the proportion, which it ought, to the old. There ſeems to be ſome great irregularity, or other, in the receipt; but I do not think it worth while to examine into the argument. I am willing to ſuppoſe, that many, who, in the idleneſs of peace, made war upon partridges, hares, and pheaſants, may now carry more noble arms againſt the enemies of their country. Our political adverſaries may do, what they pleaſe, with that conceſſion. They are welcome to make the moſt of it. I am ſure of a very handſome ſet-off in the other branch of expence; the amuſements of a town-life.

There is much gaiety, and diſſipation, and profuſion, which muſt eſcape and diſappoint, all the arithmetick of political œconomy. But the theatres are a prominent feature. They are eſtabliſhed through every part of the kingdom, at a coſt unknown till our days. There is hardly a provincial

capital, which does not poſſeſs, or which does not aſpire to poſſeſs, a theatre-royal. Moſt of them engage, for a ſhort time at a vaſt price, every actor or actreſs of name in the metropolis; a diſtinction, which, in the reign of my old friend Garrick, was confined to very few. The dreſſes, the ſcenes, the decorations of every kind, I am told, are in a new ſtyle of ſplendour, and magnificence; whether to the advantage of our dramatick taſte, upon the whole, I very much doubt. It is a ſhow and a ſpectacle, not a play, that is exhibited. This is undoubtedly in the genuine manner of the Auguſtan age, but in a manner, which was cenſured by one of the beſt poets and criticks of that or any age:

——migravit ab aure voluptas
Omnis ad incertos oculos, & guadia vana:
Quatuor aut plùris aulæa premuntur in horas,
Dum fugiunt equitum turmæ, peditumque catervæ——

I muſt interrupt the paſſage, moſt fervently to deprecate and abominate the ſequel,

Mox trahitur manibus regum fortuna retortis.

I hope, that no French fraternization, which the relations of peace and amity with ſyſtematiſed regicide, would aſſuredly, ſooner or later, draw after them, even if it ſhould overturn our happy conſti-

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tution itſelf, could ſo change the hearts of Engliſhmen, as to make them delight in repreſentations and proceſſions, which have no other merit than that of degrading and inſulting the name of royalty. But good taſte, manners, morals, religion, all fly, wherever the principles of jacobiniſm enter: and we have no ſafety againſt them but in arms.

The proprietors, whether in this they follow or lead what is called the town, to furniſh out theſe gaudy and pompous entertainments, muſt collect ſo much more from the publick. It was but juſt before the breaking out of hoſtilities, that they levied for themſelves the very tax, which, at the cloſe of the American war, they repreſented to lord North, as certain ruin to their affairs to demand for the ſtate. The example has ſince been imitated by the managers of our Italian opera. Once during the war, if not twice (I would not willingly miſtate any thing, but I am not very accurate, on theſe ſubjects) they have raiſed the price of their ſubſcription. Yet I have never heard, that any laſting diſſatisfaction has been manifeſted, or that their houſes have been unuſually and conſtantly thin. On the contrary, all the three theatres have been repeatedly altered, and refitted, and enlarged, to make them capacious of the crowds, that nightly flock to them; and one of thoſe huge and lofty piles, which lifts its broad ſhoulders in gigantick pride, almoſt emulous of the temples of God, has been

been reared from the foundation at a charge of more than fourſcore thouſand pounds, and yet remains a naked, rough, unſightly heap.

I am afraid, my dear ſir, that I have tired you with theſe dull though important details. But we are upon a ſubject, which, like ſome of a higher nature, refuſes ornament, and is contented with conveying inſtruction. I know, too, the obſtinacy of unbelief, in thoſe perverted minds, which have no delight, but in contemplating the ſuppoſed diſtreſs, and predicting the immediate ruin, of their country. Theſe birds of evil preſage, at all times, have grated our ears with their melancholy ſong; and by ſome ſtrange fatality or other, it has generally happened, that they have poured forth their loudeſt and deepeſt lamentations, at the periods of our moſt abundant proſperity. Very early in my publick life, I had occaſion to make myſelf a little acquainted with their natural hiſtory. My firſt political tract in the collection, which a friend has made of my publications, is an anſwer to a very gloomy picture of the ſtate of the nation, which was thought to have been drawn by a ſtateſman of ſome eminence in his time. That was no more than the common ſpleen of diſappointed ambition: in the preſent day, I fear, that too many are actuated by a more malignant and dangerous ſpirit. They hope, by depreſſing our minds with a deſpair of our means and reſources, to drive us, trembling and unreſiſting, into the toils of our enemies, with

whom

whom, from the beginning of the revolution in France, they have ever moved in ſtrict concert and co-operation. If with the report of your finance committee in their hands, they can ſtill affect to deſpond, and can ſtill ſucceed, as they do, in ſpreading the contagion of their pretended fears, among well-diſpoſed, though weak men; there is no way of counteracting them, but by fixing them down to particulars. Nor muſt we forget, that they are unwearied agitators, bold aſſertors, dexterous ſophiſters. Proof muſt be accumulated upon proof, to ſilence them. With this view I ſhall now direct our attention to ſome other ſtriking and unerring indications of our flouriſhing condition; and they will, in general, be derived from other ſources, but equally authentick; from other reports and proceedings of both houſes of parliament, all which unite with wonderful force of conſent in the ſame general reſult. Hitherto we have ſeen the ſuperfluity of our capital diſcovering itſelf only in procuring ſuperfluous accommodation and enjoyment, in our houſes, in our furniture, in our eſtabliſhments, in our eating and drinking, our clothing, and our publick diverſions: we ſhall now ſee it more beneficially employed in improving our territory itſelf: we ſhall ſee part of our preſent opulence, with provident care, put out to uſury for poſterity.

To what ultimate extent, it may be wiſe or practicable, to puſh incloſures of common and waſte

waſte lands, may be a queſtion of doubt, in ſome points of view: but no perſon thinks them already carried to exceſs; and the relative magnitude of the ſums, laid out upon them, gives us a ſtandard of eſtimating the comparative ſituation of the landed intereſt. Your houſe, this ſeſſion, appointed a committee on waſte lands, and they have made a report by their chairman, an honourable baronet, for whom the miniſter the other day, (with very good intentions, I believe, but with little real profit to the publick) thought fit to erect a board of agriculture. The account, as it ſtands there, appears ſufficiently favourable. The greateſt number of incloſing bills, paſſed in any one year of the laſt peace, does not equal the ſmalleſt annual number in the war; and thoſe of the laſt year exceed, by more than one half, the higheſt year of peace. But what was my ſurpriſe, on looking into the late report of the ſecret committee of the lords, to find a liſt of theſe bills during the war, differing in every year, and * larger on the whole, by nearly

* Report of the Lords' Committee of Secrecy, ordered to be printed, 28th April 1797, Appendix 44.

INCLOSURE BILLS.

Yrs. of Peace.			Yrs. of War.		
1789	-	33	1793	-	60
1790	-	25	1794	-	73
1791	-	40	1795	-	77
1792	-	40	1796	-	72
		138			283

one

one third! I have checked this account by the ſtatute-book, and find it to be correct. What new brilliancy then does it throw over the proſpect, bright as it was before! The number during the laſt four years, has more than doubled that of the four years immediately preceding; it has ſurpaſſed the five years of peace, beyond which the lords committees have not gone; it has even ſurpaſſed (I have verified the fact) the whole ten years of peace. I cannot ſtop here. I cannot advance a ſingle ſtep in this inquiry, without being obliged to caſt my eyes back to the period when I firſt knew the country. Theſe bills, which had begun in the reign of queen Anne, had paſſed every year in greater or leſs numbers from the year 1723; yet in all that ſpace of time, they had not reached the amount of any two years during the preſent war; and though ſoon after that time they rapidly increaſed, ſtill at the acceſſion of his preſent majeſty, they were far ſhort of the number paſſed in the four years of hoſtilities.

In my firſt letter I mentioned the ſtate of our inland navigation, neglected as it had been from the reign of king William to the time of my obſervation. It was not till the preſent reign, that the duke of Bridgewater's canal firſt excited a ſpirit of ſpeculation and adventure in this way. This ſpirit ſhewed itſelf, but neceſſarily made no great progreſs, in the American war. When peace was reſtored,

ſtored, it began of courſe to work with more ſenſible effect; yet in ten years from that event, the bills paſſed on that ſubject were not ſo many as from the year 1793 to the preſent ſeſſion of parliament. From what I can trace on the ſtatute-book, I am confident that all the capital expended in theſe projects during the peace, bore no degree of proportion, (I doubt on very grave conſideration whether all that was ever ſo expended was equal) to the money which has been raiſed for the ſame purpoſes, ſince the war.* I know, that in the laſt four years of peace, when they roſe regularly, and rapidly, the ſums ſpecified in the acts were not near one-third of the ſubſequent amount. In the laſt ſeſſion of parliament, the grand junction company as it is called, having ſunk half a million, (of which I feel the good effects at my own door) applied to your houſe, for permiſſion to ſubſcribe half as much more among themſelves. This grand junction is an inoſculation of the grand trunk: and in the

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*NAVIGATION AND CANAL BILLS.

Yrs. of Peace.	1789	3	Yrs. of War.	1793	28
	1790	8		1794	18
	1791	10		1795	11
	1792	9		1796	12
		30			69
Money raiſed		£. 2,377,200			£. 7,415,100

preſent

preſent ſeſſion, the latter company has obtained the authority of parliament, to float two hundred acres of land, for the purpoſe of forming a reſervoir, thirty feet deep, two hundred yards wide at the head, and two miles in length; a lake which may almoſt vie with that which once fed the now obliterated canal of Languedock.

The preſent war is, above all others, (of which we have heard or read) a war againſt landed property. That deſcription of property is in its nature the firm baſe of every ſtable government; and has been ſo conſidered, by all the wiſeſt writers of the old philoſophy, from the time of the Stagyrite, who obſerves that the agricultural claſs of all others is the leaſt inclined to ſedition. We find it to have been ſo regarded, in the practical politicks of antiquity, where they are brought more directly home to our underſtandings and boſoms in the hiſtory of Rome, and above all, in the writings of Cicero. The country tribes were always thought more reſpectable, than thoſe of the city. And if in our own hiſtory, there is any one circumſtance to which, under God, are to be attributed the ſteady reſiſtance, the fortunate iſſue, and ſober ſettlement, of all our ſtruggles for liberty, it is, that while the landed intereſt, inſtead of forming a ſeparate body, as in other countries, has, at all times, been in cloſe connection and union with the other great intereſts of the country, it has been ſpontaneouſly allowed

to

to lead and direct, and moderate all the reſt. I cannot, therefore, but ſee with ſingular gratification, that during a war which has been eminently made for the deſtruction of the landed proprietors, as well as of prieſts and kings, as much has been done, by publick works, for the permanent benefit of their ſtake in this country, as in all the reſt of the current century, which now touches to its cloſe. Perhaps, after this, it may not be neceſſary to refer to private obſervation; but I am ſatisfied, that in general, the rents of lands have been conſiderably increaſed: they are increaſed very conſiderably indeed, if I may draw any concluſion from my own little property of that kind. I am not ignorant, however, where our publick burdens are moſt galling. But all of this claſs will conſider, who they are that are principally menaced; how little the men of their deſcription in other countries, where this revolutionary fury has but touched, have been found equal to their own protection; how tardy, and unprovided, and full of anguiſh is their flight, chained down as they are by every tie to the ſoil; how helpleſs they are, above all other men, in exile, in poverty, in need, in all the varieties of wretchedneſs; and then let them well weigh, what are the burdens, to which they ought not to ſubmit for their own ſalvation.

Many of the authorities, which I have already adduced, or to which I have referred, may convey

a competent notion of ſome of our principal manufactures. Their general ſtate will be clear from that of our external and internal commerce, through which they circulate, and of which they are at once, the cauſe and effect. But the communication of the ſeveral parts of the kingdom with each other, and with foreign countries, has always been regarded as one of the moſt certain teſts to evince the proſperous or adverſe ſtate of our trade in all its branches. Recourſe has uſually been had to the revenue of the poſt-office with this view. I ſhall include the product of the tax which was laid in the laſt war, and which will make the evidence more concluſive, if it ſhall afford the ſame inference:—I allude to the poſt-horſe duty, which ſhews the perſonal intercourſe within the kingdom, as the poſt-office ſhews the intercourſe by letters, both within and without. The firſt of theſe ſtandards, then, exhibits an increaſe, according to my former ſchemes of compariſon, from an eleventh to a twentieth part of the * whole duty. The poſt-

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*POST HORSE DUTY.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 169,410	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 191,488	
	1788	204,659		1794	202,884	
	1789	170,554		1795	196,691	
	1790	181,155		1796	204,061	
		£. 725,778			£. 795,124	Increaſe to 1790 £. 69,346.
	1791	198,634	4 Yrs to 1791		£. 755,002	Increaſe to 1791 £. 40,122.

office,

office, gives ſtill leſs conſolation to thoſe who are miſerable, in proportion as the country feels no miſery. From the commencement of the war, to the month of April, 1796, the groſs produce had increaſed by nearly one ſixth of the whole ſum, which the ſtate now derives from that fund. I find that the year ending 5th of April, 1793, gave £.627,592, and the year ending at the ſame quarter, 1796, £.750,637, after a fair deduction having been made for the alteration (which, you know, on grounds of policy I never approved) in your privilege of franking. I have ſeen no formal document ſubſequent to that period, but I have been credibly informed, there is very good ground to believe, that the revenue of the * poſt-office ſtill continues

* The above account is taken from a paper which was ordered by the Houſe of Commons to be printed, 8th December, 1796. From the groſs produce of the year ending 5th April, 1796, there has been deducted in that ſtatement the ſum of £. 30,666, in conſequence of the regulation on franking, which took place on the 5th May, 1795, and was computed at £.40,000 per ann. To ſhew an equal number of years, both of peace and war, the accounts of two preceding years are given in the following table, from a Report made ſince Mr. Burke's death by a committee of the Houſe of Commons appointed to conſider the claims of Mr. Palmer, the late Comptroller General; and for ſtill greater ſatisfaction, the number of letters, inwards and outwards, have been added, except for the year 1790-1791. The letter-book for that year is not to be found.

continues to be regularly and largely upon the riſe.

What is the true inference to be drawn from the annual number of bankruptcies, has been the occaſion of much diſpute. On one ſide, it has been confidently urged as a ſure ſymptom of a decaying trade: on the other ſide, it has been inſiſted, that it is a circumſtance attendant upon a thriving trade; for that the greater is the whole quantity of trade, the greater of courſe muſt be the poſitive number of failures, while the aggregate ſucceſs is ſtill in the ſame proportion. In truth, the increaſe of the number may ariſe from either of thoſe cauſes. But all muſt agree in one conclusion, that, if the number diminiſhes, and at the ſame time, every other ſort of evidence tends to ſhew an augmentation of trade, there can be no better in-

POST OFFICE. Groſs Revenue.		Number of Letters. Inwards.	Outwards.
Apr. 1790 - 1791 - -	575,079 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
1791 - 1792 - -	585,432 - -	6,391,149	5,081,344
1792 - 1793 - -	627,592 - -	6,584,867	5,041,137
1793 - 1794 - -	691,268 - -	7,094,777	6,537,234
1794 - 1795 - -	705,319 - -	7, 71,029	7,473,626
1795 - 1796 - -	750,637 - -	7,641,077	8,597,167

From the laſt mentioned Report it appears that the accounts have not been completely and authentically made up, for the years ending 5th April, 1796 and 1797, but on the Receiver-General's book there is an increaſe of the latter year over the former, equal to ſomething more than 5 per cent.

dication.

dication. We have already had very ample means of gathering, that the year 1796 was a very favourable year of trade, and in that year the number of bankruptcies was at leaſt one fifth below the uſual average. I take this from * the declaration of the lord chancellor in the houſe of lords. He profeſſed to ſpeak from the records of chancery; and he added another very ſtriking fact, that on the property actually paid into his court (a very ſmall part, indeed, of the whole property of the kingdom) there had accrued in that year a net ſurplus of eight hundred thouſand pounds, which was ſo much new capital.

But the real ſituation of our trade, during the whole of this war, deſerves more minute inveſtigation. I ſhall begin with that, which, though the leaſt in conſequence, makes perhaps the moſt impreſſion on our ſenſes, becauſe it meets our eyes in our daily walks;—I mean our retail trade. The exuberant diſplay of wealth in our ſhops was the ſight, which moſt amazed a learned foreigner of diſtinction, who lately reſided among us: his expreſſion, I remember, was, that "*they ſeemed to be* "*burſting with opulence into the ſtreets.*" The documents, which throw light on this ſubject, are not

* In a debate, 30th December, 1796, on the return of Lord Malmeſbury—See Woodfall's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xiii. page 591.

many; but they all meet in the ſame point: all concur in exhibiting an increaſe. The moſt material are the general licences * which the law requires to be taken out by all dealers in exciſeable commodities. Theſe ſeem to be ſubject to conſiderable fluctuations. They have not been ſo low in any year of the war, as in the years 1788 and 1789, nor ever ſo high in peace, as in the firſt year of the war. I ſhould next ſtate the licences to dealers in ſpirits and wine, but the change in them which took place in 1789 would give an unfair advantage to my argument. I ſhall therefore content myſelf with remarking, that from the date of that change the ſpirit licences kept nearly the ſame level till the ſtoppage of the diſtilleries in 1795. If they dropped a little, and it was but little, the wine licences during the ſame time, more than countervailed that loſs to the revenue; and it is remarkable with regard to the latter, that in the year 1796, which was the loweſt in the exciſe duties on

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* GENERAL LICENCES.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 44,030	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 45,568	
	1788	40,882		1794	42,129	
	1789	39,917		1795	43,350	
	1792	41,970		1796	41,190	
		£. 166,799			£. 170,237	Increaſe to 1790 £. 3,438.
	1791	44,240	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 167,009	Increaſe to 1791 £. 3,228.

wine

wine itſelf, as well as in the quantity imported, more dealers in wine appear to have been licenſed, than in any former year, excepting the firſt year of the war. This fact may raiſe ſome doubt, whether the conſumption has been leſſened ſo much as, I believe, is commonly imagined. The only other retail-traders, whom I found ſo entered as to admit of being ſelected, are tea-dealers, and ſellers of gold and ſilver plate; both of whom ſeem to have multiplied very much in proportion to their aggregate number.* I have kept apart one ſet of licenſed ſellers, becauſe I am aware, that our antagoniſts

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* DEALERS IN TEA.

Yrs. of Peace.			Yrs. of War.			
	1787	£. 10,934		1793	£. 13,939	
	1788	11,949		1794	14,315	
	1789	12,501		1795	13,956	
	1790	13,126		1796	14,830	
		£. 48,510			£. 57,040	Increaſe to 1796 £. 8,530.
	1791	13,921	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 51,497	Increaſe to 1791 £. 5,548.

SELLERS OF PLATE.

Yrs. of Peace			Yrs. of War.			
	1787	£. 6,593		1793	£. 8,178	
	1788	7,953		1794	8,296	
	1789	7,348		1795	8 128	
	1790	7,988		1796	8 835	
		£. 29,882			£. 33,437	Increaſe to 1790 £. 3,555.
	1791	8,327	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 31,616	Increaſe to 1791 £. 1,821.

may be inclined to triumph a little, when I name auctioneers and auctions. They may be diſpoſed to conſider it as a ſort of trade, which thrives by the diſtreſs of others. But if they will look at it a little more attentively, they will find their gloomy comfort vaniſh. The publick income from theſe licences, has riſen with very great regularity, through a ſeries of years, which all muſt admit to have been years of proſperity. It is remarkable too, that in the year 1793, which was the great year of bankruptcies, theſe * duties on auctioneers and auctions, fell below the mark of 1791; and in 1796, which year had one fifth leſs than the accuſtomed average of bankruptcies, they mounted at once beyond all former examples. In concluding this general head, will you permit me, my dear Sir, to bring to your notice an humble, but induſtrious and laborious ſet of chapmen, againſt whom the vengeance of your houſe has ſometimes been

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*AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERS.

Yrs. of Peace.	1787	£. 48,964	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 70,004	
	1788	53,993		1794	82,659	
	1789	52,024		1795	86,890	
	1790	53,156		1796	109,594	
		£. 208,137			£. 349,147	Increaſe to 1790 £. 141,010.
	1791	- 70,973	4 Yrs. to 1791		£. 230,146	Increaſe to 1791 £. 119,001.

levelled,

levelled, with what policy I need not ſtay to inquire, as they have eſcaped without much injury. * The hawkers and pedlers, I am aſſured, are ſtill doing well, though from ſome new arrangements reſpecting them made in 1789, it would be difficult to trace their proceedings in any ſatisfactory manner.

When ſuch is the vigour of our traffick in its minuteſt ramifications, we may be perſuaded that the root and the trunk are ſound When we ſee the life-blood of the ſtate circulate ſo freely through the capillary veſſels of the ſyſtem, we ſcarcely need inquire, if the heart performs its functions aright. But let us approach it; let us lay it bare, and watch the ſyſtole and diaſtole, as it now receives, and now pours forth the vital ſtream

* Since Mr. Burke's death, a fourth Report of the Committee of Finance has made its appearance. An account is there given from the Stamp-office of the groſs produce of duties on Hawkers and Pedlers for four years of peace and four of war. It is therefore added in the manner of the other tables.

HAWKERS AND PEDLERS.

Yrs. of Peace.	1789	£. 6,132	Yrs. of War.	1793	£. 6042
	1790	6,708		1794	6,104
	1791	6,482		1795	6,795
	1792	6,008		1796	7,882
		£. 25,330			£. 26,823
Increaſe in 4 Years of War - -					£. 1,493.

through

through all the members. The port of London has always ſupplied the main evidence of the ſtate of our commerce. I know, that amidſt all the difficulties and embaraſſments of the year 1793, from cauſes unconnected with, and prior to the war, the tonnage of ſhips in the Thames actually roſe. But I ſhall not go through a detail of official papers on this point. There is evidence which has appeared this very ſeſſion before your houſe, infinitely more forcible and impreſſive to my apprehenſion, than all the journals and ledgers of all the inſpectors general from the days of Davenant. It is ſuch as cannot carry with it any ſort of fallacy. It comes, not from one ſet, but from many oppoſite ſets of witneſſes, who all agree in nothing elſe; witneſſes of the graveſt and moſt unexceptionable character, and who confirm what they ſay, in the ſureſt manner, by their conduct. Two different bills have been brought in for improving the port of London. I have it from very good intelligence, that when the project was firſt ſuggeſted from neceſſity, there were no leſs than eight different plans, ſupported by eight different bodies of ſubſcribers. The coſt of the leaſt was eſtimated at two hundred thouſand pounds, and of the moſt extenſive, at twelve hundred thouſand. The two, between which the conteſt now lies, ſubſtantially agree (as all the others muſt have done) in the motives and reaſons of the preamble: but I ſhall

confine

confine myself to that bill which is propoſed on the part of the mayor, aldermen, and common council, becauſe I regard them as the beſt authority, and their language in itſelf is fuller and more preciſe. I certainly ſee them complain of the "great delays, "accidents, damages, loſſes, and extraordinary ex- "pences, which are almoſt continually ſuſtained, "to the hindrance and diſcouragement of com- "merce, and the great injury of the publick reve- "nue." But what are the cauſes to which they attribute their complaints? The firſt is, "THAT FROM "THE VERY GREAT AND PROGRESSIVE IN- "CREASE OF THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF "SHIPS AND OTHER VESSELS TRADING TO THE "PORT OF LONDON; the river Thames is, in ge- "neral, ſo much crowded, that the navigation of a "conſiderable part of the river is rendered tedious "and dangerous; and there is much want of room "for the ſafe and convenient mooring of veſſels, "and conſtant acceſs to them." The ſecond is of the ſame nature. It is the want of regulations and arrangements, never before found neceſſary, for expedition and facility. The third is of another kind, but to the ſame effect; "that the legal quays are too "confined, and there is not ſufficient accomoda- "tion for the landing and ſhipping of cargoes." And the fourth and laſt is ſtill different; they deſcribe "the avenues to the legal quays," (which little more than a century ſince, the great fire of London

London opened and dilated beyond the meaſure of our then circumſtances) to be now " much too " narrow and incommodious, for the great con- " courſe of carts and other carriages uſually paſſing " and repaſſing there." Thus, our trade has grown too big for the ancient limits of art and nature. Our ſtreets, our lanes, our ſhores, the river itſelf, which has ſo long been our pride, are impeded, and obſtructed, and choaked up by our riches. They are like our ſhops, " burſting with opulence." To theſe misfortunes, to theſe diſtreſſes and grievances alone, we are told it is to be imputed that ſtill more of our capital has not been puſhed into the channel of our commerce, to roll back in its reflux ſtill more abundant capital, and fructify the national treaſury in its courſe. Indeed, my dear ſir, when I have before my eyes this conſentient teſtimony of the corporation of the city of London, the Weſt India merchants, and all the other merchants who promoted the other plans, ſtruggling and contending which of them ſhall be permitted to lay out their money in conſonance with their teſtimony; I cannot turn aſide to examine what one or two violent petitions, tumultuouſly voted by real or pretended liverymen of London, may have ſaid of the utter deſtruction and annihilation of trade.

This opens a ſubject, on which every true lover of his country, and at this criſis, every friend to the liberties of Europe, and of ſocial order in every country,

country, muſt dwell and expatiate with delight. I mean to wind up all my proofs of our aſtoniſhing and almoſt incredible proſperity, with the valuable information given to the ſecret committee of the Lords by the inſpector-general. And here I am happy that I can adminiſter an antidote to all deſpondence, from the ſame diſpenſary from which the firſt doſe of poiſon was ſuppoſed to have come. The report of that committee is generally believed to have derived much benefit from the labours of the ſame noble Lord, who was ſaid, as the author of the pamphlet in 1795, to have led the way in teaching us to place all our hope on that very experiment, which he afterwards declared in his place to have been from the beginning utterly without hope. We have now his authority to ſay, that as far as our reſources were concerned, the experiment was equally without neceſſity.

"It appears," as the committee has very juſtly and ſatisfactorily obſerved, "by the accounts of "the value of the imports and exports for the laſt "twenty years, produced by Mr. Irving, that the de- "mand for caſh to be ſent abroad" (which by the way, including the loan to the emperor, was nearly one third leſs ſent to the continent of Europe than in the ſeven years war) "was greatly compenſated "by a very large balance of commerce in favour of "this kingdom; greater than was ever known in "any preceding period. The value of the exports

"of

"of the last year amounted, according to the va-
"luation on which the accounts of the inſpector
"general are founded, to 30,424,184 *l.*; which is
"more than double what it was in any year of the
"American war, and one third more than it was
"on an average during the laſt peace, previous to
"the year 1792; and though the value of the im-
"ports to this country has, during the ſame peace,
"greatly increaſed, the exceſs of the value of the
"exports above that of the imports, which conſti-
"tutes the balance of trade, has augmented even
"in a greater proportion." Theſe obſervations might perhaps be branched out into other points of view, but I ſhall leave them to your own active and ingenious mind. There is another and ſtill more important light in which the inſpector general's information may be ſeen; and that is, as affording a compariſon of ſome circumſtances in this war, with the commercial hiſtory of all our other wars in the preſent century.

In all former hoſtilities, our exports gradually declined in value, and then (with one ſingle exception) aſcended again, till they reached and paſſed the level of the preceding peace. But this was a work of time, ſometimes more, ſometimss leſs ſlow. In queen Anne's war, which began in 1702, it was an interval of ten years, before this was effected. Nine years only were neceſſary in the war of 1739, for the ſame operation. The ſeven years

war

war ſaw the period much ſhortened: hoſtilities began in 1755; and in 1758, the fourth year of the war, the exports mounted above the peace-mark. There was, however, a diſtinguiſhing feature of that war, that our tonnage, to the very laſt moment, was in a ſtate of great depreſſion, while our commerce was chiefly carried on by foreign veſſels. The American war was darkened with ſingular and peculiar adverſity. Our exports never came near to their peaceful elevation, and our tonnage continued with very little fluctuation, to ſubſide lower and lower.* On the other hand, the preſent war, with regard to our commerce, has the white mark of as ſingular felicity. If from internal cauſes, as well as the conſequence of hoſtilities, the tide ebbed in 1793, it ruſhed back again with a bore in the following year; and from that time has continued to ſwell, and run, every ſucceſſive year, higher and higher into all our ports. The value of our exports laſt year above the year 1792 (the mere increaſe of our commerce during the war) is equal to the average value of all the exports during the wars of William and Anne.

It has been already pointed out that our imports have not kept pace with our exports; of courſe,

* This account is extracted from different parts of Mr. Chalmers' eſtimate. It is but juſt to mention, that in Mr. Chalmers' eſtimate, the ſums are uniformly lower than thoſe of the ſame year in Mr. Irving's account.

on

on the face of the account, the balance of trade, both positively and comparatively considered, must have been much more than ever in our favour. In that early little tract of mine, to which I have already more than once referred, I made many observations on the usual method of computing that balance, as well as the usual objection to it, that the entries at the custom-house were not always true. As you probably remember them I shall not repeat them here. On the one hand, I am not surprised that the same trite objection is perpetually renewed by the detractors of our national affluence; and on the other hand I am gratified in perceiving that the balance of trade seems to be now computed in a manner much clearer, than it used to be, from those errours which I formerly noticed. The inspector-general appears to have made his estimate with every possible guard and caution. His opinion is entitled to the greatest respect. It was in substance, (I shall again use the words of the Report, as much better than my own) "That the "true balance of our trade, amounted, on a me- "dium of the four years preceding January 1796, "to upwards of 6,500,000*l.* per annum, exclusive "of the profits arising from our East and West "India trade, which he estimates at upwards of "4,000,000*l.* per annum; exclusive of the profits "derived from our fisheries." So that including the fisheries, and making a moderate allowance for the

the exceedings, which Mr. Irving himſelf ſuppoſes, beyond his calculation, without reckoning, what the publick creditors themſelves pay to themſelves and without taking one ſhilling from the ſtock of the landed intereſt; our colonies, our oriental poſſeſſions, our ſkill and induſtry, our commerce, and navigation, at the commencement of this year, were pouring a new annual capital into the kingdom; hardly half a million ſhort of the whole intereſt of that tremendous debt, from which we are taught to ſhrink in diſmay, as from an overwhelming and intolerable oppreſſion.

If then the real ſtate of this nation is ſuch as I have deſcribed, and I am only apprehenſive, that you may think, I have taken too much pains to exclude all doubt on this queſtion; if no claſs is leſſened in its numbers, or in its ſtock, or in its conveniencies, or even its luxuries; if they build as many habitations, and as elegant and as commodious as ever, and furniſh them with every chargeable decoration, and every prodigality of ingenious invention, that can be thought of by thoſe who even encumber their neceſſities with ſuperfluous accommodation; if they are as numerouſly attended; if their equipages are as ſplendid; if they regale at table with as much or more variety of plenty than ever; if they are clad in as expenſive and changeful a diverſity according to their taſtes and modes; if they are not deterred from the pleaſures of the

field by the charges, which government has wisely turned from the culture to the sports of the field; if the theatres are as rich and as well filled and greater, and at a higher price than ever; (and, what is more important than all) if it is plain from the treasures which are spread over the soil, or confided to the winds and the seas, that there are as many who are indulgent to their propensities of parsimony, as others to their voluptuous desires, and that the pecuniary capital grows instead of diminishing; on what ground are we authorised to say, that a nation, gamboling in an ocean of superfluity, is undone by want? With what face can we pretend, that they who have not denied any one gratification to any one appetite, have a right to plead poverty in order to famish their virtues, and to put their duties on short allowance? That they are to take the law from an imperious enemy, and can contribute no longer to the honour of their king, to the support of the independence of their country, to the salvation of that Europe, which, if it falls, must crush them with its gigantic ruins? How can they affect to sweat, and stagger, and groan under their burthens, to whom the mines of Newfoundland, richer than those of Mexico and Peru, are now thrown in as a make-weight in the scale of their exorbitant opulence? What excuse can they have to faint, and creep, and cringe, and prostrate themselves at the footstool

footſtool of ambition and crime, who, during a ſhort though violent ſtruggle, which they have never ſupported with the energy of men, have amaſſed more to their annual accumulation, than all the well-huſbanded capital, that enabled their anceſtors, by long, and doubtful, and obſtinate conflicts, to defend, and liberate, and vindicate the civiliſed world? But I do not accuſe the people of England. As to the great majority of the nation, they have done whatever in their ſeveral ranks, and conditions, and deſcriptions, was required of them by their relative ſituations in ſociety; and from thoſe the great maſs of mankind cannot depart, without the ſubverſion of all publick order. They look up to that government, which they obey that they may be protected. They aſk to be led and directed by thoſe rulers, whom providence and the laws of their country have ſet over them, and under their guidance to walk in the ways of ſafety and honour. They have again delegated the greateſt truſt, which they have to beſtow, to thoſe faithful repreſentatives who made their true voice heard againſt the diſturbers and deſtroyers of Europe. They ſuffered, with unapproving acquieſcence, ſolicitations, which they had in no ſhape deſired, to an unjuſt and uſurping power, whom they had never provoked, and whoſe hoſtile menaces they did not dread. When the exigencies of the publick ſervice could only be met by their voluntary zeal

they ſtarted forth with an ardour, which outſtripped the wiſhes of thoſe, who had injured them by doubting, whether it might not be neceſſary to have recourſe to compulſion. They have, in all things, repoſed an enduring, but not an unreflecting confidence. That confidence demands a full return; and fixes a reſponſibility on the miniſters entire and undivided. The people ſtands acquitted if the war is not carried on in a manner ſuited to its objects. If the publick honour is tarniſhed; if the publick ſafety ſuffers any detriment; the miniſters, not the people, are to anſwer it, and they alone. Its armies, its navies, are given to them without ſtint or reſtriction. Its treaſures are poured out at their feet. Its conſtancy is ready to ſecond all their efforts. They are not to fear a reſponſibility for acts of manly adventure. The reſponſibility which they are to dread, is, leſt they ſhould ſhew themſelves unequal to the expectation of a brave people. The more doubtful may be the conſtitutional and œconomical queſtions, upon which they have received ſo marked a ſupport, the more loudly they are called upon to ſupport this great war, for the ſucceſs of which their country is willing to ſuperſede conſiderations of no ſlight importance. Where I ſpeak of reſponſibility, I do not mean to exclude that ſpecies of it, which the legal powers of the country have a right finally to exact from thoſe who abuſe a publick truſt; but high as this is,

there

there is a reſponſibility which attaches on them, from which the whole legitimate power of this kingdom cannot abſolve them; there is a reſponſibility to conſcience and to glory; a reſponſibility to the exiſting world, and to that poſterity, which men of their eminence cannot avoid for glory or for ſhame; a reſponſibility to a tribunal, at which, not only miniſters, but kings and parliaments, but even nations themſelves, muſt one day anſwer.

FINIS.

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